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SANCTIFICATION ACCORDING TO CHRIST.

(JOHN XVII. 17-19.)

THE Last Prayer of the Lord Jesus for His disciples, recorded in the 17th chapter of St. John's Gospel, turns mainly upon three petitions: "Holy Father, keep them in thy name" (vv. 11-15); "sanctify them in the truth" (vv. 17-19); and "that they may all be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee" (vv. 20-23). After this He has no more to wish for them on earth, only "that where I am, they too may be, that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me" (v. 24). He asks, in three words, for the *preservation* of His disciples, for their *sanctification*, and for their *perfected union* grounded in His eternal oneness with the Father. And He appears to contemplate these three blessings as destined for His Church, in some sense, successively, in the order and connexion thus specified. On the realization of the last of the three wishes of Jesus for His own the belief of the world in His mission is made contingent (v. 23).

Imminent upon the departure of Jesus was the danger of defection in the body of His disciples, the breakdown of faith in Himself and of hope for the messianic kingdom, which His death, under the circumstances, was calculated to bring about. The apostasy of Judas now decided (v. 12), and the cowardice of Peter which He had predicted (cf. Luke xxii. 31-34), brought this possibility home to the mind of Jesus. His sheep, as He foresaw, would be scattered by the blow smiting their Shepherd (Matt. xxvi. 31; John xvi. 32): it is for the Father now to see that the

little flock is rallied from its panic, that the faith which would be stumbled on this night "should not fail," that the dear treasure which He "has given" to the Son of His love, and which His Son has gathered and "guarded" for Him with so much pains, should not fall a prey to Satan in this dark hour, and be lost at the very moment when the Son is returning to the Father and reports His task on earth accomplished (vv. 4, 9-13). In this immediate peril our provident Lord anticipated the future perils of His Church, the terrors and the seductions sure to beset His disciples while remaining "in the world." He knew the long conflict and heavy strain through which human faith in Him must pass, between the present crisis and the joyful hour when He should come again to receive His brethren to Himself (see *e.g.* Matt. xvi. 18; Luke xviii. 8; John xv. 18-xvi. 3, etc.). Jesus appeals to the Father, "Keep them *in thy name*"—as if to say, "Since indeed Thou art their Father, and I have told them so at Thy bidding, show Thyself a Father to them. Let them not be as disowned or orphaned children, for I cast them upon Thee. Let their faltering faith grow strong as they name this Name, which I have put into their lips; let their hearts now filled with grief be filled again with hope and joy, as they take hold of its strength. Let Thy Fatherhood be their souls' anchor in the night of storm." Above all things the chosen Twelve—those who remained, with the traitor now gone—must stand firm; the honour of Jesus (v. 10) and the salvation of the world depended upon the fidelity, the courage of this handful of weak and frightened men. By so slender a thread hung the spiritual interests of mankind. This solicitude upon the part of Jesus is true to the occasion, and to the apprehensions ascribed to Him in the Synoptic record; it was a trait of the situation most unlikely to have been preserved and thrown into this strong relief in any legendary or inventive expansion of the Passion story

proceeding from a later age. For the pupils of the Johanne School, in the second century, the Apostles had become spiritual heroes, in whose case the failure deprecated in this prayer could hardly have been imagined. We catch here the beating of the shepherd-heart of Jesus as He "seeth the wolf coming" (xiv. 30; Luke xxii. 31): "Holy Father, keep them—keep them in thy name, keep them from the evil one."

But to be kept, this is by itself only a negative salvation. Had Christ sought and obtained for the objects of His prayer no more than this, had His personal disciples merely held fast and cherished in their own breast the faith committed to them, Christianity would have perished in a single generation; at best, it would have been transmitted to select and recluse initiates—no longer "apostles" but privileged "friends" of Jesus (xv. 15)—who though "in the world" would be careful to be only "not of the world," unknown to it and glad to remain unknown, while they guard amongst themselves their priceless heirloom, the glorious "name" of His Father and theirs, which the Son of God had once taught them. Had the prayer of Jesus ceased at verse 16 of the chapter, this is all that we could fairly have augured from it taken by itself. It might have seemed that Christ, rejected with contumely by the world and resuming His place of glory by the Father's side, now casts off the world in turn, that He renounces the impossible task of its salvation, and centres His affections and His hopes upon the little flock gathered already under His shepherding, content if His mission should terminate in them and seeking in the assurance of their devotion the one comfort that should cheer His dying moments.

It is when we arrive at the second movement in the great Act of Intercession that our Lord's policy of conquest discloses itself, and the ground becomes apparent of His hopes for the spread of His kingdom through the world:

"Sanctify them," He says, "in the truth; thy word is truth. . . . On their behalf I sanctify myself, in order that they too may be sanctified in truth." Their Lord "has sent them forth into the world," even as He had Himself been "sent forth": for this mission they must be "sanctified"; to this they were designated by their title of "apostles." By way of prelude and preliminary trial He had already sent them out (see especially Matt. x.). Let this sanctification be realized in Christ's present servants and take effect, it is possible then to foresee "those who will believe through their word" (v. 20), for whom He will ask that they also may be grafted into the Divine fellowship of which these His brethren are partakers. Let this process of sanctification continue, extending from the Head to the multiplying members, and the filial union of men with Christ in God will embrace a wider and yet wider circle, until the day appears when, as Jesus assures Himself before the Father, "the world," that now proclaims Him a blasphemer, "shall believe that thou didst send me" (v. 23), when "the authority given" to Him "over all flesh" shall be made good and Jesus shall be Lord of the full heritage which is His right amongst men (v. 3). It is evident therefore that our blessed Lord looked to the sanctification of Christian men, under the action of the Holy Spirit (xv. 26 f.), as the means of the world's conversion to faith in Him. Here He discovered the aggressive, assimilative principle of His religion, that which should give to Christianity its positive character; in this lies its working energy, its propulsive force.

From this historical point of view we must seek to gather the meaning of Sanctification as it was conceived by our Lord, as it was in fact experienced by Himself and desired for His Apostles. This particular passage, assuming it to be authentic, is decisive in the matter. For here is the only instance, so far as the recorded sayings of Jesus go, in which

He speaks specifically of the sanctification of His people ; and it belongs to the critical epoch of His mission. The language of Christ, when compared for instance with that of the Apostle Paul, shows a noticeable reserve upon this subject. He is addressed as " holy " by the demons (Mark i. 24, etc.), and so confessed by His disciples (John vi. 69) ; but, up to this last moment, we cannot find that Christ Himself applied the epithet, either *ἅγιος* or its derivatives, to men—only to " the (Holy) Spirit " and, in this prayer, to the Father (v. 11)—although its human application was not unusual in Jewish speech (see for instance Mark vi. 20 ; Matt. xxvii. 52). This avoidance can hardly have been accidental. It would seem as though our Lord, with the deep sacredness which He must needs attach to the notion of Holiness, could not until He came to the close of His work, until His sacrifice was on the point of being accomplished and His disciples were entering under the shadow of the cross, nor until the bestowment of the Holy Spirit on them was speedily to be made and had been brought clearly into their view (chaps. xiv.–xvi.)—not until these conditions were fulfilled, does it seem to have been possible or fitting for Him to speak in the hearing of His disciples of their *sanctification*. Because in Him, and for them, holiness imported something—far more and other than it did in the religion of the day. The term was to take a new complexion and to be developed to a strange issue. Only on the basis of the " finished work " of the Son of God (v. 4) could His brethren even begin to understand what holiness must mean for them, who were the legatees of that completed work and themselves its proper fruit. Only as they saw their Lord devote His person in the consummating sacrifice, would they be prepared to realize what their Christian consecration involved, what the spirit, aim and measure might be of the sanctification demanded by their calling.

We do find, however, the verb "sanctify" (*ἀγιάζω*), of this prayer, thrice elsewhere given in the Gospels from the lips of Christ. Once in the saying parallel to this, in John x. 36, where our Lord, who is alluding to His birth (cf. Luke i. 35: τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον κληθήσεται υἱὸς θεοῦ) in controversy with the Jews, describes Himself as "him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world." The same connexion exists there as here between the ideas of *mission* (or *apostleship*) and *sanctification*; in both instances *the world* is the object aimed at in the sanctification of God's servants. One thought runs in the mind of Jesus throughout; He is leaving the world now with the very end in view for which He first entered it, viz. for its salvation. But there is a difference: His mission is now not His alone; there are those identified with Him whom the Father has given Him out of the world; the consecration of Himself which the Son of God is about to make, will carry with it their consecration; and they will remain to represent Him in the world, as He departs. He entered the world upon a solitary errand; but He is drawing after Him a train of many brethren. One principle animates the entire course of Jesus; in the Atonement the purpose of the Incarnation fructifies; the seed "falling into the ground" to "die," does not "abide alone," it "bears much fruit"; and its first fruitage in the sanctified Apostles will become in turn the seed of a world-wide harvest.

The second instance to be noted of Christ's use of the word *ἀγιάζω*, outside of John xvii., is in Matthew xxiii. 16-22, where He speaks incidentally of "the temple which sanctified the gold" stored for its use, and "the altar which sanctifies the gift" brought unto it. The temple is holy, since God "dwells in it"; temple and altar "sanctify" what is given to them, since they appropriate all gifts for God's appointed service. Most impressive and most instructive is the third of the parallels in question, found in

the first petition of the Lord's Prayer : " Our Father, . . . hallowed (*i.e.* sanctified, ἁγιασθήτω) be thy name." The two Lord's Prayers—that dictated by the Lord to us, and that offered by the Lord for us—are linked in a wonderful way by the " name," which gives the keynote of them each ; and by the longing for " sanctification," which takes expression in the primary supplication of the one prayer and the central supplication of the other. The former of these great requests interprets for us the latter : God's children are to be " hallowed " in the same sense and to the same effect as His name ; that name is committed to them, is lodged in them (*vv.* 6, 8, etc. ; cf. Rev. iii. 12, xxii. 4) ; only through them can the Father's name come to be hallowed, or even to be known, on earth. In the sanctification which Christ contemplates, the " name " of the Father and the men who bear it are identified, to all intents and purposes. Just as that name is set apart amongst all human words and separated from profane and sinful use, that it may be the means of setting forth God's glory, of making known God's character and perfecting His worship amongst mankind, so it is to be with those who receive God's father-name ; they will partake of and communicate its holiness ; they will be hallowed in its hallowing and for its hallowing. They are set apart from other men for this purpose, as it from other names ; they are separated henceforth from all profane and sinful use, that *they* may be the means of setting forth the Father's glory, of making known God's character and relationship to men, of carrying on and perfecting His worship in the earth. Hence they will know themselves afterwards as Christ's " holy apostles " (Eph. iii. 5) ; and they will impress on all who accept His message through them the same character of " saints " which He now stamps upon them. The vocation of saintship, in the specific form which Christ gives to it, is in truth His legacy to the Church,—the calling which devolves by His death

upon His representatives and witnesses before the world; and here lies, we may presume, the reason why the Apostles spoke so freely of the sanctification of Christians, and why Christ Himself did not thus speak until quite the last hour, not indeed till the Father's "word" had been fully conveyed and His revelation virtually complete, not till those crowning facts came into view which constitute the chief part of "the truth" wherein men are sanctified.

When the Lord Jesus therefore prayed to the Father for His disciples, "Sanctify them in the truth," it was a very practical object upon which His mind was bent. Sanctification, in the thought of Jesus, was both for Himself and for them nothing else than *consecration to a world-mission*. And this mission was now perfectly definite; it was that of revealing God to mankind in Him, and bringing back mankind to God through Him. Sanctification is often defined as "separation," but that is the preliminary step; it is the Old Testament conception of the state. Detachment from the world is the essential, but in itself merely negative, pre-condition of effective holiness, like the retreat of Jesus into the wilderness before His ministry or His retirement to "the mountain" in preparation for His most active days. Nor is sanctification a thing of frames and feelings, a subjective spiritual state indicated by warm emotions and high raptures and peculiar happiness in the experience of religion. Such enjoyments are very real and most delightful; they constitute a precious grace of the Holy Spirit (see John xv. 11; Gal. v. 22). But we should deceive ourselves and turn the grace of God into selfishness, if we supposed that "joy in the Holy Spirit" is sanctification, or that there is any fixed and necessary proportion between the two conditions. Jesus was sanctified when He "rejoiced in the Spirit" before His Father; He was sanctified—and that to the furthest degree—when He cried out, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me!" Raptures are not sanctity;

ecstasy is not full devotion, nor any vital sign of it—no more than the song of some winged creature is its soaring flight, no more than the zest of the strong man and his joy in labour are that labour and work itself. Sanctification means the man setting out to do the work for God that God has called him to in life; it means the Church addressing itself to the task that its Lord lays upon it; it means the life and spirit of the Head taking effect in the action of His members upon the world. One cannot conceive of sanctification in any Christian sense so long as one leaves the unsanctified outside of its scope. Christ puts “the world” into the centre of His prayers for the holiness of His disciples, and the meaning and connexion of *vv.* 17 and 19 in this chapter will be altogether missed if we treat *v.* 18 as though it were an interpolation, or an abrupt and disturbing parenthesis. For these disciples, to be “sanctified” and to be “sent into the world” constitute the same vocation: the former supplies the impulse and bestows the equipment for the latter. The gold is “sanctified” as devoted to the uses and costs of the temple; the gift is “sanctified” when laid upon the altar to be consumed: so the man is sanctified when he is given up to God for the uses of a man,—to think, to feel, to act, to speak, to love and strive and spend himself his life through, for the glory of God in the uplifting to God of all his fellowmen.

Such is the import of the sanctification of Christian men as Christ represents it: let us look at the ground upon which He sets it, and the method of its accomplishment as thereby determined. “For their sakes,” He continues, “I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in truth.” The sanctification of Jesus is made by Him the basis of ours; the former seeks in the latter its fruition and complement. His sanctification is taking place at this very time, for “the hour is come” (*v.* 1); and in this pro-

cess the Son of God realizes, on His own part, the object with which the Father first "sent Him into the world" (x. 36).

Now, what was happening to our Lord Jesus, that He should thus speak of "sanctifying" Himself at the hour of His departure from the world? Was He becoming, to His own consciousness or in the eyes of His disciples, any *purser* than before? We reject the thought instantly, as a slur upon His unstained and unchallenged innocence. "Which of you," He could say in the face of His enemies, "convicteth me of sin?" and lifting up His eyes to the Father, "I do always the things that please him." None of those who heard His prayer and have noted and recorded the words in question, could have surmised that Jesus was sensible of any moral unfitness for the work before Him, or that He described Himself in these words as attaining through His passion a personal purity which He had not possessed before. Or could He mean that He was now for the first time experiencing the love of God in its fulness, that He was learning as a man, according to His own law, to "love the Lord his God with all his heart and mind"? This, we are sure, was His intention as little as the former. "I have kept my Father's commandments," He professed, "and abide in his love." For our sin-spotted nature and alienated hearts, sanctification necessitates moral cleansing and re-admission into the love of God; naturally we look at holiness in the light of these attendant and correlated blessings, and may easily confuse it with them, since it so evidently connotes them. But for Christ Himself it is clear that to be sanctified denoted something quite distinct from all such qualities and experiences, something that lay beyond His individual relations to God, though arising out of them under the given conditions. And the sanctification which He asks for His disciples lies along the same line with His own, and is of the like order. He will have them

drink of the cup from which He is drinking and be baptized with the baptism coming upon Himself.

What was it then which still remained for the perfecting of our Lord? What can He mean by "sanctifying himself"—He who is already the Holy One of God, undefiled and separated from sinners? We follow Him from the chamber of the Last Supper to the garden of Gethsemane, and we begin to understand the self-consecrating of Jesus. We hear Him say to the Father, after a thrice-repeated agony, "If this cup may not pass from me except I drink it, thy will be done." He steps from the shadow of the trees into the moonlight, that brief struggle ended, to confront Judas and his soldier-band with the clear words, "Whom seek ye?" surrendering Himself without fear or reserve to the hands of evildoers, since "power is given them from above" and this was the road the Saviour's feet must travel. So through the hours of that hideous night and cruel day—when before Caiaphas and Pontius Pilate He "witnessed the good confession," when He bore the stripes, the spitting, the mock royalty, the horror, indignity, and torment of the cross, in utter meekness, without an accent or look of anger, "dumb as a sheep before her shearers," while a word, a lifting of the finger, would have brought to His aid "more than twelve legions of angels,"—emptying Himself to the very bottom of the soul in the sheer cutting off and letting go of happiness, honour, life, of wisdom, will, and conscious hold upon God—foregoing all at the Father's good pleasure, who chose to work out through wicked hands of men man's redemption, in the sacrifice of best for worst. And marching to the cross, the Lord Jesus says, "If any man serve me, let him follow me!"

In the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ is contained the secret of our sanctification no less than of our justification. His death is the spring of the entire life of those who

are in Him; the first half of the doctrine of the cross is a single and halting limb without the second. It is precisely this that the Apostle Paul labours to show in the sixth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, where he defends his teaching respecting the gratuitous pardon of sinners from the charge of immoral consequences. Our justification is our release from past sin, racial or personal; it is our restoration to the status of righteous men before God, brought about by the sacrificial death of Jesus Christ. Our sanctification is our conformity to that sacrifice, our learning to live in the spirit and for the ends of Jesus Christ Himself, who "died for all that the living should no longer live to themselves, but to him who died for them and rose again" (2 Cor. v. 15). In the first aspect His death is vicarious, unique, concluding the sinful past—the death of One for all; in the second it is representative, universal, inaugurating a holy future—the death of all in One, who rises again that He may live to God evermore in them. The two are therefore integral parts of the same operation, no more to be severed in experience than were the burial and resurrection of the Redeemer (Rom. vi. 4 ff.). The second is in its initiation the concomitant, and in its perfection the sequel, of the first; the first is our dying from sin, the second is our living to God. The doctrine of justification is taught by our Lord in the sacrament of the Last Supper, where He speaks, in words that are assuredly no later theological comment, of "my blood of the covenant, which is being shed for many for remission of sins"; and the doctrine of sanctification is taught as plainly and strongly in the sacramental prayer that followed. Both are virtually contained in the reproof addressed to Simon Peter at the feet-washing before the Supper—in the protasis and apodosis of the sentence respectively: "If I wash thee not,—thou hast no part with me." To "have part" with Jesus is, above everything, to share in that which was *His part*, in the business upon which

the Father sent Him into the world ; it is, to use again St. Paul's vivid terms, to "know the fellowship of his sufferings, being conformed to his death," to be "crucified with Christ," and thus "to fill up on one's own part (*ἀντ-ανα-πληρῶ*, Col. i. 24) the things that are left (*τὰ ὑστερήματα*) of the afflictions of Christ" (cf. 1 Pet. iii. 21-iv. 2). When the dying Saviour asks that His disciples may be sanctified along with Him and in virtue of the sanctification which now awaits Him, He is asking for them the lot which He had promised to their leader under the sign of the pre-eucharistic washing, and which belongs to all the companions of His table. This, to be sure, was the primary element, though not the whole, of that "glory given" to the Son of God by the Father in His earthly course, which, as He says immediately afterwards (v. 22), He "has given" in turn to His brethren, through the attainment of which they will "be one" with each other as being one with Him. Christ's sacrifice therefore, offered to God for the world's redemption, was His own sanctification, as He conceived and accepted it ; and it becomes in effect the sanctification of His true people, who, "since Christ suffered in flesh, arm themselves with *the same thought*" (1 Pet. iv. 1), identifying themselves with the purpose of their Saviour's death, and finding in it their equipment for toil and suffering in His service.

But to regard Christ's death on its sanctifying side as an ideal, a pattern only, is an insufficient view. He is in every office more than our pattern—to limit Him to that is to make Him only the best and first of men—He is our representative, and stands toward men as head to members and vine-stock to branches. His sanctification sanctified His disciples in a deeper and more efficient sense than that of exemplary precedence. In what He said and did, Jesus Christ carried with Him all men believing in Him. Let us illustrate for once the original by "the likeness of his

death." When the individual Christian man "sanctifies himself," when in seeking the true life of fellowship with the Redeemer he comes to see and accept in its simplicity the will of God in Christ Jesus concerning him, he then commits to God, for all Christ's uses, himself in one decisive act, and with himself whatever is his, or may be his in the future, in this world or any other—not his bare personality of body and soul alone, but his family, his business and his purse, his influence, his moral and material belongings, everything in which he has in any degree invested and laid out himself; all that goes to the make-up of the man, goes into that total and conclusive surrender. So with *Him*! Jesus Christ gave to God the Father, for the definite purpose of His sacrifice, with His person all that was or might be His in possession or in prospect. "All mine," He confesses to the Father, "are thine!" *All*—but how much was that? Little enough, as it seemed, had this dying, deserted man to give either to God or man. Nothing was left to Jesus on the cross but His stripped and tortured body and His dying spirit which He gives back to the Father; once so rich, for our sakes He became poor. But how much was really His! He *had* those eleven men, for whom in the first instance He is praying. Though they failed Him for the moment, He knows that they are His for ever—every limb of their bodies, every feeling and fibre of their hearts—His to live for Him, to die for Him as He is dying now for them. And these were the earnest, to His prophetic knowledge, of a multitude which no man could number, of the hosts and nations of men who, He says, "will believe on me through their word." He saw the peoples bending at His feet; He saw the love and hope of the ages streaming out to Him. And He gave it all to God. Jesus could not for an instant think of anything as His, without rendering it instantly to the Father: all His dearly-purchased rights in humanity He lodged with God, at

that solemn hour when He sanctified Himself. Can Jesus possibly have meant less than this, when He says, "*On their behalf I sanctify myself*"?

These things being so, the matter of sanctification is settled irrevocably and from the first for every Christian man; and all believers, as St. Paul insists in the first line of his Epistles, are "called saints"—saints by the simple fact and inevitable consequence of their calling of God in Jesus Christ. The gospel summoned them to saintship; and if they are not "saints" in the Christian meaning of the term, devoted and holy persons, they are not under the gospel call. We were committed beforehand, and that without qualification or reserve, to the life of holiness. We are not our own, we "were bought"—and no sooner bought than given away! Christ redeemed us to God by His death, and in the same act presented us to God with His life. The Head had every right to choose for His limbs, and He has chosen. We cannot repudiate nor ignore the act of our Mediator; nor may we pretend to endorse by our faith the one half of the covenant made in His blood, that secures forgiveness for the past, while we withhold endorsement from the second half of the same instrument, which claims the consecration of our future being. This would be to mock Christ indeed. "*In the which will,*" writes the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, speaking of that all-comprising, all-commanding will of God under which the Son of God consecrated Himself a willing victim for the sins of men—"in the which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."

GEORGE G. FINDLAY.

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

II.

THE EVANGELIC DEPOSIT AND THE APOSTOLIC WITNESS.

THERE occur on the pages of the New Testament two words which are pregnant with significance as regards the momentous question of the historicity of the evangelic records. One is *παραθήκη* and the other *μαρτυρία*: and, if we would see them in their historical setting and appreciate their bearing upon the present problem, we must recall the methods of the Jewish Rabbis at whose feet the New Testament writers had sat and by whose principles their minds were dominated.

It is not unnatural that the hypothesis of the oral transmission of the evangelic tradition should excite in modern minds a sense of wonderment not far removed from incredulity. Is it possible that it should have been preserved in the memories of the disciples for at least a generation ere being committed to writing? And if such were indeed the manner of transmission, what can be the value of the record? One of the marvels of modern literature is Boswell's report, so minute and accurate withal, of his hero's conversation; and the only explanation is that, as he states in his introductory chapter, he "had the honour and happiness of enjoying his friendship for upwards of twenty years; had the scheme of writing his life constantly in view; acquired a faculty in recollecting, and was very assiduous in recording, his conversation, of which the extraordinary vigour and vivacity constituted one of the first features of his character." How quickly and irrecoverably even that vigorous and vivacious conversation must have faded from the listener's memory had he not hastened to write it down while it was still ringing in his ears! It was by a like device that Damis of Nineveh, the Boswell

of Apollonius of Tyana, succeeded in preserving his master's conversation and rescuing even his *obiter dicta* (εἰ τι καὶ παρεφθέγγατο) from oblivion.¹

Now is it conceivable that the discourses of our Lord should have remained fresh and accurate in the memories of His disciples for a generation and suffered no corruption in their transit from mouth to mouth? Inconceivable as it may appear to us, it was no impossible achievement for men trained in the Rabbinical schools. The marvel of the oral transmission of the evangelic tradition sinks into utter insignificance beside the fact that it was not until the close of the second century of our era that the Rabbinical literature was reduced to writing. It was at least a century before the birth of our Lord that the *Halacha* and *Haggada* came into existence, and during those three centuries that voluminous and ever-increasing literature was carried in the memories of the Rabbis and their disciples and orally transmitted from generation to generation.

"Commit nothing to writing" was the constant maxim of the Rabbis,² prompted originally no doubt by their reverence for the Written Law (תּוֹרָה שֶׁבִּכְתָּב), though latterly they invested the Oral Law (תּוֹרָה שֶׁבֶּעַל פֶּה) with transcendent dignity and claimed for it an equal antiquity and divinity with the Pentateuch, alleging that it had been given to Moses at Sinai, had come to Ezra through the Prophets, and had been transmitted orally ever since.³ The maxim however was still adhered to even when a superior sanctity was no longer attached to the Written Law; and the diligence of the Rabbis was directed to the immaculate transmission of the Oral Law, ἡ παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων (Matt. xv. 2). "Train many disciples" was their motto; and their disciples—תַּלְמִידֵי הַחֲכָמִים as they were called—were drilled in the multitudinous precepts of

¹ Philostr. *Apoll.* i. 19.

² Jost, *Gesch. des Jud.* i. 367.

³ Robertson Smith, *O. T. in Jew. Ch.* p. 60.

that interminable tradition until they had them by heart. The lesson was repeated over and over again till it was engraved upon their memories; and hence the phrase for Rabbinical instruction was מְשַׁנֵּה (*repetition*), rendered *δευτέρωσις* by the Greek Fathers.¹ Nor was it only while they sat at the Rabbi's feet that the disciples conned their lesson. It must never be out of their minds. "When two sit together," said R. Chananiah ben Teradion,² "and do not converse about the Law, they are an assembly of scorners, of which it is said, *Sit not in the seat of scorners*. But when two sit together and converse about the Law, the Shekhinah is in their midst." "Whoso," said R. Simon,³ "walks by the way and repeats the Law to himself, but interrupts his repetition and says, *How beautiful is this tree! How beautiful is this field!* the Scripture reckons him as one that has forfeited his life."

It is truly wonderful what a genius for remembrance was fostered by this method. A good disciple was likened to "a well lined with lime which loses not one drop";⁴ nor was this an ideal proficiency never attained. Such was the precocity of the historian Josephus that at the age of fourteen he was consulted by the High Priest and the rulers about *minutiæ* of the Law.⁵ "Should one question any of us about the laws," he says,⁶ "he would repeat them all more easily than his own name. Indeed from the very dawn of understanding⁷ we learn them off and have them as it were engraved on our souls."

The study of the law was thus a purely mechanical exercise, and the least disposition to originality would have been fatal to proficiency. The qualifications for success were a retentive memory and a scrupulous adherence to the

¹ Jerome, *Ep. ad Algas.*; cf. Geiger, *Judaism and Islam*, pp. 42-3.

² *Aboth*, iii. 2.

³ *Aboth*, iii. 7.

⁴ *Aboth*, ii. 8.

⁵ *Vita*, 2.

⁶ *Contra Apionem*, ii. 18.

⁷ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης εὐθὺς αἰσθήσεως. Cf. Timothy instructed ἀπὸ βρέφους in ἱερὰ γράμματα (2 Tim. iv. 15).

letter of the tradition. A curse was pronounced against the disciple who should let anything slip,¹ and the tradition was to be handed on exactly as it had been received, *ipsisima verba*, בְּלִשׁוֹן רַבּוֹ.² It was the boast of R. Eliezer that he had never taught anything which he had not learned from his teacher. "It came to pass," says the Evangelist at the close of the Sermon on the Mount, "when Jesus ended these words, the multitude were astonished at His teaching: for He was teaching them as one that had authority, and not as their scribes." No wonder they were impressed by His reiterated ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν, accustomed as they were to the faltering preface "*R. So-and-so saith.*"

Such was the school in which the disciples of Jesus had been trained. With the doubtful exception of St. Luke the New Testament writers were all Jews, and it was at once natural and inevitable that they should handle the παράδοσις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ precisely as they had handled the παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων. Hence those two words which are now to engage our attention, and which have the force of technical terms in the New Testament. The teaching of Jesus was the παράδοσις of the Apostles; but they did not so entitle it, remembering doubtless His denunciation of that vain παράδοσις for the sake of which the Pharisees and Scribes transgressed the commandment of God (Matt. xv. 3, 6). They gave it a new name, a very beautiful and significant one. Τὴν καλὴν παραθήκην they called it (2 Tim. i. 14)—"The Fair Deposit." The meaning of the term is well illustrated by that striking story in Herodotus³ of the Spartan Glaukos, son of Epikudes, to whose keeping a certain Milesian committed half his wealth (θέσθαι παρὰ σέ), and who refused to deliver up the deposit (παραθήκην) when it was reclaimed. Hence the metaphor of the Apostle when he says (2 Cor. v. 19), "God hath

¹ *Aboth*, iii. 8.² *Edujoth*, i. 3.³ vi. 86.

committed unto us (*θεμένος ἐν ἡμῖν*) the Word of Reconciliation." The Gospel was the Fair Deposit, and it was the sacred duty of those to whose keeping it had been committed to guard (*φυλάσσειν*) it with the selfsame faithfulness wherewith the Rabbis guarded the *παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων*. It was a twofold vigilance they must exercise. They must see to it on the one hand that nothing was lost, and on the other that it suffered no change; and thus with an awful sense of responsibility must they hand on that precious deposit unimpaired and uncorrupted. *Τὴν καλὴν παραθήκην φύλαξον διὰ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος ἐν ἡμῖν.*

The Gospel was a sacred deposit, and the business of its guardians was not to embellish or even interpret it, but simply to preserve it. In a word, their calling was *μαρτυρία*. How elaborately this function of the Apostles is defined in the New Testament, and how clear was their perception of it! "When the Comforter is come, Whom I will send to you from the Father," said Jesus in the Upper Room (John xv. 26-27), "even the Spirit of Truth which proceedeth from the Father, He shall witness (*μαρτυρήσει*) concerning Me; and do ye also witness (*μαρτυρεῖτε*) because from the beginning ye are with Me." And on the Mount of Ascension He repeated the charge: "Ye shall be witnesses of Me (*ἔσεσθέ μου μάρτυρες*) in Jerusalem and Judæa and Samaria and unto the end of the earth" (Acts i. 8). Nor did they forget. "This Jesus," said St. Peter on the Day of Pentecost, "did God raise up, whereof all we are witnesses" (Acts ii. 32; cf. i. 22, iii. 15, v. 32, x. 39). It was the selfsame commission that was given to Saul of Tarsus (xxii. 15; xxvi. 16); and he remembered it (xiii. 31-32). So impressed was St. Paul by this view of his vocation that he calls the Gospel message *τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (1 Cor. i. 6; cf. 2 Tim. i. 8; 2 Thess. i. 10). In view of all that the Fourth Gospel, that sublime creation of sanctified

mysticism, has suffered at the hands of the critics, one may be pardoned for catching a tone of pathos in the asseveration so simple and unfaltering with which it closes: "This is the disciple that witnesseth (ὁ μαρτυρῶν) concerning these things and that wrote these things; and we know that his witness (μαρτυρία) is true" (xxi. 24). Surely a consensus so remarkable yet so plainly undesigned has an apologetic value. How comes it to pass that all the sacred writers are possessed with this conception of the apostolic vocation unless it emanated from Jesus?

In this connection 1 Tim. vi. 20-21 is fraught with significance. "Oh Timothy, guard the Deposit, turning away from profane babblings and oppositions of the Knowledge falsely named, which certain professing missed the mark as regards the Faith." The point of this pleading injunction obviously is that heretical teachers had been busy at Ephesus, certain persons (τινες) well known, whom the Apostle might have named and whom Timothy would immediately identify. The epistle is full of them (i. 6-7; iv. 1-3, 7; vi. 3-5). They were heretics of the blatant sort, loud-mouthed and shallow-minded, puffed up with windy vanity (τετούφωται, vi. 4). Ἐπαγγελλόμενοι means "professing," but it carries a suggestion of *boastfulness*, as Euthymius Zigabenus perceived when he explained it by αὐχοῦντες. It would seem that this unhealthy teaching was of two kinds. Some tickled the fancies of their hearers with silly and unhistorical legends about Jesus, which the Apostle justly brands here as βεβήλους κενοφωνίας, and in iv. 7 as βεβήλους καὶ γραῶδεις μύθους—the style of fables which are found in the apocryphal gospels and which could serve only to bring Christianity into contempt. Others again were of a philosophical turn, and they unsettled the minds of the believers by their metaphysical disputations (cf. Col. ii. 8)—ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως. Baur, bent on bringing the epistle down to the latter half of the

second century, sees here a reference to Marcion's book *The Antitheses* written about the middle of the second century to expose alleged contradictions not only between the Old Testament and the New but between those portions of the latter which he accepted and those which he rejected. This is a baseless assumption. Ἀντίθεσις was no coinage of Marcion, but a good Greek word at least as old as Plato, part of the traditional stock-in-trade of philosophers, rhetoricians, and grammarians; and if Marcion could use it in 150, why should not St. Paul in 67? It means here simply *oppositions*, and is most appropriate to the Apostle's argument. *Apte dixit ἀντιθέσεις, oppositiones* is the just and cutting comment of Erasmus: *quod omnibus de rebus inter istos mira sit digladiatio*.

St. Paul does not essay the refutation of those wrangling heretics: why should he when they were busy refuting one another? Nor does he urge Timothy to join issue with them: on the contrary he bids him stand aloof (ἐκτρέπεσθαι) from the bootless and interminable λογομαχία (vi. 4). His business is to keep jealous watch over the evangelic tradition and see that amid all this babble and disputation it suffers no corruption and no mutilation. "Oh Timothy," pleads the Apostle, "guard the Deposit." *Non enim*, says Erasmus, *vult aliquid addi traditis*.¹

So far as documentary evidence goes, the authenticity of this passage is indubitable; yet Moffatt brackets it as spurious and disposes of it by the loud-sounding *dictum*: "In these verses it is impossible to miss the tone of semi-legalism, ecclesiastical formality, and anxiety, which begins to be heard in the sub-apostolic literature. To suppose that such utterances were due to Paul before 67 A.D., is not merely to violently contradict the apostle's self-revela-

¹ Cf. Herm. Past., Mand, iii. § 2: οἱ οὖν ψευδόμενοι ἀθετοῦσι τὸν κύριον καὶ γίνονται ἀποστερηταὶ τοῦ κυρίου, μὴ παραδίδοντες αὐτῷ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἣν ἔλαβον.

tion in his other epistles, but also to throw the whole development of early Christian ideas and institutions into gratuitous and inextricable confusion.”¹ Now, if it be a true interpretation that our investigation has led us to, this awe-inspiring verdict is no better than a grave misjudgment and exemplifies at once the peril of *a priori* prepossession and the supreme value of sound exegesis, that prime essential to just and reasonable criticism. How luminously significant and how suitable to the lips of St. Paul does the passage appear when placed in its true historical setting! It reveals to us a necessity which had emerged at that stage of the history of the primitive Church, and which must have cost the Apostles much anxious thought—the necessity of effectively safeguarding the evangelic tradition by committing it to writing and stereotyping it in a permanent record. *Littera scripta manet*. It would be as the result of this anxious solicitude for the purity and integrity of the Fair Deposit that our canonical Gospels were put into shape and an authoritative version of the evangelic history given to the Church.

Now, if such be indeed the manner in which the primitive tradition was preserved and transmitted, it furnishes a singularly reassuring guarantee of the absolute credibility of the evangelic narratives. Indeed it may be safely asserted that there is no other history possessed of such credentials or entitled to equal reliance; and it is surely a circumstance to be marvelled at that, when the Gospel came into the world, it fell into the hands, not of thinkers who would have turned it into a philosophy, or of historians who would have sifted and arranged it according to the canons of their time, but of men trained in that Jewish school to idolatrous veneration of tradition and scrupulous solicitude for its immaculate transmission. One may well think kindly of Rabbinical pedantry, considering the heavy

¹ *Hist. N. T.* p. 561.

debt under which, in the wondrous providence of God, it has laid the world.

It is no mere surmise that the *dicta* and *facta* of Jesus (τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἡ λεχθέντα ἡ πραχθέντα) were thus preserved and transmitted. On the contrary, it is an indisputable fact attested by clear and abundant evidence. Ere the appearance of the written Gospel there was a class of teachers in the primitive Church whose function it was to go about instructing the believers in the oral tradition and drilling it into their minds after the fashion which prevailed in the Rabbinical schools.¹ They were named οἱ κατηχοῦντες and their scholars οἱ κατηχούμενοι (Gal. vi. 6) — a most expressive name, since *κατηχεῖν* signifies to *din* a thing into a person's ears by incessant reiteration. Their *תּוֹרָה* or *δευτέρωσις* was called *διδασκαλία*, and it was hard and disagreeable work with nothing of the inspiration of preaching about it. Οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλία is St. Paul's description of it. However laborious and mechanical it may have been, it was nevertheless a necessary service at that period, when there was no written record and believers were dependent on oral instruction for their knowledge of the historic facts of the Gospel; and St. Paul more than once took occasion to remind the Church of the debt it owed to the Catechizers (Gal. vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 17-18).

The presence of this order of the Catechizers demonstrates the existence in the primitive Church of an oral tradition; nor is there lacking evidence of the value which was set upon it and the fidelity wherewith it was transmitted. We have seen what alarm was excited in the heart of St. Paul lest that Fair Deposit should be corrupted by "profane and old wifish fables" or mutilated by metaphysical speculations. In view of the leading part which he is supposed by the critics to have played in

¹ Wright, *Composition of the Four Gospels*, chaps. i.-iii.

obscuring the historic Jesus by a haze of devotion, it is interesting to note the emphasis wherewith the Apostle asseverates his scrupulous adherence to the Evangelic tradition: "I received (*παρέλαβον*) from the Lord that which I also handed on (*παρέδωκα*) to you" (1 Cor. xi. 23); "I handed on (*παρέδωκα*) to you first of all that which I also received (*παρέλαβον*), that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He was buried, and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that He was seen" (xv. 3-8). And, besides such declarations, there are other indications in the New Testament, all the more conclusive that they are undesigned, of profound reverence for the evangelic tradition and earnest solicitude for its purity and integrity. One is *the almost total silence of the Evangelists regarding the earlier life of Jesus*. In order to appreciate the significance of this fact it is necessary to mark the contrast presented by the apocryphal gospels. Next to nothing is related by our Evangelists of the early life of Jesus. St. Matthew and St. Luke tell the story of His wondrous Birth; St. Luke records the visit of the Holy Child to Jerusalem in the company of Joseph and Mary; and St. Mark drops a casual hint (vi. 3) that He followed the trade of carpenter at Nazareth. Such are the sole glimpses of Jesus in the canonical Gospels betwixt His Birth and the commencement of His public Ministry. It is most natural that believers should desire some knowledge of those thirty silent years, and the apocryphal gospels essay to satisfy this curiosity. Some of their stories may possibly be authentic, but they are mostly silly fables. St. Luke tells how "the Child grew and waxed strong, being filled with wisdom, and God's grace was upon Him" (ii. 40); and St. John pointedly asserts that the miracle at Cana was "the beginning of His signs" (ii. 11); but the apocryphal gospels cram the most amazing prodigies into their story

of His childhood. They tell, for instance, how He and His playmates made clay sparrows by the riverside, and how, when He clapped His hands, His sparrows took wing and flew chirping away; and again, how He had a dispute with His teacher, R. ben Israel, about the letter Aleph, and, when the latter raised his rod to chastise Him, his arm was paralysed. It would be such legends as these that St. Paul had in view when he warned Timothy against "profane babblings."

How comes it that our Evangelists are so resolutely silent regarding the earlier years of the Lord's earthly life? The obvious explanation is that the oral tradition took to do exclusively with His public Ministry; and, while they had doubtless heard of much besides that was interesting and perhaps authentic, they realized that their business was simply to reproduce that tradition without increment or corruption. They were not independent authors setting to work with a free hand and full liberty to search out fresh material and incorporate it in their narratives, but editors rather whose duty it was to eschew originality and faithfully reproduce what they had received. And their silence regarding the alluring theme of the Lord's early life is an evidence of their scrupulous fidelity. They have guarded the Fair Deposit and handed it on unsullied. "What we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we beheld and our hands did feel, concerning the Word of Life—and the Life was manifested, and we have seen and witness and proclaim to you the Life, the Eternal Life, which was with the Father and was manifested to us—what we have seen and heard, we proclaim to you also, that ye also may have communion with us" (1 John 1-3).

A further indication of the fidelity wherewith the Synop-
tists have reproduced the evangelic tradition is the tone,
more easily felt than defined, which pervades their nar-
ratives—a *tone of aloofness as of men contemplating a*

transcendent mystery which they could only marvel at and durst not construe. It is this attitude that differentiates the Synoptics especially from the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Epistles. "To me it seems certain," says the late Mr. R. H. Hutton, in his masterly discussion of *The Incarnation and Principles of Evidence*,¹ "that St. Paul and St. John alone among the apostles whose writings are recorded, had gained anything like a conscious grasp of this truth. The authors of the first three gospels, though they mention facts which point to it, as the rays from behind a cloud point to the hidden position of the sun, had apparently never grasped the magnitude of the truth that they were helping to reveal." They rarely interpret and never theologize. They simply set forth the wondrous story, and it is left for others to interpret it and unfold its theological and metaphysical implications.

Eusebius² quotes from the *Outlines* of Clement of Alexandria a tradition that St. John, perceiving that "the bodily things" had been set forth by the other three Evangelists, at the instigation of his acquaintances, and by inspiration of the Spirit, composed "a spiritual Gospel." There is not a little justice in this distinction of the Synoptics as *somatic* and the Fourth Gospel as *pneumatic*, yet it would be unwise to depreciate the former on this account. It is unquestionable that St. John had attained to a profounder insight than the others into the mystery of the Incarnation and wondrously disclosed the hidden majesty of our Blessed Redeemer; nevertheless, just because it is an interpretation of Jesus, his Gospel is in a sense less valuable than the others. It shows us our Lord as *St. John understood Him*; yet even the Beloved Apostle could know but in part and prophesy

¹ *Theol. Essays*, viii. p. 278.

² *H.E.* iv. 14: τὸν μέντοι Ἰωάννην ἔσχατον συνιδόντα ὅτι τὰ σωματικὰ ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις δεδήλωται, προτραπέντα ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων πνεύματι θεοφορηθέντα πνευματικὸν ποιῆσαι εὐαγγέλιον,

but in part ; and, glorious as his conception of it may have been, the fact was more glorious still. St. John perceived one aspect of "the manifold wisdom of God" revealed in all its fulness in Jesus, and St. Paul perceived another aspect—each different, both true, neither complete. It is the unique distinction and the priceless blessing of the Synoptic Gospels that they do not essay an interpretation, but set forth the Lord for all time as He "tabernacled among men, full of grace and truth."

Speaking of the evangelic tradition, "the fairest memorial which the primitive Christian community has raised for itself," Weizsäcker says: ¹ "Its history shows it unproductive in doctrine. It has left no developed theology like that of Paul. It spread the Gospel only within a very limited territory. Compared with Paul's great conceptions and bold undertakings, it appears to represent stagnation and to prepare for him hindrances. Its merit comes to light only when one realizes the fidelity and persistency with which it clings to its Master and His doctrine." This last sentence goes to the very root of the matter. The Fair Deposit had been committed to the Evangelists, and they realized their awful responsibility and the obligation under which they lay to guard (*φυλάσσειν*) it and transmit (*παράδιδοναι*) it unimpaired. Their task was not *ἐπίδοσις* but *παράδοσις*. Their vocation was *μαρτυρία*. Most solemnly did they realize their responsibility and most faithfully did they discharge it.

DAVID SMITH.

¹ *Das Apostol. Zeit.* S. 382.

THE CHRISTIAN PROPHETS AT PHILIPPI.

WE have thus¹ explained two difficulties of the three which have hitherto puzzled the commentators in the narrative of Acts xvi. The first is the meaning of *the spirit of Jesus*. The second—which indeed has baffled them—is *first of the portion Macedonia*, as applied to Philippi, and the third remains. What is the meaning of the words, “where we supposed,” or were thinking, “that a place of prayer was” (Acts xvi. 13)? This is Westcott and Hort’s reading, and has the best testimony. The Sinaitic MS. does indeed give us a remarkable variant, “where he supposed,” presumably meaning Paul. The Western recension gives us “where it seemed (likely).” Blass has conjectured by a change of one letter “where they were wont to be engaged in prayer.” But this is pure conjecture and testifies to the difficulty of the reading “where we supposed” rather than to its unsoundness: the MSS. should not be given up if we find a reasonable sense in what they say.

And I think we can find the sense in accordance with the observations already given and in accordance with the prophetic ideas which especially at this time ruled the minds of Paul and Silas. We have seen that they were finding “much fulfilment” in their visit to Macedonia and that they did not and could not hesitate to take a text of the Old Testament, especially the Book of Jesus, upon its own merits and apart from its context. Possessed of the conviction that Philippi was their Jericho, first city of the Portion of Benjamin, although the complete fulfilment had not yet been vouchsafed to them, there was one place which they naturally sought to identify, and this was Gilgal on the banks of the Jordan. They proceeded in their journey as the writer of the Acts is careful to tell us, *συμβιβάζοντες*, putting one and one together and so “concluding” that

¹ See above, pp. 116 ff.

the spirit of Jesus was still with them. It may be thought that Gilgal and Jericho too should have been at Neapolis, for the Jordan was the corner of the Aegean Sea which they had already crossed. However it had not proved to be so, and they might well *be thinking* that as their Jordan was wider by ten times than even the Rabbinic Jordan, twelve miles in width, so their Gilgal might be on the same scale some eight miles further on near Philippi, which was their Jericho.

Now they had before their eyes the words in the LXX of Joshua (Josh. v. 9 f.): "And the Lord said to Jesus son of Naue, To-day I take away the reproach of Egypt from you. And he called the name of that place *Galgala*. And the sons of Israel made the passover on the 14th day of the month at evening, *on the west of Jericho beyond Jordan in the plain.*" When then they found on arriving at Philippi that the *Gangas*, otherwise called Gangites,¹ was the river of Philippi *to the west of it*, it is natural to understand how they *were thinking* that hard by its stream, approached by the Arch commemorating the Battle of Philippi, they would find the place of prayer. The great Via Egnatia, that artery of the Roman Empire which joined Rome with Byzantium, is lined near the Arch with rows of tombs. In that outskirt of the Roman colony the members of the small Jewish community were compelled to find their place of prayer.²

Let us now pass beyond the neighbourhood of Philippi looking forth toward the western side of *the portion Macedonia*. It is not necessary to make the reasonable supposition that the two Prophets, guided by the spirit of Jesus, on arriving at Neapolis or before, had gotten them a map or itinerary of the country in which they were wayfaring

¹ See Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 52, ed. 1879, though he sees no prophetic clue.

² See the admirable work of T. Lewin, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, for the topography of Philippi.

strangers. If a map were not allowed by the earliest prophetic Rule to those who might not take purse or scrip or shoes, then they must depend on the oral pronunciation of the names of places in the country they were to visit, and when these were pronounced by foreign lips, there was much room for doubt as to the spelling, and there would be a proportionate freedom in identifying the Macedonian name in its uncouth pronunciation with the odd Greek names of small and obscure Hebrew localities recorded in the book of Jesus as belonging to the portion of Benjamin. Probably the earliest prophetic Rule had been relaxed by this time in view of longer journeys for the Prophets. In any case the modern reader who will take a map in the one hand and a Bible in the other will be surprised to see what astonishing resemblances there are between Macedonian names and Benjamite. Let him however bear in mind that the identities discovered by Paul and Silas were the fruit of intense enthusiasm, of ecstasy, of a prophetic zeal which anticipated and so promoted the fulfilment of its own types. And let him remember that the anticipation was not always found to be exact, although on the whole its approach to exactness was remarkable.

The following coincidences then would first strike the eye or the ear—

LXX.¹

MACEDONIAN NAMES.

Azeka and Makeda = Akte and Makedonia.

Auein = Eïon, port of Amphipolis, on the Strymon, one mile from the Egnatian road.

Phara = Phagres, three miles further along the coast.

Rogel = Trogilus, on the Egnatian road.

Sara = Serrhae or Siris, in the Strymon valley.

¹ Josh x. 10; xviii. 23.

Whether we can venture to carry identification any further except as to Beerotha (Beroea) is very problematical. Yet considering the two cities, the great Amphipolis on Lake Cercinitis, and the small Apollonia, receive mention in the Acts, though only a bare mention, as halting places on the Egnatian road, we may perhaps say that the following equations would be the result of more hesitating conjecture by the Prophets—

Karapha and Ammona and Aphnei = Kerkine and Amphipolis and Apollonia.

It is a strange fact that this is the reading of some MSS. of the Hexapla instead of the "Karapha and Kepheira and Monei" of the restored LXX text of Swete, and the "Kapharammon and Aphni" of Stier and Theile. The Benjamite cities in Joshua are grouped first (1) as twelve cities and their villages, in the East of Benjamin, and next (2) as thirteen cities and their villages in the Western section. It would then seem natural to the Prophets to find the corresponding division in (1) Macedonia Prima or Eastern, which consisted of the basin of the Strymon and outlying districts with Amphipolis and Philippi as capitals, and in (2) Macedonia Secunda and Tertia which extended as far West as the Peneus with Thessalonica and Pella as capitals. They would be confirmed in this latter identification by finding that whereas the above-named places were in the First, in the Second and more distant group the Benjamite Beerotha suggested Beroea, and also the Benjamite Seleka suggested again in another form Thes-Salonika. If they had variant texts of LXX before them, it is possible that they might have found in one text a place called Theralala where another gave for the same place Nakan,¹ and if so there was nothing to prevent them from supposing that the two forms gave either half of the true name Theralanakan or Thessalonica.

¹ Field, *Origen's Hexapla*, in loc.

There was at least, from the prophetic point of view, this very striking piece of guidance to be found in Jesus: "And thus I will bring out for you a lot (*κλήρον*) before the Lord in Selo" (Josh. xviii. 8). . . . "And Jesus cast in for them . . . a lot in Selo before the Lord" (Josh. xviii. 10). Selo, be it remembered, is the LXX form of *Shiloh* (Josh. xviii. 1). It was therefore plain that "a lot" was to be expected on the arrival of the Prophets at Selo. The nature of this "lot" appeared to be shown in a previous verse of Jesus: "And there was gathered together a whole *synagogue of the sons of Israel* unto Selo." Now there is not much ingenuity required for the identification of Selo as a prophetic name with the great seaport of Macedonia, Thessalonica. It would seem to Paul and Silas that they were led thither, and that if so the *synagogue* there was *the lot*, or part of the lot. Luke then, we observe, has duly marked the fulfilment of the prophecy by recording quietly the words: "They came to *Thessalonica*, where *was a synagogue* of the Jews" (Acts xvii. 1). The expression is perplexing on any other hypothesis but that the author of Acts means to point back to Joshua xviii. 1. For at a large place like Thessalonica there must have been more than one synagogue. Lewin and Alford say that we must read "*the synagogue*." Westcott and Hort are opposed to this. I take the true bearing of the words to be this: "There was at least one synagogue, and therefore Joshua xviii. 1 was fulfilled." The fact that the later name was Salonike suffices to show that the first syllable Thes- was not very strongly pronounced perhaps as early as St. Paul's time. The difference of sound would therefore not forbid the *fulfilment* of Selo in Thessalonica.

The narrative of the sojourn of Paul and Silas in Thessalonica itself exhibits a trace, though not so clearly as that of their sojourn at Philippi, of the fulfilment of a type of the Old Testament. Let me say that any one who has visited

the Passion Play of Ober-ammergau will be readily disposed to observe these New Testament fulfilments however far-fetched they may appear to us. The parallel in question happens to concern the personality of Lot, who was distinctly a favourite type with Luke.¹ Paul and Silas—for just here Timothy, though present, is not mentioned—arrived in the strange city of Thessalonica as the two angels arrived in Sodom. They appear to have been sheltered by Jason as the angels were received into the house of Lot. The *fulfilments* followed thus:

The Jews “took unto themselves certain *vile* (πονηρούς) fellows of the rabble and gathering a crowd set the city of Thessalonica on an uproar, and assaulting the house of Jason they sought to bring Paul and Silas forth to the people.” So of old had the men of the city encircled the house of Lot, all the people together; and they said to Lot, “Where are the men that came in to thee? Bring them out.”

At Thessalonica they “found not” the Apostles: at Sodom “the men at the house door were smitten with blindness.”

At Thessalonica they “dragged Jason . . . before the rulers.” At Sodom Lot came out and said, “Nay, brethren, be not ye *vile*” (πονηρεύσθησθε). Here the parallel, which is just perceptible, appears to end.

We pass on to consider *much fulfilment* at Troas.

“And these having gone there (or gone before) tarried for us at Troas” (Acts xx. 5). This part of the We-document contains further notes of days and places on the journey from Europe to Asia and along the Asiatic coast, and one of the first incidents is the restoration of Eutychus to conscious life. We need not open the question whether the words “he was taken up a corpse” imply actual death or not. Now the type of this sign in the Old Testament is

¹ *The Christian Prophets*, p. 163.

quite unmistakable; it is found in the raising of the widow's son at Zarephath.

The type occurred in a city facing the Western Sea (1 Kings xvii. 17 ff.): so did the fulfilment at Troas. The very name of Zarephath (Tsârfâh in Hebrew) bore a strong resemblance in sound to Troas. It is quite likely that it was locally pronounced Tsrâfâh; hence the Greek form Sarepta.

Again, the scene at Zarephath introduces us to a *loft* or upper storey (Acts xx. 8): so does the fulfilment to *the third loft*.

The sufferer was *a boy* at Zarephath: at Troas he was a *young man*.

In the type Elijah's words are, "Let *this child's life* come into him again": in the fulfilment St. Paul says, "*His life is in him*."

In the type Elijah *stretched himself upon* the child (breathed into him LXX) three times: St. Paul "*fell on* Eutychus *and embraced* him."

Lastly, we may not fail to observe that the type is preceded in the story by the eating of "a *morsel of bread*," or rather "a little cake first" instead of "the morsel of bread" (*ψωμὸν ἄρτου*) which was asked for: this corresponds in the fulfilment to the description of St. Paul "having *broken the bread* and tasted" of this high token of communion.

Nor is the effect of the *spirit of Jesus* to be discerned only in the occurrences at Troas and in Macedonia. It began earlier still, if we may infer from two instances of fulfilment of the Book of Jesus by events in this memorable "second" journey of Paul and Silas.

"Jesus *circumcised* the sons of Israel . . . and the Lord said to Jesus son of Naue, To-day I take away the reproach of Egypt from among you" (Josh. v. 3, 9). St. Paul had *circumcised* Timothy, whom "he wished to *take the field*

with him"—to give the expression (ἐξελθεῖν) its military touch once more in accordance with the military tone of the book of Jesus—"because of the Jews which were in those parts, for they all knew that his father was a Greek (heathen)." The critics who are so positive that St. Paul never could do so inconsistent a thing as to circumcise Timothy, after all that he had said or was going to say about "circumcision availeth nothing," and who accordingly infer that the Acts is a falsification and romance, may perhaps think it worth their while to ponder this consideration. St. Paul as a Prophet was guided by the spirit of Jesus, and he would be compelled by that record of the circumcision of the people to obey the guidance of Jesus in this doubtful case of Timothy also; for his of course was the case of the son of a mixed marriage, and it was one of chronic disputation, especially where the father was the heathen parent. If St. Paul did not comply with the spirit of Jesus in "removing the reproach of Israel from among" his own company, how could he ever face a Jew again and profess that he was guided by the spirit of Moses' own chosen successor? It was therefore no desire of time-serving or "pleasing men" on St. Paul's part that induced him to circumcise Timothy while he afterwards declined to circumcise Titus; but it was a far higher dictate—the humble desire to obey the spirit of Jesus and to ensure the same guidance for the future.¹

The other act of obedience to the same spirit was even more in the course of ministration marked out for St. Paul in the "second" journey, though perhaps the correspondence is not so clear as in the case of the circumcision of Timothy. We read in Jesus: "Be ye very strong to keep and to do all the things that are written in the book of the law of Moses" (Josh. xxiii. 6). This solemn injunction of

¹ This question of inconsistency, which to many minds does not arise at all, is too large to be treated here.

the law by Jesus to the Israelites is made in accordance with the charge of the Lord to him at the first: "Be strong then to keep and to do according as Moses my servant commanded thee . . . and the book of this law shall not depart from thy mouth . . . *then shalt thou prosper . . .*" (Josh. i. 7 f.). It seems to be something more than fancy, considering what has been said above, to infer that when Paul and Silas "delivered them (the brethren in the cities of Asia Minor) *the decrees for to keep*, which had been ordained of the Apostles and Elders that were at Jerusalem," they did so in fulfilment of the passage in Jesus. At least it may be said that the conclusion of the Conciliar letter embodying the decrees is: "from which things if ye keep yourselves, *ye shall do well.*" This is essentially an antique ending, though not in actual form that of the Book of Jesus, as quoted above. Two out of the four Conciliar precepts of Jerusalem, those against idolatry and impurity, are enjoined clearly by Jesus in his final exhortation to the Israelites (Josh. xxiii. 7 ff.).

One more observation. It can hardly be doubted that when the Acts says that the Prophets delivered to *them* the decrees, it means to the synagogue congregations, around whom the Churches were gathered and out of which they invariably grew. The supposition of there being in the time of this "second" journey many Gentile Christians who were not and had never been connected with Judaism is purely a fiction of theological imagination, though it is a fiction which will die hard. One of the last verses of Jesus is very instructive to Jewish Christians of the time, and it is this: "And Israel worshipped the Lord all the days of Jesus and all the days of the elders, as many as had lived out the time with Jesus and as many as had seen all the works of the Lord which He had done to Israel." The effect of this passage on the early Church would be to increase the veneration in which the Christian Elders were

held, but also and especially to cause all the new Israel of God to persevere in the ancient worship of Temple and Synagogue throughout the lifetime of *the elders who had seen the Lord*. The effect of this veneration is discernible as late even as the time of Irenaeus,¹ long after the time at which the original basis of it in the Book of Jesus had been forgotten.

It will finally occur to the reader to ask whether the occurrences in Macedonia did then occur as they are related. The answer is certainly that they did occur so: there is nothing whatever to shake our acceptance of the history. Had the *consecutive* account in Acts corresponded with the *consecutive* account in Joshua, we should be inclined to say that this was a purely manufactured story, for history does not repeat itself in a considerable number of consecutive details. But such is not the case with these accounts. The fulfilment is not a fulfilment of one passage in Joshua, but of several *disjointed* pieces of several passages, which are patched together exactly as the Christian prophets were wont to patch them. I believe this account in Acts is true and accurate history.

E. C. SELWYN.

¹ See *The Christian Prophets*, p. 336 f., quoting Irenaeus' *Epistle to Florinus*: 'These decrees are not those which *the elders* who were before us delivered to thee. . . . The intercourse of *the rest* who had seen the Lord.'

*BISHOPS AND PRESBYTERS IN THE EPISTLE
OF ST. CLEMENT OF ROME.*

It seems to be generally believed that the terms *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος* are applied in the letter of St. Clement of Rome indiscriminately to the same persons, and the assumption that this is the case underlies a good many of the arguments against any distinction between the two corresponding offices having been recognized in the apostolic age. The subject of the origins of the Christian ministry is one of such great interest and importance, and at the same time of such obscurity, that a fresh examination of one little corner of the field of evidence is perhaps excusable, well trodden as the ground is. I desire to confine myself in this paper strictly to one question, viz. the nature of the evidence afforded by the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians as to the usage of the terms *ἐπίσκοπος* and *πρεσβύτερος* at Corinth during the last decade of the first century. Leaving on one side all other evidence, I ask whether the language of this Epistle would suggest that the *denotation* (as the logicians say) of the terms was coextensive in the year 95 A.D. Does Clement contemplate a state of things at Corinth in which all presbyters were bishops and all bishops were presbyters? Or does his letter suggest that the *ἐπίσκοποι* were a class of officials distinct from the general body of *πρεσβύτεροι*, in the mind of his correspondents? I put the question in this way, because it seems to me (whether rightly or wrongly) that critics have been too apt to interpret Clement's language in the light of their preconceived conclusions as to the history of the development of the episcopate. They have in many cases approached the Epistle with the conviction that during the first century the office of *ἐπίσκοπος* was not conceived as distinct from the office of *πρεσβύτερος*; and

they have thus been led to pass over the indications which seem—to me at least—to suggest a different conclusion. At any rate, I propose to examine Clement's letter afresh, leaving aside for the moment all the other available evidence. That would afford material for a much larger essay than this slight sketch.

What was Clement's object in writing to the Church of Corinth? The letter was, we know, called forth by a schism which had appeared among the Christians in that city. But what was the nature of the schism? That is the problem to which we must address ourselves in the first instance.

i. The schism was originated and fostered by a few men only: it was a detestable and unholy sedition *ἣν ὀλίγα πρόσωπα προπετή καὶ αὐθάδη ὑπάρχοντα . . . ἐξέκασαν* (§ 1). It was got up "for the sake of one or two persons," *δι' ἓν ἢ δύο πρόσωπα* (§ 47).

ii. The cause of the sedition or schism was *jealousy*. This comes out again and again. In § 3 *ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος* are deprecated; examples of jealousy are given as a warning, such as Cain, Esau, Joseph's brethren, the opponents of Moses, Aaron and Miriam, and of David (§ 4), the persecutors of the Apostles (§ 5), and of holy women (§ 6). The Corinthian Christians are bidden to root out this jealousy (§§ 9, 63), and to be jealous instead for the things that pertain to salvation (§ 45). And the point of the appeal (to which we shall again return) in § 43 is that as Dathan and Abiram (cf. also § 4) were jealous of the prerogatives of the sons of Levi (Numb. xvii.), so also were the leaders of the sedition at Corinth actuated by jealousy of others.

iii. The sedition was directed against the *πρεσβύτεροι*: *στασιάζειν πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους* is the phrase used (§ 47). See also § 3. In some sort, the course adopted had been derogatory to the presbyters, for Clement observes (§ 44): "Happy are those presbyters who have gone before, seeing

that their departure was fruitful and ripe, for they have no fear lest any one should remove them from their appointed office" (τύπος). The revolt was an invasion of presbyteral authority, and the ringleaders are bidden to submit themselves to the *presbyters* in repentance: ὑμεῖς οὖν, οἱ τὴν καταβολὴν τῆς στάσεως ποιήσαντες, ὑποτάγητε τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις (§ 57). They are entreated to give way, that the flock of Christ may be at peace with its duly appointed presbyters, μετὰ τῶν καθεσταμένων πρεσβυτέρων (§ 54).

iv. It is apparent, then, that one or two men desired through jealousy and envy to grasp a station of dignity which was not theirs by lawful appointment, and that this action of theirs was really a revolt against the authority of the presbyters. They are told by Clement: "It is better for you to be found little in the flock of Christ and to be of good repute (ἐλλογίμους) than to be had in exceeding honour and yet be cast out from the hope of Him" (§ 57).

v. The climax of the revolt is thus described by Clement: ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐνίους ὑμεῖς μετηγάγετε καλῶς πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῆς ἀμέμπτως αὐτοῖς τετηρημένης¹ λειτουργίας (§ 44), viz.: "For we see that ye displaced some men, though they were living honourably, from the service which had been blamelessly discharged by them." Now the question before us is this: Who were the men thus displaced? Were they members of the presbyteral body, thrust out to make room for the jealous intruders who had no claim except that they were faction leaders? And was this the invasion of presbyteral authority of which the schismatics were guilty? To answer this question we must scrutinize with care the words actually used. The men who were "displaced" had discharged an office which is described as one of λειτουργία. Is this only a general term, or is it descriptive of any special kind of service? In particular, does it stand for a service in which presbyters took part?

¹ This is Lightfoot's emendation of the MS. τετιμημένης.

vi. The answer is not doubtful. *λειτουργία* is never once applied in the Epistle to the actions discharged by men called *πρεσβυτέροι*. It is habitually applied to the service of those who held the office of *ἐπισκοπή*, or of those who were (in Clement's thought) their precursors and types under the Old Covenant. This will appear the more clearly if the argument of §§ 37-47 be analysed.

vii. Subordination of offices, Clement urges, is God's appointment. We are members of One Body (§ 37). Each man has his proper function and gift, not that of another man (§ 38). We ought to do all things in order. In particular, God commanded "that offerings and services to be performed carefully," *τὰς προσφορὰς καὶ λειτουργίας ἐπιμελῶς ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* (§ 40). They should be performed at the proper times and by the proper persons. So under the Old Covenant, *τῷ ἀρχιερεὶ ἴδιαι λειτουργίαι δεδομέναι εἰσίν, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἴδιος ὁ τόπος προστέτακται, καὶ λευῖταις ἴδιαι διακονίαι ἐπίκεινται· ὁ λαϊκὸς ἄνθρωπος τοῖς λαϊκοῖς προστάγμασιν δέδεται*, i.e. "To the high priest his proper services have been assigned, and to the priests their proper place has been appointed and upon the Levites their proper ministrations are laid. The layman is bound by the layman's ordinances" (§ 40). In other words *λειτουργία* was the special service of the high priest; the offering was made *διὰ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως καὶ τῶν προειρημένων λειτουργῶν* (§ 41). Death was the penalty for breaking this law (cf. Num. xviii. 7). So it is too under the New Covenant. God sent Christ; Christ sent the Apostles; the Apostles "appointed their firstfruits to be bishops and deacons unto them that should believe," as the prophet had foretold: *καθίστανον τὰς ἀπαρχὰς αὐτῶν, δοκιμάσαντες τῇ πνεύματι, εἰς ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν* (§ 42; cf. Isa. lx. 17). Is it thought strange that such provision should be made for the future worship of the Church? Let us remember that Moses made a similar ordinance when jealousy provoked Dathan

and Abiram to stir up sedition against him (cf. § 4), and to claim priestly prerogatives to which they had no right. But Moses, that such disorder might never arise again, provided that the high-priestly office should always remain with Aaron's family, and he obtained the people's assent thereto (§ 43; cf. Num. xvi., xvii.). Now the Apostles knew that there would be strife over the *ἐπισκοπή* just as Moses knew that there would be strife over the *ἱερωσύνη*: and so the Apostles appointed "the aforesaid persons [i.e. *ἐπίσκοποι καὶ διακόνοι*] and afterwards they gave a further injunction [reading *ἐπινομήν*] that if they should fall asleep, other approved men (*δεδοκιμασμένοι*) should succeed to their service (*λειτουργία*). Those, therefore, who were appointed by them or afterwards by other men of good repute (*ἐλλογίμων*) with the consent of the whole Church [this corresponding to the assent of the whole people of Israel in the case of Aaron's priesthood], and who have served (*λειτουργήσαντας*) the flock of Christ blamelessly, . . . these men we consider to have been unjustly thrust out from the service (*λειτουργία*). For it will be no light sin if we thrust out from the episcopate those who have offered the gifts blamelessly and holily (*ἐὰν τοὺς ἀμέμπτως καὶ ὁσίως προσενεγκόντας τὰ δῶρα τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς ἀποβάλωμεν*), Happy are those presbyters who have gone before seeing that their departure is fruitful and ripe; for they have no fear lest any should remove them from their appointed office (*τόπος*). For we see that ye (*ὕμεις*, with emphasis) have displaced some men living honourably from the service (*λειτουργία*) blamelessly discharged by them" (§ 44).

viii. This long analysis of Clement's reasoning may serve to bring out the parallel he urges between Moses' action in perpetuating the priesthood in Aaron's family, and the Apostles' action in providing for due succession of *ἐπίσκοποι*. Further, the sedition raging at Corinth was strictly parallel

to the sedition of Dathan and Abiram. Both were inspired by jealousy (§ 4); both are conceived as directed—not against Aaron in the one case and the ἐπίσκοποι in the other (although the result of Dathan's schism, if successful, would have been to depose Aaron, as in the Corinthian schism some ἐπίσκοποι were deposed), but—in the one case against Moses (§ 4), with whom were associated the Israelitish presbyters (Num. xvi. 25), and in the other case against the Corinthian presbyters. Yet again the service of Aaron was a λειτουργία; so was the service of the ἐπίσκοποι. That term is not used by Clement of the work of the presbyters either under the Old or the New Covenant.

ix. When the office of a presbyter is spoken of in the Epistle, the word used is the general term τόπος.¹ This is significant only because of the careful avoidance of the term λειτουργία, which is applied all through to the service of worship performed by the ἐπίσκοπος or his precursors (in Clement's view) under the Old Covenant.² Λειτουργία is the word employed in Numbers xvi., xvii. of the service of the sanctuary performed by the priests and Levites. So we have it in § 32, § 40 (twice), § 43; and then in § 44 it is applied to the corresponding work of the ἐπίσκοποι (four times). It could not be applied by Clement to the office of the presbyters any more than it could be applied to the office of Moses or the Israelitish presbyters against whom Dathan's rebellion was directed. We miss the whole point of Clement's argument if we do not see that just as Moses

¹ In the letter of the Churches of Vienne (Eus. *H. E.* v. 4), it is said of Irenaeus, "a presbyter": εἰ γὰρ ᾔδειμεν τόπον τινὶ δικαιοσύνην περιποιεῖσθαι, ὡς πρεσβύτερον ἐκκλησίας, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐν πρώτοις ἂν παρεθέμεθα. But the term is a quite general one, and is applied to the ἐπισκοπή in the Apostolic Constitutions. Cf. Acts i. 25, τὸν τόπον τῆς διακονίας.

² It is indeed used sometimes (§§ 8, 9, 20, 34, 41) in a more general sense; but there can be no doubt that Clement uses it of the ἐπισκόποι in §§ 37–47 in a special sense corresponding to the special sense in which it is employed of priests and Levites throughout the Old Testament.

corresponds in his thought to the Apostles, and Aaron to the first ἐπίσκοποι, so the πρεσβύτεροι of the Christian Church correspond, so far as rule is concerned, to the successors of Moses and the ἐπίσκοποι to the successors of Aaron. It is the office of the ἐπίσκοποι "to offer the gifts," i.e. the gifts of Eucharistic worship (προσφέρειν τὰ δῶρα, § 44); it is the office of the πρεσβύτεροι to choose the ἐπίσκοποι (§ 44), and generally, to exercise functions of rule (cf. §§ 21, 54, 57).¹

x. We may now return to the question stated above in v. The state of things at Corinth seems to have been as follows. The presbyters there, as in the early Christian communities generally, occupied a position of authority, similar in many respects to that of the Jewish presbyters under the Old Covenant. These presbyters in the second Christian generation and those which followed it were entrusted with the duty proper to the Apostles in the earliest period, of appointing certain persons to the (quite distinct) office of ἐπίσκοπος, a principal part of the episcopal office being the superintendence of worship. The ἐπίσκοποι were as distinct from the πρεσβύτεροι as the priests were from the elders under the Jewish dispensation. At Corinth one or two unruly faction mongers had succeeded (not without the co-operation of the Church at large; see ὑμεῖς § 44) in displacing some ἐπίσκοποι from their λειτουργία. The motive of their action was jealousy of the peculiar prerogative as to the conduct of worship attaching to the episcopal office, just as the motive of Dathan and Abiram was jealousy of Aaron's family. But exactly as Dathan's sedition was in fact a rebellion against the authority of Moses and the elders (Num. xvi. 13), so this revolt at Corinth was a revolt

¹ It will be observed that the ἐπίσκοποι are twice described as "approved" men (δεδοκιμασμένοι), approved, that is, by those to whom their selection is entrusted (§§ 42, 44); these latter are ἐλλόγιμοι, men of repute, whose names are on God's roll (§§ 44, 58). ἐλλόγιμος is used again in § 57 as descriptive of the character which the faction leaders should content themselves with.

against the authority of the presbyters. Only those who could appoint to the episcopate had the right to depose from it; and for other members of the Church to assume to themselves the power of deposition was an invasion of the presbyteral office (τόπος, § 44). The presbyters who had died were "happy," for no one could now treat *them* with such indignity (§ 44).

xi. I maintain, then, that the whole tenor of Clement's argument no less than his careful choice of words compels us to recognize a fundamental distinction between the *πρεσβύτεροι* and the *ἐπίσκοποι* at Corinth in the year 95 A.D. That there were several *ἐπίσκοποι* is plain; the monarchical episcopate had not yet established itself there any more than it had a few years earlier at Philippi (Phil. i. 1). But that the *ἐπίσκοποι* as ministers of worship are quite distinct from the *πρεσβύτεροι* or ministers of rule, the argument of Clement's Epistle seems almost necessarily to require. Otherwise his long-drawn parallel between the rebellion of Dathan and the rebellion at Corinth is without point. I believe that the rest of the evidence points in the same direction; but for the present it must suffice to have discussed the Epistle of St. Clement of Rome.

J. H. BERNARD.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

VI.

CHRISTIANITY'S PLACE IN MORAL EVOLUTION.

THE question has often been asked, What is the precise line of separation between the animal and the man? It is not a question of origin. We make a mistake, in my opinion, by attaching so much importance to beginnings. In my view things should be studied in their latest, not in their earliest, manifestations. We have been long searching for the missing link between the animal and the human. I do not think if we found it we should find what we expected to find. We are seeking a line of demarcation. Lines of demarcation are not marked at the beginning. It is no scientific disadvantage that we have been born late; it is the contrary. He who would study the first day of creation must begin with the seventh. It is by the light of the afternoon that we must read the records of the morning. Accordingly, the question is not whether Nature reveals *at the beginning* a contrast between the animal and the man; it is whether in the *completed process* we can tell precisely where the contrast lies. The place for inquiry is not the foot, but the top, of the hill. We have to consider the animal at its highest and the man at his highest, and to say where at this present moment lies the essential difference. At first it might seem an easy task; try it, and you will find it very hard. Science has found the problem no playground. It is very easy to say that the man has left the animal far behind. So he has; but, if the animal has travelled one inch the same way, that is only a difference of degree, not an essential difference. If, on the other hand, we select some special point as a vantage ground of comparison, we are often surprised to discover that the

thing we thought distinctive of the man is not distinctive, but is common to him with the beast of the field. The briefest consideration will illustrate this experience.

Shall we say that Man is endowed with the power of reason and that the animal is guided by instinct. But there are cases in which the process is reversed. There are acts of the animal world which are done by pure intelligence, and there are acts of the human world which are done by pure instinct. Intelligence is a factor of the animal; instinct is a factor of the man. The only difference there is is one of proportion; the man has *more* of the former, the animal more of the latter; the contrast is only in degree. Or, shall we say that the man has the power of language and the animal has not. That would not be correct. The latter may have no language but a cry; but if a cry is used for purposes of communication, it is itself a language—as veritable a form of language as any word. That the animal does employ its cry for purposes of communication is beyond question; and the fact constitutes its right to be enrolled among the possessors of a gift of tongues. Or, yet once more, shall we say that the man is endowed with sympathy and the animal is not. Here again we should commit a mistake. We have seen that Altruism had its birth in the lower creation. We have seen that the gregarious life, however much it may have originated in conscious need, has by heredity become instinctive, existing for no reason but itself. What is this but to say that sympathy is not limited to Man—that the tendency to emerge from the life of an individual into the life of a community is a tendency which Man has inherited from the fowl of the air and the beast of the field.

In none of these respects, then, is Man original. To explain his present place of absolute superiority, what we want to find is something which he holds *alone*. Is there such a possession? if so, where? Is it the sight of the

beautiful?—but the *bird* can admire gay plumage. Is it the sense of music?—but there are *creatures* which can be charmed by song. Is it the love of home?—but the home is an expanding of the *nest*. Is it the power of architecture?—but the bee leaves us far behind. Is it intuitive perception?—but we are eclipsed in this by *all* the creatures. Is it the feeling of nothingness in the presence of a higher power?—but I think the animal must have that feeling for *Man*. None of these things is a distinctive element. *Is* there such an element? Is there an attribute which marks the man, which forms a definite boundary between him and all beside? Is there something which distinguishes the human soul, not only in degree, but in kind, from the lower fields of creation, and which indicates that the identity of their origin has not prevented a separation of their destinies?

Yes, there is one such attribute, *one* point in which Man as the result of his latest development stands alone. I say “as the result of his latest development.” For we must remember that Man has to outstrip not only the animal in the world, but the animal in his own soul. He is born with the animal nature in him; he has to conquer it step by step; and only in the afternoon of the day has his victory been perfected. What, then, has his victory been? Where lies the vantage ground he has won? What is that point of supremacy which now, henceforth and for ever must constitute his essential separation alike from the beast of the field and from the animal nature which once dominated his own will? I shall express the answer in a single sentence. The developed man is distinguished from the animal nature everywhere in the fact that he alone of all creatures has a power of sympathy sufficient to leap the wall of his own species. Other creatures are sympathetic *within* their species—within the barriers which evolution has assigned them; Man has the power to break these

limits, to overleap the boundary of his native province, and to enter into the wants of those who are supposed to possess a nature other than his own.

You ask if this difference between the animal and the man is a scientific difference. I answer, it is supported by one who is not only a leading apostle of modern science, but who is at the same time the one who has striven most to minimize the distinction between the animal and the man. If there ever was a writer who has laboured to explain away the contrast between the animal and the man, that writer is Romanes. He has an extravagant sense of the powers inherent in the lower creatures. In his book on *Mental Evolution in Animals* he tells a story of a parrot which, if admitted, would, as St. George Mivart says, separate the bird by only an accidental line from Sir Isaac Newton. I think, then, that where Romanes confesses a limit you may conclude with confidence that you have found a veritable mark of the beast. Now, Romanes does find such a limit to the powers of the animal nature. In that remarkable posthumous work, *Thoughts on Religion*, in which, without deserting the standpoint of the scientist, he reveals the leanings of the Christian, he says of the lower creation, "There is no instance of an entire species using its instinct exclusively for the benefit of another species."

Notice two qualifying words in this statement—the word "entire" and the word "exclusively"; they are inserted to remove possible objections. You see a dog plunge into the water to rescue a drowning child; is not *this* one species coming to the help of another? Romanes would answer, no. He would say: "This is not an act characteristic of the entire species. It results only from forced and special training of an individual member of the species—a training which would be equally successful if the object to be rescued were a stick or an umbrella."

Again, you see the bee go to the flower in search of honey and shake down the pollen which fertilizes the stem beneath; is not *this* one species coming to the help of another? Romanes could answer, "Yes, but the bee is not coming with that object; its action is not exclusive of self; its help has been given in the pursuit of another end." I have sometimes put the question to myself, What if the time were to come when the bee should cease to gather honey from the flower and yet continue to come to the flower and repeat the fertilizing process? I should call this a genuine development of Altruism on the part of the insect—exactly such a development of Altruism as is seen in the man—the change from help unconscious to help deliberate. In point of fact we do not see this transition in the bee or in any animal species; we do see it in the man. That is the reason why we poise the animal over against the man. Man alone has an unlimited sympathy. Man alone can break over the wall of his own species. I do not mean that he breaks over the wall when he meets Mr. Darwin; there ceases then to be any wall. The charity of Man comes out in this, that while he still believes himself to be a separate species, he passes over from his own enclosure to carry help to that which he considers alien to himself. Whatever his position may be at the beginning of the evolutionary process he reaches at the end of the line a unique place in the history of creation—a place which makes him different not only in degree but in kind from all the other inhabitants of the earth.

You will notice, however, the expression "at the end of the line." The true moral antithesis to the animal is not the *primal* man. The primal man is morally very much in the position of the animal; the difference is merely one of latent capacity. The savage has an Altruism within those limits which he believes to constitute his species. His species is his tribe. Any other tribe is to him another species; this

he can rob, cheat, plunder. It is sometimes said that the primitive man is ignorant of moral distinctions. He is not; he is ignorant that moral distinctions extend beyond his *species*—his tribe. I have no doubt his conscience would reproach him heavily were he to steal from his own tribe. He is an Altruist within his limits; but they are animal limits. Nay, they are originally *narrower* limits than those of the animal. The first human tribe is very small. No creature of field, air, or sea has such a circumscribed area for its Altruism as has the primitive man. Numerically speaking, we should say that Nature had declined—had lessened the moral possibilities of her creatures. Man starts with a more limited sphere for his Altruism than do the herded cattle and the flocking birds. These have a vast range for their communion; Man can count the objects for his possible fellowship at first only by fifties and hundreds. His species is not yet Humanity; it is only an insignificant tribe of men. Truly there are heavy odds against the progress of his Altruism!

By-and-by the area is extended. The extension comes by conquest. One tribe subdues another tribe or collection of tribes. When they are subdued they become incorporated—parts of the one. There follows a numerical increase of Altruism. But it is still only numerical; there is no expansion of the sympathetic principle. It is merely because the many tribes have become a portion of his own tribe that the primitive man consents to give them fellowship. Sympathy is still limited to species, and you can only widen sympathy by widening species. I venture to think that the pre-Christian world as a whole never emancipated itself from this idea. We have applied it to the primal man because the smallness of his sphere makes the principle conspicuous. But, if we turn to the great centres of civilization in the ancient world, we shall find, it seems to me, a state of things in no way different from the Altruistic level of the

savage races. Take Rome. From one point of view she exhibits a cosmopolitan power; she gathers within her dominion all sorts and conditions of men. But then, it must be "within her dominion." Rome will accept any amount of divergent opinions on every subject but one—her own supremacy; but on this she insists pertinaciously, unqualifiedly; the many tribes must become her tribes. What is this but the old primitive régime. Is it in any essential respect beyond the Altruism of the primal man. He too will accept any amount of divergence in the sentiments of surrounding tribes provided only they will submit to be conquered—to be called by his name. The primal man and the man of the Roman Empire represent the extremes of the old world's culture; yet, when all is said, they stand upon one base of Altruism. Neither the one nor the other has transcended the limits of his own species. Neither the one nor the other has been able sympathetically to leap that wall which divides the life of each from what each regards as alien.

Or, look at another centre of the old world—the Jew. Here again we have an apparent cosmopolitanism; we see a nation aspiring to embrace every other nation. But on what terms? On the terms of the primal man. The Jew summoned together all the tribes of earth; but whither did he summon them? To Jerusalem. It was really a call to enter within his own gates. It was sympathy within the walls of the house—but not outside of them. The gates were to be widely opened—but men must become proselytes of the gate. The privilege was to be universal—but the condition was to be universal too. All the tribes of earth were to enter into the city—but they were first to become the tribes of Israel. It was still but the Altruism of the species—the standard of sympathy reached by the primal man. There was as yet no going forth of charity from the limits of home, no excursion of sympathy into the land of

the stranger, no leaping of the wall to carry help to races deemed outside the pale.

Look, once more, at India. There is a system of India which commonly gets the credit of being universal. It is that marvellous creed, or want of creed, which men call Buddhism. Universal it certainly is—in the sense of *inviting* all. But to what does it invite them? To the sacrifice of everything that is alien to itself. Buddhism was not an Altruistic religion. At no time did it enter into sympathy with the *world*. It called upon men to leave the world and come within its own gates. They could bring nothing with them of the old life. All earthly desires were to be left outside the temple door. The desire of life itself was to be left outside the door. They who entered there had to abandon their varieties of species—the things which made them different from one another. There could be only one species—the species of the dying, of the consciously dying, of the joyfully dying. The ground of union was a unity of sentiment—the welcome of release from the events and changes of life. Is *this* really beyond the creed of the primal man? Without hesitation I answer, No. It is a refrain of the old cry, “Come into my garden; give up your own peculiarities; make all your tribes a part of my tribe!” It is not a *step* beyond the Altruism of primal humanity, nay, so far as results go, it is not a step beyond the Altruism that is manifested in the animal world. It is simply the gospel of sympathy within the boundaries of a single species.

The truth is, the overleaping of the wall of species has been almost entirely due to one great historical force—Christianity. You will understand, of course, that I am not alluding to anything supernatural. When a man makes reference to Christ in the field of science, the men in that field commonly say, “He seems to be a preacher.” Why should he be a preacher! Is Christianity not as secular a force in the world as the electric telegraph or the steam

engine! There is a question which has not yet received much attention either in religion or in scientific circles, and that is, the place of Christ in the system of Evolution. When the book comes to be written on that great subject, it will not be necessary that it should be written by a theologian or even by a churchman. It is a question more for the scientist than for the psalmist—a question which the scientist cannot escape and which belongs as much to his province as the origin of species or the place of natural selection. One thing is quite certain—that the influence of Christianity upon organic life must have been enormous. Directly affecting the lives of its followers, it has not been confined to its followers. It has modified the life of men outside, of nations outside. It has placed every portion of the earth in a position different from that which it occupied before its coming. It must have modified even the organisms of some of the lower animals, for it has sweetened Man's relation, not only to his brother man, but to many a bird of the air and to many a beast of the field. The preacher makes Christianity a question of salvation; but it is assuredly also a question of science. Its origin may be left to the theologian; its effects are within the scope of the British Association. We may leave it to the one to discuss where it comes from; we must ask the other to tell what it has done.

For my part, I think the position of Christianity in the system of Evolution is that of the missing link between the Altruism of the animal nature and the Altruism of the man. It seems to me that in Christianity Man for the first time transcended the limits of what he believed to be his own species—for the first time leapt the wall which debarred his sympathies from those not recognised as already his brothers. I cannot find in any other system of faith or philosophy a call of sympathy addressed to the world outside its own opinions. Christianity, so far as I know, is the earliest

manifestation of Altruism towards the foreigner as foreigner. It is Rome stretching out her hands to tribes who have not yet become Roman. It is Judea greeting races which are still alien to Israel. It is India turning aside from her Buddhist pessimism to share in the joy of those who sit at a marriage feast or partake of a banquet in the wilderness.

This view of Christian Altruism is the earliest view. It is the place claimed for Christ by His first foreign missionary—Paul of Tarsus. In a letter to the Church of Philippi that missionary says, “Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who, though in the form of God, thought equality with God a thing not to be snatched at, but emptied Himself, and took upon Himself the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men.” I have quoted these words purely for their scientific value—as indicating what was the earliest interpretation of the Christian ideal. And what is this ideal, this model for imitation? It is the sympathetic abandonment of one form for another form. Paul appeals to the Christian to follow his Master in His great leap of Altruism. He bids him come out from that which he believes to be perfect into that which he believes to be inferior—from God’s form to the servant’s form. He bids him “empty himself”—not into nothingness, but into the limits of a life below his own. He bids him claim that life as a part of himself, as a member of his own body, as something which henceforth he will feel instinctively bound to protect, to preserve, to support in the struggle for survival.

If, again in the interest of science, you refer to that other utterance of Paul which I would call the Completed Confession of Altruistic Faith—the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, you will find, I think, a remarkable corroboration of the view here set forth. It is the famous hymn in praise of love. But what is the nature of that love which is praised? Read it clause by clause, and you will come to

one conclusion. The love here eulogized is love for things not like ourselves. It is far nearer to the idea of the Authorized Version than to that of the Revised Version, and would be much better rendered by the word "charity" than by the word "love." It is essentially charity—the power of coming down to the wants of men beneath. It is a power that can be longsuffering, slow to anger, free from the pride of superiority, looking beyond personal gain. "Love seeketh not her own" are the words which sum up in a sentence this New Confession of Altruism. They imply that sympathy is now to enter upon a wider field, to break the barriers that held it within its own species, and to find a foothold in those other regions which have hitherto been outside the wall.

And this new Altruism has been the permanent feature of Christianity—the feature which has remained when tongues have ceased and prophets failed and knowledge vanished away. The watchword of modern charity is "brotherhood beyond the species"—brotherhood beyond the sphere which constitutes *our* community. Why did the Jews send out the demoniac to dwell among the tombs? Because they thought he belonged to another species—the devil species. Jesus did not tell them they were under a delusion; what He did say was this, "Assuming him to be under the influence of another species, is that any reason you should not come to help him? ought not your Altruism to leap the wall of species and claim brotherhood beyond your boundaries!" That is the principle which, ever since, has regulated human Altruism. Why did men agitate for the abolition of slavery? Was it because they had become convinced that all human beings had sprung from one stock? Not at all. The outburst was independent of any such conviction—would have been unaffected by the demonstration that the slave had *other* blood than that of Adam. It came from the fact that the question of

species had been held in abeyance, and that the needs of the creature had become the only incentives to sympathy. Or, what is the origin of that movement against cruelty to animals? Is it the result of Darwinism? Does it spring from the fact that we have accepted the scientific dogma that we and the animals belong to the same tribe? No. Our gentleness to the animal is independent of our acceptance of Darwinism. We have reached in Christianity an Altruism which "seeketh not her own"—which is not dictated by identity of lineage nor stimulated by similarity of life. Rather is it wakened by the sense of diversity, by the perception of inferiority, by the sight of that which makes others *less* than ourselves. Unlike the animal world, unlike the primal man, the Christian man begins with the outside. He leaves his country and his kindred and his father's house. He forgets the unity of species. He leaps his garden wall. He makes for the highways and the hedges. He seeks that which is alien to him, foreign to him. He sojourns in a strange land. He pursues that which is furthest away. His search is for that which is lost, and his mission is to the Gentiles.

G. MATHESON.

*THE AUTONOMY OF JESUS: A STUDY IN THE
FOURTH GOSPEL.*

FINALLY (iv.), the same studious tendency to acquit Jesus of being motivated by human influence, or of complying with a direct request, comes out in the well known tale of his behaviour when the news reached him that Lazarus was ill (xi. 1-16). He does not move at the appeal for help and pity (v. 6).¹ When he does so it is expressly and deliberately said that the journey is undertaken owing to his superior wisdom. He himself knows best the proper time; his actions are mysteriously and absolutely his own, springing from his inner impulse; they are not to be explained, as they were not prompted, by what transpires on ordinary human levels.² This line of pragmatism seems quite as congenial to the author as that which leads him to emphasize Christ's delay from a desire to make the miracle as great as possible. Even when the tenderest appeals meet him directly from a human heart, he remains self-poised and imperturbable. The heart and rule of his life was absolutely inward, and any attempt to form a connexion with himself from the outside was steadily rejected as incompetent. To the author of this gospel, in fact, the

¹ Even in the Epist. Diognet., some thirty or forty years later, a more humane and human view of Jesus is presented. God sent him, this graceful author writes, ἐν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ πραύτητι . . . βία γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι τῷ θεῷ (vii. 4). So Milton in *Paradise Regained*, bk. i. lines 215-222.

² Here again Mr. Hutton rather minimizes the tendency of the passage. The author, he explains, "lays stress on the circumstances that show the law of Christ's nature to be mysterious and given from above, and not determined by the small occasional motives which make sport with human wills" (*op. cit.* p. 185). How can a friend's distress be described as a small and occasional motive for help? Are appeals for pity and sympathy, rising out of the circle of human relationships, to be considered as sportive inroads upon a human will? If so, the synoptic representation of Jesus is strangely compromised. There is more appositeness in a subsequent remark of the same writer that when Greek "religion was highest and truest, it consisted in the assertion that right and good are eternal and immutable, liable to no personal control at all" (p. 140).

character of Jesus was apparently too ethereal to be exposed to common influences, of too fine a texture to be subjected, even innocently, to the calls or claims of human life.

Hints of the same tendency are not wanting in the minor touches and general treatment of the story. From the outset it is patent that the writer wishes to represent Jesus as independent of and superior to the Baptizer, but even beyond this particular trait he exhibits the movements of Christ as based upon some mysterious and inward principle. He always anticipates human insight; he is first with every man, even with the keenest (i. 38, 42, 47-48; "before Philip called thee, I saw thee, when thou wast under the fig tree"). He forms his own plans, carries out his own intentions, knows when to hold aloof from human nature, needs no interview, and requires no information¹ as to the temper and attitude of men towards himself (ii. 24-25; contrast the synoptic "Who do people say that I am?" Mark viii. 27 and parallels). Neither in Judas nor in the people

¹ This mental perception is not gained as the result of long and painful experience. The author represents it as an intuition full-blown and active from the outset, and evidently intends to picture it as something supra-natural, higher even than an abnormal development of what has been called the "illative faculty" (Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, chap. viii. § 3), by which inferences can be drawn rapidly and accurately from one's experience of men and things. The endowment of omniscience possessed by Jesus in the Fourth gospel is an inheritance, not an attainment; full-orbed from the first, it requires neither to be sustained nor matured by new accesses of experience. Such a representation is the pictorial expansion of an idea like that already enunciated in Col. ii. 9 or Heb. iv. 12-13, where the Logos is portrayed as living and energetic, with penetrating insight into the secret life of men: "And before him nothing created is concealed, but all things are bare and laid open before the eyes of him with whom we have to do." In the Apocalypse, upon the other hand, the Logos (xix. 13) resembles the martial and invincible Logos of the older Wisdom literature (e.g. Wisd. Sol. xviii. 15 f.), which leaps from the royal thrones in heaven "into the midst of the doomed land as a stern (*ἀπότομος*) warrior, bearing the sharp sword of thine unfeigned commandment, and filling all things, as it stood, with death." But if the conception of the Logos in the Fourth gospel is naturally carried into much higher and wider levels of religious speculation than were accessible to the Apocalyptic prophet, it is at the same time rendered so superhuman that it almost fails to preserve the tenderness and sympathetic humanity assigned in Hebrews to the earthly Jesus.

of Jerusalem is he deceived. His plans also are his own; not even his intimates and relatives can fathom or forecast them (ii. 2; vi. 6; xiii. 7). His power works by itself, unmediated (iv. 50-53). He chooses his disciples, not they him (xv. 16); and with consummate skill he finds out men, rather than is found by them (i. 43; ix. 35; xi. 42, etc.). He takes the initiative (vi. 5, a tacit correction, as editors properly observe, of Mark vi. 36, viii. 4), showing himself perfectly conscious of all that is transpiring (vi. 61, 71), or that is to transpire towards the end of his life (xiii. 1, 3), when initiative is denied him. Yet even in the Passion, as has been already indicated, he is active and self-possessed. Activity, in fact, is a note of the Passion in the Fourth gospel (xiv. 2 f., 12, etc., 22; xvi. 5, 7, 22, 23; "I go"¹); "Arise, let us go hence" (xiv. 31). The Passion is no drift, but an open-eyed choice, calling into exercise the full powers of thought and energy, and exhibiting, in spite of apparent degradation and impotence, the marks of a royal advance (xviii. 37). Jesus is not swept into the grasp of death, nor does he yield to any constraint or pressure from without. "I have the right to lay down my life . . . I consecrate myself." Similarly, after death, he addresses his friends first (xx. 14-15); he knows Mary before she knows him. All human recognition of his person is due to himself (1 John iv. 19). He is removed from human touch, too holy for ordinary endearments (xx. 17, "Touch Me not"—plainly a correction of the earlier tradition in Matt. xxviii. 9, "They grasped his feet," which conflicted with the author's high conception of the heavenly Logos). Up to the close he takes the lead (xx. 19 f.; xxi. 5 f., 6, 10, 13, 22); the priority remains his in action and in thought alike (cf. iv. 23, *ζητεῖ* of God). Human ties then more than ever, as this writer feels, must

¹ *ὑπάγειν* is a favourite word of the author; it occurs more than a dozen times in his book, and always in the mouth of Jesus.

have been obtrusive or unbecoming; Christ's end was not to submit to these, but to go to the Father, and nothing must stand in the way of this exaltation.¹

After allowance has been made for so much of this as is common to the Synoptic tradition and might have been generated from a study of that tradition, also for the subordinate and secondary character of a portion of these materials, it is undeniable that a considerable body of evidence remains which admits of only one explanation. Without doubt, the author conceived the ideal personality of Christ in such a way that voluntary choice or self-determination was essential as a prominent factor in his Divine majesty. In his case anything like suggestion or influence would have been irrelevant; and indeed influence, in the writer's mind, spells interference so far as Jesus is concerned. His supremacy involved his spontaneity. It implied that outward events never afforded a direct reason for action upon his part, that no human soul shared in his resolutions, that his plans could be thwarted as little as they could be furthered by an outsider, and that his convictions sprang ready-made from the secret of his inner consciousness. Consequently, as the idea came to be worked out in detail, Jesus (who is the true Logos, the supreme Revelation and Agent of God for men) was described and delineated as one who was bound by no human ties either in the common events or in the great crises of his life, whose actions were resolved upon by his unaided wisdom and executed by his own power. Rising from the

¹ The Jesus of the Fourth gospel hardly needs to pray (xi. 47); on the contrary, and this is a new development of thought, he is prayed to by the disciples and the church (xiv.). Note the significant omission in John vi. 15, as compared with Mark vi. 46, Matthew xiv. 23. Not prayer, as the expression of dependence upon God and the confession of human need, but the resolve to avoid premature and unthinking pressure from the side of men, is given as the motive for Christ's retirement after the miracle in question. He also carries his own cross (xix. 17 as against Mark xv. 21 and parallels) unaided, and needs no food.

lonely depths of a unique personality, they were subject to a higher law than that of ordinary causation. In a word, the Jesus of the Fourth gospel really never acts upon the direct initiative of others, but always upon his own. Persons and things seem to have produced little impression upon him. Sovereign and spontaneous, beyond the reach of accident, and set above the clash and play of ordinary motives, the Logos moves in a relative independence of limitations. His inner life is serene and secure as a fortress with the gates closed. Hence, in keeping with this autonomy of his being, no place is found for human birth or human temptation. These, with the family ties of Jesus, pass into the background, leaving the transcendental freedom of the Logos unimpaired, so that from the outset he is inviolate amid the exterior claims and conditions of his age. Not merely, in this study, is he not determined by circumstances of time and place; he is hardly influenced by them at all, so careful is the author to prevent anything local or concrete from affecting or seeming to infringe his power of self-determination. In his vocation he remains king of himself; no exterior cause is ever allowed to tie his hands. And even when he is occasionally represented as having adapted himself to circumstances—which of course was necessary if the sketch of his life was to possess any claims to naturalness and reality—the writer is scrupulously careful to safeguard his autonomy, in order to prevent the erroneous idea that Jesus, as the true Logos of God, was very closely entwined with the details of contemporary life. He seems to have feared that his hero's spontaneity would have been drowned, had it been associated with even the simple phases of human influence or suggestion. To him the personality of Jesus had superhuman and abysmal depths; but these depths included, besides pre-existence and subsequent exaltation, an inviolate sphere within the human spirit whence it acted upon

the world without, while at the same time it shrank from admitting any impulse in return.

In the hands of a less able writer, and at a greater distance from the impressive personality of Jesus as that was mediated by the synoptic tradition, such a combination of ideas as that reached along this line of treatment might have led to a somewhat cold elevation of the central Figure, until it lost much if not all of its interest both in and for mankind. To withdraw Christ as far as possible from all contact with pain and sin and poverty would have destroyed his humanity, just as his personality would have become unreal if all motive and inlets of suggestion had been shut off from his life on earth. In that event, the portrait of Jesus might have resembled that of Henry VII. as Bacon draws it,¹ the portrait of one who admitted no claim to sway his opinions or to direct his actions, but preserved a somewhat mysterious exclusiveness and majesty. And as such criticisms have actually been passed upon the Fourth gospel as a biography of Jesus, it is important to define precisely what is meant by this feature of autonomy in his character as there described, to discover the sources, and to determine, if possible, the object of this fundamental category.

For one thing such a conception of autonomy is not a mere emphasis upon unworldliness or abstinence from common life for the sake of purity. Nor is it an expression of the desire, which frequently becomes mere selfishness and

¹ "*Hee was of an High Mind, and loved his owne Will, and his owne Way; as one that revered himselfe, and would Raigne indeed. Had he been a Priuate-man; he would have been termed Proud. But in a wise Prince, it was but keeping of Distance, which indeed hee did towards all; not admitting any neare or full Approach, neither to his Power or to his Secrets. For he was governed by none. . . . His Mother hee revered much, heard little. . . . Hee had nothing in him of Vaine-glorie, but yet kept State and Maiestie to the height. . . . To his Confederates abroad he was Constant and Iust, but not Open. But rather such was his Inquirie, and such his Closenesse, as they stood in the Light towards him, and hee stood in the Darke to them.*"

pride, for a clear course of self-development, by which a man gets quit of responsibility and interference in order to live his own life. Such an idea is unthinkable in connexion with Christ. Besides there is no development, practically speaking, in Christ's character throughout the Fourth gospel, and the note of unselfish sacrifice¹ is deep and frequent. Still less can this feature anxiously attributed to Jesus be identified with the loneliness and reserve of a nature which is truly sympathetic, or with the desire to preserve one's inner peace and freedom amid the interpositions and encumbrances of life—

Within the soul a faculty abides
That, with interpositions which would hide
And darken, so can deal that they become
Contingencies of pomp, and serve to exalt
Her native brightness . . . virtue thus
Sets forth and magnifies herself; thus feeds
A calm, a beautiful, and silent fire
From the encumbrances of mortal life.

Nor is this isolation in the Fourth gospel parallel to the method by which a strong nature preserves and asserts its independence with a view to mould others into its likeness; for there is little or no propaganda in the book, the dualism (almost the fatalism) of light and darkness overpowering anything like a conception of great and gradual changes in the people round Jesus. We come nearer the truth when we think of spontaneity as a force breaking out of its own accord and impulse, and thereby securing for itself a fertile and varied expression; or when we imagine a self-reliant majesty of nature, rich in inner resources and calmly sure

¹ Jesus, in this gospel, comes to live and die for men; the whole meaning of his existence is to carry out an eternal purpose of God for mankind. But it is a curious proof of the abstract standpoint held by the author, that (if we except—and the exception is only partial—Christ's private circle of adherents) he did not make the life of those among whom he lived an object of immediate and loving concern to any marked degree. Cf. Hutton on this, "the weaker side" of the gospel (190 f.).

of its treasure, which does not require any outside stimulus or co-operation—like Amphiaraüs (for example) in the *Septem contra Thebas* (590 f.).

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

But even these ideas do not take us to the psychological centre of the idea, as it is handled by the author of the Fourth gospel. What he seems to feel, and what he tries to bring out, is that for a personality so mysterious and deep as that of Christ (when viewed under the category of the Logos) receptivity would be a mark of inferiority. The height to which Jesus had risen, as the church came reverently to reflect upon him in the course of the years, made it almost an irreverence (in this writer's judgment) to think of him as actuated by motives such as those which sway a common life. Were he subject to advice or influence, he would become a satellite of circumstances, and undue yielding upon his part to pity, sympathy, or love, might indirectly trespass on his divine authority. Some such feeling as this apparently underlies the treatment of Christ's person in the Fourth gospel, a feeling which (as the gospels of Matthew and Luke indicate) had for some time been spreading in the church, but which had never so completely mastered the primitive tradition of his earthly life. It is not, of course, as though everything yields to him at once in the narrative of the Fourth gospel, or that he is able invariably to carry his will and dispose of everything according to his purpose. As the drama develops, check and retreat are conspicuous features of his life, nor does he ultimately win all and each by his potent influence. But the point is that he never abandons himself freely to the claim of the moment, nor does he suffer himself to be swayed even by apparently innocuous advice. Sustaining himself apart,

he moves through life with a sense of detachment, his independence never compromised even when it is working in line with others or under the compulsion of necessity.

The counterpart of this autonomy in action is the inward omniscience which, following hints in Luke (v. 4, 20, etc.), the author heartily predicates of Jesus. To a far greater extent than the synoptic Jesus, the Christ of the Fourth gospel knows all from the first and possesses a knowledge of his own career and fate which is not deduced from experience or limited by uncertainty upon details. His hour—its time and place—stands clear before his soul (ii. 4); his future is mapped out before him; actually, though not verbally, he is entitled (as Holtzmann points out) to the Divine name, *καρδιογνώστης*,¹ possessing in this unerring acuteness or intuition a power of self-guidance which acts by itself unchecked. He is *αὐτοδιδάκτος* (i. 48, iv. 17-18, 35, v. 42, vi. 15, 61, 64, viii. 40, xiii. 11, 18, xvi. 19, etc.). "Nothing to him falls early or too late." Over this true human Logos the world can exercise no power (i. 5, vii. 26, 44, viii. 20, 59, x. 39, xiv. 30); God alone controls him (xix. 11) and his life. It is part of his greatness and glory that in virtue of this omniscience he is enabled to exercise choice (v. 21) and act unexpectedly,² as he pleases, subser-

¹ It is this quality of marvellous insight which impresses and even convinces other people more than anything else: cf. the cases of Nathanael (i. 47-51), the Samaritan woman (iv. 19-29), and the Jews (vii. 15). Part of his function as the true and capable Shepherd is to know every individual entrusted to him (x. 14, 27; cf. i. 42, xx. 16).

² E.g. i. 43, iv. 46, viii. 12, xii. 44. The abruptness of xii. 44-50 is eased, however, if the paragraph be restored to what is probably its original position between vv. 36a and 36b (so—after Wendt—*Historical New Testament*, pp. 520, 692). Also it is possible that the gap between vii. 52 and viii. 12, when the spurious pericopê is removed, originally contained some paragraph which has gone amissing (for conjectures, see *op. cit.* pp. 691-692). Otherwise one must try to find some connexion between viii. 12 and vii. (which Wendt boldly does by omitting vii. 30-32, 36, 39, 44-52 as additions made by the evangelist to his source, *das Johannes-Evangelium*, pp. 63 f., 86-90, 136 f.), or simply take viii. 12 as the prelude to chap. ix. To ease the latter view, Mr. P. M. Strayer has recently conjectured that x. 22 has been displaced from its true position

vient to no standard of human thought or wish ; while even the process of his suffering, as Weiss has rightly noted (*Neutest. Theologie*, E. Tr. ii. 340 n.), is described as not merely foreseen but foretold by himself in all its mournful and exact details.

How consonant this emphasis upon autonomy is with some features of Alexandrian speculation upon the Logos, hardly needs to be pointed out. That semi-personal principle, which had become familiar in Hellenistic circles of Jewish Christians, was essentially operative and active, the vicegerent of God in this world, subject to Him alone and by reason of its divine intelligence enabled to master all ideas and energies throughout the lower cosmos. The use of this category (along with others ¹) in the Fourth gospel to explain the significance of Jesus was naturally conditioned by its aim. Here the Logos is no mere embodiment of an abstract idea, nor a Divine force freely personified in a poetic or mystical style. Though one may substantially agree with Weizsäcker that this gospel is a history mainly in form, its contents being virtually a science of the history, still the author has too much artistic taste and historical sense to represent the living Jesus as a mere symbol of the Logos idea. The latter is dexterously confined to the prologue, although its contents underlie the subsequent speeches and narratives, which are interpenetrated by its spirit. Yet its exploitation must have led to unexpected difficulties. To graft it upon the synoptic tradition was obviously a problem of extreme delicacy, for the two factors, if not incommensurable, presented several points of considerable disparity, and any speculative interpretation such as this inevitably involved some readjust-

immediately before viii. 12 (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1900, October, pp. 137-140).

¹ In John i. 14 Dalman observes (*Worte Jesu*, i. p. 189) three essentially Jewish factors are represented as having been manifested in Jesus: מֵיְהוָה (=ὁ Λόγος), מְשִׁיחָא (=ἐσκήνωσεν), מְדָבָר (=δῶξα).

ment of the facts at the writer's disposal. Still this is the clue to the author's general conception of Jesus, and to any particular trait in it—this attempt to harmonize the two aspects of a human Jesus and a mysterious Logos; very much as the Deuteronomist's idea of law elucidates his sketch of Moses the lawgiver, or as Plato's view of philosophy and its function affords the only proper standpoint from which to estimate his biography of Sokrates. Idealism is not an altogether inaccurate motto for this method of the Fourth evangelist. Over and again, under the power of reverence and speculation, he transmutes the realistic Jesus of the synoptists into an idealized transcription; if we can hardly say that he conceives it his business

Not to catch men with show,
With homage to the perishable clay,
But lift them over it, ignore it all,
Make them forget there's such a thing as flesh,

nevertheless his general aim is in that direction; and the total effect of the book is to produce a strong impression of one who was a representative personality, to convey a definite conception of this Life and its significance, rather than to delineate in any photographic or topographic fashion the details of a particular career. This criticism would apply indeed to all the four gospels, even in some degree to Mark. But the feature becomes well defined and dominant only in the pages of the Fourth gospel, thanks to the speculative atmosphere in which it was composed.

JAMES MOFFAT.

(To be continued.)

SURVEY OF RECENT ENGLISH LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

INTRODUCTION.—In this department of literature there has recently appeared a work of quite exceptional value. Its full title is *The Historical New Testament, being the Literature of the New Testament arranged in the order of its Literary Growth and according to the Dates of the Documents. A new translation, edited with Prolegomena, Historical Tables, Critical Notes, and an Appendix*, by James Moffatt, B.D. (T. & T. Clark). This title shows us that the author considers his chronological arrangement of the literature to be the characteristic feature of his volume. He even goes so far as to say that it is “unique.” But not only does every scholar nowadays read his New Testament with an eye to the dates of the various books, but in at least one instance an attempt has been made to induce the public to use the Bible in this fashion. And if such attempts have not been common, this arises from the conviction that as yet they can only be tentative. Mr. Moffatt has assurance, and the advantages and disadvantages attaching to this quality are apparent in his volume.

It is not the idea of the book that is novel, but the extraordinary erudition and ability with which it is carried out. With scarcely any exaggeration it may be said that Mr. Moffatt has not only made a minutely careful study of the New Testament itself, but has mastered the entire mass of modern critical literature. The mere accumulation of material suggests a rare expenditure of industry; but the material is not merely swept together into an indiscriminate heap, but is sifted, weighed and utilized with a critical acumen and sagacity which are truly astonishing. Inquiries which in this age of dictionaries would naturally have been allotted to several men are here undertaken by one and carried with ease to a successful issue. Even as a complete presentation of the present state of opinion the book is of the highest value; but it is much more than that.

The “New Translation” is an excellent piece of work. Mr. Moffatt offers this part of his work to the public “with extreme diffidence” as a “difficult and audacious attempt,” which has “proved itself beyond his powers.” We are persuaded that many who are in a position to judge will pronounce it the best yet made. There

is at any rate evidence throughout that it has been made with a full knowledge of all suggested meanings, with a firm grasp of sound principles of translation and with a faculty for writing intelligible and accurate English. He has not hampered himself with adaptation to any previous versions, but has rendered direct from the original text.

The "Prolegomena" aim at ascertaining the proper attitude of mind which must be assumed towards the New Testament writings when their origin and early history are kept in view. They are an able survey of the influences at work in the formation of the Gospels, and form a commentary on the text: "To become legible these books need the context of the religious situation." "The conception of Jesus in the Gospels represents not only the historical likeness so far as its traits were preserved in the primitive evangelic tradition, but also the religious interests of the age in which and for which these narratives were originally drawn up. It is in the balance and adjustment of these two elements that one real problem of New Testament criticism will always lie." With Mr. Moffatt's statement of the general principles governing historical criticism, few will be disposed to disagree.

It is when we come to the application of these principles as exhibited in the introductory notes to the individual books that dissent will be provoked. His conclusions regarding authorship and date are in general those which have been promulgated by Jülicher. Traditional dates are in almost every case where difference of opinion is possible pronounced too early—although here and there Mr. Moffatt seems a little mixed in his own chronology—the Pastoral Epistles have only a minute Pauline nucleus, 2 Peter is pseudonymous, and so on. With Mr. Moffatt's method little fault can be found, except that he does not sufficiently appreciate the weight of evidence against his own opinion. Thus in considering the authorship of the Pastorals he does not even allude to the ablest defence of the traditional view, that by Prof. Findlay; and while he affirms that the weightiest argument against the Pauline authorship is the difficulty of finding a place for them in the life of the Apostle, he gives no account of the evidence in favour of a second imprisonment. Indeed his whole treatment of the Pastorals is one-sided. He has actually persuaded himself that such sayings as "sinners of whom I am chief" were the invention of a forger. This unknown person must at any rate have

been a humourist and smiled to himself as he advised a supposititious Timothy to take a little wine for his stomach's sake. The main argument is that the Epistles are ecclesiastical, therefore not by a theologically inclined and devout spirit such as Paul—which is rather hard on men like Bishop Westcott and Principal Rainy, who are large enough to include both the devout mystic and the hard-headed statesman.

The airiness with which Mr. Moffatt treats important critical questions sometimes carries him into the cheap method of dismissing the adverse opinions of great scholars with a point of exclamation; sometimes into an apparent oblivion of the consequences of his own opinions. No doubt critical inquiries must be conducted and truth declared regardless of consequences, but a consideration of consequences balances the mind and lends seriousness to the discussion. It may be said that we lose nothing and that the documents remain of equal value whoever was their author. But that is not so. If the Epistle which passes as that of James really belongs to the second century, then we lose, not indeed the strongest proof of our Lord's sinlessness, but certainly the strongest testimony in its favour.

But, such drawbacks notwithstanding, Mr. Moffatt's volume decisively makes good its claim to be called the historical New Testament, for in its perusal we are brought into touch with the ideas and movements of the first century, and are taught to judge the books in connexion with these ideas. What may be termed the critical attitude has no finer illustration in our language, and the volume will be found an admirable discipline for the student.

Two Lectures on the Gospels, by F. Crawford Burkitt, M.A., (Macmillan and Co.) sketch the present position of the criticism of the text and of the origin of the Gospels, and may be useful as an introduction to books in which these subjects are more fully treated. The same firm are issuing a series of New Testament handbooks, edited by Prof. Shailer Mathews, of Chicago, which reach an unusually high level of excellence. They are written in a spirit of liberal and well informed but not extreme criticism. The conservative mind may here and there resent an apparently needless concession to the more revolutionary German critics, but in the main a reasonable moderation prevails.—Prof. Bacon's *Introduction to the New Testament* is not a mere popular compilation such as frequently does duty as a manual, but is the

original production of a strong and highly cultivated mind imbued with the critical spirit and sensitive to critical problems. English readers have access to no such stimulating writing on New Testament introduction. It is necessarily brief, but it is thorough; and even where one dissents from the writer's conclusions it must be recognized that they are based on well considered and lucidly presented argument.—Similar in character, although scarcely so instructive, is Prof. Ezra P. Gould's *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, an extremely clever presentation of the contents of the New Testament books, but often provoking dissent.—Prof. Nash's *History of the Higher Criticism*, and Prof. Shailer Mathews' *New Testament Times* are also well worthy of a place in this most scholarly and useful series.

We offer Dr. Hastings our cordial congratulations on the issue of the third volume of the *Dictionary of the Bible* in course of publication by Messrs. T. & T. Clark. It contains the headings from Kir to Pleiades. The New Testament articles, which strike us as being the most substantial additions to our knowledge, are those by Dr. H. A. A. Kennedy on the Latin versions, Dr. Chase on St. Peter and the Epistles ascribed to him (more than sixty pages), and Prof. Findlay on St. Paul. The erudition and careful unbiassed judgment displayed in these articles cannot fail deeply to impress all who use this eminently helpful dictionary. Many other articles might be specified which, although they may not so distinctly as these advance our knowledge, yet bring before us in a convenient form information which it would be laborious to collect for ourselves. It would be wise policy in every preacher and student to economize by resisting the temptation to purchase second-rate or twentieth-rate books, and invest in so permanently and continually serviceable a work as this.

In textual criticism we are furnished by Dr. Eberhard Nestle with a thoroughly competent guide in his *Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament*. This instructive volume, already in a second German edition, has been translated by William Edie, B.D., edited by Prof. Menzies and issued as the thirteenth volume of Messrs. Williams & Norgate's Theological Translation Library. It is intended to be used as a textbook in colleges, and is therefore not so full in its account of MSS. as Gregory's *Prolegomena* to Tischendorf, nor does it give so elaborate an account of the Versions as is to be found in the latest edition

of Scrivener. Dr. Nestle divides his subject into three parts, a history of the Printed Text, Materials of Criticism, and the Theory and Praxis of Criticism, to which is added a useful discussion of many important passages. Under the first head the genealogy of the Printed Text might with advantage have been given with greater detail, and it is unfair to the Plymouth Brethren to rob them of their greatest distinction, our noble English critic Tregelles, and hand him over to the Quakers. On the whole, as a manual of textual criticism, Nestle's book is likely to supersede all others.

St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, a new translation with a brief analysis, by W. G. Rutherford, headmaster of Westminster, (Macmillan & Co.) will be welcomed by the many persons who are conscious that much may yet be done by translation to elucidate the New Testament. The first words of Dr. Rutherford's preface do not inspire us with confidence. "This was," he says, "a plain letter concerned with a theme which plain men might understand." The author of 2 Peter did not think so; and any one who proceeds to translate under the impression that lucidity of expression is all that is needed to make the writings of St. Paul intelligible is mistaken. Dr. Rutherford's criticism of other translations and his indication of the sources of their errors are excellent. And although his own attempt may not accomplish all he expects, it will certainly help to the understanding of the Epistle.

EXPOSITION.—The most important contribution to Exegesis in recent months is the new edition (the ninth) of Prof. Beet's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Hodder & Stoughton). One cannot but admire the love of truth and the patience which have prompted the author to rewrite a book which already was so favourably received by the public. In its present form it deserves to command even increased popularity. Those who have used it will testify to its scholarship, its independence and its sympathy with Panline teaching.

Of the same Epistle Mr. C. E. Stuart publishes *An Outline* (second edition, Marlborough & Co.). It is rather a paraphrase than an outline. Mr. Stuart explains in his own language and with slight elaboration what he conceives to be the meaning and order of thought of the Epistle. He has views of his own which others will scarcely find in the teaching of St. Paul; but for any student

of the Epistle who has not time to consult larger books this will be found convenient.

Principal Garrod continues his useful series of handbooks, and now publishes (Macmillan & Co.) *The Second Epistle to the Thessalonians*. It is on the same plan as the previous volumes, giving an introduction, a full analysis and notes well selected and conveniently arranged.

The Principal of Midland College, Rev. J. Howard B. Masterman, with a very similar purpose in view, has issued a commentary on *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (Macmillan & Co.). Slightly more ambitious than Principal Garrod's volumes, it contains the Greek text and notes upon it and will be found a serviceable introduction to the study of the Epistle. Principal Masterman does not seem to have used the excellent commentary of Pastor Monnier (*La Première Epître de l'Apôtre Pierre*—Macon, Protat Frères), published last year.

Two books on the Gospels reach us from America. One of these is *The Life of Christ*, by Profs. De Witt Burton and Shailer Mathews, in the series of "Constructive Bible Studies" which they are editing. Like everything else which these scholars have produced, this series of studies is eminently worthy of attention. It is so arranged and so equipped with suitable apparatus of questions and directions for further study as to be available either for private or class work. Any one who works his way through this attractive and rich volume will find himself possessed of a full and accurate knowledge of the life of our Lord.

President Cary, of Meadville, contributes the volume on *The Synoptic Gospels* to the series of "International Handbooks to the New Testament," edited by Dr. Orello Cone. The purpose of this series is to "meet the wants of the general reader, and at the same time present the results of the latest scholarship and of the most thorough critical investigation." This purpose may be said to be fulfilled, although the result cannot be said to be happy for "the general reader." He is presented with extreme views regarding miracle, and with little to counterbalance them. One does not always perceive what Dr. Cary's own view is. He seems, e.g., to favour that explanation of the resurrection which proceeds upon the supposition that Jesus had not died on the cross but was merely in a state of syncope. But one is slow to credit any scholar with so antiquated and imbecile a view.

A volume in which there will be found a large amount of sound, scholarly and enlightening exegesis is the last series of Kerr Lectures published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark, *The Relation of the Apostolic Teaching to the Teaching of Christ*, by the Rev. Robert J. Drummond. The subject is one which called for discussion, and could not have been more satisfactorily handled. Without any distortion of his text Dr. Drummond shows that the teaching of the Apostles, though often very differently worded and in different connexions, is still faithful to that of the Lord. The examination covers a great deal of ground, and is conducted with admirable insight, tact and suggestiveness. The Lectures are a distinct, much needed and valuable addition to our knowledge of the New Testament.

MISCELLANEOUS.—Messrs. Macmillan & Co. have issued in an admirable form the works of Bishop Butler. The two volumes, one containing the *Analogy* and another the *Sermons*, appear as part of the English Theological Library. They are most judiciously edited by Dr. J. H. Bernard, of Dublin, whose notes give precisely the needed information, neither obtruding superfluous remarks nor withholding what a reader ought to know. This edition is pretty sure to supplant even the editions of Fitzgerald, Gladstone, and others.

The Rev. Henry Latham, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, has followed up his original volume, entitled *Pastor Pastorum*, with another on the resurrection of our Lord and His subsequent manifestations. It is published by Messrs. Deighton Bell & Co., and is equally ingenious as the former but not so convincing. As an examination in detail of the record of events in the Christian circle from the Resurrection to Pentecost, however, Mr. Latham's book has great value. It is entitled *The Risen Master*.

It is probably too late to call attention to Dr. John Watson's *The Doctrines of Grace* (Hodder & Stoughton), but it may be said in the interests of those who may not yet have seen the volume that it is full of weighty thought on somewhat perplexed religious problems. It is needless to say that any one who begins the volume is pretty sure to read on till he finishes it; and when he finishes it he will find himself a wiser man.

Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton have also published an extremely able apologetic by the Rev. P. Carnegie Simpson, of Glasgow. It is entitled *The Fact of Christ*, and starting from the historical

figure of Christ Mr. Simpson draws from that one fact a proof of all that is essential in Christianity. It is a very remarkable and thoroughly sound piece of reasoning, and deserves the consideration not only of all who are in doubt, but also of all who have in any way to do with doubters and of all who love a piece of clever and brilliant reasoning.

In *From Apostle to Priest*, by James W. Falconer, M.A., B.D., (T. & T. Clark), we have a very competent study of early church organization. Mr. Falconer presents us with a singularly fair, well informed and compact account of the development which united his two poles, Apostle and Priest, carrying us down from the first century to the days of Cyprian. He is well acquainted with the literature of his subject, and keeps an eye on writers who give an account of the matter different from his own, and draw conclusions adverse to those which seem the inevitable inference from his statements.

Mr. Henry St. John Thackeray has rendered useful service in his Kaye Essay on *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought* (Macmillan & Co.) It is a healthy sign of the times that so much labour is being spent on the editing and interpretation of the Jewish literature which forms the background of the New Testament writings. The illustration which these writings thus receive is both abundant and enlightening. Mr. Thackeray has brought together much that has hitherto lain scattered in various volumes; and has thus furnished the student of the Pauline writings with a useful book of reference. His statement of the positions of St. Paul does not always approve itself as strictly accurate; and this seems to be due to his too unquestioning reliance on certain commentators.

The Rev. Cosmo Gordon Lang publishes with Messrs. Isbister & Co., *The Miracles of Jesus as Marks of the Way of Life*, that is to say, as conveying to us some of our Lord's most impressive teaching regarding character and conduct. The volume is valuable. It is not only the point of view which is fresh, but the entire treatment is original, interesting and instructive. To those who desire not so much an exposition of the miracles as some lessons drawn from the character of the persons on whom they were performed Mr. Lang's volume can be cordially recommended.

In *The True Christ and the False Christ* (George Allen) Mr. J. Garnier makes it his aim to expose the errors of Romanism

and spurious Evangelicalism by exhibiting the truth regarding Christ's person and work. There is learning and thought in the two volumes, but few will agree with the author throughout. Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons publish *The Divine Pedigree of Man, or the Testimony of Evolution and Psychology to the Fatherhood of God*, by Thomas J. Hudson, LL.D. It is a book for psychologists, in which the author attempts to establish and apply his theory of a double mind in man; an objective mind dependent on the brain, a subjective mind independent of it.—In *After the Spirit* (Drummond's Tract Dépôt) Dr. Elder Cumming furnishes a continuation of his excellent papers on the Eternal Spirit, His person and work.—Mr. Parke P. Flourney publishes through Mr. Thynne *The Searchlight of Hippolytus*, in which he collects the evidence for the New Testament writings and against the Papal claims which is furnished by the writings of that Father.

Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton publish yet another help to the production of sermons, *The Preacher's Dictionary*, by E. F. Cavalier, M.A., rector of Wramplingham. The idea of the book is novel. It consists of a collection of "Subjects," such as Baptism, Bible, Death, Evil, Fear. These are arranged alphabetically and cover a large number of the ordinary themes for sermons. Under each heading a definition is given, then a conspectus of Biblical teaching, and a large collection of thoughts gathered from ancient and modern literature. Mr. Cavalier's reading has been wide and varied, and any one with skill to use such a book has immense material here laid to his hand.

Messrs. Macmillan & Co. wisely issue an abridged edition of the *Life of Edward White Benson, sometime Archbishop of Canterbury*. The abridgement is accomplished not by rewriting, but by the simpler method of omission. Subjects not likely to interest the general public have been subjected to curtailment and many letters have been omitted. In its present form this excellent biography will reach a still wider circle of readers and bring to their more familiar acquaintance a man well worth knowing.—The same firm issue *Sermons on the Books of the Bible* selected from the volumes of "Village Sermons" by the late Dr. Hort. They are printed separately because they have been found "extremely valuable for Indian students." "Indian" might be omitted.

From Mr. Charles H. Kelly we have received two excellent additions to the useful series of "Books for Bible Students." One

of these is *Studies in Eastern Religions*, by Alfred S. Geden, M.A., tutor in the Richmond Wesleyan College and author of a previous volume of this series, *Studies in Comparative Religion*. The present volume, though issued under a different title, is really the second volume of those "Studies," giving a thoroughly competent and compact account of Brahmanism and Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.—The other addition to the series is Mr. A. W. Cooke's *Palestine in Geography and in History*, which aims at including a general description of the country, its inhabitants and history, together with a detailed description of the principal divisions of the country, with careful geographical and historical sketches of each province and its important sites. The volume is written in an interesting manner and the seven maps are unusually good.—From the same publisher comes Mr. Clapperton's *First Steps in New Testament Greek*, a simple and rudimentary introduction to the accidence of the language with a few syntactic rules. It is to be hoped it will not prevent students from using the same publisher's *Introduction to New Testament Greek*, by Mr. J. H. Moulton.—A more ambitious attempt is Mr. A. T. Robertson's *New Testament Greek Syllabus for Junior Greek Class* (Dearing, Louisville, Kentucky). A great deal may be learned from the hundred small pages of this little manual. Philology and syntax are treated in a scholarly fashion, although occasionally the changes introduced into later Greek are neglected.

From Mr. Andrew Melrose comes an excellently edited issue of *The Heidelberg Catechism*. The editor's name is not given—unless we are to infer that this is from the hand of the general editor of the series of "Books for the Heart"—but our warm thanks are due to him for the German text and translation, and especially for his Introduction, in which he gives a clear account of related catechisms.

Messrs. Eyre & Spottiswoode send us a small (pearl 24mo) illustrated Bible. The illustrations are highly coloured.—They also issue *The Crimson Letter Testament*, so called because all the words of our Lord are printed in bright red colour.—The same firm publishes *The Child's Guide to the Book of Common Prayer*, by Ernest Esdaile. Messrs. Gale & Polden issue *From the Battlefield to a Glorious Resurrection*, by Expectans, in which the theory that the spiritual body exists in embryo in the natural body and is disengaged at death is advocated. Mr. Ellis, editor of the

Tool Basket, issues through Messrs. Simpkin, Marshall & Co. *The Evangelist's Wallet and Christian Worker's Note-Book*. We have received from The Knickerbocker Press Horatio Dresser's *Living by the Spirit*; from Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton, *Bersier's Pulpit*, containing an analysis of all the published sermons of the celebrated French preacher. This analysis is skilfully made by Mr. J. F. B. Tinling; also Dr. J. R. Miller's *The Golden Gate of Prayer*, consisting of doctrinal studies in the Lord's Prayer in the author's well known edifying style; from Messrs. Methuen & Co. a most useful compilation of facts and opinions on *The People of China: their country, history, life, ideas, and relations with the foreigner*, by Mr. J. W. Robertson-Scott.

From Messrs. Melville, Muller & Slade, of Melbourne, comes an "Essay in constructive religious Meliorism," entitled, *I Say unto You*, from the pen of Rev. J. Wellington Owen, B.A. (Oxon.); a learned and able and sincere, but somewhat confused piece of writing.

We have received *The Journal of Theological Studies*, the *Critical Review*, and *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, all of which contain much interesting and profitable matter.

MARCUS DODS.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

V.

FAITH AND THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD.

THE righteousness of God, which for St. Paul is equivalent to the gospel, is hardly presented to us, in the Epistle to the Romans, as a thing in itself. No doubt there is a sense in which it is independent of the relation of any man to it; it is *there*, there in Jesus Christ set forth by God as a propitiation in His blood, whether men look that way or refuse to look. It is as real as the presence of the Son of God in the world, as real as His death upon the Cross, whether men comprehend it and appropriate it or not. But although the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* must have this outwardness and independence, since otherwise the Evangelist would have nothing to preach, St. Paul habitually thinks and speaks of it in relation to that human act or experience in which it becomes man's. That act is faith. Apart from faith, the revelation of God's righteousness is nothing to us; through faith, all that it is and means becomes ours. Hence it is a Divine power to save in the case of every one who has faith (chap. i. 16); it is revealed "from faith to faith"; that is, according to the most probable interpretation, faith is from first to last the condition on which we appreciate the revelation, and make its blessings our own (chap. i. 17); the end of an apostolic ministry is to produce among men that submission to God's way of salvation which can be described as the obedience of faith (chap. i. 5):

even the propitiation which Christ is in His blood is expressly characterized as a propitiation "through faith" (chap. iii. 25), as though the Apostle would warn us against ascribing any magical virtue to the propitiatory death where faith in it was wanting. The subject of this paper is faith in relation to the righteousness of God, as St. Paul exhibits it in the Epistle to the Romans.

St. Paul himself nowhere gives a definition of faith, the reason being presumably, as Pfleiderer suggests, that he does not employ the word in any other than the current sense, or at least is not conscious of doing so. Where the gospel is spoken of as a message which the Apostle delivers, to believe naturally means to accept his testimony, to receive his message as true; where it is identified with a person, with God as its source, or with Christ as its mediator, then the acceptance of the message is elevated into some kind of trust reposed in God or in Christ. In a sense religious faith always has God as its object, and means reliance upon Him in the character in which He has revealed Himself. It may be reliance on a word which God has spoken, holding fast to such a word as the one thing which cannot be shaken in a world of unrealities: such was the faith of Abraham, who lived as if the only reality in the universe were this, that his seed should inherit Canaan, and that through him all the families of the earth should be blessed. It may be reliance on a deed which God has done, a deed in which His character is so exhibited as to evoke the confidence of men. If we regard the presence of the Son of God in the world, including His death and resurrection, as one such great revealing act of God, we can understand how Peter speaks of Christians as those who "believe in God through Christ" (1 Pet. i. 21). Such faith might be indefinitely rich in content, as rich as the life of Jesus recorded in the Gospels and as the innumerable impulses to trust which spring out of it. If, again, the

act of God is that central and decisive one—the setting forth of Christ as a propitiation in His blood—in which He deals with the sin of the world for man's salvation, then the corresponding faith is that sinner's faith on which Paul concentrates attention as the condition of being right with God. It is really this last which we have to consider. The generic use of the terms "faith" or "believing" by the Apostle may be disregarded; the point of interest is his specifically Christian use of them—that is, his use of them in relation to the revelation of the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* in the propitiation of Christ.

The first point to notice is that such faith only becomes possible when the object which evokes it is presented to the sinner. There must be an exhibition, through the preaching of the gospel, not merely of Christ, or even of Christ crucified, but of Christ as in His death a propitiation for sin. Without this, there is not, for the Apostle, any possibility whatsoever of faith, or salvation, or even of what some people would call Christianity. This is the one and indispensable foundation for everything Christian. It is sometimes asserted that there are really two ways of putting the gospel in Paul: first, a forensic or judicial way; and second, an ethical or mystical way. To the forensic gospel, Christ is in some sense man's substitute, and faith means the acceptance of what He has done for us; to the mystical or ethical, He is in some sense man's representative, and faith means identification with Him in His death and life. Often, it is added, the "forensic" is the inferior type of gospel, a type in which the form, borrowed from Pharisaism, does great injustice to the Christian contents; it is the ethico-mystical gospel which really answers to the experience of Christian men. The conception of faith, too, which answers to the forensic gospel, and to the substitutionary Christ of the propitiation, is indefinitely empty and unreal—it is a mere abstraction; the faith, on the other

hand, which corresponds to the gospel of ethical identification with Christ, is the rich and powerful moral force in which the Christian actually lives and moves and has his being. The same criticism, too, is passed on the issues of faith in the respective cases. The righteousness of God in the "forensic" gospel is only, it is said, an imputed righteousness; some sort of unreality clings to it; to build our life on it is to build on a false bottom, and in point of fact it has constantly led to moral disasters; whereas the divine righteousness of the ethico-mystical gospel is as real as the union with Christ, and if at any given moment defective enough, it has yet the promise and potency of perfection in it.

This whole line of argument seems to me not only mistaken in itself, but conspicuously and even wantonly unjust to St. Paul. That the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans says all that has been said above about union with Christ through faith is not to be questioned; but (1) he does not say it as a substitute for what he has said before about faith in Christ set forth by God as a propitiation in His blood; nor (2) does he say it in blank forgetfulness of this, or in no relation whatever to it. It is assumed in all such criticism of the Apostle that in Christ on His Cross, *independent of His propitiatory character*, there is that which will draw sinful souls into mystical union with Him. This, it is very safe to say, the Apostle would at once have denied. And he would have been in the right in denying it. There must be something in the death of Jesus on the Cross, more than in other deaths, which draws men into union with Him; what is it? In what does the attractive, subduing, constraining power of that death lie? Those who set the ethico-mystical theory of faith and salvation against what they call the forensic, or who make the two independent of each other, have no answer: the power of the death of Jesus to draw men into mystical union with Him

is merely impressionist ; the rationale of it is to seek. But Paul *has* an answer. The death of Christ has power to draw sinners into union with Him because it is in point of fact—such is the marvellous love embodied in it—*their* death which He dies. The seat of the attraction in Christ, in virtue of which sinners are drawn into ethico-mystical union with Him, the point of contact which sinners have in the Sinless One, is nothing else than this, that He has come into our place, that on the Cross He is taking our responsibilities, bearing our sins, dying our death. Here is the love of Christ which takes hold of men, and draws them into the ethico-mystical union. But put this aside, and there is no force to produce this union, in the case of Christ, any more than in the case of other sufferers for righteousness' sake, whose story impresses our hearts. The union with Christ in His death, therefore, which is represented as an alternative to Christ's propitiation for our sins and the acceptance of it by faith, is in reality no such thing ; neither is it a thing independent of the propitiatory death ; it is its effect, or rather its fruit. It is Christ our Substitute, Christ who bore our burden, Christ who made our sins His own when He died our death upon the tree, it is that Christ and no other in whom the power dwells, and by whom it is exercised, to draw sinners to Himself and make them one with Him in death and life. The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of Romans are not a new gospel for those who do not care for the third, fourth and fifth ; they are not an accidental, or a much needed, supplement to those chapters, having yet no organic connexion with them ; they are vitally involved in them, *and in nothing else*. Apart from the significance of Christ's death, as exhibited in chaps. iii.—v., the power of it as exhibited in chaps. vi.—viii. is baseless, inexplicable, incredible. All Christianity, including the mystical union with Christ, has the atonement and faith at the foundation of it, and it can

have no other foundation. To St. Paul there is only one gospel, and his construction of it is one: it is no thing of shreds and patches, but a seamless garment. The true connexion of his ideas is perfectly put in the glorious lines of that great mystic, St. Bernard—

*Propter mortem quam tulisti
Quando pro me defecisti;
Cordis mei cor dilectum,
In te meum fer affectum!*

As a comment on the connexion between Romans iii. iv. v. and Romans vi. vii. viii.—on the relation of the substitution of Christ to ethical identification with Him—of Christ for us to Christ in us or we in Him—this for truth and power will never be surpassed. But blot out the first two lines and the inspiration of the third and fourth is gone. Precisely so, I venture to say, blot out the “forensic” representation of St. Paul’s gospel, and the “ethico-mystical” one has the breath of its life withdrawn. There is no regeneration if you give the go by to the atonement; it is the atonement received by faith—that is, it is justification—which regenerates.

But to return. If faith is only possible when the object which evokes it is presented to the sinner, it is no less true that the object presented to the sinner in the gospel is fitted to evoke faith. There is nothing arbitrary in making faith the condition of salvation. When a sinner knows what Christ on the Cross means—when he accepts the apostolic testimony that this is not merely a murder or a martyrdom, but a propitiation—when he recognises that in Jesus Christ as set forth in His blood the love of God is bearing the sin of the world—when it comes upon him that *this* is the revelation of what God is in relation to sinful men; then he understands also that there is only one act and attitude by which the sinful man can properly respond to God, that, namely, in which he gives himself up un-

reservedly to the love demonstrated in Christ. If he had another hope, he cannot keep it; he lets everything go, that he may unconditionally surrender to this. If he had no other hope, then this is his refuge from despair; a love to which sin is as tragically real as it is to him, and which makes his sin its own. Can a man with a bad conscience buy that? Can he earn it? Can he pay for it? Can he do anything but commit himself unconditionally to it, knowing that only so can he be right with God? Can he think that there is anything else in the world on which a sinner may hope to build up a good life than this assured love of God bearing the world's sin? The questions answer themselves. To St. Paul faith, in the specifically Christian sense, is the act, or if we prefer it the state, of the soul in which the appropriate response is being made to the revelation of God's righteousness in the propitiation of Christ. For such a soul, that propitiation, or the revelation of God which is made in it, is the universe; nothing else counts. The soul is given up to it; it is absorbed, overcome, determined through and through by it; its past does not count; its future is divinely assured; in the great renunciation and abandonment of faith it is at last right with God; it counts on Him, and He undertakes for it. This is the experience which St. Paul has in mind when he speaks of justification by faith. The justified man is one whose relation to God is determined not by sin, or by the law, but by Christ who died for sin, and by faith in Him and His atoning death.

The criticisms of the Pauline gospel of justification by faith, ancient and modern, are innumerable, but in the main they are of two kinds. First, it is asserted that the whole conception of propitiation (to which faith is here made relative) implies a "legal" and therefore a false conception of God's relations to man. This has been already considered in the papers on sin and law. Secondly, it is asserted that the "legal" justification of man, secured

through the substitution of Christ, is without moral contents, and contains no moral guarantees for the sinner's future life. This is in effect answered in the representation given above of what justifying faith truly is, and it will be more fully dealt with below when we consider what St. Paul himself says about faith establishing the law. To get a more adequate idea of the faith through which man becomes right with God it is only necessary to study the passage in Romans iii. 27 ff. in which the Apostle, at the close of his demonstration of the significance of Christ's death, points out the characteristics of the Christian religion as based upon faith in it.

"Where," he asks, "is boasting, the boasting with which Pharisaism is so familiar? It is at once shut out. How is the religion—the Divine institute—to be characterized, which so summarily excludes it? Is it to be characterized by works? No. It is to be characterized by faith. For our conclusion is that a man is justified by faith apart from works of law." It is implied in this, of course, that faith is not a work of law. There is nothing meritorious in it, nothing on the ground of which the believing sinner may claim acceptance with God as his due. It implies a relation to God into which such ideas cannot possibly intrude. But although boasting (*καύχησις*) in this sense is excluded, it is introduced in another, and introduced through faith. The believing man, justified by his faith, makes his boast in the Lord (chap. v. 1-3). *Καυχᾶσθαι* is a favourite Pauline word; and exultation, triumphant assurance, glorying in God, are the characteristics of the Apostle's faith. He knew perhaps better than any one who has ever lived what that word means: The joy of the Lord is your strength.

There has been much theological discussion as to the relation of assurance to faith, and the motives of the usually meticulous treatment of the problem (the desire not to wound tender, timid consciences, not to encourage presump-

tion, not to blunt the zeal for sanctification) are honourable enough; but it is certain that out of regard for them the apostolic mood has often been completely lost. When a man has his eye fixed on Christ, set forth by God as a propitiation in His blood, is it a sin for him to be *sure* of God's love to the sinful? Can he be *too* sure of it? Is it presumptuous of him to be *perfectly* sure? Is not the presumption rather in doubting it? All great evangelists have felt that without an *initial assurance* of God's love, an assurance which is not so much an added perfection of faith as the very soul of faith, the sinner never does justice to God, never is truly made right with Him, never gives the gospel a chance, or gets for himself the inspiration the gospel can give. What Paul means when he cuts faith off completely from works is to emphasize its sole sufficiency for the religious life, a sufficiency of course conditioned by its object, but once its object is apprehended, unconditional. As long as the sinner holds on, though it were but with his finger-tips, to something in which the initiative and the credit are his own, he does not abandon himself unreservedly to the mercy of God in Christ; and until he does this he can never know what incomparable impulses of strength and gladness dwell in the atonement. Yet it is in these alone that his hope of a future life of virtue lies. This is the answer to all the timid qualifications of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Reduced to their simplest terms, and exhibited in their true meaning, they are neither more nor less than attempts to take moral guarantees from the sinner *before* he is allowed the benefit of the gospel. But the very meaning of the gospel—and here we see with what propriety justification by faith is treated as identical with the gospel—is that the sinner is not in a position to give any such guarantees. Allow him unconditional access to Christ the propitiation, allow him an initial unconditioned assurance of the sin-bearing love of God, and all

moral guarantees will be found in that. The gospel does not demand such guarantees, because it is its business to provide them.

This truth, which is often missed by moralizing critics of St. Paul, has been grasped in some fashion by every branch of the Christian Church. The moralist is apt to be a legalist without knowing it, and he is slow to understand that morality may be transcended without being endangered; or rather that, in the case of men who have a bad conscience through sin, morality *must* somehow be transcended by an unconditional grace, if such men are ever to have the chance of being moral again. But this unconditional grace—this grace which is here, antecedent to any moral guarantee the sinner can offer, requiring of him nothing but that he abandon himself to it, and giving him the assurance that if he do so all will be well—this unconditional grace is what is represented alike in the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith alone, in the Calvinistic doctrine of sovereign electing grace, and in the Romish doctrine of the grace contained in the Sacraments. All these doctrines mean, at bottom, the same thing. They mean that in the work of man's salvation an unconditioned initiative belongs to God, and that all that is required of man is the unreserved abandonment of himself to what God has done. That is faith in the sense of St. Paul, and it contains everything because it contains God the Saviour in the revelation of His grace. Faith is the abandonment of the soul to that revelation in the assurance of its utter truth. It is not an antecedent condition, a work of law which a man must make good out of his own resources before he can receive the Gospel; it is nothing else than the acceptance of the Gospel. That is why it puts a man right with God, and has all joy, and all moral possibilities, in it.

Next to the all-sufficiency of faith—for this is what is

really meant by the exclusion of "works" from the initiation of the Christian life—St. Paul insists on the universality of it as a religious principle. The inseparable association of "faith" and "all" is very striking in the Epistle. The obedience of faith is to be won among all the nations (Rom. i. 5); the gospel is the power of God to every one who has faith (i. 16), to Jew first and also to Greek; the righteousness of God is through faith in Christ Jesus, upon all that believe, without distinction (iii. 22); any Christian is adequately described as one who has faith in Jesus (iii. 26). It is in this line that St. Paul asks, when he has finished his exposition of propitiation and faith in their relations to each other, Is God—that is, the God who has set forth Jesus as a propitiation in His blood—a God of Jews only? Does that great demonstration of love appeal to something national, so that only those born in a certain line, and trained in a certain tradition, can respond to it? Far from it. That to which the great propitiation appeals is neither Jewish nor Greek, neither ancient nor modern, neither oriental nor occidental; it is simply human. God in His propitiation undertakes for sin, and appeals to the sinner for unreserved trust: that is the whole matter. As a religious principle the faith which is the response of the sinful soul to the atonement abolishes all national distinctions; the only realities in its world are the Redeemer God, and the soul in which His love evokes the response of faith. Paul was conscious of this inference from the very hour of his conversion: it pleased God, he says, to reveal His Son in me, *that I might preach Him among the nations* (Gal. i. 16). It was not a Jew who was saved on the way to Damascus, but a sinner; and the same appeal, made to the same necessity, and evoking the same response, was independent of all national limitations. The Cross, as St. Paul interprets it, speaks a language to which conscience gives every man the key; if we make it out at all, we see this,

and know that there is but one way in which circumcision and uncircumcision alike, or ancient and modern alike, or cultured and uncultured alike, can become right with God, and face life with assurance and joy.

It might seem an immediate inference from this that all that was Jewish passed out of religion, or, to use words that were natural then, though in some respects too big for this meaning, that faith abolished the law (chap. iii. 31). No doubt the inference is in some sense, or even in various senses, just. As it has been put above, the revelation of God made in Christ the propitiation is the whole world to the sinful soul, and the response of faith which it evokes is the whole of religion. As far as the law means anything that is national, historical, statutory, it is made void by faith: Christ is the end of it to every one who believes (chap. x. 4); the Jewish religion is superseded. We are not under law any longer; it is not a system of precepts and of prohibitions by which our life is ruled; we are under grace; the life we live is that which grace calls into being through faith; not restraint but inspiration is the Christian's watchword, not Sinai but Calvary is his holy mount. But where Paul discusses the connexion of faith and propitiation, what he is concerned to maintain is that faith does *not* annul the law, but rather sets it on its feet. What is the conception of law implied here?

It may be plausibly argued, if we look to the sequence of chaps. iii. and iv., that what Paul wishes to prove is that the way of being right with God which we discover in the Old Testament, which in a large sense may be called Law, is not subverted but confirmed under the Christian dispensation. In other words, he wishes to prove that in all ages men have been justified in the same way—that Abraham, for instance, the father of the Jews, is the spiritual ancestor of all believers, the type of that attitude to God which has

its final and perfect exemplification in Christian faith, because that faith is a response to the final and perfect revelation of God. There is a great truth in this. God has one people through all the ages, and at bottom their attitude to Him is one. That is why we can understand the Old Testament and use it as a religious book. In this sense, an argument that faith does not annul but confirm the law would be an argument in support of our Lord's words, I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. But if we consider both what precedes (chap. iii. 21-26), and what comes after (e.g. in chap. viii. 4), we shall probably be inclined to the conclusion that what St. Paul means in chap. iii. 31 is something quite different. Law to a Jew, and for that matter to most men, is a symbol of the distinction between right and wrong, a guarantee of righteousness; and what he asserts is that faith is so far from annulling that distinction (as some of his adversaries asserted then and have asserted ever since), that it actually establishes it. There is nothing, the Apostle maintains, to which the distinction of right and wrong is so inviolable as faith; there is nothing which does such signal justice to that distinction; there is nothing which is so productive of genuine righteousness; nay, there is nothing else which can produce righteousness at all.

One could conceive the Apostle challenging his opponents to look at an empirical proof of this. The only good man, he might say, is in point of fact the pardoned man, the man whose heart has been made tender, and his conscience sensitive, by submitting to have his sins forgiven for Christ's sake. To humble oneself to receive the reconciliation which comes at the cost of the atonement is to pass through the only experience in which one becomes a new creature; and short of becoming a new creature, no man ever does justice to the demand of the law. You may think you are fulfilling the law while the hardness of your

heart leaves you insensible to what it is; it is only when the great appeal of Christ's propitiation melts your heart and casts it into a new mould that you begin to see what goodness is, and to be a good man. Faith in the atonement is not hostile to righteousness; it is the fountain of all righteousness worthy of the name. Religion, it might be otherwise put, though it transcends morality, does not extinguish it; on the contrary, the only genuine morality is born of it.

Again, we might conceive the Apostle, when accused of annulling the law by faith, pointing to Christ Himself, and to His undisputed character. Sainte Beuve quotes some one who says that the last enemy to be overcome by the believer is the great God Pan. He means that sense of the unity of all things in which the sense of their differences is lost. Nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, the personal and the impersonal, even good and evil, are fluctuating and evanescent distinctions; they shade off into each other by imperceptible degrees, and even the critical line which marks off good and evil wavers and vanishes as we try to fix it. This is the mood which really annuls "law," and makes righteousness not a reality or a hope, but an illusion and a despair. And in the very world in which this mood overcomes men, and they say it is all one, we come suddenly upon Christ crucified, dying to establish the difference which their minds are weariedly giving up. Whoever else may ignore the claim of righteousness, the just demand of law, the believer in Jesus dare not: for Jesus resisted unto blood, striving against sin, and showed us in doing so that righteousness is as real as His passion, and the demand of the law more sacred than life itself. How can faith in Him make Law void?

But the conclusive argument of the Apostle would certainly be an appeal to his doctrine of propitiation. The faith which is charged with subverting the law of God is a

faith which has Christ set forth in His blood as its object and inspiration. Now what is the meaning of that object? According to the Apostle, it is Christ bearing sin, Christ accepting and making His own in all their tragic reality the responsibilities in which sin had involved us. How, then, can the faith which such a Christ evokes but have the moral characteristics of that propitiation in its very substance? How can it do anything else than treat as absolutely real that righteousness of God to which the propitiation which is its abiding source is the most signal homage? Faith begotten by Christ, set forth as a propitiation in His blood, is faith to which sin is all that sin is to God, holiness all that holiness is to God, law all that law is to God; it is so far from subverting morality that in a world of sinful men it is the one guarantee that can be given for a genuinely good life. It is with such an impression of it on his heart that St. Paul writes: I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is a Divine power to save in the case of every one who has faith; for in it a Divine righteousness is revealed of which faith is the very element.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE LAW OF RECIPROCITY IN RELIGION.

THERE is a natural world and there is a spiritual world. Both these worlds are governed by constant and unresting laws. In many ways, as we should reasonably expect seeing that the same Creator formed them both, the laws of these two worlds closely resemble each other. The principal difference is that in the working out of spiritual laws, will and affection and faith play a larger part than in the laws of the lower sphere. With this exception the two sets of laws are so nearly alike that they who rule

their spiritual life according to the laws of the natural world are not likely to go wrong religiously.

Moreover as pure science is the theoretical knowledge of the laws of the physical world and applied science their actual use, so theology is the theory of the laws of the spiritual world and religion the application of those laws to practice. And as in common life—in lighting our fires, for example, or preparing our food—we often avail ourselves of physical laws without having any deep acquaintance with the pure science of those laws, so people are often very practically religious without being profoundly theological, although it is certain that as pure science is eminently useful to applied science so theology is a very strong help to religion.

It is also of importance to observe that while the facts and truths of Nature are unchangeable, the feelings and emotions of scientific men towards Nature greatly differ. Some scientists have very warm feelings towards Nature. They love Nature. Her beauties and wonders fill them with admiration and reverence and awe. Other scientists are cold towards Nature. Their knowledge never kindles into affection. Nature to them is vast, irresistible, yet in no sense an object of affection. But the feelings of scientists towards Nature, whether warm or cold, enthusiastic or indifferent, cannot change a single fact or truth of Nature. Their feelings make an enormous difference in the happiness of the scientists themselves—in their power of entering into and appreciating the spirit of Nature—but to Nature and her facts the feelings of scientists make no difference whatever.

Again, the opinions and controversies of scientists in no wise affect Nature. The process of the formation of scientific opinion is exceedingly interesting, and scientific controversies often do much good. They stimulate attention and clear the air, thus enabling thought to

breathe and move more freely. But neither opinion nor controversy can convert any physical fact into something which in essence it is not, or abrogate a single law of the natural universe.

In like manner the laws and facts of the spiritual world cannot be changed or subverted by any of our feelings or opinions or controversies concerning them. A man's faith indeed makes all the difference in the world to his religion, but it makes no difference at all to the realities of the spiritual world. Nothing could be more foolish than the vain supposition that a truth is necessarily doubtful because I doubt it, or non-existent because I disbelieve it. My doubt or disbelief is of immense moment to me, but to the doubted fact or the disbelieved law it is not of the smallest moment. Let my doubts and disbeliefs be what they may, facts remain facts and laws remain laws. As I cannot believe any object or truth into existence, neither can I disbelieve it out of existence. We clearly see this to be the case in the physical world. When the ancients thought the earth was flat their so thinking did not make it flat. When the Pope put thumbscrews on Galileo for maintaining the motion of the earth the papal thumbscrews had a momentary effect on Galileo, but no effect at all on the motions of the earth. If a man, disbelieving in the law of gravitation, should throw himself from a lofty pinnacle, vainly imagining he would fly and not fall, his disbelieving imagination would have no effect upon the law, but upon himself the effect would be irreparable. Upon our own destiny therefore the influence of our opinions may be incalculable, but upon fundamental truths and universal laws their influence is nothing.

So also is it in the spiritual world. Our opinions concerning religious truths and spiritual facts greatly affect ourselves, but upon the facts and truths they have

no effect. The atheist, for example, says in his heart there is no God; and the agnostic that he knows nothing about a future life. Their not believing and not knowing makes an infinite difference to themselves—a difference as great as darkness from light or blindness from seeing—but to the existence of God and the facts of a future resurrection and judgment it makes no difference at all. We fondly or fiercely debate the verities and the laws of the spiritual world as if forsooth any of them lay within the scope of our decision! What does lie within our decision is the solemn and endless choice whether we will recognize the verities and obey the laws. But with this choice our power ceases. Neither the facts concerning which our choice is made nor the consequences of our choice upon ourselves can in the least degree be modified by any feelings or opinions or beliefs we entertain about them.

“With the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.” This declaration is a simple and strong illustration both of the power of our beliefs upon ourselves and of their utter powerlessness upon universal moral and spiritual laws. The declaration occurs in our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. Now what is the Sermon on the Mount? It is not a sermon in the ordinary acceptance of the word. It is not merely a good man’s exhortation, or a wise man’s warning, or a clever man’s exposition, or an eloquent man’s oration. It is much more than all these together. For it is the Law-maker’s own declaration of the laws which He Himself has enacted. It is the Omniscient unveiling the hidden facts of the spiritual world and the eternal life of man. In this respect among others the Sermon on the Mount differs from every other sermon delivered in the history of the world. All other sermons are the utterances of fallible men. They are speeches, discourses, exhortations, lectures, expressions of

feeling and opinion. They often contain debatable matter; they are never entirely free from imperfection and mistake. It is altogether otherwise with the Sermon on the Mount. Here is no possibility of error, no misconception of fact, no utterance of mere opinion. The Sermon on the Mount is more even than the expression of our Lord's unerring thoughts. It is the enunciation of indestructible facts and immutable laws.

When, for example, our Lord says, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven"; "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy"; "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,"¹ He is not giving utterance to religious sentiments, but announcing truths which eternally and unchangeably are. The kingdom of heaven is the heritage of the poor in spirit by a law as sure as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. It is as certain that the merciful will obtain mercy as that the force of gravity diminishes as the square of the distance. Good eyes are not more necessary to natural vision than purity of heart to the vision of God. The blessedness of the meek and the merciful and the pure is in no sense an uncertain or hypothetical blessedness—it is a blessedness resulting from laws whose operation is as constant as the rotation of the earth. It is not a mere matter of belief that the proud and the cruel and the impure will be cursed. They are cursed as certainly as the leper is diseased. Saying the Communion Service does not constitute their curse, any more than reciting a proposition of Euclid makes the laws of geometry. Neither does leaving the Service unsaid remove the curse. The laws of the spiritual as of the natural universe are what they are; our speech does not enact them, and our silence cannot abrogate them. In religion, as in all things, true wisdom patiently seeks till it finds the facts and the laws by which

¹ Matt. v. 3, 7, 8.

the facts are governed. Neither personal feelings nor current opinions, neither conciliar decrees nor conciliar anathemas matter much in comparison with the actual facts and the actual laws of the spiritual universe.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the nineteenth century was its development of the scientific temper throughout the civilized world. The scientific temper proves all things, and searches diligently among phenomena for the underlying law. It pays little heed to assertions and renders scant homage to authority not founded in law. Its devotion is to truth and to the evidences by which truth is sustained. Gradually and most happily this scientific temper is invading the realm of religion. Its invasion promises to usher in an entirely new reign for Christianity. It is the beginning of a great religious revolution; the sure destruction of the baseless superstitions which, like parasites, have for ages been sapping the strength of the gospel of Christ. What St. Paul did to overthrow Judaism the scientific temper is now doing to overthrow papalism and every manner of Christian superstition. And it is accomplishing this result mainly by the establishment of the scientific method upon the throne of religion. Religion has too long been regarded as a matter of conjecture and emotion and opinion. The scientific method however is leading us to realize firmly that the spiritual world is a world of fact and law, like the natural world. It is also teaching us that just as temporal health and happiness depend on the recognition of natural facts and self-adjustment to natural laws, so eternal salvation and holiness depend on the recognition of spiritual facts and self-adjustment to spiritual laws. The Sermon on the Mount is the codification of a portion of these spiritual laws made by the Christ, the Divine Lawgiver Himself.

Among the laws enunciated in this code of Christ a

striking prominence is given to the law of reciprocity. Men commonly suppose that reciprocity is only a pious precept of religion; whereas it is a law constant in its operation and unvarying in its effects. When our Lord said, "The second commandment is, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,"¹ His saying implied three truths. First, that brotherly self-surrendering love is the Divine ideal of human conduct. Secondly, that as God takes pleasure in man's highest happiness so He enjoins upon him the highest ideals, because it is only through aspiration after the highest ideals that the highest happiness can be attained. Thirdly, that upon the character of our treatment of our fellow men depends God's treatment of us. These three verities are all contained in what St. James calls the royal law of Scripture, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."²

The least attended to of these three truths is the last—the truth that as we deal with others God will assuredly deal with us. In the economy of the spiritual world the law of reciprocity prevails. As we judge our fellow men God will judge us. As we bestow our gifts on our fellow men in the same proportion will God bestow His gifts on us. If we are merciful to others God will be merciful to us. If we are exacting in our condemnation He will be exacting. If we forgive men their trespasses against us then will our heavenly Father forgive us our trespasses; but if we forgive not men their trespasses neither will our heavenly Father forgive us. Everywhere and in all things the same measure that we mete to our fellow men God will mete to us.

Manifestly these utterances, repeated by our Lord in so great a variety of forms and with such solemnity of emphasis, are more than beautiful counsels; they are the authentic promulgation of a fixed law. From the dominion

¹ Matt. xxii. 39.

² Jas. ii. 8.

of this law there is no escape. Sooner or later it will inevitably be applied to every man, and upon its application will depend his final doom.

Nothing is so real as religion; no facts more certain than spiritual facts; no laws more sure in their operation than spiritual laws. Yet how seldom we seriously ponder over these immutable facts and irrefragable laws, charged with consequences of such immeasurable moment to ourselves! To the world at large religion is either an effete superstition or a magical routine or a debatable theory, or at best a reasonable probability and a beautiful belief. Even among its professed adherents how rarely Christianity assumes the majesty of eternal fact and persistent law. Yet heaven and earth will pass away sooner than one of these facts be destroyed or one of these laws abrogated. You could as easily turn the earth backward on its axis as obtain God's bounty for the niggardly, or God's pardon for the unforgiving, or God's mercy for the cruel or the beatific vision for the impure.

Eternal life and happiness are revealed as depending upon three fundamental facts: (1) The free grace and gift of God. We cannot cause ourselves to live either physically or spiritually. All life is derived to us from sources external to ourselves. Eternal life is generated in us by God the Holy Ghost, the Author and Giver of all spiritual life. (2) The maintenance of eternal life depends on our adoption of the necessary means. God gives the seed but we must prepare the soil. God gives the sunshine and the rain, but if we restrict a plant to drought and darkness it will die. God gives children brain power and conscience, but unless they are educated and trained they will lose both their moral light and intellectual strength. Similarly with the seed and power of eternal life. Without its proper soil and culture it will perish. (3) The gifts and acts of God to us depend upon our gifts and acts to our fellow men. As we

do to others God will do to us. As we give to others God gives to us. As we judge others He will judge us. As we forgive we in turn shall be forgiven. Not only so, but in the parable of The Unmerciful Servant we are taught that if after being ourselves forgiven we fail to forgive others then God's forgiveness of us is taken back.¹ Nearly every parable dealing with the Final Judgment is a solemn illustration of this just righteous immutable law of reciprocity everywhere dominant in the spiritual world.

We see an analogous law working throughout the natural world. As men sow they reap. As they judge their fellow men, their fellow men judge them. Even by his fellows the kindly man is kindly judged, and the cruel man with severity. Others' estimate and treatment of us is conditioned by our treatment and estimate of them. The revelation of the gospel is that this law which we see in frequent yet imperfect operation on earth will after death become permanent and complete. We may by faithful allegiance acknowledge the law, or by indifference and disobedience practically deny it; but neither our acknowledgement nor denial will make any difference to the certainty and fixedness of its operation. We may act on the law of religious reciprocity or not as we choose; but whether we act on it or not it will act on us, for our eternal happiness if we obey it, for our unending regret if we slight it.

JOHN W. DIGGLE.

Matt. xviii, 23-35.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

VII.

THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO HOLINESS.

WE have arrived at the conclusion that Nature, as interpreted by the system of Evolution, is not morally indifferent. We have seen the world of life—itsself the flower of the natural forces—proceeding by a steady growth from Individualism to Altruism. We have seen that the individual stage—what we now call selfishness—was not originally immoral. We have seen that self-preservation was the first law of Nature and that obedience to this law took the place of a duty. Nay, we have seen that self-preservation has never *ceased* to be a duty—that it is the last, as well as the first, law of Nature. The difference between the animal and the man—in other words, between Individualism and Altruism, is not that the former preserves *itself* and the latter preserves another. The primitive animal and the highest man both preserve themselves. The difference lies, not in their idea of *preserving*, but in their idea of self. Completed Altruism is not simply the *love* of others ; it is the identification of others with myself—the incorporation of others in my law of self-preservation. The essence of Christ's preaching is expressed in a single sentence, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." Sin first becomes possible in Man, not because self-preservation *ends* in Man, but because in Man there is first presented to the mirror of consciousness the image of two selves—the one individual, the other corporate. Henceforth it becomes at once the duty and the difficulty of the creature to *extend* the law of self-preservation—to seek for no individual good which would dispel the larger image.

The difficulty of the new duty lies, as we have seen, in

the preliminary start given to the old principle. Selfishness, or Individualism, was already far on its journey ere the second image was formed. Will it be said that this itself proves the non-moral character of the system of evolution? I think it proves exactly the reverse. I hold that the evolution of Altruism would have been impossible if the state of individual desire had not preceded it. For, what is Altruism? It is the wish that another should have the thing I myself have loved. All charity is based on that principle, all help is suggested by that principle. You save a drowning child because you yourself would not like to be drowned; you contribute to the poor because you figure in yourself the pains of poverty. It is impossible that the sacrificial life should precede the personal life. When a man is told to go up to Mount Moriah and offer something for the service of humanity, the thing which he offers is always something which is dear to him. His gift, if it be Altruistic, implies the memory of something previously enjoyed. If it is given merely to show contempt for the possessions of life, it is not an Altruistic offering. No man would dower an object of his love with that which was, in his mind, associated with contempt. The treasure which I bestow on the world only becomes a gift of Altruism on the supposition that it has been already a treasure to me.

But while all this is true, and while it is corroborative of the moral trend of Nature, it remains a fact that the preliminary start given to the selfish principle makes the task more hard for Man. Of the many ages of animal life by far the larger part have been ages of Individualism. The primal man therefore starts with a disadvantage. Cain has not learned to love his brother as himself nor to regard the welfare of Abel's flock as equivalent to his own prosperity; accordingly, he rises up to slay him. The truth is, the progress of evolution has been more retarded by sin than by anything else in the universe. We are in a great mis-

take in this matter. We think of the problem of moral evil as one which affects religion but which is completely and triumphantly evaded by the theory of Evolution. There is no greater error conceivable. Sin is not only a problem of Evolution, but it is the distinct enemy of the evolution that prevails in *our* world. It is the greatest of all barriers to the progress of that Altruism which is the goal of human development. Our process of evolution is not so rapid as it ought to be. There is a drag upon the wheels. I heard a professor of divinity define sin to be "a necessary moment in a process of development." The saying was meant to be religiously naughty; it only succeeded in being scientifically weak. Of course we all know that evolution in the abstract is as compatible with a fall as with a rise. But the system in our world is not evolution in the abstract; it is a particular phase of evolution—evolution upward. The progress of organic life has been a progress from Individualism to Altruism. Any conquest, however temporary, of the Altruistic principle by the selfish principle is, for the time being, an interruption of that progress, and, to that extent, a thing to be deplored. The scientific definition I would give to sin would be "an unfortunate regress in a development whose trend is manifestly upward."

I repeat, then, that the influence of sin is as disquieting a problem for science as it is for religion. No religious man seeks his heaven more pertinaciously than the Evolutionist seeks his optimistic world. It is beyond all question that the retarding element to the realizing of the dream of faith has been also the retarding element to the realizing of the dream of science. Sin is not merely a spiritual calamity; it is a secular calamity. What we call, in the sphere of faith, the march of holiness we term, in the sphere of science, the march of Altruism; what religion calls the *retardation* of holiness, Evolution terms the retardation of Altruism. The resisting element to religion is identical

with the resisting element to evolution; it is in each case the stream of a heredity which for ages has been running in a different channel and bent on a different way. The obstacle in each case seems naturally stronger than the counteracting force. I say "naturally"—"looking only at what we see." Standing at the dawn of the human race, and considering how much longer has been the pedigree of the man's selfish principle than the pedigree of the man's Altruistic principle, we should be disposed to pronounce the hope impossible that the new creature should ever be emancipated from the old thralldom.

And yet there *has* been a process of emancipation. Man has attained in theory and has approximated in practice to the standard of perfect Altruism. In Christianity he has reached the theory; in hundreds of self-denying lives he has essayed the practice. In its centre and in its rear humanity is still outside the city of gold; but the van is already within the gates, and the firstfruits of the promised land have touched the lips of men. How are we to explain this moral progress in the face of moral disadvantages? The nearest approach I can make to an explanation is to call it a deliberate choice on the part of Nature—a choice which in theological language would be termed a manifestation of Divine holiness.

There is a difference between holiness and morality. Morality is goodness; holiness is separation from evil. To the mind of the Jew—the man who of all others emphasized the holiness of God, the distinctive feature of this holiness was its separativeness. The Holy Place in the Tabernacle was screened and curtained from all beside, and the man who entered in entered by a special door. Now, in the process of evolution the nearest approach to this I know is the slow march of humanity towards a completed Altruism. To me the slowness of the march is the main proof of a separative choice. Had it been quick, it would

have failed to suggest to me the idea of purpose. I do not think the idea of purpose is ever suggested where there is not the sense of an obstacle. We never associate the spontaneous with the purposeful. The popular mind speaks, of course erroneously, of "the wayward winds." Why so? Just because of their seeming unimpededness. There is not sufficient sense of obstacle to suggest definite and determinate design. On the other hand, to the popular mind the river does suggest purpose; we describe it as moving "at its own sweet will." Why so? Is it not because the river has a winding course, a course which seems full of impediments, and where the waters appear with difficulty to reach the sea. These, no doubt, are poetic fancies; but they are fancies which reveal a great truth. They tell us that the idea of purpose is suggested by the overcoming of obstacle, and that Man first reaches the notion of design, not by the sight of omnipotent action, but by the vision of resisted effort.

Now, when we turn from the physical to the mental life, the sense of an obstacle to the plan of Nature ceases to be poetry; it becomes fact. It is no longer an illusion; it is a reality. You and I feel within us the action of two hereditary influences—the one driving us in, the other drawing us out. The one has existed from the beginning; the other is but of yesterday. The one has been rooted and grounded in the very foundations of the animal life; the other has been an offshoot, an excrescence. Both are forms of self-preservation; but they are different forms of the "self." To the one the self is the individual man; to the other the self is the outside world—the sphere originally deemed foreign. The conditions here are manifestly those of antagonism; and even a writer far advanced in the Christian life is obliged to confess that the deepest note in his being is that of conflict: "There is a law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into

captivity." The further a man advances on the road to Altruism, the more he feels this bondage to Individualism. It is the cry of science as much as of religion, "Who shall deliver us from this body of death!"

But here comes the remarkable thing. In spite of this state of conflict, we have conceived a perfect ideal of Altruism. In the very midst of this struggle, in the very heart of this conflict, we have aspired to a height of brotherhood which is absolutely insurmountable; the rain is still on the river but the sun is on the hill. This anticipation of the side of victory is what I call Nature's choice of holiness. It is as if, ere yet the battle is over, she had waved a flag of goodwill to that one of the combatants whom she loves best. The human verdict in favour of Christ is a verdict in advance of the environment; we accept an ideal of Altruism which we do not yet follow. What else does Paul mean when he says that we are justified by faith and not by works! None of us have completely exercised the practice of Altruism; the majority of us have not *begun* to practise it. Yet the verdict of humanity has been given in advance. Millions have accepted Christ as the way, the truth, and the life while yet they are outwardly environed by absolutely opposite conditions. The force of the old life—the selfish life, is still too strong to be repelled by the *hand*; but it is already repelled by the heart. The heart environs itself in an ideal atmosphere while yet the real atmosphere remains impure. From the scientific side I call this "Nature's choice of holiness." It is the deliberate act of separation from a force which is still in possession of the field—the selection of an Altruistic path at a time when the path of Egoism is still the beaten and frequented one.

I wish to emphasize this fact, that the distinctive step of human Altruism is not an act but a choice. Coleridge says, "He prayeth best that loveth best." That is quite true;

but it is equally true that this Altruistic love begins with a prayer. It is at first a wish, an intention, an aspiration; and the actual life lags far behind it. This is a platitude of Christian theology; but it is not limited to theology. Science too has had her advocates for what I may be allowed to call "Evolution by Faith." At the beginning of the nineteenth century Lamarck propagated the doctrine that the first organs of sense came from the animal's feeling of a want *without* them and its struggles to supply that want. Here is faith preceding fact. Then came Darwin with violent denunciation of Lamarck, crying to all points of the compass that the fact must come first, and that good *breeding* must precede good thinking. At first Darwin commanded the audience and Lamarck was everywhere decried. But opinion has swung round somewhat and science is divided. I do not think the majority would now say that the good breeding is alone sufficient; Darwin himself in his later letters expressed great doubt of it. The simple question is whether the things we call "inward" have or have not modified the process of evolution. That they have, seems to me as certain as that two and two make four.

In that familiar illustration of evolutionary power—the blind fish in the Kentucky cave—there is a somewhat novel problem which has often suggested itself to me. The fish have lost not only their sight but their eyes. The loss of the organ has come from the disuse of the faculty. They have fallen into an aperture from which light is excluded; and, as they have ceased to have any reason to exercise the eye, the eye itself has ceased to exist. Now, the problem in my mind is this: When we say that the loss of the organ has come from the loss of the light, do we mean that it has come exclusively from the loss of the *outward* light? If we do, we are in my opinion wrong. These fish have lost something *besides* the outward light—the image of light in the brain. I have no hesitation in saying that if, even

while resting in rayless darkness, they could have preserved the *memory* of sight, the organ would have been alive to this day. For, I take it that the memory of sight is itself a use of the organ—a movement of the optic nerve. Every time you imagine a beautiful landscape you are, even though you be blind, making use of that nerve and conserving the form of the organ. Here is the power of *intention*. The memory of sight is simply the will to see, the effort to see. The effort in the blind is abortive so far as vision is concerned; but it is not abortive so far as the organ is concerned. It keeps the organ alive; doubtless it preserves its beauty.

There is a remarkable exhortation by a Christian writer of the first century, "Labour to enter into rest." It is an utterance peculiarly suggestive, and one which has a deeper bearing on our age than it had on his. It is the exhortation not so much to goodness as to the effort at goodness—to the intention, the determination, the striving of the will. The doctrine of heredity will in my opinion bear out the value of this precept. What *is* that which we transmit to posterity? It is not actions, but tendencies, intentions, strivings, "the labouring to enter in." Even where the desired haven may not have been reached the *straining* to reach it becomes a possession for posterity. Here, for example, is a young man with a bias towards inebriety. He makes a strenuous effort to conquer that bias. He fights against his temptation; he practises abstinence; he labours to enter into rest. For fifteen years he is victorious. At last, one depressing day, he reels and staggers in the street. The popular view is that by this one act of apostasy he has fallen to his original level and forfeited all the promise of the long years. The man himself thinks so. He believes that all his past efforts have gone for nothing; and it is this belief that often drives him to despair and forbids him to try again. But is this a just estimate?

Has this one act outweighed the strivings of the fifteen years? In power of hereditary transmission shall these years of inward struggle be less effective than an outward deed performed in one moment of one day? Without hesitation I answer, no. If there be transmission of acquired qualities at all, the stream of this man's heredity will be influenced infinitely more by the long period of inward effort than by the single act of outward backsliding. Indeed, from the view-point of heredity, the momentary outward lapse can go for very little. The tendency is everything, and the tendency has been upward. I would say to this man, "Grasp again the thread of yesterday; it has not been snapped by the deed of to-day."

* There is an old saying, "Hell is paved with good intentions." In the light of modern Evolution my aphorism would be just the reverse; I would say, "Heaven is paved with good intentions." What is *sustaining* this world? Theologians tell us that we are "dead in trespasses and sin," and, from the side of science, Professor Huxley's latest utterances are not much more cheering. I shall not take such strong ground. But I do believe that if you measure the mere outward works of men, men as separated into good, bad and indifferent, you will find that the good occupy a space comparatively small. If, on the other hand, you measure the good and the bad *intentions* of men, you will find a reversed estimate to that given by the deeds. You will find that the good intentions outnumber the bad by a hundred to one. What will be your conclusion from these two separate calculations? Can it be any other than this, that it is human *intentions* that are keeping the moral world alive! I believe, as a scientific fact, that the world would have been morally dead long ago if the preservation of the moral organ had depended on the outward acts of Man. It has been preserved by the predominance of good intentions. The suffrages of the outward acts have been in favour of a

fall; but the overwhelming majority of votes among the intentions of the heart have been in support of a reign of righteousness.

Let us suppose for a moment that the case had been reversed—that the majority of human intentions had been bad and the majority of human deeds good. I am not aware that this problem has ever been suggested before; but it seems to me to open up a most fruitful question. Let me take an imaginary case from the vice already referred to—inebriety. Here, let us say, are a hundred generations of men every one of whose members have had a strong tendency to excess in the use of alcohol. Let us say, however, that by a process of hypnotism these generations had been made to believe that cold water was alcohol, and that in point of fact none of their members had ever been intoxicated. The question which I put to the Evolutionist is this, How would subsequent generations be affected as regards transmission? As a matter of fact—beyond an initial experience in each generation—there has been nothing drunk for ages but cold water; would this favour the sobriety of the coming race?

I answer, no, and I am convinced that every intelligent physician will agree with me. Every one of these men has yielded *in intention*. They have taken water; but they have taken it believing it to be alcohol. Their faith, in this instance, has *not* “made them whole.” It is their faith in the identity of water and alcohol that makes them use the water so copiously; and this is as much a yielding to temptation as if alcohol were the actual beverage. I prophesy that in this fancy world of mine the coming race will be a generation of weak-willed men—men liable at the withdrawal of the hypnotic influence to succumb to the seductions of the wine cup and sink before the spell of Bacchus. So far as heredity of temptation goes they will be in exactly the same position which they would have

occupied if their forefathers had been the actual victims of alcoholic excess.

I arrive, then, at the conclusion that the most potent instrument of human evolution has been Thought. I think the continued life of the moral organism is mainly due to the fact that the majority of human intentions have remained pure even where human acts have been inconsistent with them. It is to Christianity that mainly belongs the credit of having discovered this ground of hope for Man. Judaism looked at the *outward act*—the observance of law. It measured exclusively the *deeds* of men and valued intentions only as they issued in deeds. And so its outlook upon humanity was one of gloom. To the eye of the son of Israel the bad predominated over the good, because the bad and the good were estimated not by work planned but by work done. His verdict on this estimate was clear and uncompromising, "By the works of the law shall no man be justified." Christianity homologated the verdict; but it did not stop there. It proclaimed that there was another estimate of human worth—an estimate founded not on deeds but on thoughts. It proclaimed justification by faith—by will, by intention. It proclaimed that while the outer man was perishing the inner man might be renewed day by day, and that the renewal of the inner would counterbalance the fading of the outer. It emphasized before all things the desires of the heart. It said, "Whatsoever things are pure and honest and lovely and of good report, think of these things." One would have expected the word to have been "'do' these things." But science has justified the wisdom of Paul; Evolution has confirmed the testimony of the Christian consciousness; and heredity has put its seal upon the doctrine that men may be led upward by the power of good intent.

G. MATHESON.

ST. PAUL IDENTIFIED WITH ANTICHRIST BY
THE JEWS.

THE reference to Mnason (Acts xxi. 15-18), as "an old-fashioned disciple of Cyprus," the native place of Barnabas the Prophet, is a distinctive prophetic feature in the history of the Acts. It seems clear that the point of mentioning an "old-fashioned" disciple as providing entertainment for St. Paul and St. Luke on the way to Jerusalem¹ is this: St. Paul represented the new fashion in prophecy, the new ideas which he and Barnabas had set forth at the Council of Jerusalem some eight years before, the new and much larger faith which opened *the door of faith* (Acts xiv. 27) to the Gentiles without entrance through *the door of circumcision*. This seemed at first to be a dangerous doctrine. Perhaps the danger might be lessened if their host adhered to the "old-fashioned" opinion and would at the same time vouch for his guests. This amount of guarantee, however, proved quite inadequate; and James accordingly now propounded his almost fatal plan, whereby St. Paul should as it were appease the rage of "the wild beast" by putting his head into its mouth.² Nothing could possibly show St.

¹ Blass is undoubtedly right in pointing out how much more clearly the position is described in the Western recension of Acts xxi. 16, "And having arrived at a certain village (between Caesarea and Jerusalem) we lodged with Mnason," etc. Mnason did not lodge in Jerusalem.

² Prof. Schmiedel, in Cheyne and Black's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, p. 46, remarks: "And had Paul been engaged in carrying out a Nazirite vow, it is hardly likely that his presence in the Temple could have led to an attempt on his life." This remark would supply justification, if any were needed, for the observations which follow, though they were written before I was aware of Prof. Schmiedel's article. The encyclopædists should, if possible, be read, as providing a valuable stimulus to study and promoting a clearer understanding of the Acts and of its author's point of view. Schmiedel also says (p. 43): "To prove that Paul himself constantly observed the Jewish law would, for Paul, have been simply an untruth, and that, too, on a point of his religious conviction that was fundamental (Gal. iv. 9-11; Rom. x. 4, etc.). This kind of assertion is incessantly overstated by encyclopædists. The question is important and requires further discussion.

Paul's marvellous faith in God's providence and purpose towards him, his absolute humility and consideration for others, and his willingness to submit to the judgement of others, more conclusively than his compliance with James's advice. Looking back upon the circumstances now, especially through the mild atmosphere of the historian of the Acts, we can see how the true colouring of God's purpose has mellowed the lurid passions of the Jews, who would have torn the Apostle in pieces in the Temple Court. In the twentieth century we can take the request of James as a matter of course in the unfolding of St. Paul's progress to the world's metropolis, where he intended to plant the Cross; we can see that it was a move upon the board, which brought in its sequel other necessary and most beneficial moves. But if we ask how an impartial observer—an intelligent Nicodemus or Gamaliel of the time, if we could find him—would have regarded James's action, there can be but one answer, that it was the rashest and most ill-judged course that could be advised.

James must have known something of Antichrist. He must have known that, just as Messiah was an all-pervading dream of the Jews of that and the preceding century, so Antichrist was a dream, an almost universal dream, a dream that fiercely haunted many of the Jews, and haunted some of them more closely than did that of Messiah. Their minds would be full of him; and some who could not rise high enough in the moral scale to thrill with the joyful hope and aspiration for a personal Son of Man, could very well summon up a fiery and patriotic indignation that would storm forth against so devilish a thought as "the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the Prophet standing where it ought not" in the Temple of the Most High.

Now just as the dream of a Messiah took many different forms in different minds, so did the dream of an Antichrist. In the mind of John of Ephesus, since the term Antichrist

is not mentioned in the Apocalypse, we can hardly say¹ that it designated Rome. But the idea is essentially that Rome or its representative was Antichrist. St. Paul himself, though he again has never used the term, speaks of the Man of Sin as if he were Antichrist, and he takes the exactly opposite view to John in that he regards Rome as the beneficent controlling power which restrains Antichrist at present, while John in his indignation at the Emperor-worship under Nero regards Rome as the Church's deadliest foe. The true Roman citizen, who was also Jew by birth and training and Christian by conviction, would have been grievously vexed with the Ephesian seer's outburst against Rome. It is hardly too much to say that had Paul the Aged survived to read the Apocalypse it would have broken his heart. He was spared that piercing thrust, that "wounding in the house of his friends" (Zech. xiii. 6).

If all this difference of opinion could exist between two New Testament writers on the subject of Antichrist, it is plain that no less difference would reign among different Jewish minds.² There is an equal difference between the charges brought against St. Paul by the Jews in different places. When it suited them they could, as at Thessalonica, accuse him of "acting contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying that there is another king, Jesus." Yet at Antioch in Pisidia the Jews, "filled with jealousy," had "urged on the devout women of honourable estate" (Acts xiii. 45, 50), presumably on high scriptural grounds of the Old Testament. At Corinth (Acts xviii. 13) again the Jews had alleged the injury done by Paul to the Mosaic Law. At Ephesus (Acts xix. 13) they complained of his injuring their trade in magic. Now it is certain that there were Jews in Ephesus, as everywhere else, who held strongly the belief in Antichrist.

¹ With Dr. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 348 n.

² See Dr. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 380 ff. n. for a discussion of the Jewish origin of the idea of Antichrist, which we must remember was as shifting and unsubstantial and yet impressive as a dream.

Nowhere was the Book of Daniel more closely studied : nowhere was there a more fruitful crop of Messianic literature : nowhere were persons more awake for Judaism than in the birthplace of the Apocalypse of John. Ephesus is the origin of a prophetic writer who within a few years of the time which we are considering was to invoke his countrymen¹ thus : "And thou, Asia, that art joined in heart to the splendour of Babylon (Rome), and art the glory of her person, woe be unto thee, thou wretch, because thou hast made thyself like unto her. . . . Therefore, saith God, I will send plagues upon thee, widowhood, poverty, famine, sword, and pestilence." At the same time he could address his readers in language which bears an unmistakable resemblance to our Apocalypse itself, and yet is Jewish without being Christian.

The Ephesian or Asiatic Jews—for of course "Asiatic" means of the Roman Province of Asia—would bear at this time a special grudge against St. Paul personally. At the tumult at Ephesus (Acts xix. 33) they had put forward Alexander, in order if possible, to prove to the excited mob that the Jews were not to be saddled with the offences of this apostate Pharisee, Saul of Tarsus. They failed, and they doubtless had suffered in consequence since. But above all they were infuriated by his teaching. Had he not himself said to the Thessalonians that there was to be a great "apostasy" (2 Thess. ii.) before Antichrist came? "Anathema!" they would say; "he is the apostate himself; he teacheth men to believe that Jesus is the Christ; he maketh the Law of Moses to be of none effect; he ceaseth not to speak against the Holy Place; he saith that the Jew hath no advantage; that Abraham hath nothing whereof to glory; that circumcision is nothing, that the Jew is abolished." They plotted to take his life at Cenchrea, and thought they were doing God service. For was it not

¹ 4 Esdras xv.

written in the Book of Daniel (Dan. xi. 21, 25, 26, LXX): "And in his place shall stand up a contemptible person, to whom they shall not give the glory of a king; but he shall come in suddenly, and obtain the kingdom by lottery (or inheritance, but in the Chaldee, *flatteries*). . . . But he shall not stand, for a device shall be devised against him." Had not St. Paul's weak bodily presence and contemptible power of speech been already criticised by the Corinthian objectors (2 Cor. x. 10)? Had not St. Paul preached much about the "inheritance of the Saints" and their *lot*? Had he not been already accused of preaching the Kingdom by *flatteries*, as he admitted himself when he wrote to the Galatians—"Am I now persuading men, or God? or am I seeking to *please men*?" (Gal. i. 10). Had he not enlarged in preaching about the "lot of inheritance" (Acts xxiii.)? It would be easy for Asiatic Jews¹ to see in many of his actions and doctrines the fulfilment of ancient prophecy. And it was easy to find more than forty resolute Jews who should forecast devices against him, in other words, plot his destruction. For there is no wind to fan the fanatical flame so strong as a popular belief in the fulfilment of prophecy.

The prophecies in the Book of Daniel continued: "And strong arms shall stand on his part" (Dan. xi. 31, LXX). Well, the strong arm of the law of Rome had protected him once and again against the spluttering fury of the Jews, at Corinth and at Ephesus (Acts xviii. 16; xix. 40). Only

¹ It seems possible, though improbable, that the Asiatic, i.e. Ephesian, Jews who took the leading part in arresting Paul were well versed in the Chaldee of Daniel vii.-xi., but they certainly knew it in LXX, and probably had other versions of it also. From the valuable articles of Dr. Gwynn on Symmachus, Theodotion, Hexapla, etc., in Smith's *Dict. of Christian Biography*, we gather that other versions existed. Such a famous eschatological passage as this would be most closely studied and jealously guarded. Thus it is probable that Aquila's version of Daniel ix. 26, 27 was so hallowed that when Symmachus came to make his version, he did not venture to alter it. By Aquila's literal version, to the fanatical students of prophecy it would be even plainer than by the LXX, that St. Paul was Antichrist, and ought to be slain at once, to do God service.

one step more was needed ; it was that he should be found standing in the Temple of God. " And they shall pollute the sanctuary of awe, and shall take away the daily sacrifice " (Acts xxi. 28 f.). Precisely so. Saul, they would say, is abolishing the sacrifice by introducing the polluted heathen into the Temple, where he had as a fact himself entered in order to make the offerings prescribed in the Law (Num. vi. 13-20). " And they shall place the abomination that maketh desolate." It was written—" He shall honour with gold and silver a god whom his fathers did not know " (Dan. xi. 38). " A kingdom of Gentiles shall corrupt the city and the Holy Place with the Messiah " (Dan. ix. 26, 27, LXX)—just what Saul of Tarsus was doing, in bringing the offerings, so long and carefully collected from the Gentile Churches, to aid the poor Saints in Jerusalem in the name of Messiah!—" and in the end of the week there shall be removed the sacrifice and the libation " (Dan. ix. 35). " And some of them of understanding shall devise for purifying themselves " (Acts xxi. 26)—exactly what St. Paul was doing in the Temple. Now they had watched for him day after day, and he had been seen in the Temple, at the altar, and his four ragged men with him. What were these four? Were they not also the four horns (Chaldee, notable ones) towards the four winds of heaven spoken of also by Daniel the prophet? And what was their poor ragged appearance but a crafty disguise of Beelzebub? For " the four bruised ones were not according to their real strength " (Dan. viii. 8, 22, LXX). And what was Saul doing but confirming his diabolic covenant for one week? And what was he about to do but to stop the sacrifice and overspread the abomination of desolation? They must not wait the full seven days, or they would be too late. So when the " seven days were almost ended, they stirred up the people and took forcible hold of him " (Acts xxi. 27).

The conclusion, the wild conviction and certainty, that the Jews would draw from these coincidences was that Saul of Tarsus was Antichrist himself. Swiftly enough the rumour flew from mouth to mouth. And no wonder that they cried, "Away with him!" There was for them no other way of dealing with "the man of lawlessness" who opposed the law of Moses, "the man of sin, the son of perdition" (2 Thess. ii. 3).

The subsequent measures for his safety which Claudius Lysias found it necessary to take are quite incommensurate with the idea of an ordinary accused person; but 470 foot and horse were not too many to guard the supposed Antichrist on his way to the court of justice at Caesarea, at least as far as Antipatris. Indeed the plot against St. Paul, subsequent to his rescue by the Chiliarch, appears to have been prompted by an increased conviction on the part of the Jews that Antichrist had been snatched from them. The Romans, in fact, were fulfilling their part of the prophecy in Daniel just as St. Paul had been fulfilling his. For Daniel continues—"And the Romans shall come and shall thrust him out, and he shall turn round" (Dan. xi. 30, LXX)—this St. Paul had done when he stood on the castle steps and waved his hand to the people (Acts xxi. 40; xxii. 20-22); "and they shall be angry upon the Covenant of the Holy One (or Holy Place)"—thus they had been angry when he reminded them of Stephen, and the covenant once made with their fathers and now extended to the heathen. Any one who will endeavour to read the 8th, 9th, and 11th chapters of Daniel¹ in the lurid light of an Ephesian Jew, so far as he can place himself in so passionate a position, will appreciate something of the half-reasoned frenzy which flung the mob and their conspirators upon the innocent Apostle. E. C. SELWYN.

¹ The whole passage, which is obscure enough in the original, is more so in the LXX, but it is quite capable of an interpretation which would make Saul of Tarsus to be Antichrist to a fervent Jew of 58 A.D.

*THE AUTONOMY OF JESUS: A STUDY IN THE
FOURTH GOSPEL.*

As the trait of autonomy has been developed by this method, and as there is little or nothing in Philonic speculation to account for the unwonted prominence assigned it in this Christian writing, it is natural to look for the sources in those materials which lay to hand in earlier Christian literature. The general Christology¹ of the Fourth gospel rests upon a semi-Pauline basis which supports a superstructure of distinctive ideas due partly to Alexandrian speculation, partly also to the previous development in the synoptic gospels. As the latter lie nearest to the Fourth gospel in time and spirit, it might be supposed that they would throw some light upon the early presuppositions of this autonomy idea. But as a matter of fact this is not the case. In the primitive synoptic tradition the self-determining power of Jesus is carefully subordinated to his mission. His deeds of healing and wonderful acts are done by him as the agent or delegate of God (Mark vii. 34, Matt. xiv. 19). His power is from God; he is subject generally to the common duties and obligations of human existence (Matt. iii. 15); and as his actions are dependent upon natural motives, his knowledge is, like that of his

¹ Composed in all likelihood at Ephesus, primarily for the local churches, the Fourth gospel betrays the existence of a threefold situation. In addition to the "Alexandrian" Semi-Gnostic element, which requires no comment (Acts xviii. 24 f.), there is evidence that a strong Jewish school existed, whose influence (1 Tim. i. 7) and antagonism had to be met by dialectic; chapters v.-ix. especially reflect the contemporary polemic of Christians and Jews upon the burning questions of the day. Upon the other hand there are traces, as in Apocalypse (ii.-iii.), of the religion cultivated by the mysteries (e.g. iii. 3 = *renatus in eternum*, a technical phrase; xii. 24, corresponding to the Demeter mysteries; i. 18, *ἐξηγείσθαι*, Christ being the Divine mystagogue; xiv. 8 and xvii. 19), the language being carefully chosen and employed to represent Christianity as the final solution of such aspirations and problems. Evidence for both of these features in Ionian religious life is fairly familiar.

followers, beset by natural limitations (Mark xiii. 32, xiv. 35, 36, etc.). Liable to surprise and disappointment, dependent for information now and then upon the course of events or the reports of his neighbours, the Jesus of this tradition determines his conduct as a rule by ordinary methods of reflection and observation, in regard either to the progress of outward affairs or to the inner movements of the human consciousness. The amount of self-possession and spontaneous vigour predicated of him is not more than might be reasonably expected from a personality so commanding and unique, nor is there any obvious interest in heightening this side of his career. With the increase of reflection and reverence in the church, fresh problems rose. The more emphasis fell upon the person of Jesus in early Christian faith, the more richly was his inner consciousness and authority portrayed; the colours were intensified, the features more clearly cut—a development whose traces can still be made out not merely in the epistles and Apocalypse, but in the later portions of Matthew and Luke, where interpretation and reflection predominate, though as yet upon fairly historical lines. No longer is the unique independence of Christ chiefly a matter of shrewdness or rare intuition, due to the working of a rapid, energetic genius who possesses the gift of seizing the moment, forecasting the future, and with the abandonment of entire devotion throwing himself upon his particular age and opportunity. Something higher is in the writers' mind. They see in it the Godhead breaking through. Yet, for all this, it is not the autonomy but the necessity of Christ's life that mainly fascinates their devout imagination. Their leading concern is to show how that life conformed to the prophetic standards or the Divine decrees already promulgated in the Old Testament; consequently the stress falls upon the necessity of his sufferings, of his death, of his resurrection on the third day (Matt. xvi. 21; Mark viii. 31; Luke ix. 22, xvii. 25,

xxiv. 7, 26 = Acts xvii. 3),¹ as the fulfilment of Scripture (Matt. xxvi. 54). This comes to a head in Luke, where divine necessity is a leading characteristic of Jesus and his career: from first to last (ii. 49, iv. 43, xiii. 33, xix. 5, xxii. 37, xxiv. 26, 44) he is devoted to the higher will of God in his activity and suffering alike. His life is represented as the supreme form of constraint—a splendid obedience to God's behest, and that (it must be admitted) in a less artificial and more impressive manner than the method which, as in Matthew, had paralleled it with naïve literalness to the ancient prophecies. "This rigorism," as Keim finely puts it (*Jesus of Nazara*, E. Tr., ii. 328 f.), "which brooks no bending and no twisting, which presses straight forward, knows but one thing and rejects all else . . . lies like a godlike glory on the whole life of Jesus." But while the synoptic gospels thus correctly depict Christ's undeviating adherence to his line of mission, the union in him of inclination and destiny, and his refusal to adopt compromise or to abandon his principles for an instant under any lower suasion, the autonomy of his life in the Fourth gospel is rather different; the trend is to raise him not merely above the possibility of wavering and seduction, but even above that level where goodness is subject to appeals and impressions, as a growing and human product. Influence is quite out of keeping with the Johannine² Christ. There is a tendency to view humanity and its needs as in some degree a hindrance upon the whole to

¹ In view of passages like Luke ii. 49, iv. 43, xi. 42, xii. 12 (besides many others), it seems impossible for us to confine *δεῖ* in Luke ix. 22 to logical necessity rather than to moral obligation (*ᾧφειλεν*, Heb. ii. 17) or natural fitness (*ἐπρεπεν*, Heb. ii. 10). Luke xvii. 25 is a characteristic addition of the author to the source at his command.

² I use this term merely as a convenient adjective. At the most it implies that whatever historical elements or personal reminiscences underlie the narratives and speeches of the Fourth gospel, the ultimate source of that substratum is the development of early Christianity which sub-apostolic tradition has vaguely but persistently connected with the residence of the apostle John in Asia Minor.

Jesus,¹ and to represent the career of this Being in such a way that he would be distracted or degraded by the impact of a human touch. In this respect the atmosphere of the Fourth gospel is theologically superior, as it is ethically inferior, to that of the synoptists.

In the earlier theology of Paul the subordinate place assigned to Christ's human life naturally precluded any widespread reference to either autonomy or necessity in his career.² But in one famous passage (Rom. v. 19: "through the obedience of the One"), corroborated by others (especially Phil. ii. 1-11), the apostle happens to find occasion for emphasizing the latter as a dominant feature in Jesus. His career, as Paul viewed it, was one great obedience, conscious and free, yet due to the Divine behest and rewarded by the Divine favour; submission to God was its

¹ Thus "grace" is conspicuously absent from the Fourth gospel, and indeed from the whole group of the so-called "Johannine" books; it merely occurs as a term in the colloquial and stereotyped form of salutation (2 Ep. 3, Apoc. i. 4, 5, xxii. 21). The only exception to this statement is found in John i. 14-17, where however *χάρις* is evidently introduced, in Pauline fashion, to contrast Christianity with the Mosaic economy. In the subsequent chapters this distinctive feature of Christ's character is entirely dropped; he is not presented as an embodiment of *χάρις*, and it cannot be said that the burden of the story is in any real sense his gracious love. The conception of *ἀλήθεια*, upon the other hand, is more congenial to the author. His Christ utters the claim, "I am ἡ ἀλήθεια," but never "I am ἡ χάρις," and it simply illustrates the limitations of this gospel to say, with Hort (*Hulsean Lectures*, p. 44), that "as the power in him was the grace, so the revelation in him was the truth." Words like *ἐλέω*, *οικτιρμός*, *σπλαγχνίζομαι*, and *ἔλεος* are unknown to the vocabulary of the Fourth gospel, and their absence is highly significant.

² In an Old Testament passage, part of which is incidentally quoted by Paul (1 Cor. ii. 16), any joint action of God and other powers is carefully repudiated (Isa. xl. 13, 14: "Who hath regulated the Spirit of Jehovah, and being his counsellor informed him? With whom hath he taken counsel, that he might instruct him and teach him as to the path of right, and teach him knowledge, and inform him of the way of perfect discretion?" Cheyne). The point of the passage is to sarcastically prove the absolute freedom of the Lord from all conditions that might trammel his activity. He defers to no one, and in this autonomy lies the effectiveness of his providence. In one aspect the Fourth gospel affords a series of variations upon this theme (ep. Wisd. Sol. ix. 13), as applied by the Christian consciousness to some concrete details of Christ's career on earth. His *αὐτονομία* is just the privilege *suis legibus uti*.

principle, self-sacrifice its end (2 Cor. viii. 9). However, as Paul never had any occasion to bring Christ into relation with any of his human contemporaries—disciples or opponents—his writings throw little or no light¹ upon this question of autonomy. Not much more help is to be got from a study of Hebrews, which lies midway between Paulinism and the Fourth gospel, in the development of early Christian thought, though distinctive and apart from both. There also, as in Luke, the element of necessary obedience (v. 8-9) is prominent, with reference to the sufferings and death of Christ. To the question, “Why was Christ’s death necessary?” an answer was sought mainly along sacrificial lines; his death, as this writer understood it, was a vital element in the new relation (*διαθήκη*) instituted between God and man, which indeed could not have come into existence otherwise. Similarly, he had to suffer, because without pain his sympathy and intelligence would have remained incomplete. Such experience was needful to equip him for the rôle of high priest; and that office again is a gift (chap. v.), it is not chosen by the occupant but conferred upon him. One passage (v. 7-9), indeed, on the passivity and human weakness of Jesus lies curiously nearer to the synoptic tradition than to the Fourth gospel, which tends to omit all traces of such infirmity as derogatory to the superhuman majesty and power of the divine Logos. It could not be inferred from the Fourth gospel that Jesus had thus to win his knowledge of God painfully, and to fortify his faith gradually and constantly; the true

¹ Besides, the Christology of the Fourth gospel and that of Paul viewed the person of Jesus from very different sides. As a passage like John iii. 24, 25 is sufficient to show, an idea such as that of Christ’s humiliation (Phil. ii. 1-11) was foreign to the circle of ideas and emotions in which the later writer moved. It may be also noted that in the Fourth gospel, for example, there is no place, as in Paul (Rom. i. 4, etc.), for the Spirit as a factor in the high and glorified existence of Christ; here the Spirit is conceived mainly in its relations to man; it operates among disciples and believers rather than upon the person of Christ himself, nor is this contradicted by passages like John i. 33, xvi. 14.

and helpful idea that even he required to make his way humbly into the higher reaches of thought and feeling is vividly present to the mind of the Alexandrian genius who wrote Hebrews, but it is uncongenial (if not entirely foreign) to the temperament of the Fourth evangelist.

It is clear, therefore, that in previous appreciations of Jesus, even along semi-Alexandrian lines, there had been little or nothing to suggest so remarkable a prominence as that assigned in the Fourth gospel to his spontaneous and independent freedom. Whether his person had been studied from the prophetic, the sacrificial, or the ethical standpoint, the conditions under which it was construed did not necessitate any peculiar emphasis upon his self-determination. So far as any feature was regarded as characteristic, it was his submissiveness (due largely to the popular use of a passage like Isaiah liii., with its impressive ideal of the Servant's obedience and humility), which was only thrown into more brilliant relief by his undoubted majesty and authority. The wonder and glory of his life was that, being what he was, he stooped to obey. His self-suppression, his restraint, his humiliation—these, not unnaturally, fascinated the imagination and the mind of early Christianity. But while it is undeniable that these qualities are recognized also in the Fourth gospel, their proportion is changed. In the balance of elements which compose the character of Jesus here, a new quality assumes an unwonted predominance, and it is this element of the Christology which demands attention. Why was it introduced? Whence did it come? As the latter question helps to elucidate the former it has been taken first. But since the result of our inquiries hitherto is to leave its origin obscure, it remains for us to look outside the records of primitive Christianity and pass beyond the limits of early Christian thought.

Kindred ideas immediately present themselves in the

allied conception of wisdom found in the Alexandrian *Wisdom of Solomon*, a book whose influence¹ upon Paul (especially in Romans), the gospels, Hebrews, and James, is widely recognized at the present day. In its philosophical rhetoric, autonomy of a sort is amply predicated of the divine Reason as she labours among men. Wisdom also, somewhat in the manner of John i. 43 f, 47 f, forestalls her votaries; "she is beforehand with those who desire her, making herself first known. He who rises early to seek her shall have no toil, for he shall find her already seated at his gates" (vi. 13-14). "She goes about herself, seeking those who are worthy of her" (vi. 17). Freedom of motion and penetrating power are hers: "there is in her a spirit that is intellectual, holy, only-begotten (*μονογενής*), manifold, subtle, penetrating (or freely moving), keen (*ὀξύ*, cf. Heb. iv. 12), unhindered, free from care (*ἀμέριμνον*), all-powerful, all-surveying, and passing through all spirits that are intellectual (*νοερόν*, a Stoic term), pure, most subtle: for wisdom is more mobile than any motion, she pervades and passes through all things by reason of her purity" (vii. 22-24). "Being a unity, she can do all things, and remaining in herself she renews all things" (vii. 27). "She stretches from one end of the world to the other with unabated strength, and orders all things well" (viii. 1). "She knows how to divine things old and things to come; she understands subtleties of speech and interpretations of enigmas, she foresees signs and wonders

¹ For Paul, see especially Grafe's discussion and proof in *Theologische Abhandlungen* (1892), pp. 250 f; for Hebrews, von Soden in *Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*, iii. 2 (3rd edition, 1899), pp. 5, 6; for James, Spitta's edition in *Zur Gesch. u. Litteratur des Urchristentums*, ii. (1896), p. 14 f. There is a possibility that it was also used by the author of 1 Peter (von Soden, *ibid.* p. 118), as well as by the composers of Matthew and Luke; it was certainly familiar to the author of the Slavonic Enoch, a century later to Clemens Romanus, and later still to Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria (Eusebius, *HE.* vi. 13). Its wide circulation and its attraction for the primitive church can be further inferred from the fact of its inclusion in the Muratorian canon (see also Epiph. *Haer.* 76).

and the issues of seasons and times" (viii. 8). Such qualities of self-possession and spontaneous energy, which are plainly cognate to some of the attributes of Jesus in the Fourth gospel, must in all likelihood be referred in part to the Stoical tendencies with which the wisdom of Solomon is tinged. In Stoicism independent volition or autonomy was frankly recognized as an excellence of the ideal life; and as the ethics of that school dominated to a large extent the Roman Empire and (if we are to credit Josephus) Judaism itself towards the opening of the second century after Christ,¹ it is not improbable that they permeated the mental atmosphere in which the Fourth gospel was composed, although that gospel is hopelessly at variance with the major part of the Stoic theology. Indirectly, I believe, the Johannine emphasis upon Christ's self-possession takes a form which is more or less due to the contemporary and popular ideas of Stoicism upon the ideal life. Throughout that philosophic school, and even in the minds of many who did not share its distinctive tenets, from Musonius Rufus, or even from Posidonius, Cicero, and Seneca, down to Epiktetus and Aurelius, self-sufficiency is advocated as a supreme quality of character. The divine

¹ Vestiges and echoes of Stoicism are to be noted possibly even in Ecclesiastes, but certainly in Philo (Zeller, *die Philosophie d. Griechen*, iii. p. 271 f.), 3rd Maccabees, and 4th Maccabees (before 70 A.D.); the last named ("worin mosaïsche Legalität u. stoische Moral sich zu einem idealisirten Judenthum verbinden," Holtzmann) is a semi-philosophical tractate, written by a Jewish contemporary of Paul, in order to prove that the pious reason (ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμὸς) is supreme in human life (αὐτοδέσποτος, αὐτοκράτωρ, τῶν παθῶν), the historical narrative being written in order to exemplify the principles laid down in a speculative preface. To say nothing of the Stoic λόγος, the Stoic conception of the world-soul had certain affinities with some elements in the providential function of the Philonic Logos. In arguing from the use of Stoic terms to familiarity with Stoic principles it must be remembered, however, that the moral terminology of this school was widely diffused throughout the civilized world, especially in the first century A.D., and that the presence of Stoic diction is far from implying necessarily a sympathy with Stoic theories. On the relation of Stoicism and early Christianity, see W. W. Capes (*Stoicism*, 1880; chaps. xi. and xiv.).

reason (διάνοια) in man, we read, is exempt from all necessity. While a person is bound to take part in the relationships and responsibilities of life, he is inwardly αὐτεξούσιος, in so far as his intelligence is concerned. The distinctive excellence of human nature is, in fact, its possession of this ruling faculty (τὸ ἴδιον ἡγεμονικόν, Cicero's *principatus*), which tests, rejects, selects (ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον). Amid the swarm of exterior necessities, this governing faculty subsists, and subsists—if one chooses to have it so—not merely unimpaired but steadily developing; the result being that the soul ceases to be moved or turned by outward things, which have no right of admission into its life. On this view man has the power of maintaining himself in tranquillity by refusing to yield to external impressions or be unduly affected by ordinary appearances, so that the outside events of life merely come to furnish him with matter and opportunities for the soul's victorious and equable progress through this world. "Whatever this life of mine is," Aurelius reflects, "it is a little flesh, a little breath, and the ruling faculty." The function of the last named (which forms the characteristic side of man in Stoicism) is to avoid being circumscribed or limited by anything exterior to itself, or—in the favourite metaphor of Aurelius—to prevent life being pulled like a puppet by the strings of desire and fear; just as on the positive side it aims at asserting itself, converting apparent obstacles into a real furtherance of its true interests, co-operating with others and labouring for them, but never suffering itself to be subject to wants of any kind, or to be depressed and distracted. "The leading principle has no wants." It must not stand utterly apart from human life, but it must not on the other hand be melted into the flesh or overpowered by what is gross and common. To be anti-social and to be materialized are two of its great dangers—especially the latter. The ἡγεμονικόν must be preserved pure

and free, as well as allowed to freely devote itself to practical and moral ends; for the inner being of the sage, as Stoicism conceived him, self-conservation was an absolute duty. Hence "intelligence and reason," ideally conceived, "have the power of passing through all that opposes them," inevitably as a stone falls or as a flame rises. "What pulls the strings is that which is hidden within a man; this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this (if one may say so) is man" (Aurelius). Possessed of this a man is independent of external impulse, able to stand erect and to avoid being diverted by blame or praise, advice or warning; like gold or emerald or purple (to use the Stoic simile), whatever happens, he must keep his colour. The average Stoic, especially during the Roman period 60 B.C.—200 A.D., would have readily joined Sir Henry Wotton in praising the capacities and qualities¹ of the independent life—

How happy is he born and taught
That serveth not another's will . . .
Whose passions not his masters are,
Whose soul is still prepared for death,
Untied unto the world by care
Of public fame, or private breath . . .
Who hath his life from rumours freed,
Whose conscience is his strong retreat—
This man is freed from servile bands
Of hope to rise, or fear to fall;
Lord of himself, though not of lands;
And having nothing, yet hath all.

This is merely an ennobled description of the *αὐτάρκης*, the man who is free to live his own life, or (to put it in a less selfish form) who is free to do his task and execute his mission without hindrance from other people, and to adhere steadfastly to his chosen line of action. That a conception like this has coloured the representation of Jesus in the

¹ A similar emphasis is laid in Ecclus. xxxii. 23, xxxvii. 13-14 upon self-reliance, when safe-guarded by friendship and by prayer.

Fourth gospel is, I think, more than likely. Autonomy was identified in the purest ethics of the age with the crowning excellence of human life, and it is highly probable that this element went unconsciously to tinge a portrait of Jesus in which the author aimed at bringing out his absolute, unchecked authority in action, especially for an audience which could not but be familiar and sympathetic with Greek thought and feeling. Certainly the employment of the Logos category in itself involved a somewhat free handling of the synoptic tradition, and at the same time encouraged any tendency to heighten the self-possession and the majesty of Jesus in the interests of faith. But that would not of itself suffice to explain the distinctive phenomena of the Fourth gospel; it is this contemporary feature of Stoical ethics, mediated possibly by the Wisdom of Solomon and allied writings, and rendered feasible by the author's speculative bent, which throws the clearest and most satisfactory light upon his sources and method in expounding Christ's divine autonomy.

The dangers and difficulties of such a method, as I have already hinted, are not obscure. When narratives like these are taken in our dry Western literalness, as if they were intended to be nothing but coherent and circumstantial statements of fact, the reader is plunged into moral problems of considerable magnitude; upon that line of interpretation the conduct of Jesus has given occasion (from the days of Porphyry downwards) to charges of fickleness, deception, vacillation, exclusiveness, harshness, and inconsistency; he is accused of a certain lack of sympathy, and of aloofness from human need; men have complained that they missed in him the charm, the humane feeling, the simple accessibility of the synoptic Jesus, and they have blamed the narrative of the Fourth gospel (not altogether without reason?) for introducing a Christ who stands almost outside the laws of moral

influence and impression, and is apparently tinged with a certain artificiality and restraint in his relations with his family and friends. Most of these difficulties, however, are imaginary. They melt whenever some or all of the narratives in question are regarded, as they were probably meant to be regarded, not as detailed historical accounts, but as, in their present form at least, the semi-allegorical¹ expression of great principles, set with all an Oriental's love of *minutiæ* and incident in the picturesque form of a story, and yet intended primarily to convey and point a moral. Like any true artist, the author of the Fourth gospel has his individual vision or conception of the subject in hand; this idea he develops with occasional representations of actual facts and incidents, fully alive to the place of anecdote and the value of detail as a method of literary proof; but while far from indifferent to the letter, he is true to his dominant idea, and to it he subordinates as much as is needful. It is in this respect that the Fourth gospel marks an advance upon the synoptists, especially Matthew and Luke. They also betray the introduction of an imaginative and interpretative element into the primitive memories of Jesus, and exercise to some degree what has been called "a creative pressure upon incidents." But in the Fourth gospel a distinctive and particular method of vision first obtains its due in the historic representation of Jesus; never before had the analytic details and circumstances of his career been so completely subordinated, in the interests of faith and reverence, to a speculative idea of his person: never before had so intel-

¹ The Alexandrian taste for allegory, with its tendency to depreciate history as such, was quite in keeping with the independent and allied disposition which (as Zeller has shown) led the Stoics to employ allegorical methods for propagating their own ideas of the world and God. Upon the relations of the philosophic Diatribê, as employed in the Stoic propaganda and the early Christian literature, there is an interesting statement in Wendland's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie u. Religion* (1895): "Philo und die kynische-Stoische Diatribe," pp. 2-6.

lectual an interpretation of his personality found expression in terms of the synoptic tradition. It represents probably the maximum of divinity and the minimum of humanity compatible within the limits of a biography of Christ which adhered substantially to that primitive tradition. The result is that one or two traits, such as this of autonomy, are sometimes elaborated so decisively that the accompanying features of ignorance, surprise, mistake, and disappointment, are almost wholly obliterated. Hence the loss of vividness and actuality which is occasionally felt in the Johannine sketch of Jesus as an individual. He is hardly ever persuaded, seldom needs to be informed,¹ is never disappointed in men or things, never taken aback, never mistaken in his hopes or calculations, not apt to be moved to any natural outburst of love or fear.² Whenever character is thus represented as insulated and apart, isolated in the main from the formative environment of circumstance, it tends to produce an impression of unreality and even insipidity;³ and although, for several reasons, this danger is happily avoided by the author of the Fourth gospel in his delineation of Christ, yet we can easily realize how, with a less devout and skilful writer, or with a subject

¹ vi. 6 is plainly intended to correct the idea which might be gathered from the synoptic account (Mark vi. 38), that Jesus ever needed to ask information or help from any source. The slight and infrequent references to such a practice in the Fourth gospel (iv. 1; xi. 3-6) show how far this trait lies from the author's conception of Jesus among men. The normal attitude of the incarnate Logos was a complete and certain perception of the details in any case which came before him (v. 6, 42).

² Except e.g. in chaps. xi. 35 and xii. 27, 44—exceptions which serve to prove the rule (Oscar Holtzmann: *das Johannes-Evangelium*, 1887, p. 133). After making all necessary deductions, the above statement is amply borne out by the general drift of the gospel, so far as Christ's life among men (i.-xii.) is concerned.

³ "The only moral excellence of which we have any experience or can form a distinct idea, is that produced by moral effort. If we try to form an idea of moral excellence unproduced by effort, the only result is seraphic insipidity. Character is formed by action on a basis of natural tendency, under the moulding environment of circumstance": Goldwin Smith, *Guesses at the Riddle of Existence*, pp. 21, 129.

of less moral and religious grandeur, the gain in theological importance would have been accompanied by a corresponding and heavier loss in human reality.

Thy soul was like a Star, and dwelt apart;
Pure as the naked heavens, majestic, free,
So didst thou travel on life's common way,
In cheerful godliness; and yet thy heart
The lowliest duties on herself did lay.

That represents not unfairly the attitude of the synoptic editors to Jesus. To them he was sublime yet human, lofty yet accessible; there was evidently little or no sense of hopeless incongruity between his common lot and the mysterious dignity of his inner, secret self. It would be unjust, in face of incidents and sayings, such as those preserved e.g. in chaps. xiii. f., to assert that the Fourth gospel is exclusively wrapped up in adoration of the lonely Star; but certainly the lowly duties of a human life seem to find little or no place in the picture which this author gives of Christ's average outward existence. It is as though he shrank from urging that the inner calm of Jesus could be rippled by keen sensibility to human woe or weal. Consequently in passing from the synoptic gospels to the Fourth, while we are sensible of an unspeakable gain in our conception of Christ as an eternal and mystic being, a possession of the devout soul, a final revelation for the church and world, it is impossible to deny that we do miss¹ something as we proceed; the high and semi-abstract conceptions of his majesty do not interfere with his tender personal relationship to his disciples, as that is conveyed in his divine and penetrating words (chaps. xiii.-xvii.), but they do serve to diminish those simple and natural ties of intercourse which in the earlier gospels knit him to

¹ No man, says Aristotle significantly in the *Ethics* (*Nik. Eth.* viii. 7, 6)—no man desires that any friend of his should become divine—for then he would lose his friend.

the common business and anxieties of men, and showed him as the friend and lover of his kind, moving unaffectedly amid the exercise of charities that soothe and heal and bless.

It is hardly necessary to add that this predominance of unfettered freedom, as the outcome of autonomy, is not allowed to infringe upon the human side of Christ, as the author conceived him. He is too excellent a writer to have committed such a breach of historical decorum or to have perpetrated the error of painting an entirely abstract and superhuman Christ, even had the synoptic tradition in the churches formed a less solid barrier against such incipient docetism. He is thrilled by the impression of Jesus. "The Logos became flesh, and dwelt among us." That forms the keynote of his treatise, and it recurs throughout. Even Jesus, the incarnate Logos, must needs be subject to the natural laws of the world (xi. 15), to space and time (iv. 1-4),¹ to weariness and thirst; he is accessible to occasional impulses and influences of fear and prudence (vii. 1, viii. 59, x. 40, xi. 54), he is swayed here and there by motives (iv. 40) such as those of grief (xi. 36), strong feeling (xi. 38), joy and indignation (xviii. 20), and he has some limitations of knowledge (xi. 34). Such touches indicate that the author did not conceive Jesus as absolutely out of range of human impulses and needs, or out of contact with the world of men and things, although he strove none the less to show that his autonomy remained intact. Further, in chapters xiii.-xvii. a true humanity appears; the words addressed to his inner circle of adherents are suffused with love and joy that hasten to communicate themselves and still respond to our deepest human needs. Yet the weakness of the book

¹ As Zahn admits (*Einleitung*, ii. p. 549), the εἶδει must not be pressed; it is simply a colloquial and ordinary phrase, employed without any deeper mystic import. Parallels in Josephus (*Antiq.* xx. 6. 1 etc.) and Bereschith Rabba, 32, 81.

lies in this, that the author's esoteric aims and presuppositions led him to confine this side of Christ's person mostly to a revelation in words, and in words addressed to this inner group instead of to mankind as it lived around him. Hence the Fourth* gospel lacks much of that broad and deep humanity which streams from Jesus as he moves in the synoptic gospels. To this author, writing for a circle of Christian believers, Jesus is the head of the church, the founder of a community which stands over against Judaism, the representative and fountain of light amid darkness, of truth against error. The evangelist's esoteric tendency and speculative dualism thus combine to prevent him from quite doing justice to the synoptic conception of the Son of Man, or even to the conception found in Hebrews. To the Johanne Christ ordinary life is not irrelevant, but it seldom exercises much direct influence upon him or carries home to him the same urgent appeals as in the earlier tradition. We miss in this gospel, in fact, that sense of human lives attracted to Jesus and vibrating at his touch, which lends so much charm and persuasiveness to a sketch like that of Mark. In the idealized picture of the Fourth gospel Jesus seldom moves men, and less seldom is moved by them. He seems hardly at home with his age. He is shown to us in a sketch in which high abstraction is not suffered to sink into anything like a cool, nonchalant indifference,¹ as of a hermit spirit, but in which at least it is not the author's aim to do justice to the warmth and graciousness with which the Son of Man treated children and women, the disappointing and the disappointed, the aspirants who sought his

¹ "The abstract terms, Work, Light, Life, Spirit are not abstract" to this writer; "they have all a mystic, personal quality; out of them looks the face of Jesus, and His look is love" (Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 346). On the other hand it is to be observed that the men who approach Christ in the Fourth gospel are, as a rule, individuals of excellent moral character. He is thrown into contact with selected specimens of human nature (Nathanael, Nikodemus, etc.), not with the poor, the sinful, the sick, and the despised.

help, the friends who gathered round him with counsel and support. The range of his motives lies somewhat apart from that work-a-day world; he appears in it and withdraws from it abruptly; he speaks, questions and answers, seldom if ever out of a natural connexion with the immediate situation; and if he occasionally responds in debate or moves in action under outward pressure, it remains none the less true that the general result of the narrative is to obscure the moral communications between Jesus and his contemporaries. Traits and incidents to the contrary exist, as we have already noted; but they do not really form a characteristic feature of this gospel. They are not of its essence. The slightest comparison of the synoptic gospels shows at once how meagre is their sum, and at the same time throws into relief the fact that this author's main interest lay rather in the transcendental quality of the Life in question. The surprising thing is that writing under so dominant and conscious a tendency he managed to combine the real and the ideal with such success, to delineate a character, and also, in doing so, to develop antitheses and ideas of a particularly abstract nature.¹ Indeed it must be reckoned one proof of his literary skill and religious insight that this dualism seldom obtrudes itself upon the whole, when we consider the enormous obstacles met by any one who would essay to carry out a conception such as that laid down in the Johannine prologue. Any lesser man would have allowed the idea to overwhelm the historic circumstantiality, or would have fallen into repeated contradictions as he endeavoured to depict human features and a human situation for

¹ We may put it in this way. The historical descriptions in the synoptic gospels rarely suggest upon the whole that there could be anything incongruous in conceiving Jesus under such concrete and local categories. In the Fourth gospel, however, we are made sensible that there was something to reconcile when the ideal and the real were thrown into close juxtaposition, and that the writer was conscious of this. Fortunately he had before him an authoritative tradition of Jesus, possibly in writing, which was derived from the reminiscences of John the apostle.

so divine a Spirit. For wherever self-sufficiency is delineated upon a large scale, it verges upon an unnatural and arid isolation from the passions that sway human life; with the result that the subject appears to be, like one of Leibnitz's monads, "windowless."

JAMES MOFFATT.

(To be continued.)

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

III.

SECOND CENTURY RIVALS OF THE EVANGELIC JESUS.

WHEN it is alleged that the Jesus of the evangelic narratives is not the Jesus of history, but an ideal figure created partly by the Church's faith which all unconsciously surrounded the Lord with an halo of glory, and partly by the theological processes of a later generation, the question arises: *Is it credible that that age should have imagined such a character as is depicted by the evangelic narratives? Was it capable of conceiving so transcendent an ideal?* This is the inquiry to which we shall now address ourselves, and it so happens there is material at hand for a singularly satisfactory and instructive solution.

By the middle of the second century the Faith had won its way to recognition, and had proved to the intellectual world that it was not a folly to be laughed at, but a force to be reckoned with. Once it engaged the attention of lettered men, they dealt with it after two methods. One was argument, and the principal disputant was the philosopher Celsus, whose clever attack in the *True Word* evoked Origen's masterly reply. The other method was more subtle and elusive. Christianity was not directly assailed, but an attempt was made to undermine it by proving that it was not so wondrous or unique a thing as it professed to

be, and that all the good it contained, and even more, might be found in Paganism. By a true instinct it was perceived that Christ is all in all to Christianity, and its opponents sought to compass its destruction by robbing Him of His glory. Unable, perhaps unwilling, to deny His greatness and goodness, they painted pictures of other teachers of their own, greater and better, according to their standards, than He, and set those rivals of Jesus before the world, never so much as mentioning His name, but leaving the obvious comparison to present itself and suggest the inference they intended. They said nothing, but they meant: "See! here is one nobler and wiser and more wonderful than your Jesus."

At least two such attempts were made to discredit Jesus, and very significant they are in relation to the question of the historicity of the evangelic narratives. 1. The author of the first was Lucian, that brilliant *littérateur*, the last of the great Greek writers. He was born at Samosata on the Euphrates during the reign of Trajan (98-117 A.D.), and, according to the Byzantine lexicographer Suidas, followed the law for a time at Syrian Antioch, but, failing in this profession, abandoned it and devoted himself to literature. It is customary to speak of Lucian as "the Voltaire of the second century," but such a characterization is much less than just. It is true indeed that he plied the religion of his day with his merciless artillery of satire and ridicule, and made cruel sport of the ancient legends of the gods and goddesses; but then the religion of that degenerate period was no better than a mass of incredible, contemptible, and often immoral superstitions, and it was no impiety to rid the world of the baleful incubus. And, moreover, while he did his utmost against Christianity, which he imperfectly comprehended and regarded as merely the latest phase of that ancient and ever-changing superstition, this at least should be imputed to his credit, that he never blasphemed

the Faith; and when he speaks of Jesus, it is in a tone which is wellnigh reverential. "That great man," he says in one place, "they still revere, who was crucified in Palestine, because He introduced this new mystery into life"; and again: "Their first lawgiver persuaded them that they are all brethren when once they forsake and deny the Greek gods and worship their wise man, him who was crucified, and live according to his laws."

Such is the spirit in which Lucian essayed to set up a rival to Jesus by way of demonstrating to the world that there was nothing unique or transcendent in Christianity. He paints the picture of a philosopher named Demonax, whom he professes to have known, and who may have been a real personage, though unquestionably he has been idealized by his biographer for controversial ends. The reason for telling the story of his life was "that he might be had in remembrance by the best folk, and that young men of the nobler sort who had an eye to philosophy might be able not merely by the ancient examples to attune themselves, but also from our own age to set a standard before them and emulate that great man, who proved himself better than any other philosopher I know."¹ It is not difficult to perceive here, reading between the lines, that Lucian's purpose was to set forth a rival to one who was held in general reverence; nor is it open to reasonable question that it was Jesus whom he had in his eye. Such distant yet unmistakable allusiveness was just in Lucian's manner; and to one who remembers his veiled satires in the *True History* on the story of Jonah and the Apocalyptic description of the New Jerusalem,² the reference in this instance must appear indubitably plain.

It must be allowed that the character which Lucian

¹ *Dem. Vit.*, § 2.

² i. §§ 30 sqq.; ii. §§ 11 sqq.; cf. article "Unto the Greeks Foolishness," by the present writer, in *EXPOSITOR*, October, 1900.

depicts is exceedingly attractive. Demonax was a native of Cyprus, and, disdaining worldly advantages, he devoted himself early to the study of philosophy. He attached himself to no school, neither did he originate a philosophy, but selected from the various systems whatever he deemed good. He was an eclectic, and was chiefly indebted to two masters, being a Socratic without the "irony" of Socrates and emulating Diogenes without Diogenes' affectation of humility.¹ His discourses were "full of Attic grace,"² and he always "acted and spoke by the aid of the Graces and Aphrodite, so that, as the comedy has it, 'persuasion sate upon his lips.'"³ He had two outstanding characteristics. One was his pleasant humour, and the collection of his *bons mots* which Lucian gives is one of the most entertaining passages in ancient literature. The other was his winsome humanity. He loved the gracious office of peacemaking, and many were the feuds, both domestic and civil, which he reconciled. "Never was he seen crying aloud or straining beyond measure, or irritated even when he had to rebuke some one; but, while he was down upon their sins, he would pardon the sinners, and thought it meet to take his example from the physicians who, while they heal their sicknesses, show no wrath against the sick; for he counted it human to sin, but the part of a god or a godlike man to correct the errors."⁴ "Such was the manner of his philosophy—meek, gentle and blithe."⁵

Such then is Lucian's rival to Jesus; and, while acknowledging the beauty of the conception—so artistic, so statuesque, so thoroughly Greek—one cannot wonder that it failed to gain the suffrages of mankind or draw away the hearts of sinful mortals from the Redeemer. One prominent feature of Demonax which distinguishes him from Jesus is *his absolute unoriginality*. He was an eclectic, a

¹ §§ 5-6.² § 6.³ § 10.⁴ § 7.⁵ § 9.

mere gleaner in other men's fields; and this of itself is sufficient to place an immeasurable and impassable gulf between him and Jesus. It must seem indeed to a believer a slight tribute to pay to our Blessed Lord, yet it is a fact which should be observed in this connection, that not only did He bring into the world a conception of God, man, and human life which is recognized by believers as nothing less than a divine revelation and has exercised the subtlest intellects for more than eighteen centuries, but this conception is an absolutely new thing. It has its roots indeed in the religion of Israel, but it transcends the latter. Jesus was no disciple of lawgivers or prophets. He was their Lord; they had spoken of Him, and He handles their sacred oracles with sovereign authority, interpreting, expanding and fulfilling them.

It is significant, too, what features of Jesus Lucian omits in painting his rival picture. It is plain that, like Celsus, he was offended by the *σκάνδαλον* of the Cross. The burden of grief which Jesus carried all His days and which crushed Him at last, displeased this Greek's artistic instincts, and he depicts one of excellent wisdom yet of sunny temper, who won the love of his fellows, living admired and honoured and dying amid universal lamentation. How different from Him who was "despised and rejected of men," and died that shameful death on Calvary! It was an ideal picture, and Lucian seems to have had misgivings of its possibility. He understood human nature too well to imagine it possible for a good man to go through life unhated and arouse no resentment by his steadfast opposition, however gentle, to the prejudice and vice of his fellows; and he makes the admission with evident reluctance. "Both the general populace of Athens and the magistrates exceedingly admired him, and continued looking to him as one of the superior order, although at first he offended most of them and incurred no less hatred than

Socrates with the multitudes on account of his boldness of speech and freedom.”¹

The truth is, that very feature of Jesus which chiefly displeased Lucian was His distinctive glory. It was the *σκάνδαλον* of the Cross that made Him the Saviour of the world. Whatever praise may be accorded to Demonax, he was no saviour and had no message of help or hope for suffering and sinful mortals. “The only thing that pained him was disease or death, since he reckoned friendship the chiefest good among men.”² It is precisely here, in the hour of mortal weakness, that consolation is supremely needed; but Demonax had none to give. He had nothing better to offer the afflicted than a string of Stoical common-places, mere aggravations of the suffering they pretended to cure. “By and by the things that pain will cease, and a certain oblivion of things good and ill and long freedom will overtake us all.”³ “When one was mourning for his son and had shut himself up in darkness, he went to him and said that he was a magician and could bring up his child’s ghost, if only he would name to him any three men who had never mourned. The man hesitated long and was puzzled, for he had none such, methinks, to mention; and Demonax said: ‘Then, you ridiculous person, do you suppose that you are the only one whose lot is intolerable when you see no one who is a stranger to mourning?’”⁴ How cheerless such consolation beside that hope of immortality which Jesus brought to light and His Apostles preached!

2. Side by side with the intellectual movement which found in Lucian its most distinguished representative, and which aimed at the suppression of superstition and the introduction of a rational view of life, another and very different movement was in progress. It was nothing less than an attempt to rehabilitate Paganism, and its most remarkable phase is the Neo-Pythagoreanism which arose

¹ § 11.² § 10.³ § 8.⁴ § 25.

in the reign of Augustus. This school revived the mystic philosophy of Pythagoras and reinforced it with Oriental theosophy.¹

The most interesting of the Neo-Pythagoreans was Apollonius of Tyana, the hero of a ponderous yet not unprofitable romance by the elder Philostratus. It is impossible to determine what measure of fact the narrative may contain, but it is certain that the historical Apollonius has been marvellously embellished by his biographer. Philostratus was much inferior to Lucian as a literary artist, and his ideal wise man is little better than a vulgar charlatan, strikingly like the pseudomantis, Alexander of Abonoteichos, that "Cagliostro of the second century" whom Lucian has so mercilessly scourged. The story is that Apollonius was born, apparently in the same year as our Lord, in the Cappadocian town of Tyana, his birth, like our Lord's, being heralded and attended by portents. He studied a while at Tarsus, contemporary with Saul, the future Apostle, and then betook himself to the neighbouring town of Ægæ, where he acquired a knowledge of medicine in the temple of Æsculapius and embraced Pythagoreanism. On the death of his father he divided his inheritance among his poorer relatives and set out on his travels. He visited India, and there conversed with the Brahmins and was initiated into their magical lore. Then he journeyed westward again, and visited Greece, Egypt, Rome, and Spain, attended everywhere by a band of disciples. Wherever he went, he wrought wonders and was revered as a god. He settled eventually at Ephesus, where St. John ministered contemporaneously; and at the age of nigh a hundred years he died or rather vanished from the earth.

Although, like Lucian, Philostratus simply depicts his

¹ Justin Martyr had recourse to a philosopher of this school during his fruitless search after truth and happiness before his conversion to Christianity (*Diab. c. Tryph.*).

hero and does not expressly set him forth as a rival to Jesus, his purpose is unmistakable. Nor did it go unperceived. About the year 305 A.D. appeared an anti-Christian work entitled the *Philalethes*, in which Jesus and Apollonius were elaborately compared and the superiority of the latter asserted. The author was Hierocles, who, as judge at Nicomedia, distinguished himself by his activity in Diocletian's persecution of the Bithynian Christians, and in recognition of his zeal was promoted to the governorship of Alexandria. The *Philalethes* is lost, and is chiefly known by the replies it elicited from Eusebius¹ and Lactantius.² Nor should it be forgotten what use was made of the Life of Apollonius by the Deists of the seventeenth century.³

It was the selfsame task that Lucian and Philostratus took in hand. They both desired to discredit Jesus, and each of them essayed to depict a rival who should put Him to shame and draw off from Him the admiration and worship of mankind. It was the selfsame task that both essayed, but each essayed it in a different fashion. Lucian abhorred superstition, and depicted a wise man entirely free of it; whereas Philostratus, as became a votary of Neo-Pythagoreanism, depicted his hero as a wonder-worker of the first order. At point after point he brings Apollonius and Jesus into tacit competition, with the obvious suggestion: "See here a thing more marvellous than your Gospels tell of! What think ye of your Jesus now?"

It is with disgust, not unalloyed with pity, that one reads the story. A fair sample of it is this horrible incident which occurred at Ephesus, and which is so interwoven with superstition that one would fain believe it to be without a shred of truth. The city had been stricken with

¹ In *Hierocl.* included in Olearius' edition of Philostratus.

² *Instit.* v. 2-3.

³ Charles Blount's *Life of Apollonius*, bks. i.-ii., London, 1680.

plague, and appealed to Apollonius for help. He assembled the men in the theatre and, pointing to a poor old beggar, blind—or, as the story says, feigning blindness—ragged and dirty, with a few crusts in his wallet, bade them stone him. Hesitatingly they obeyed, and their pity for the wretch vanished when they perceived the demon in his flashing eyes. When the bloody work was done they cleared away the stones and found the battered carcase of a huge dog.¹ If such was the credulity of a philosopher what gross darkness must have covered the multitude, and how extreme the world's need of the visitation of the day-spring from on high !

As an attack upon Christianity the Life of Apollonius is unworthy of serious consideration, and is chiefly interesting as a singularly pathetic chapter in the history of superstition. It may not be amiss, however, to observe two striking contrasts between Jesus and Apollonius. One is furnished by *their teaching*. Apollonius is set forth as a rival to the Teacher of Israel, yet there is hardly one memorable saying in those eight ponderous books, each of them twice as long as the Gospel according to St. Matthew. Any single verse of the Sermon on the Mount is richer in wisdom than all the discourses which Philostratus has put in the mouth of his hero. And even such poor wisdom as the latter possessed was not his own but had been derived from his master and the Brahmins of India. The other contrast is presented by *the respective attitudes of Jesus and His rival toward the opinions of their times*. Apollonius was imbued with the spirit of his age and shared to the full its superstitions and limitations. Not only did he espouse opinions which have since been proved mere fantasies of primitive ignorance, but he promulgated theories of his own which, though applauded by his biographer for

¹ iv. 10 ; cf. Apocryph. First Infancy : Devil expelled from Judas in form of a mad dog.

their supernatural wisdom, simply amuse the modern readers by their childishness. When, for instance, he reached the western coast of Spain, he observed the phenomenon of the ocean's ebb and flow, so surprising to one who had lived by the tideless Mediterranean;¹ and he accounted for it by the *naïve* theory that there are vast caverns at the bottom of the sea, and when the wind which fills them rushes out, it forces the water back upon the land; then, when it returns like a great respiration, the water subsides.² How different with our Lord! It is impossible to read the evangelic narratives without remarking His singular detachment from current theories. "One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of Christianity," says the late Dr. G. J. Romanes,³ "is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed I am not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of human knowledge—whether in natural science, ethics, political economy, or elsewhere—has had to discount. This negative argument is really almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of—or at least attributed to—Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in the sense of becoming obsolete. . . . Contrast Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought, . . . is nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the Dialogues, and see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors of all kinds, reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to sayings

¹ cf. Caes. *Bell. Gall.* iv. 29.

² v. 2.

³ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 157.

shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by alleged revelation." Whatever be the explanation, the fact remains that, so far as the record goes, Jesus never uttered a syllable which entangled His teaching with any of the popular notions of His day, nor yet with any of the vexed questions of science or criticism which have since emerged. When the Inquisition condemned Galileo, it was not to the Gospels but to the Book of Joshua that they went for evidence of the Ptolemaic astronomy; when the evolutionary theory was propounded, it was not with the teaching of our Lord but with the Book of Genesis that it seemed to be in conflict; and reverent criticism may assign what date or authorship it will to the Old Testament documents unchecked by a single pronouncement of Jesus.

The chief apologetic significance of these two attempts to rival our Lord and dethrone Him from the place He had won in the love and reverence of believers, lies in their emphatic condemnation of the theory that the Evangelic Jesus is not the Jesus of history but an idealized picture of Him. It is difficult, in view of the manner of their composition, to conceive the possibility of idealization in the Synoptic Gospels, which are not original writings but mosaics of traditions. The first three Evangelists were not authors but editors; their task was the arrangement of existing material, and they could not, even had they wished, have given play to their imaginations. But with the Fourth Gospel it is different. It is widely believed to have been written about the middle of the second century, and to be not so much an history of Jesus as a philosophy of the Incarnation, emanating from the school of Alexandria and coloured by Gnostic speculations; and, on this view of it, it may reasonably be brought into comparison with those

two efforts, practically contemporary with it, to pourtray an ideal teacher. No sooner, however, is the comparison attempted than the absolute impossibility of regarding the Johannine Jesus as an ideal creation of the second century becomes apparent. The Fourth Gospel is a transcendently marvellous work. It has fulfilled, according to the late Mr. T. H. Green, "the special function of representing the highest thought about God in language of the imagination, and has thus become the source of the highest religion." This were a wondrous achievement for any writer in any age, but the wonder of it reaches the point of incredibility when one considers what manner of period the second century was, and what its best intellects were capable of producing. It may safely be asserted that Lucian and Philostratus represented, each in his own way, the highest culture of their times. They were both philosophers, and had both thought earnestly about the problems of life and religion; yet how utterly, even ludicrously, they failed when they essayed to depict the ideal teacher! Is it conceivable that, where they so signally failed, another quite unknown, with no advantage of intellect or environment, should have so signally succeeded, transcending the resources of his poverty-stricken age and embodying an ideal which for eighteen centuries has evoked the admiration of mankind, and is acknowledged by one of the subtlest thinkers of modern times as "the source of the highest religion"? Surely the Johannine Jesus is no ideal creation, but a presentation of the historic Jesus, not indeed as He had appeared to the world, but as He had manifested Himself in the wonder of His grace and glory to the heart of a sympathetic and adoring disciple.

It may, however, be urged that it is not necessarily a question of intentional idealization. The contention is rather that the historic Jesus was transfigured by the faith of the primitive Church, and it is this coloured and dis-

torted image that is depicted by the Evangelists. The latter did not, like Lucian and Philostratus, set to work with a deliberate purpose of idealizing, but they saw Jesus from the standpoint of their time and through the atmosphere of their religious and intellectual environment; and thus "the conception of Jesus in the gospels represents not only the historical likeness as its traits were preserved in the primitive evangelic tradition, but also the religious interests of the age in which and for which these narratives were originally drawn up."¹

Now, if it be incredible that the evangelic image of Jesus is a consciously idealized creation, it is surely tenfold more incredible that blind and groping ignorance should thus have chanced upon it, blundering into a conception which puts to utter shame the best imagining of the highest culture and intelligence of the age; like that ancient painter who, unable to represent the foam on a horse's mouth, dashed his brush at the canvas in a rage and produced the very effect he desired. Had the Evangelists deliberately set themselves to idealize the historic Jesus, they could have produced at the best a Demonax or an Apollonius; while, had the primitive tradition been unconsciously modified by the faith and thought of the Church, the result must have been not idealization but degradation. It were indeed no marvel had some skilful hand painted a picture of Jesus which, though unhistorical, should yet have been a harmonious and noble conception; but that a multitude of scattered traditions should have taken shape and resolved themselves into that matchless image which is enshrined in the Gospels, ἐν οἷς ἐγκαθέζεται ὁ Χριστός,² were a miracle no whit less stupendous than that "fortuitous concourse of atoms" whence, on the Lucretian theory, this wondrous universe originated ἀτερ θεοῦ.

¹ Moffatt, *Hist. N. T.*, p. 11.

² Irenaeus, *Adv. Hær.* III. ii. 8.

In a quiet nook of Scotland lies a little town, remote from the throng of cities and the highways of commerce. It is an old-world place, and certain of its red-tiled and moss-grown dwellings bear dates of the seventeenth or the sixteenth century inscribed over their crumbling lintels. Built here and there into their rude walls one observes blocks of masonry, broken and defaced, yet skilfully shaped and carved with artistic devices. How comes it that they are found in so unworthy a setting? Hard by stand the grey ruins of an ancient castle which, if tradition be true, sheltered King Robert the Bruce ere he had won Scotland's liberty; and when "the rude forefathers of the hamlet" were minded to build them dwellings that venerable pile served them as a convenient quarry. At a glance one recognizes those fragments of nobler handiwork amid their rough and alien setting.

Even thus does the evangelic portraiture of Jesus shine amid the ignoble rubbish of contemporary ideals, putting them to shame and proclaiming itself of diviner origin. It requires no other guarantee of its verisimilitude than the simple fact that it is what it is. And if it be asked how it comes to pass that it is what it is, the only adequate and reasonable answer is that the Evangelists had before them the vision of that wondrous life, and faithfully and reverently set it forth; being withal singularly aided by that "Spirit of wisdom and revelation" Who "enlighteneth the eyes of the heart in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ."

DAVID SMITH.

"JUSTIFIED IN THE SPIRIT."

THIS clause is one of the minor difficulties of 1 Timothy iii. 16, and in trying to interpret it we need mention only one of the main questions which the text raises. How are we to explain the grammar of *ὃς ἐφανερώθη*—"who was manifested"? The most satisfying answer seems to be that which makes the verse from the "who" to the end a quotation, and a quotation probably from an early hymn or chorus.

After the introductory sentence then the verse may be treated as a stanza of six lines. It is printed so in Westcott and Hort. They must of course be divided either as triplets or as couplets. If we take them in couplets each division will present the mystery of godliness under two aspects—an outer and an inner, a heavenly and an earthly, a human and a divine. Moreover each of the three divisions turns back from the point at which the preceding couplet pauses, thus making the thought metre of this ancient chant resemble the word metre of Tennyson's "In Memoriam."

Who was manifested in the flesh,
Justified in the Spirit,
Seen of angels,
Preached among the nations,
Believed on in the world
Received up in glory.

Flesh and spirit, angels and nations, the world of sinners and the glory that cometh from the only God combine to set forth the wealth of this revealed mystery.

Our concern is with the second line of the first couplet, "Justified in the Spirit." The contrast with "flesh" is reason enough for following the Revised Version and printing "Spirit" with a small s. Though it is the work of the Holy Spirit to glorify the Saviour, the Holy Spirit is not directly meant by the term here. Probably the most rudi-

mentary sense of the contrast between flesh and spirit in the New Testament—the root conception from which the others branch out—is the contrast of inner and outer. The context usually adds some special shade of colour to this, and makes us think sometimes of pure and impure, sometimes of higher and lower, sometimes of real and unreal. The last is probably intended here. The flesh is here the passing show and appearance of things, the outermost ring of human experience. No one would think of restricting the sense to the body. It means the body and its nearest neighbours. It includes those aspects of the mind which are most easily touched by what is external and temporary. The spirit, on the other hand, is the sphere of man at his best, of conscience fully awake, of reason properly enlightened, of emotions kindled from the right sources. Our Lord not only came in the flesh to take His turn in the ordinary fortunes of men, but was justified in the spirit, proved Himself to be what He was in the higher sphere to which man belongs. He won for Himself a welcome in that inner realm and made Himself part of the permanent heritage of man wherever man is at his best. Many things appear in the flesh; they make themselves heard; they fill a considerable space in the gossip of the hour. Many an opinion, many a song, many a book, many a preacher, many an author have a great vogue for a time, and that is as it should be. It is their chance and the world's chance of verifying their right to be heard. But of the many that appear in the flesh only the rare few are justified in the spirit. Only in these do men discover a treasure of lasting worth. To only one here and there do we come back when we have recovered from the shock of a passing sensation. The Master, whether in thought or in art, is distinguished above all in this, that He recalls men over and over again to His standpoint after He has been for a time obscured or almost forgotten; His methods come to be taken so much as a

matter of course that they are used by those who reject His name and His school as freely as by His professed disciples. Now if this be true of human genius and its products how much truer must it be of the Incarnation? That fact was an event in history, but it justified itself in the Spirit as well. It justified itself in the sphere where man is at his best. Jesus Christ was manifested in time, but His appearance had an eternal meaning.

To say nothing of its effect within its own peculiar domain, the Church, where the fact has been personally accepted and appropriated, Christ has been justified to the best thought and conscience of all mankind. A few years ago a learned Jew writing for Jews gave his first impressions of St. John. I have not the article by me for exact quotation, but one criticism was that St. John set up the particularism of creed instead of the particularism of race. The universalism, that is, was, according to Mr. Montefiore, incomplete. But the interesting point for us is that a criticism of St. John from a Jewish standpoint should find the chief defect to be a lack of complete unqualified universalism. Universalism is, as all will admit, one of the great marks of our Lord's teaching and spirit. The fault found then with the writings of St. John was that they are not as completely governed by the Spirit of Christ as they ought to be. Whatever may be thought of the criticism from the Christian point of view—and on the whole it was by no means unappreciative—it shows that even outside the Christian Church Christ is the ultimate standard of appeal. When the human heart rises to its higher levels it instinctively turns to Him. Whenever the judgment sits and the books are opened Christ takes the throne by the vote of every enlightened mind, whether it consciously assigns it to Him or not.

Thou art the Judge. We are bruised thus.
But the judgement over, join sides with us.

Wherever the human spirit is at its best, wherever thought is at its clearest, there Christ is justified. Apart from any belief in His divinity it must henceforth be deemed a lack of intellectual sanity in any one who has heard the Gospel to value the pearl of great price as second to anything. To call Jesus an accursed thing is simply to turn the hands of the clock backward and to give up the choicest conquests of the race.

To be justified in the spirit then means to be justified in the higher sphere to which man belongs. "The word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." He proved Himself to be what He was under the limitations of flesh.

The closest parallel perhaps to this meaning of flesh and spirit would be 1 Peter iii. 18—"Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the Spirit." There, as in 1 Timothy iii. 16, the article is absent. As a fact in history our Lord's crucifixion was death; but in its eternal spiritual meaning it was life. His sacrifice so transfigured death as to make it an aspect of His life. He entered more fully into life by dying. What St. Peter says of the death of Christ St. Paul says of His Incarnation. The Incarnation too had its historic aspect; but it had its place in the spiritual sphere as well; and there in the domain of abiding reality Christ vindicated His right to appear.

J. PULESTON JONES.

RECENT OLD TESTAMENT LITERATURE.

PROF. SWETE'S *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*¹ is a work for which students have long been waiting; it supplies a want even more fully than could have been expected. The reader is delighted to find subject after subject dealt with, as to which hitherto information had to be sought from a number of out-of-the-way sources. In many ways the book adds to our knowledge and understanding of the subject, notably by the text of, and introduction to, the Letter of Aristee by Mr. H. St. J. Thackeray. The whole book is a monument of accurate and exhaustive scholarship. Prof. Swete assigns the LXX of the Pentateuch to the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, B.C. 285–247; with regard to the completion of the work he writes: "On the whole, though the direct evidence is fragmentary, it is probable that before the Christian era Alexandria possessed the whole, or nearly the whole, of the Hebrew Scriptures in a Greek translation" (p. 25). Mahaffy and Deissmann's work on the papyri is used as additional evidence of the Egyptian character of the Greek of the LXX. We do not notice any criticism of the suggestion that supposed Hebraisms in Hellenistic Greek are merely idioms of the Egyptian dialect. This contention, however, may be true, and yet these idioms may be Hebraisms, or perhaps we might say Semitisms, due to the influence of the large Jewish and Semitic population in Egypt, and of the Semitic element in Coptic on the formation and development of the dialect. In the list of common grammatical peculiarities on p. 308 the literal translation of the Hebrew *wayyehi* . . . *w*, EV "and it came to pass that," should have been included.

Dr. Swete holds that the Hebrew MSS. used by the translators of the LXX were written in a character inter-

¹ Camb. Univ. Press, 1900, pp. xiv. 593.

mediate between that used by the ancient Israelites and the later square character, except perhaps in the case of the Pentateuch (p. 321). In this connexion we may remark that so closely packed a book needs a better index ; for the above topic we tried "script," "writing," "character," all in vain, and could find nothing in the index to refer to it, or to another important topic, the date of the completion of the LXX. Again, a table of symbols and contractions would have been useful ; modern scholars are getting quite rabbinic in their use of these devices. The bibliography is avowedly a selection, but on pp. 262 ff. Dr. Haupt's *Sacred Books of the Old Testament* should have been mentioned ; and later editions will have to take account of the remarkable collection of striking facts about the LXX published by Dr. E. A. Abbott in *Clue* and other works of the same series.

Our chief feeling as to Prof. Driver's *Daniel* in the *Cambridge Bible* is one of regret that a work that must rank with Prof. Bevan's as one of the two best extant commentaries on *Daniel* should be published in small type, as notes to the Authorised Version. Could not the material be somewhat amplified and modified, and published as a commentary on the Hebrew text ? There is one paragraph in which the author carries his habitual caution a step too far. On p. lxxv. he writes : "A number of independent considerations, including some of great cogency, thus combine in favour of the conclusion that the Book of Daniel was not written earlier than c. 300 B.C." [and therefore not by Daniel]. "And there are certainly grounds which, though they may not be regarded as *demonstrative*, except on the part of those who deny all predictive prophecy, nevertheless make the opinion a highly *probable* one, that the book is a work of the age of Antiochus Epiphanes." In the first place there are very many who do *not* "deny all predictive prophecy," and who yet hold

that the Maccabean date of *Daniel* is a demonstrable fact. Further, if, as is here implied, it is conclusively proved that the book was not written by *Daniel*, there is nothing to countervail the evidence which points to the Maccabean period. The use of the first person, if it be not recognized as a literary convention, may be misunderstood and taken as evidence for authorship by Daniel; otherwise the writer's information, interests and standpoint indicate the Maccabean period; there is no positive evidence for any other period. As far as we have noticed, those who consider that the Maccabean date is not proved believe that the authorship by Daniel can be demonstrated, and *vice versa*.

Prof. R. H. Charles lays scholars of apocalyptic literature under fresh obligations by a new and very complete and interesting edition of the *Ascension of Isaiah*.¹ It contains the Ethiopic Version, the new Greek Fragment, the Latin Versions, the Latin Translation from the Slavonic, an annotated English translation from the Ethiopic, and a full Introduction. Prof. Charles holds that the *Ascension* is a composite work formed not later than A.D. 200 by the combination of three works circulating in the first century A.D., viz. the Martyrdom of Isaiah, a Jewish work, and the Vision of Isaiah, and the Testament of Hezekiah, composed by Christians. The last-named is "the first and oldest document that testifies to the martyrdom of St. Peter at Rome" (p. xii.). The complete work includes apocalyptic visions of the usual type seen by Isaiah, the account of the sawing asunder of that prophet, etc., etc. The introduction shows that the *Ascension* throws much light on the criticism of *Revelation*; Prof. Charles holds that Jewish materials were used by the author of the canonical book (pp. lx. ff.), which he dates c. 90-100, p. lxxi. We may point out that the variants *Melchira*, *Belchira* (p. 13 n.) are

¹ A. & C. Black, pp. lxxiii. 155. 7s. 6d.

doubtless due to the fact that in the Hebrew script of New Testament times *B* could hardly be distinguished from *M*.

The Rev. D. McKenzie's *Exposition of Old Testament Sacrifices*¹ is unduly traditional in its views of criticism and the history of Israelite religion; nevertheless its application of the symbolism of sacrifice to Christ and Christian teaching is often interesting and edifying.

The Ancient Scriptures and the Modern Jew,² by David Baron, a Christian Jew, is chiefly valuable for its account of Zionism, Anti-Semitism, and modern Judaism generally.

Dr. E. C. Selwyn's *Christian Prophets*³ is an original and scholarly work, in which the order of prophets often referred to in the New Testament is made to play an important part in the early Church. The Synoptic Gospels come to us through the prophets, and St. Luke wrote 2 Peter for that apostle (!) The Fourth Gospel is a non-prophetic work, certainly not written by the author of *Revelation*, but rather to correct it. Many, however, of these views seem rather ingenious than sound.

We have also received *Sermons on the Psalms*, by the Rev. J. F. B. Tinling, B.A.,⁴ a set of analyses of sermons by distinguished preachers—a useful homiletic help to busy pastors.

W. H. BENNETT.

¹ Toronto : Wm. Briggs, pp. 368. \$1.25.

² Hodder & Stoughton, pp. xii. 342. 6s.

³ Macmillan, pp. xvi. 278. 6s.

⁴ Hodder & Stoughton, pp. 144. 1s. 6d.

AN INDIVIDUAL RETROSPECT OF THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

It has been remarked, many times before now, that the nineteenth century has seen greater changes in the general tone of religious thought than any age since the Christian era, saving only the century that included the Reformation. The changes have been effected more gently and unobtrusively than those of the previous crisis, because the temper of the age does not admit of direct physical persecution, but they are none the less real and lasting. The results of thought are not precisely what they were, but it is the method of thought that has altered yet more, and this is of wider importance, since it affects every subject on which we think, and all future accretions of knowledge will necessarily come under its scope and sway. The scientific temper of mind is aroused, facts are sharply separated from our inferences from those facts, and the whole mental machinery by which we deal with any new problem has become so much more accurate and incisive that we look on in amazement at the looseness of the older methods and wonder how they could have satisfied cultivated minds.

If one man could have lived through the whole century, and been touched by the phases of religious thought in a long consecutive series, it would be very interesting to hear his testimony, and, strange as it may seem to make this claim, I think I can approximate towards it, for though my own mental and spiritual life does not quite cover the later half of the century, that of my parents, with whom I was

associated with a quite unusual closeness of sympathy, fills up nearly the whole of the earlier half. There must be others who have the same tale to tell, and it would need the aggregation of many such experiences to give a correct impression of the crisis the religious mind of our English race has passed through, a crisis of which the bewilderment has scarcely yet left us, although the poignant suffering of its first shock is over. The lesson is learned, and we cannot go back on it. On some matters the human mind wavers continually between good and evil, but on others it makes progress that never has a retrogressive step, and just as the injustice and futility of persecution took long to learn but is now written on our common mind for as long as the earth shall be habitable, so have the lessons of this century been learned and indelibly fixed, though what they are it is perhaps hard to say. We are even yet too near them to see them as a whole and be able to word them clearly and succinctly. A modern writer says, "The dissociation of the moral judgment from a special series of religious formulæ is the crucial, the epoch-making fact of our day," but to me this seems but a partial statement. Any answer I could give must be couched in a historical form, for the facts are clear and definite, while the gathering up of results lies scarcely within my power.

It is therefore necessary to picture the spiritual surroundings that greeted the first dawn of consciousness, and this is not hard, the mental scene lying as vividly before me as any that was seen by the outer eye. Had my father been alive, he would have been a hundred years old in April, 1900, and my mother was less than seven years younger, and both having been gifted with minds peculiarly tenacious of childhood's training, they represented the first decades of the century rather than those of their maturer years. As they had received they gave, and never were children more profoundly impressed with the real core of

the Puritan doctrine in its more attractive forms. Reverence, not only for God Himself, but for all that belonged to Him—His book, His day, His truth, His people, His future judgment—the sense of our own littleness before His greatness, and in consequence the entire independence of man and of man's opinion that was the birthright of every one who forsook the world for the knowledge of God, these were the oft repeated and indelible lessons. Not that we ever had what would now be termed a "Bible Class," or ever were spoken to individually with an appeal to decide for Christ ; so that, looking back, it is not easy to know how it was effected, but the result remained in every young heart of unquestioning obedience of soul to the high though vague demand, and a strong desire to be able to live worthy of the vocation. There was no scorn, no reaction as time went on, only a kind of fear, a brooding sense that was felt half as an honour half as a regret, that we could never be quite like other people, never join in the general swim of the world's varied interests, but must always be set aside as something apart. The true Christian, like the Greek philosopher, must not be a part of the unthinking stream he looks at, where each particle hurries on the next and there is no real choice or self determination toward any goal but one that is involuntary, but rather must stand on the shore and consider it all and keep his own aims, his own desires. That such teaching would produce a somewhat critical spirit is obvious.

Any description I can give of the earlier years of the century necessarily, from this purely personal point of view, takes the form of the opinions held by my parents, so it will be forgiven if their characters and aspirations are dwelt on in so far as they affected the religious life of those around them.

Our father was a great reader, yet it was not reading that led him far out of the one chosen circle of his thoughts.

His favourite chapters in the Bible were Isaiah i. and ii., chapters that represent a Divine fury of iconoclasm, and his favourite verses were Isaiah ii. 22, "Cease ye from man, whose breath is in his nostrils; for wherein is he to be accounted of?" and also 1 Corinthians ii. 14, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned," and other similar words that dwell on the nothingness of man and the fullness of God. His mind was intensely individualistic, and he cared little for Church gatherings, or tendencies of thought, or widespread movements of any kind. That truth was generally not found on the side of the majority was his belief, and while personally exceedingly humble and even diffident, he yet believed his judgment on the deep things of God was based on the direct utterance of the Divine Word, and was therefore right and not to be gainsaid. Complete dependence on the revealed truth of God, rendered him as completely independent of the opinion of man as were any of his spiritual forefathers in the ranks of Cromwell's Ironsides, and he was as utterly certain that the final truth and right were on the side of his words, as they were that these overmastering and victorious allies were on the side of their swords. They say you can tell a man by his books. The main bulk of his library was sold at the breaking up of our old home; but even the few shelves that remain of his well bound and well marked companions show a fair outline of his mental courses. About a third of these books must be omitted, for they fall outside our range of time. There are all William Law's works, and strange old brown volumes of Jacob Böhmen, the translations themselves being dated 1649; there are Eusebius and Josephus, Foxe and Rollin, Lavater and Paley, and Chevalier Ramsay's ponderous *Principles of Religion*. But most of these are works that are not affected by the lapse of time,

and one has a sense of being further afield when one comes to the books that are written in the early years of our own century. Here is an imposing book in four volumes, full of Greek quotations, and bearing the ambitious title, *A New System, or an Analysis of Antient Mythology, wherein an Attempt is made to divest Religion of Fable, and to reduce the Truth to its original Purity.* Jacob Bryant, 1807. This work is composed of classical stories and tales of ancient travellers, illustrated by beautiful old engravings of Serpent temples, the rites of Serpent worship and Fire worship, with altars, priests, and strange designs copied from seals and rings. Another book by the same author bears an even more cumbrous title, as though the reader might feel himself defrauded were not every portion of the subject on hand mentioned on the first page: *Observations upon the Plagues inflicted upon the Egyptians, in which is shewn the Peculiarity of those Judgments, and their correspondence with the Rites and Idolatries of that People, to which is prefixed a Prefatory Discourse concerning the Grecian Colonies from Egypt.* 1810. The object in the introduction is said to be "to authenticate the Scriptures," and truly no pains are spared. The index runs thus, "Observations, Considerations, Arguments, Objections Answered, Short Recapitulation, Argument Pursued, Different Opinions, Opinions Canvassed, Alternatives, Other Objections, Review of the Whole, Further Observations, Conclusion." These two books were read with profound interest by our father, but to us now they seem to have come from another world, so remote are they from our researches. But here is something different; seven stately bound volumes of *The History of the Church of Christ*, four by Isaac and Joseph Milner, dated 1810, and three by Scott, dated 1828. The other books I have mentioned we only looked into for the pictures, but this one was taken down and carefully and reverently read, and it remains with me still. It is the

fashion to mock at "Milner," as written from the most arbitrary and untenable point of view, but from where we then stood together it was one absolutely reasonable. We did not want the outer circles of religion, we did not want to see how the things of God have been travestied and abused by the corrupt minds of men, we wanted to follow the single pure stream of Divine truth through the tangled thickets of the world's history. That this aim could not be perfectly carried out on account of the Church of Christ being an invisible body, was acknowledged at the outset and accepted by the reader as inevitable, but at any rate an attempt could be made to trace the main current of those living waters; so we watched the disciples of Christ in the cloister and amid the gorgeous ceremonials of Rome, and then when that system became too corrupt we abruptly left it, and found ourselves on the open hill side amid the poor and simple, following the fortunes of the Waldenses or the Lollards. However historically imperfect such a method as Milner's may be on account of the breaks in continuity destroying the sense of development, the impression gained by the growing mind of what the Church of Christ really is, it is beyond the power of subsequent time to efface. It is the individualistic and not the collective view, and to adopt it colours all after life. But we must pass on to another group of books of rather later date that represent groping attempts to combat unbelief and to introduce into Scripture unity both with itself and with the world outside, and we open first on this: *The Theology of the Early Patriarchs illustrated by an Appeal to Subsequent Parts of the Holy Scripture, in a Series of Letters to a Friend*. T. Biddulph, 1825; and here the absolutely literal fashion in which the story of Adam and Eve is handled down to the minutest details and curious inferences from those details, makes one feel how many miles have been mentally traversed since it was written. Next we find a row of the Bridgewater

Treatises, *On the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God as manifested in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man*. There is Dr. Chalmers 1834, and Kidd, Whewell, Bell, Prout, and Roget follow in order due. Then we have *An Attempt towards an Improved Version, being a Metrical Arrangement of the Twelve Minor Prophets*. W. Newcome, D.D., 1836. This book was evidently held to be a store of learning, and with it there stand various old re-translations of the New Testament, with notes and comments of all kinds of laborious scholarship. Among these is *An Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures*. T. H. Horne, D.D., 1834, which contains a certain amount of historical knowledge, being full of notes from classical writers and the early fathers, with description of local antiquities, but not one point that we should call "criticism." Then come some of the first glimpses of the East, a subject to which he was specially attracted through all his later years, having a latent belief that the well-spring of certain pure elements of primeval religion derived through the sons of Noah or possibly the later sons of Abraham might still be discovered there. The mass of these books, and there were many of them, were sold, but a few remain. *The Precepts of Jesus, or a Guide to Peace and Happiness*, by Romauhon Roy, 1824; and *Christianity and Hindooism contrasted, or a comparative View of the Evidence by which the respective claims to Divine Authority of the Bible and of the Hindoo Shastrus are supported*. G. Mundy, 1834; and further, a work with an exceedingly ambitious title that runs thus, *The One Primeval Language traced experimentally through Ancient Inscriptions in Alphabetic Characters of lost powers from the Four Continents, including the Voice of Israel from the Rocks of Sinai, and the Vestiges of Patriarchal Tradition from the Monasteries of Egypt, Itruria and Southern Arabia*.

C. Forster, 1852. To the writings of Max Müller he never could fit his mind, though in latest years he greatly valued those of Sir Monier Williams on these subjects. But now we get into a distinctly more modern atmosphere, with Merle D'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*, in three tall volumes, of the date 1840, a book much read and dearly prized, and that made the times of the Reformation as vivid and clear to us all as any personal reminiscence. *The Tongue of Fire*, by W. Arthur, of which the thirteenth edition came out in 1858, was the only book of that kind that was read and valued by him, and somewhat similar in tone were a few papers by a certain "C.H.M." that appeared in 1860 in *Things New and Old*, a publication belonging to the Brethren. Though a member of the Church of England and unremitting in his attendance Sunday by Sunday with never a break, and also a communicant, he yet seldom found there what was to his mind in doctrine, and the writings of Nonconformists more often suited the channels along which his hopes were laid. With the Tractarian movement of 1833 and onward he had no sympathy whatever, and none also with the Platonizing movement that succeeded it; the one was to him the foolish unthinking retrogression toward Rome of people who knew no Church history, and the other the relapse into the "heathenism of the natural man" of people who knew no Theology. He had not patience to read the books or hear the sermons of either party, so fundamentally opposed did they appear to him to the plain and straightforward declaration of Holy Scripture; and if ever he accidentally came across them, he would be both vexed and sorrowful that English people could take up such false and superficial ideas, endeavouring to lower the demands of God, and to make them easy and congenial to the natural heart by lowering them to be either lax or merely formal: and then, recovering himself, he would say these errors were all

transitory, and we must wait a few years yet, and often end with a favourite motto that was one of the anchors of his trust, "*Magna est veritas et prævalebit.*" Though he identified himself with the Evangelical body by giving generous support to objects he approved and by seeking out Evangelical Churches to attend when away from home, he yet always kept aloof from their lines of thought in his own inner spirit; those representatives he met he seemed to feel too bustling and too much immersed in good works; he thought they employed solemn phrases too easily, and took the personal assurance of salvation too much for granted, and could not go down deep enough into the truth to be able to help him, and this feeling he retained to the close. He was a Puritan and not an Evangelical; and though they coincide on many points, there is a distinct note of difference between the two, and to this note his whole life was attuned. Although he lived to be eighty-eight, I do not think he read with personal interest any religious book more modern than those of thirty or forty years before, and we usually found he had reverted to those over a century earlier, Law's Letters and parts of Böhmen's *Aurora* being with him to the end, so thoroughly were the hopes of his spirit anchored to the past below the tossing confusions of the present. It is not wonderful that the impress of a solid, inflexible character, nourished on food such as this and full of a kind of devout spiritual integrity, remains stamped on the being of all of us to this day.

Our mother exactly coincided with him in opinion, but, being of French Huguenot descent, the same thoughts took in her mind a different colouring. It was certainly her influence that was the paramount one in our lives; and though in many ways full of talent and invention, bright and eager and industrious, her inner life was a strangely solitary one. Her central expression from Scripture was that we were intended to be "strangers and pilgrims," and

to this idea all others gave way. Any one self-satisfied, fashionable and talkative, any one who surrounded himself with luxury and seemed to be "building a nest in this world" was an object of genuine repulsion to her, and she loved to single out of all ranks the humble and unambitious, those who had a meek and quiet spirit and kept themselves free from the ordinary amusements of the world, whether they were enlightened or not. Teachableness, humility, contentment with being overlooked, industry and happiness in dull circumstances, these were what she valued and inculcated, even down to the evidence of trifles. The great recognized amusements of the world were never mentioned in our home; her own dress and that of her daughters was studiously out of the prevailing fashion, smoking she utterly condemned, slang, even a word of it she could not endure, and any sentiment or attitude that betrayed indolence or self-indulgence was at once checked. Her watch was intuitive and incessant, being due to her nature more than to any words, and her authority was never disputed. These great motives influenced her choice and decision in the veriest trifles, though she seldom openly expressed them. I remember her selecting a set of little cups for afternoon tea, and though of some three or four the quality and price were equal, she chose without hesitation the simplest pattern and colour, gently saying they looked to her more like "pilgrim cups" than the others. She was through life profoundly affected by her own early experience, which was that of longing for the simplicity and purity of the highest type of life within her ken, and of turning away heart and soul from the pleasures of society in which she had been brought up. This, her fixed idea, derived perhaps as much from philosophy as from Christianity, was only strengthened by her subsequent enlightenment, and received a further ground for its reasonableness from the example of our Lord. Of definite religious

instruction she gave us but little, yet it was as if she formed the very texture and shape of our minds by her unremitting example and criticism being always along the same well defined lines, and by her endless demand for industry, simplicity, and contentment. She often pointed out the shortness of life and the poverty of its aims unless it is dominated by a nobler spirit within, and she would repeat with feeling, but without any comment, the second title of Law's *Spirit of Prayer*, which runs, "The Soul rising out of the Vanity of Time unto the Riches of Eternity." This was a favourite expression with her and seemed to embody her working creed. Beside a few old books, such as Cowper's Poems and Romaine's Letters, she loved, as did also our father, the earlier works of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, and *The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel* above the rest. This essay was out of print then, and she would take much trouble to find the second-hand copies and present them to her friends. Erskine had brought her accessions of light in early days, and she was faithful to him all her life. These were his writings between 1815 and 1830, before the strange forty years of silence descended upon him; for of his posthumous writings she did not approve any more than of those of Maurice or Kingsley. Never blinded by the name of a good author, she preserved a keen, unerring vein of criticism for every fresh work presented to her, a criticism that always had in it something of the Greek philosopher, as well as the Puritan or the Huguenot.

Our Sunday books in early days were very few. We read that much scoffed-at work, *The Fairchild Family*, and others similar in tone; but though I believe she approved of the theology, she always drew back at the personal applications made at the close of each chapter. To a mind like hers, lofty but somewhat rigid, it seemed like a lowering of divine truths and consolations to make them

fit too closely to the conduct of children with their petty disobediences and their elementary struggles towards the right, and with us she invariably worked on the more ethical plane, speaking of what was due to another, of what befitted our station, of how sweet was true humility and contentment, and similar motives. Sermons too we read by Evangelical preachers, and whenever opportunity occurred we heard them with great interest and delight, and were encouraged by her to take diligent notes to be stored up for use in the more barren land where our own home was cast; but we observed that while she loved explanation and enlightenment she always shrank from the expression of emotion, and never alluded afterwards to any appeal made to the heart or the will. This was a loss as years went on, and with all our respect and love for her we yet felt there was a region she could not understand and could not touch, while some others laid their hand right on the central spot, and this produced a sense of separation which tended to increase with time.

Both parents had a great love of hymns, whether to be repeated aloud on Sunday evenings or sung to solemn, slow tunes. They were the hymns of the first thirty years of the century, and the stock was very seldom added to. "What is life? 'tis but a vapour," and "Change is our portion here," were called for week after week, and nearly every one had the long-drawn pensive cadences of those times. "O Zion, when I think of thee," was a favourite with us all, and at nine years old I used to take the words to heart without one idea that they might not be suitable. The second verse runs thus—

While here I walk on hostile ground,
The few that I can call my friends
Are like myself, in fetters bound,
And weariness our steps attends.

Others were about worldlings, and scorning earth's baubles,

and looking forward to the pure joys of heaven, and having the heart fixed above transitory pleasures where no evil could penetrate. There was a great deal of aspiration in those hymns and a great deal about heaven, but all were somewhat of the same calibre, and I scarcely remember a verse that spoke of direct personal assurance or personal joy, the contrast of the hopes of the Christian with those of the world being their one prevailing theme. But a few years later the hymns and songs of the Revival began to penetrate the religious community, and some of us brought them back from school with their glad certainties and ringing melodies that ran so joyously together.

He is fitting up my mansion
Which eternally shall stand,
For my stay shall not be transient
In that holy, happy land.
On the other side of Jordan,
In the sweet fields of Eden,
Where the tree of life is blooming,
There is rest for you.

So we sang, pleased at finding these new treasures, and then felt at once the shade of disapproval descend. The tune was far too quick and shrill, the words were uneducated, the rhymes inexcusable, the meaning superficial, and, worst of all, it was putting into the mouths of the young and ignorant the expression of a conviction that was to most of them wholly untrue. Thus it fared with all that class of hymns, and the same fate awaited nearly all the "Sankey's Hymns" that appeared in their turn some eight or ten years afterwards. But though we withdrew the actual singing and reverted to the old type, we were not to be robbed individually of what seemed to us so good. It was not the hymns only, it was the teaching that went with them that won its way into our hearts, though there was sometimes a lurking fear that such teaching was com-

paratively superficial and did not include the deep stores of thought and grand foundation principles, such as we felt actuated the lives of our parents. But other friends and other influences of a potent character came into our lives from the more direct Evangelical side, and as far as religious position was concerned we gradually transferred ourselves in thought from the beginning of the century to its more central years. Some slight modifications crept into our mother's own opinions, judging by the books she accepted in her old age, but it did not affect her standard in speaking. To the end she kept the same unswerving line of stringent criticism combined with a sort of aggressive unworldliness and simplicity of aim, and her inner life was a very silent one, however much its outcome was impressed on all who surrounded her, friends and servants as well as children.

For us, we were chiefly educated with a tutor at home with but a short period at school; under a docile exterior there was a good deal of the ferment that is incidental to most energetic natures. Now and then we used to long to try the excitements of the ordinary world, and to be a little more "like other people," but far more often it was an inspiration towards literary and artistic ideals, which our mother seemed to encourage heartily with the one hand and then crush flat with the other, by her vigorous and correct criticism of our crude efforts. Again we would find the religious life and ambitions of other Christians much more accessible and congenial, with their more easily expressed convictions and their hands full of loving and active work; but so consistent were both parents in word and conduct, so thoroughly did they by their very silences make us feel that depth and fidelity to truth lay with them even if attractiveness lay with the other side, that the ebullitions of repressed energy in any directions were not permanent, and we, both boys and girls, came round to their ways. We carried on the two layers together, as it

were, the foundation laid in childhood being the harder and more indestructible ; and yet the second layer, that of the middle of the century, being a true factor also. We loved to hear the great preachers of the day ; we loved to be in London for the " Week of Prayer," and meetings of that sort, where Sir Arthur Blackwood and Mr. Aitken might be heard, and as no one can drink into the spirit of such teaching without longing to impart also to others, the desire arose to work among the village people at home. A cottage reading, and classes for lads and girls were started, and were endured with kindly tolerance by our parents rather than encouraged, they being as it were divided between satisfaction that we were evidently choosing the better part, and feeling that it savoured of arrogance that we should do what they had never done, and should set up to teach when we might with perhaps more profit take the place of learners.

Thus by an almost insensible transition the horizon widened as the years rolled by. The doctrine remained much the same as it had been originally, though in some of its outworks it gained in elasticity, but the practical area was greatly increased. The Church of Christ was felt to be a true and living spiritual unity under many diversities of method, so that brothers and sisters were to be found not only through all the long centuries, as " Milner " had taught us in the old days, but here and now, all the world over, speaking many languages and under many forms of thought, and even making many mistakes, but still most truly one body. This noble conception once grasped by a young mind, it is impossible to change it again for one more limited, or one dependent on the form of Church government or any external mark whatsoever, and the sense of loyalty aroused by belonging to such a " holy, catholic, and apostolic Church " is a factor in all subsequent related conceptions. Looking back I can see that some genuine

building up of the spiritual fabric was going on through these last years of the old home life, though a strain of something unfixed and wavering runs through them also. History was studied, and whether it was ecclesiastical or secular history the sense of the relation to theology was always mentally present as the all-important thing; biographies were read with great interest, new religious books were read and criticized, and best of all, the main points of faith were actually verified here and there by seeing pardon through Christ accepted by some of the village people and the new life of God springing up in their hearts. Yet the sense of being stranded in a quiet bay was ever there, the sense of being outside the great stream of the world's thought and action; and sometimes I could think in the profound stillness of a summer's evening that I could hear it thundering away in the far distance, a dim invitation, fearful yet attractive, and the German proverb came to mind, "And beyond the hills again, there are people." It was a curious strife between a sincere contentment with home and this vague, restless waiting for the call to come. To live and give pleasure and satisfaction to those who are dearest seems a good fate; but when this is accomplished with about one-third of one's being, and the other two-thirds are lying idle, and have just sufficient consciousness to know that they are there and are idle, an unmanageable element is at once introduced. A dumb protest or cry is for ever going on within, a desire for something harder or more dangerous, an eager listening for what may prove to be a new experience, a sense that the untested character is nearly valueless, and all this though the regnant third does its work so completely and well that the presence of dissatisfaction under that smiling exterior is never even guessed at.

The call came at last, and I sprang up to meet it with a

swift impetus that I had never felt before and have never known with the like intensity since. My career was somewhat unexpectedly altered, and on October 14, 1872, I entered the University of Cambridge. The purely personal experiences are necessarily omitted, but it will be my aim to give a correct impression of the new and overwhelming religious influences that fell upon me there. An ardent desire that had never been definitely expressed was now granted, and I stepped from the quiet bay into the full mid-stream. The Universities are, it is acknowledged, subject to waves or alternations of feeling, and Cambridge was at that time passing under that wave of materialistic unbelief, that, though short in duration and followed by strong reactions, was powerful while it lasted. There was as ever much that was only good and strengthening, but it was a great deal to encounter all at once, and the forces of the new thoughts at work were so great that they seemed like a row of fierce spirits standing waiting to devour any young unsheltered spiritual life that passed within their range. Yet all at the time was very natural, very simple. Every one knows the outlines of life at the University, and to me it was a grand experience to wake each morning and realize afresh that this sudden turn had come into my life, and that at last I might learn, really learn the outlines of the thought that prevailed in the thinking world.

O happy days, a grasp we laid
 At least upon the varied keys
 Of knowledge! ah, such days as these
 Are worth regret when all is said!

And while the outer life was full of the spring forward that is the natural heritage of well used youth and energy, and I entered with delight into all that was offered me, the inner life seemed to be faring about equally well; faith held its own in all practical matters, and the destructive

suggestions and negative hints of the first months were repelled like rain off some kinds of hardy leaves, and only a silent sense of pitiful respect was left for the desolate or ignorant hearts that could utter them.

I have a life with Christ to live,
But ere I live it must I wait
Till learning can clear answer give
Of this and that book's date?
I have a life in Christ to live,
I have a death in Christ to die,
And must I wait till Science give
All doubts a full reply?

No suggestion passed unheeded, but the foundations had been too firmly laid and personal experiences had too often verified their truth, that they should be soon shaken, and more than a year went by in the protest, sometimes expressed in words, but more often silently given, "*But I know.*" This protest seemed to be one of simple intuitive insight that could hardly be mistaken, something not founded on argument but on immediate apprehension, like seeing a colour or hearing a sound. But the strain was too great to be borne continuously. Glad at first with the gladness of certainty, the protest became more diffident and less joyful as a second side, wholly unthought of before, was seen to the question at issue. Everything seemed to conspire in the one direction; my own studies in the outworks of philosophy, the new lights on historical veracity and the worth of testimony, the sense of the fixity of the laws of nature, the dawn of the world-embracing ideas of development, the stir of falling strongholds of belief, and above all the vague gentle questioning of primary truths, whether in papers or reviews, the hint that what has before been taken for granted is at least open to revision, all this came in softly but irresistibly like the incoming tide. The persistent rain wetted the leaves at last, the questions were

not refused a hearing, and “like the cold snake in the nest of the swallow,” doubt slipped in and made there its home. There was no rebellion against past teaching, no definite unbelief of any doctrine, or rejection of evidence, but the presence of a permanent chilling question whether any solid substratum of fact lay under the complex tenets to which all life had been so firmly fastened, or whether they were but figments created by the pressing hunger of our orphaned race. The visible and the material seemed to be the real, and all else as intangible and irresponsible and dependent on the position of the mind that looked on them as the colours in the rainbow. The rock-like faith of the older generation, and the active responsibilities and joyous certainties of the more modern, both were at fault here, for while both had stood persecution and laughter in their day, neither had met this paralysing enemy, this foe who did not seem to attack from without, but in silence and secrecy to be a traitor born and nourished from within.

In old days we used to sing—

Set the prize before thee, gird thine armour on;
Heir of grace and glory, see thy blood-bought crown.

And again, in other words—

Surely my Captain may depend on me!
If in the battle to my Lord I'm true,
Mine will be the honours in the Grand Review.

And yet again in a more collective expression—

Like a mighty army moves the Church of God;
Brothers, we are treading where the saints have trod;

and the desires of untried valour to join in that grand battle of faith with unbelief had been ardent. Impatience had been silenced by the remembrance that David killed the lion and the bear in private before he slew Goliath in public, but the longing for such an encounter remained steadily in the background of thought as an object of

existence. And now it had come, and it was no battle at all, only the numbing of the nerves of faith and devotion that had been so well used before, and the rousing of the nerves of intelligent insight and coherent thought from their long slumber up to keenest employment upon everything within their grasp. One of the primary truths taught in the old days was, "To doubt is a sin," so it was only inch by inch and with a reluctance that was almost despair that any advances were made, and yet, against all the crowd of desires and affections, against the concentrated force of the will, not one sentence, not one half sentence of suggested doubt once heard could ever be forgotten, but remained stored up and waiting its time to avenge itself. It was like a fate that the arguments most dreaded had the most tenacity of life, and when the intellect is on one side and the heart and conscience on the other, it is the intellect that temporarily wins the day. The structure still seemed to stand intact, but beneath the surface brick by brick had been quietly pulled out of the wall till the foundations shook. Is the Bible then not true? Are the Church and the World not separate? Is there no distinction in kind between them? Is there no such thing as the new birth from above? Are we not in prayer speaking to a Divine Friend? Is He not wonderfully irresponsible? Can He really be there at all? It was all so confusing that the best plan seemed to keep the two departments quite separate in the mind, and to endeavour to hold firmly to the old thoughts and duties and methods of expression with the one hand, while pursuing the more urgent inquiries to some extent with the other.

In practical life also the difficulties were very great. Many a story has been written of a noble, free but more worldly nature, suffering from contact with a grim Calvinist or a narrow Evangelical, and severely have these types been held up to the scorn of mankind, but few, very few, have

been able to tell of the pain of the stricter soul amid a new laxity of surroundings. One does not want to be always sitting in judgement, always dividing the sheep from the goats, one longs to be upright, reliable, kindly and winning, and show something of what the life of Christ is like. On a blank page of my Bible stood these words—

In patient, hidden deep accord,
The servant may be like his Lord,
And thy love my love shining through
May show the world that Thou art true,
Till those who see me see Thee too.

But one is all at sea. The old landmarks gone, the final appeal to the Scriptures treated as irrelevant, a kind of general indulgence and hope reigns over all; things one had believed to be sins are spoken of as natural; and the very distinction between right and wrong begins to fade away, or at any rate so to change its place that it is scarcely to be found from the old bearings. At even a suggestion of this the Puritan in the blood gets all aflame, and one feels, "I do well to be angry." The heart may be all sympathy, but the conscience has grown in a form that will not bend, and its rigidity comes in at every turn, giving pain doubtless to others, but ten times more to the heart with which it lives in such close union. The whole inner being is at strife and both sides incur blame, as the sentence now of cowardice and now of unwise aggression is passed on words and actions by the watchful guardian within.

As far as the actual results of thought are concerned, there had been some kind of preparation. Hugh Miller's works had been read and assimilated, so that not only was the antiquity of the globe assented to, but also some kind of development in the sense of successive layers of creation, ever advancing in complexity of structure. Also the point at issue in Edward Irving's *Human Nature of Christ* had been considered, and whether future punishment is retributive or

remedial, and other cognate questions had been raised. The old life was not a life without argument and thought within a certain range, but they were strictly bounded by authority. It was not the subject handled, it was the spectator's point of view that was changed, and the change affected every detail, as one can see in comparing such a book as *The Unconditional Freeness of the Gospel* with *Ecce Homo*. The gap is so great, it seems useless to begin on details: in the first the standpoint is from God and His will, and man with his feelings and misguided endeavours is dismissed with scant courtesy, while in the second the standpoint is from man, and it is God who is at the far distance. Human love too much ignored, human conduct too much undervalued, now avenge themselves sevenfold, displaying their attractive colours and varied forms, and coming forward as the only true and tangible treasures of life. To one who has once had a glimpse of the purity and permanence of Heaven, these flowers of the earth are poor things with which to fill one's hands, and those offered me were indignantly flung away, and my soul refused comfort. Earth is valueless if Heaven is empty; and if life is to continue, the full misery of the possibility cannot be looked in the face.

But I am anticipating. The three years at Cambridge fairly coincided with the crest of that wave that so soon passed by when Mill and Spencer, Huxley and Tyndall were thought to have said the last word on the subject of truth and reality, and it was later that the finer and more subtle antagonists came into the field, but to the true Puritan the enemies of the cross of Christ are all counted as one. If neither sun nor stars appear and the compass has been proved untrustworthy, it does not much matter which wind blows, or in which direction the vessel sails. And it was lonely too, lonely as a tract of land where death reigns—

As in strange lands a traveller, walking slow
In doubt and great perplexity,
A little before moon-rise hears the low
Moan of an unknown sea,
And knows not if it be thunder, or a sound
Of rocks thrown down, or one deep cry
Of great wild beasts; then thinketh, "I have found
A new land, but I die."

It was new indeed, but more as death is new to the living than like a new phase of life. In this present year the world seems full of souls who have passed through a process similar to that which I have described, and books are now written that might help at every step of the way. But twenty-five years ago it was not so. Like myself, those that were in the midst of their sorrowful journey had a hand laid over their mouth and could not speak a word to each other as to their discoveries and their chilling fears; and for the rest, those in the old school of thought might have pity or affection or blame to give, but no help, for they could not see where any difficulty lay, save in the perversity of the human will, which would not accept the plain statements made by God. Again, my companions in the new school of thought took the transition so lightly, and had evidently so superficial a sense of sin and condemnation, and so unspiritual an ambition, that their opinion was worth less still. Of true self denial, of crucifixion with Christ, of walking carefully in white garments, they seemed to know nothing, and an ethical aim of kindly usefulness contented them. Thus between the two camps, between the two halves of the century, the soul walked on alone, desolate in time and space. It was like something empty that ought not to be empty; the sea of faith, as Matthew Arnold says, had retreated, and no mental effort could bring it back. Nothing was left to the ear but "its melancholy, long withdrawing roar" in the pages of history, and nothing to the eye but the bare facts of human life, "the vast edges

drear and naked shingles of the world." It was not the ages of unreasoning belief in the power of Rome to which the heart looked back with longing, the ages of credulity and superstition, but to the glowing, practical victor faith of Wesley and Whitfield, of Archbishop Leighton and Spurgeon—the faith that “obtained promises, and stopped the mouths of lions.” Was such faith gone for ever out of reach of all minds that had been trained to consecutive and more accurate thought? Was some great attraction, some irresponsible, blind, invisible force even beginning to lead the bright flood slowly away from our side, and leaving only a sad, empty slope of stones and sand strewn with helpless, dying forms of life? It was a process that might go on further and ever further, and one could not tell where it might end, and all life was robbed and spoiled.

(To be continued.)

1 CORINTHIANS XV. 29-34: AN ARGUMENT
AND AN APPEAL.

AT the close of the First Epistle to the Corinthians St. Paul finds it necessary to recapitulate his gospel, laying especial stress on the death, burial and resurrection of Jesus Christ (*ἀπέθανεν . . . ἐτάφη . . . ἐγήγερται*, xv. 3), on the significance of that death (*ὕπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*, v. 3) and on the correspondence of the death and resurrection of Christ with prophecy (*κατὰ τὰς γραφάς*, vv. 3, 4). This recapitulation is enriched by several particulars of surpassing interest—the appearance of the risen Christ to Cephas, to the Twelve (strictly of course to the Eleven), to the five hundred brethren at once, to James the Lord's brother, and to all the Apostles (*τοῖς ἀποστόλοις πᾶσιν*). This, as distinct from His appearance to the Eleven, may imply a wider meaning of the word "Apostle."

The Apostle then proceeds to argue from the proved fact of the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the dead generally. It is surprising that the argument should have become necessary. To us it seems inconsistent to believe in the resurrection of Christ and yet to disbelieve in the resurrection of the dead. But through all the ages inconsistency has been a note of unbelief.

St. Paul rests his argument in its first stages on the proved and acknowledged fact of the resurrection of Christ. From that fact to a general resurrection of the dead is a necessary inference. The truth of the one stands or falls with the truth of the other. This is what St. Paul presses in a passage of sublime Christology, which is one of the most precious possessions of the Church.

It is, however, in regard to the next step in St. Paul's great argument (vv. 29-32) and on the short digression which follows (vv. 33, 34) that we desire to offer an explanation.

I. Up to this point, as we have seen, the Apostle has been establishing the truth of the resurrection by the testimony of accredited witnesses to external facts. He now proceeds to prove his thesis by a different kind of evidence which does not lie on the surface. Consequently the two statements of fact used in support of it seems to interrupt and break into the argument instead of helping to build it up. Rightly regarded, however, these words are an appeal to the deepest and most convincing source of proof, and the digression which follows is valuable as indicating both the cause of the lapse in faith and the character of the lapsed.

In verse 29 the much disputed words occur respecting baptism for the dead, which have been discussed in a previous paper.¹ Here it will suffice to remark that whatever interpretation of the words be accepted the argument rests on a deduction from the Christian rite of baptism.

The Apostle then proceeds in further proof of the resurrection to refer to his personal experience. He describes a life of hourly danger, of hardship and self-sacrifice. He does not suggest that this is the best possible life, but he suggests that with the motive which inspires him it is the only possible one. Side by side with his own plan of life, and in contrast with it, he places the Epicurean life-formula, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die" (*φάγωμεν καὶ πίνωμεν αὐριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν*, v. 32), as a conceivable alternative.²

But here it may be asked, How does baptism for the dead, or how does this life of sacrifice, hardship and danger endured for Christ's sake, and in faith of the resurrection, prove the fact of the resurrection? The truth is that in both cases the strength of the argument is suggested and

¹ See EXPOSITOR for May, 1901.

² With this phrase descriptive of the worldly life of pleasure compare what the unwise rich man says to his soul: "Take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry" (Luke xii. 18).

not expressed. It lies in the deep consciousness of the candidate for baptism or of the Apostle reviewing his life that he is not mistaken. The Apostle's argument rests on the instinctive conviction which impels him to believe that he is right and wise in sacrificing everything for Christ, and the truth of the resurrection. And in such matters the argument from instinct affords the strongest possible evidence. It is one from which there is no appeal. Instinctive action is divinely guided action, and is never at fault. Wherever verification is possible it is found that the end suggested by instinct is a right end, often an end necessary for the preservation and development of life, and that the means suggested by instinct for achieving the end are the best adapted for the purpose. It is therefore a reasonable inference that where verification is not possible the end suggested by instinctive consciousness is right and the means true. This is not of course the only passage in which St. Paul appeals to this infallible test of spiritual facts. Compare, for instance, "But unto us God revealed them (i.e. Divine mysteries) through the Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God. . . . But we received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God" (1 Cor. ii. 10-12). And in a passage still more nearly akin to the subject of the resurrection he writes: "Now He that hath wrought us for this very thing (i.e. eternal life) is God, who gave unto us the earnest of the Spirit" (2 Cor. v. 5); that is, God gave us an inner witness and premonition that death is not an ending of life, but the passage to a higher life then beginning.

St. Paul then argues for the truth of the resurrection, not only from the fact of Christ's resurrection, which can be attested by many witnesses, but from that inward evidence of the Spirit which he speaks of in the strictly

parallel passage, which we have quoted from the Second Epistle.

St. Paul then advances one step further in his argument. The same instinct that proves the resurrection proves that it is the very basis of life, and that the hope of the resurrection is the one thing that makes life worth living, in consideration of which distress, pain, death are matters of indifference. If this motive and basis of life be removed let the Epicurean or any other scheme of life be adopted, it matters not. If the dead be not raised, the Apostle says in effect, I grant you that that life of sensual enjoyment may be justified in a way. If you have not the Christian motive, I cannot expect you to lead the Christian life.

Here, then, St. Paul makes pause in his argument in order to warn those of his recent converts who had lapsed into the old Epicurean life, or at least had tried to find the two lives compatible. It is this departure and digression from the train of his argument—or, more strictly, this change from argument to appeal—that gives a certain abruptness to these two verses, which disappears only if the connexion is thoroughly understood.

We trace that connexion in the Epicurean formula, already alluded to, which the Apostle uses to express the antithesis to the hard life of the Christian soldier: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

It is hardly necessary to explain that in using this phrase St. Paul does not intend to argue that for those who have abandoned the Christian ideal the only alternative is a life of pure self-indulgence. Even Epicurus himself and his school maintained that happiness consisted in a moderate use of pleasure. What St. Paul does is to place in contrast the life in Christ and the life of paganism.

II. With the thought of that contrast the true underlying cause of the denial of the resurrection against which he is contending flashes into the Apostle's mind. Hence

this digression from his argument is only apparent. The earnest compressed sentences which follow betray the emotion with which the warning is given. It is a direct appeal to conscience—to that God-given sense already illuminated by Christian teaching and the power of the Incarnation. It is impossible, he tells these wavering disciples, for the high and spiritual thought of the resurrection and the resurrection life to exist in the heated atmosphere of Epicureanism. There must be a complete severance between the old life and the new. It is the Wordsworthian scheme of “high thinking and plain living” deepened, hardened and spiritualized. The Christian ideal must be nurtured in a brighter and purer air; that “atmosphere of moral and religious influences which surrounds every man’s existence, of which he is often as little conscious as of the air he breathes, but without which spiritual life would be just as impossible as physical life under an exhausted reservoir” (W. R. Smith’s *Prophets of Israel*, p. 2).

“Do not,” he says, “go on deceiving yourselves” (μὴ πλανᾷσθε, note the middle voice and present tense). Do not continue in that fatal mistake of expecting to live the old sensual life and still to keep your souls pure and your hope of the resurrection bright and open. “Evil associations corrupt a good character,” or, as we might paraphrase it, “Pagan companionships and consequently pagan words and ideals corrupt and lower the higher life which you have learnt to live in Christ.” The last words are an iambic line—φθείρουσιν ἡθὴν χρήσθ’ ὁμιλίας κακαί—from the Thais of Menander.¹ The citation is peculiarly interesting, for

¹ In citing this line among the fragments of Menander, Meineke (*Menandri et Philemonis Fragmenta*, p. 79) refers to this passage alone of 1 Cor. as the source of the quotation. Its ascription to Menander appears to rest on the authority of Jerome in notes on Tit. i. and Gal. iv. The evidence that it was a line in the Thais of that poet is derived from a marginal note in a MS. of the New Testament in the possession of H. Stephens.

Menander, a poet of the New Comedy, was a contemporary and close friend and disciple of Epicurus¹ himself, of whose philosophy he was the poetical exponent. It is therefore not without a touch of irony that St. Paul cites the Epicurean poet against his own followers, infusing, as he does, a Christian interpretation into the pagan advice. Learn a lesson, the Apostle says in effect, from your own favourite poet; give up the low companionship, which must mar and ruin the acquired Christian character.

The expression which follows—*ἐκνήψατε δικαίως*—is not adequately rendered either in the Authorized or the Revised Version. But “awake to righteousness” of the A.V. is certainly preferable to the bald and inaccurate “awake righteously” of the R.V., which could hardly convey a definite meaning to the English reader. In the first place *ἐκνήψατε* does not mean “awake.” *Νήφειν* is to be sober (see 1 Thess. v. 6; 1 Pet. v. 8); *ἐκνήφειν*, “to be sober from or out of”; i.e. to return to sobriety out of the dissipation into which you have plunged. *Δικαίως* presents some difficulty, which is not overcome by the literal “righteously” of the R.V. It implies that the life of soberness is the rightful and true life of a Christian believer. *ὁ δίκαιος* is the man who satisfies or fulfils all the claims upon him, who is right in what he does. *Δικαίως* means rightly or befittingly, and the clause may be rendered: “Return to the sobriety which befits the higher Christian life.” Compare Titus ii. 11, 12, a passage nearly akin to this in thought: “For the grace of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men, instructing us, to the intent that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly and godly in this present age” (. . . *παιδεύονσα ἡμᾶς ἵνα ἀρνησάμενοι τὴν ἀσέβειαν καὶ τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας,*

¹ Menander and Epicurus were born in the same year at Athens, and spent their youth together as sharers in the same exercises (*συνέφηβοι*). (*History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, Muller and Donaldson, ii. 69.)

σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν ἐν τῇ νῦν αἰῶνι). Καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε. This clause expresses the argument negatively. That life of self-indulgence and dissipation which had resulted in scepticism is characterized as an ἁμαρτία. For the Christian such a life was a mistake, a blunder, implying want of true spiritual insight.

The need of this apostolic warning thus early in the history of Christianity is abundantly affirmed by the experience of succeeding generations. The social life of paganism, with the cruelty and open vice of amphitheatre and stage, was for long a formidable and grave hindrance to the Christian disciple. But perhaps, as the Apostle seems to foresee, the greatest danger of all lay in the excess and vicious talk and unwholesome atmosphere of the pagan banquet: "Difficile inter epulas servatur pudicitia," says Jerome.

In the next phrase, ἀγνοσίαν γὰρ θεοῦ τινὲς ἔχουσιν, the Apostle has probably definitely in view the Epicurean associates whose companionship had a corrupting influence on the higher life. The Vulgate rightly renders τινὲς by *quidam*, persons whom the Apostle does not care to designate more particularly, but who would be recognized. He says in effect to his lapsed converts, "Those Epicurean friends of yours are really ignorant of God notwithstanding their pretence of knowledge." Here, as earlier in the Epistle, St. Paul claims the true philosophy and the capacity of knowing God for the Christian faith (comp. chap. i. 21-25). And here it is perhaps possible to trace the way in which this affectation of γνῶσις (knowledge) had disturbed the faith of the new disciples in the doctrine of the resurrection. Menander, whose words are here quoted, belonged, as we have seen, to the New Comedy, which, "even more decidedly and more exclusively than the Middle Comedy, was rich in ridicule of the Platonic Academy, of the newly revived sect of the Pythagoreans,

and of the orators and rhetoricians of the day.”¹ We can well believe that this critical tone was characteristic of the society to which St. Paul alludes in *κακαὶ ὁμιλίας*. Nothing is more probable than that at the Epicurean *symposia* into which the new converts were drawn difficulties connected with the resurrection of the body would form the subject of scornful criticism to which the Christian neophyte would not find it easy to reply. We may imagine one of these discomfited disciples laying before the Apostle the difficulty which has given occasion for the victorious answer with which the chapter concludes.

This then suggests a link of connexion, and enables us to see a reference to the *ἄφρων* (thou fool) of verse 36 to the *ἀγνοσίαν* (ignorance) of verse 34.

It is not perhaps a mere coincidence that in refuting his Epicurean opponent the Apostle should use the same expression, *ἄφρων*, which our Lord applies in His parable to that other follower of the lower life (St. Luke xii. 19).

In this passage then, as we have shown, three characteristic points of St. Paul's theology are brought into relation with his great argument for the resurrection: (1) The appeal to instinctive conviction; (2) The claim for the supremacy of the Wisdom of Christ; (3) The need of severance from the world for the spiritual life.

But there is another point which does not appear on the surface of the argument of too great practical importance to be overlooked. If we have rightly conjectured the genesis of the question on which St. Paul's final argument is based, we have here a very early instance of an “insuperable” objection to the faith of Christianity dispelled by a single word from an Apostle. But for that authoritative word a false conception of Christian teaching on the momentous subject of the resurrection might have con-

¹ *History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, Muller and Donaldson, ii. 60, 62.

tinued to disturb the faith of uninstructed converts, such in type as those who fell easy victims to the philosophic criticism of the Corinthian *symposia*. The question might still be asked in scorn or doubt, "How are the dead raised, and with what manner of body do they come?" Throughout her history the Christian Church has suffered from such misconception of her faith as is implied in the question. Time after time the attempt has been made to proclaim as vital truths of Christianity tenets and dogmas which the wiser criticism of a succeeding age has found to be groundless, and not Christian truths at all. The Calvinistic doctrine of election; an *a priori* theory of accuracy in the Bible narrative resulting in forced explanation of discrepancies; the necessity of a literal and unconditional fulfilment of prophecy; the doctrine of verbal inspiration; misinterpretation of particular texts—all these have in turn furnished "insuperable" difficulties in the way of accepting Christianity. Some have been dispelled by a truer religious instinct and a deeper knowledge; some are still with us, either slowly vanishing in the growing light; or else remaining only to be dissolved in a flash of spiritual insight at the final revelation.

ARTHUR CARR.

AN UNOBSERVED QUOTATION FROM THE BOOK
OF ENOCH.

DR. ABBOTT has discussed in his recent work entitled *Clue* the cause of the variation between the transmitted forms of one of our Lord's sayings, which occur in what he calls the Double Tradition. The passage to which I refer is

Matthew xiii. 17 = Luke x. 24,

which is presented by Dr. Abbott in the following English parallel—

<p>Many prophets <i>and righteous</i> [men] have passionately desired to see the things on which ye look.</p>	<p>Many prophets and <i>kings</i> have desired to see the things on which ye (emph.) look.</p>
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The first criticism which is provoked by the juxtaposition of the passages (whether in Greek or in English) is the inappropriateness of the word "kings" which stands in Luke over against the "righteous men" of Matthew, a variation which Dr. Abbott holds to be (a) historically impossible, and (b) out of harmony with other statements of our Lord concerning the rulers of this world. Of these objections the first is the one that has the greater validity, and the two points together are summed up in a question—

"Of how many 'kings' could Jesus say this? Is there anything in Christ's doctrine, or in the special goodness of the kings of Israel or Judah that would lead us to suppose that He would use language so favourable to royalty?"

The question arises as to whether the variation is explicable by the hypothesis of a Hebrew or Aramaic source; and accordingly we find Dr. Abbott suggesting that the cause of the variant tradition may be the similarity between the Hebrew words for *king* (מֶלֶךְ) and *angel* (מַלְאֲכִי): (he has previously disposed of a somewhat similar suggestion of Resch, who, one is tempted to say, can always find a com-

mon Semitic ancestor for any two Greek words taken at random from the dictionary). Thus, according to Dr. Abbott, we are to understand Christ as speaking of the prevision, the insight, the spiritual desire of *prophets* and *angels*. It is even possible that the first form may have spoken of *prophets*, *righteous men*, and *angels*, but this does not affect the point with which we are chiefly concerned, viz., the juxtaposition of *prophets* and *messengers of God*.

Two important suggestions are made by Dr. Abbott upon the form of the tradition as thus reconstructed, viz., that the term *messenger of God* was "applicable to Noah, Abraham, and many others, whom the Epistle to the Hebrews describes as having seen and greeted the promises 'from afar';" and that a similar conjunction of *prophets* and *messengers* (again defined as far-seeing and in-seeing) would elucidate the verses in the first Epistle of Peter (i. 12, 14), "the *prophets* sought and searched diligently," "the *angels* desire to look into"; that is, the angelic inquisitors may after all have been righteous men, and even in Peter they may have acquired the celestial connotation (if such be held to be involved in his language) from an earlier and simpler statement.

Now the suggestion of a connexion between the Petrine language and the Synoptic [Dual] tradition is not a piece of imaginative criticism, as the following note from Dr. Hort will show—

"*Προφῆται* without an art. is not likely here to have a limiting power, 'some prophets,' not all; such a restriction is not needed, for, though that which is said was in strictness true of some only, there would be nothing unnatural in gathering up the prophets into one whole. But a more emphatic sense is gained by giving *προφ.* an indirectly predicative force, 'men who were prophets' or, as we should say, 'even prophets,' even the receivers and vehicles of God's revelation were in this respect themselves

seekers and searchers like any other men. This interpretation agrees with the highly probable derivation of the idea from our Lord's own words in Matthew xiii. 17, Luke x. 24, while the one Evangelist has *δίκαιοι* and the other *βασιλείς*, both alike have *προφῆται*."

It appears then that both of the critics to whom we refer suggest that the Synoptic passages will throw light on the two sentences in Peter, Dr. Hort going so far as to make the Logion underlie the language of Peter, while Dr. Abbott appears to content himself with the statement that the substitution of "messengers" for "kings" which elucidates the divergent traditions in Matthew and Luke will also throw light upon the two verses in Peter.

Suppose we take up the Petrine text at this point and ask the question over again, "What person or persons are involved in the prophets who inquired and sought diligently?" and if the angels are not mere messengers and so equivalent to the prophets already mentioned, what angels are they that look down upon or look into the history of the world? Dr. Abbott suggests Noah, Abraham, and other patriarchal names. Have we any right to make such a suggestion without some support from written documents? For in this connexion there is no need to assume that it is a part of special revelation to Peter that certain matters had been specially revealed to his forerunners; a revelation concerning a revelation is not to be thought of, and we are therefore led to infer that his reminiscence of the state of mind of the righteous men [and messengers?] is a historical reminiscence. But where in the sacred writings shall we find any such records as we are assuming to have existed? Dr. Abbott says, "Try Noah, Abraham, etc."

But if this hint be a good one, we should expect *a priori* that the writer quoted would be the one that is quoted elsewhere in the Epistle, viz. Enoch, from whom even the

traditions about Noah are borrowed. But is there any reason to suppose that the Book of Enoch can be regarded as a fountain or original for the statement that the prophets prophesied of grace to the Gentiles and had a revelation that it was not for themselves that they saw their vision, but for us?

When we turn to the opening verses of the Greek Enoch, we find the following statement—

ἀγιολόγων ἁγίων ἤκουσα ἐγὼ καὶ ὡς ἤκουσα παρ' αὐτῶν, πάντα καὶ ἔγνων ἐγὼ θεωρῶν. καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν νῦν γενεάν διενεοῦμένην ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πόρρω οὔσαν ἐγὼ λαλῶ (Enoch i. 2).

Here at the very opening of the Enoch apocalypse we find the writer explaining that he was not engaged upon matters relating to his own day or generation, but upon those which referred to a generation that was afar off. The suggestion is a natural and easy one that this is the reason for the Petrine statement—

οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος προφητεύσαντες, ἐραυνῶντες εἰς τίνα [? χρόνον] ἣ ποῖον καιρὸν ἐδήλου τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ προμαρτυρόμενον τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας. οἷς ἀπεκαλύφθη ὅτι οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς ὑμῖν δὲ διηκόνουν αὐτά ἀ νῦν ἀνγγέλη ὑμῖν διὰ τῶν εὐαγγελισαμένων ὑμᾶς πνεύματι ἁγίῳ ἀποσταλέντι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, εἰς ἀ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακύψαι.

The parallel is sufficiently close between οὐκ εἰς τὴν νῦν γενεάν and οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς, and between ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πόρρω οὔσαν and ὑμῖν δὲ διηκόνουν αὐτά. If it is not a forced and artificial parallel, we are entitled to recognize the influence of the Greek Enoch upon Peter from the very opening of the Epistle, and before he comes to the legend of the fall of the angels and the story of their imprisonment.

Now there is a curious verification of the correctness of this view to which I venture to invite attention. I premise that no difficulty arises from the titles given to Enoch;

whatever we wish to call him of the triad—prophet, angel, or righteous man—can be justified from his own writings or from the reputation in which he was held by others. That he was a prophet is sufficiently recognized; that he is Ἐνώχ, ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, appears from the opening sentences of the book, as well as elsewhere, nor are there wanting statements that he was an angel or messenger of God. Leaving on one side these minor proofs of the fitness of the generalization which has deduced the prophetic characteristics from the statements of Enoch, we turn to the Greek of the two passages referred to, and it becomes clear at a glance that the perplexing διηκόνουν αὐτά of Peter is a textual error, which should be corrected by the aid of the διενσούμην of Enoch; in other words, Enoch was *contemplating* (not *ministering*) the matters of his prophecy, not with a view to his own generation, but with a view to a later day; and we must restore for the διηκόνουν of the extant text of Peter the paleographically almost equivalent διενσοῦντο which makes at once the linguistic parallel with Enoch complete and restores his argument.

Not only so, but the emendation is immediately justified by the fact that it improves the sequence of the Epistle in a remarkable way. It is customary to divide the paragraphs in 1 Peter chap. i. so as to close the first great paragraph with the words “which things the angels desire to look into,” after which the text resumes, but resumes *de novo*, with an exhortation to a watchful and expectant attitude; when, however, we have restored Enoch’s διενσούμην, we see at once that the break in the text has a very slight claim to a paragraph at all, for the sequence is maintained by the occurrence of a following διάνοια, as follows—

διὸ ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν,

where the link with the previous verse becomes obvious, and ὑμῶν is now emphatic; as if he should say, “They con-

templated what should come to you, and therefore 'imp the wings of your own high-flying mind.'"

It appears, then, that a marginal reference to Enoch i. 1 should be added against these verses of the first Epistle of Peter, and that the reference will make them more lucid, more consequent and easier to understand. If the introduction of the new factor reduces to zero some whole pages of commentary and illustration from other quarters, that is also as it should be. Most commentaries on the New Testament are rich in matter that is only remotely applicable to the text, and especially is this the case when, as in the instance to which I refer, the text itself is wrong.

Nor should we omit to notice what is of great importance in the history of the text of Enoch, and not without bearing upon other places where he is quoted in the New Testament, that it is the *Greek* translation of Enoch and not the Hebrew original that is current in the apostolic circle.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

JUDE 22, 23.

THESE verses present a well known problem in the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. Their difficulty, which is partly due to the extraordinary variety of readings in the four primary uncial witnesses, is enhanced by the lack of old Latin or old Syriac versions, and the absence of early patristic evidence. No single uncial is undoubtedly supported by any early version except the Bohairic, nor by any Church father before Clement of Alexandria; and, as we shall see, his evidence is not free from difficulties.

The first point to be determined is whether there are two or three clauses in these verses, a question on which modern editors are much divided. The evidence stands thus:—

(i.) For two clauses:

(a) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε ἐν φόβῳ, μισοῦντες κ.τ.λ., read by B and adopted by WH in their text with a comma after ἀρπάζοντες. It is also accepted by Weiss, who inserts a comma after the first ἐλεᾶτε as well. This too is the text which Weizsäcker follows in his free translation, “Und habet Mitleid hier mit denen, die in Zwiespalt sind, rettet, reisst sie aus dem Feuer heraus; habet Mitleid, dort mit Furcht, mit Abscheu auch vor dem Rock,” etc.

(b) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους, οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες ἐν φόβῳ: read by C^a, Syr. hl.

(c) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεεῖτε διακρινόμενοι, οὓς δὲ ἐν φόβῳ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες: read by KLP, Thphyl. text, Oec. text, and so by TR.

(d) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους, οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες ἐν φόβῳ: read by C.

(ii.) For three clauses:

(a) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους, οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε ἐν φόβῳ; read by A 5, 6,

13, 27, 29, 66** al^p lat. vg., boh., æth., arm. "Ephr." This, which is put by Weymouth in his resultant text, is the reading of Tregelles, Tischendorf, and Nestle. Zahn also accepts this as correct.

(b) καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους, οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε ἐν φόβῳ; read by N, and followed in the text of our Revised Version.

This bewildering array of readings is best explained by some error that crept early into the text and cross-fertilized every family. Our task is to try to determine by external evidence and congruity with the context, first, whether the original contained a two- or a three-limbed sentence; and then, if the former is found to be probable, to decide which, if any, of our extant readings best satisfies the conditions.

Though most modern editors seem to incline to a triple-claused reading, the external evidence is the other way. The threefold division is attested almost entirely by Alexandrian witness, for the text of N is evidently conflate. A has as its chief supporter the oldest Egyptian version, the Bohairic, which is regarded by present critics as particularly free from so-called Western additions. Unfortunately in this passage we have no guidance from any great uncial, nor the old-Latin nor old-Syriac, as to how the "Western" reading would run. The Epistle of Jude, it would appear, was not present in any early Syriac version, and if Antioch was the home of the "Western" text, the deficiency in early "Western" testimony may be accounted for.

There is, on the other hand, strong support for two clauses, BC**a KLP syr. hl. syr. bodl. In addition we have the important testimony of Clement of Alexandria, our earliest patristic evidence, for nothing can be made of the supposed reference in the *Didaché* on this point. Clement's words, *Strom.* vi. 8, are, καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζετε, διακρινομένους δὲ ἐλεεῖτε, with the lat. Hier.

Ezech., 18: "et alios quidem de igne rapite, aliorum vero qui judicantur miseremini."

Turning to the internal evidence afforded by the passage, we judge it to be in favour of a reading with two clauses. As has been remarked, Jude evinces a fondness for triplets, and at first sight this would seem to support the Alexandrian text. But the progress of the thought of the passage really requires only two classes of persons in 22, 23, to complement the description of the proper attitude of believers in view of the intruding libertines (19-21). The whole work of these impious invaders is destructive and unspiritual. To repel and counteract their influence the readers are exhorted to the exercise of Christian duty, first, for their own benefit and protection (20, 21); secondly, towards brethren who are falling into danger; and finally, towards those whose condition has become almost desperate (22, 23). This exhortation finds its motive power in the great Christian verities summed up in the concluding doxology (24, 25).

Dr. Chase, like v. Soden, is not satisfied with the reading of either A or B; but if the former is accepted, he finds the three clauses rising to a climax, each with its characteristic idea—hopeful compassion, desperate effort, compassion paralysed by fear of contamination (*Hastings' D.B.*, art. "Jude"). Zahn supports a similar interpretation thus: "There are doubters who do not decidedly reject this spurious doctrine, but weigh the pros and cons. They must be convinced with reasons of the folly of their indecision, and of the untruth of teaching that is fraught with peril to them. There are also those who are already laid hold on by the fire of destruction, but who may still be snatched from it. Finally there are those who can now be only an object of compassion coupled with fear; their unclean vices must be hated and earnestly shunned, but they themselves are to be regarded with that unmerited

mercy that all hope to receive from Christ the Lord at the Day of Judgment" (*Einleitung*, ii. 79).

But it is impossible to draw a distinction between the second and third classes. The flames of destruction, which are already playing round members of the Church, find their lurid prototype in the fate that overtook the Cities of the Plain (cf. *v.* 22 with *v.* 7). Some of the Christians to whom Jude writes are in a measure tainted with the same vice as that of Sodom, and a punishment like that of Sodom awaits those guilty of similar sin, whether they be these filthy intruders, or believers who yield to their seductions and become their followers. There is no word of mercy for such. Eternal fire awaits them. The purpose of this letter is to warn the readers against associating with those whose conduct is sensual, not to bid them show mercy towards them, even if it be with fear. Mercy is to be exercised only towards those for whom there is still a vestige of hope. But there is no hope for those plunged into the fire (*v.* 7), though there may be some for those on whom the flames are beginning to play. Incipient sensuality, while fraught with direst peril, is not utterly desperate. But the next step of one on whom the flames are already leaping forth will bury him for ever in the sea of fire where the libertines and their followers are. Mercy is for the former; the latter are beyond its power. So the only three possible stages are, doubt, incipient sensuality—in both of which some of the Christians are involved—and complete ruin, to which the libertines and their disciples are given over. Thus the exhortation to sympathetic treatment contained in verses 22 and 23 is concerned with the first two classes, both of them still within the circle of Christian influence; and this, along with the entreaty to give heed to self-edification on the part of the steadfast portion of the Church, forms the threefold division in 20–23, which harmonizes well with the style of Jude.

If our interpretation of the evidence has been so far correct, a serious difficulty still confronts us when we attempt to decide how the two clauses are divided.

Weiss accepts the reading of B as satisfactory, partly by reason of the harsh asyndeton of the first clause. Weizsäcker, as may be seen in his version already quoted, escapes the difficulty by a free rendering with vivid finite verbs; while Kühl resorts to the extreme expedient of taking ἐλεᾶν in different senses in the two clauses—in the first of active helpful sympathy, in the latter of a pity nerveless through fear, a paralysed emotion. Hort says, "The reading of B involves the incongruity that the first οὗς must be taken as a relative, and the first ἐλεᾶτε as indicative." Such a necessity justifies his opinion that a primitive error affects the passage. To remedy this state of matters he suggests that the first ἐλεᾶτε is intrusive, and was inserted mechanically from the second clause.

But though it is with the greatest hesitation that one ventures to question an opinion from such an authority, one cannot escape the impression that Dr. Hort's suggestion is insufficient. It seems to have both internal and external evidence against it. When the two clauses are divided as in B with οὗς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε after ἀρπάζοντες, the passage presents the same difficulty that invalidates the tripartite reading of A; that is to say, mercy is required to be shown to a class hopeless because they are already in the midst of the fire. If we are shut up to a choice between A and B, the former is much preferable, for in its first two clauses it draws a distinction required by verses 5-7, between those in doubt and those in the flames of sensuality.

Turning again to external evidence, we observe that the reading οὗς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε is supported by \aleph BC^a KLP (ἐλεεῖτε) Syr. hl., and that οὗς μὲν ἐλέγχετε occurs in AC* minuscules, vg., boh., arm., æth. Thus the balance of testimony

is strongly on the side of οὗς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε. This is also the harder reading, and less likely to have been substituted for the other. ἐλέγχετε would indeed make admirable sense, but it is a word which might have been easily suggested by such passages as Matthew xviii. 15, Ephesians v. 11, 1 Timothy v. 20, Titus i. 9. So we may assume with a degree of confidence that οὗς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε is the true reading in the first clause.

Our next step is to determine where the second clause begins. οὗς δὲ is inserted after διακρινομένους by \aleph AC*^a minuscules, vg., boh., arm., Syr. hl., æth., and with ἐν φόβῳ between οὗς δὲ and σώζετε by the Constantinopolitan text. In fact, B is the only great MS. that omits this οὗς δὲ. Thus if, as we have seen, both external and internal evidence lead us to a bipartite reading, we are almost constrained to hold that it would run as follows: καὶ οὗς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους, οὗς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες ἐν φόβῳ, μισοῦντες κ.τ.λ.

This reading actually occurs in C^a, Syr. hl.; and the earliest corrections of C, which were inserted in the sixth century, are important. Further, Clement of Alexandria lends more support to this than to any other when he writes: καὶ οὗς μὲν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζετε, διακρινομένους δὲ ἐλεεῖτε. He seems to be quoting loosely, though the reading of the Bodleian Syriac, "et quosdam de illis quidem ex igne rapite; cum autem resipuerint miseremini super eis in timore," might lead to the conjecture that the inversion was even behind Clement. This would account for the early intrusion of οὗς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε before ἐν φόβῳ. But the fact of importance is that Clement and the Bodleian Syriac agree with C^a, Syr. hl. in the two classes referred to.

The internal evidence agrees remarkably well with this reading. In verses 5-7 Jude warns his readers by illustration against the fatal example of two types of characters—those who, having been guilty of apostasy, like the Israelites

in the desert, will perish; and others whose sensual conduct aggravates their revolt, as typified in the fallen angels and the inhabitants of the Cities of the Plain. Their punishment will also be the doom of those in the Christian Church who repeat their conduct, whether it be of the nature of unbelief or of vice. So in verses 20-23 we have the duties of the true believer set forth in contrast to the practices of the libertinists as outlined in verse 19. These intruders are separatists, introducers of caste. They claim to be spiritually-minded, pneumatic, superior to the average Christian, from whom they withdraw to form cliques of kindred spirits. In reality it is easily seen that they have nothing spiritual in them, but are dominated by the sensual. Evidently these people have been at work with some success, and this epistle is a warning against apostasy and vice. It is also a strong plea for unity.

The integrity of the apostolic faith must be preserved (v. 3). Pernicious example can be thwarted only by a true conception of life based on apostolic doctrine as the foundation of Christian character. A life of prayer in the Holy Spirit will bind the Church together in harmony. God's love, which streams forth upon the brethren, an earnest of the final revelation of mercy when the Lord Jesus shall appear to give them life eternal, will protect the Church and fortify her against error in life or doctrine (20, 21).

But though the bulk of the Church is true, there are some to whom the arguments and promises of the libertines have proved attractive. Catechumens perhaps, they are unstable (*διακρινόμενοι*) and have to be dealt with tenderly or they will be lost. As the Lord will on the last day show mercy to the faithful believer, so must the steadfast Christian exercise compassion towards the erring. Jude, familiar as he is with Pauline thought, gives advice, in accordance with the wise and generous precepts of

2 Thessalonians iii. 14, 15, to disapprove of unruly conduct, though instead of treating the offender as an enemy to admonish him as a brother. An even closer parallel is found in Galatians vi. 1: "Brethren, even if a man be overtaken in any trespass, ye which are spiritual, restore such a one in a spirit of meekness; looking to thyself lest thou also be tempted." So here the truly spiritual man is not the separatist, but he who shows mercy to the waverer.

Finally, there are some within the Church who are guilty of gross sensuality. They are not yet past hope, but afford opportunity for the discretion of the most spiritual among the brethren; for the peril both to the rescuer and to the perishing is awful. Hateful as it is and dangerous for the pure to approach the unclean, he is constrained to venture by the knowledge that a doom of eternal fire is reserved for those who apostatize into fleshly vice. Even the impure are not past hope. With the figure of Zechariah iii. 1-5 in his mind, Jude is persuaded that brands may be plucked from the burning, that filthy garments may be replaced with rich apparel; for Satan the Accuser is faced by the Servant, the Branch who will remove iniquity (cf. v. 9). God alone is the Saviour through Jesus Christ. He has all glory and majesty and might and power, and He can keep His Church inviolate. He can preserve the waverer from stumbling to a fall; He can remove the stains of sin, so that the sinner shall with exceeding joy stand in perfect purity, even in the presence of Him whose glory is untarnished.

Thus the doxology gives a well compacted and appropriate conclusion to a letter which begins with an eager exhortation to unity. In the Almighty God their Saviour His people have a magnificent ground for confidence against any inroad of vice.

R. A. FALCONER.

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE TO THE
HISTORICITY OF THE EVANGELIC JESUS.

IT must be confessed that the appeal to experience is a somewhat perilous expedient and one which should be employed with extreme caution. It is not infrequently an *asylum ignorantie* resorted to by enthusiasts and obscurantists when they are hard put to it for a reason of the faith they profess. Argument is at an end when a man says: "So it seems to me; and, say what you will, you shall not argue me out of my conviction." This is just the Protagorean *homo mensura* which Socrates criticizes in the *Theætetus*.¹ "'Man,' says Protagoras, 'is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.' He means by this that, as everything appears to me, such is it to me; and, as it appears to you, such again is it to you."

This, however, is the abuse of the argument, and does not disprove the legitimacy or validity of it. Experience is a fact and must be taken account of. It was a fair and conclusive appeal to experience when Diogenes, unable to expose the fallacy in Zeno's demonstration of the logical impossibility of locomotion, got up and walked. *Solvitur ambulando*. And with equal justice may a believer take his stand, in quiet confidence, upon his experience of Christ's grace and reply to the criticism which assures him that the Saviour whom he trusts in is a mythic personage and that next to nothing can be known about the Historic Jesus: "I know Him whom I have believed. He has manifested His mercy and grace to my poor soul; and I am sure that He

¹ 151 E.

was just what the Gospels represent, because I have found Him even such in my own experience."

According to Romanes¹ the criteria which differentiate faith from superstition are "the spiritual verification" and "the moral ingredient," and it is the selfsame criteria that determine the legitimacy of the appeal to experience. Does the experience accord with the evangelic story? Then it verifies the story and the story justifies it. And is it morally unobjectionable? It is told how an impostor, one Lacey, of the sect called the Prophets, once waited on the Lord Chief-Justice Holt and demanded the release of a brother fanatic who had been thrown into Newgate for seditious talk. He announced himself as "a prophet of the Lord God." "He has sent me to thee, and would have thee grant a *nolle prosequi* for John Atkins, His servant, whom thou hast sent to prison." This pretended experience lacked the moral ingredient. "Thou art a false prophet," was his lordship's reply, "and a lying knave. If the Lord God had sent thee, it would have been to the Attorney General, for He knows that it belongeth not to the Chief-Justice to grant a *nolle prosequi*; but I, as Chief-Justice, can grant a warrant to lay a lying knave by the heels."

Consider, then, how Christian experience answers to the evangelic record. It is written in the Gospels how, when Jesus met with penitent sinners, of His own sovereign authority He absolved them and bade them enter into peace; how He bade the weary and heavy laden come unto Him and find rest unto their souls; and how multitudes trusted Him and from that hour lived new lives, being freed from the lusts which had held them in bondage, and filled with all joy and peace in believing. Thus it is written in the Gospels, and even such at this hour, as it has been during more than sixty generations, is the actual experience of myriads of believers.

¹ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 139.

It is remarkable with what equanimity the mass of Christians are wont to regard the assaults of destructive critics on the historicity of the Scriptures, going quietly on their way and feeding their souls upon those narratives whose incredibility is so loudly proclaimed. It is not that they are irrational, but rather that their faith rests on a foundation which no criticism can weaken or destroy. They know Him whom they have believed. They have seen His blessed and gracious face, have tasted of His goodness, have experienced the power of His Resurrection, and are holding continual fellowship with Him. Their faith standeth not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. They believe in Jesus, not simply because the Scriptures testify of Him, but because they have had personal experience of His love and grace; and they regard arguments against the historicity of the Gospels much as one might a scientific demonstration of the non-existence of the sun. They may be unable to refute them, but they know that they are false.

Though one be personally a stranger to such experience, one dare not question the reality of it, seeing it in others; as Bunyan saw it in those "three or four old women" in Bedford, "sitting at a door, in the sun, talking about the things of God. . . . Their talk was about a new birth, the work of God in their hearts, as also how they were convinced of their miserable state by nature. They talked how God had visited their souls with His love in the Lord Jesus, and with what words and promises they had been refreshed, comforted, and supported against the temptations of the devil: moreover, they reasoned of the suggestions and temptations of Satan in particular; and told to each other by what means they had been afflicted; and how they were borne up under his assaults. They also discoursed of their own wretchedness of heart, and of their unbelief, and did condemn, slight, and abhor their

own righteousness as filthy, and insufficient to do them any good. And methought they spoke with such pleasantness of Scripture language, and with such appearance of grace in all they said, that they were to me as if they had found a new world—as if they were people that dwelt alone, and were not to be reckoned among their neighbours.”¹

One will hardly dare to dismiss it as a devout illusion who reflects that never is such experience of the Lord's grace so real and precious as in the sore straits of life, and especially in the solemn hour of dissolution when, if never before, a man deals honestly by himself and looks facts in the face. Even at the risk of seeming to import sentiment into a scientific discussion one must marvel how it is possible for a Christian minister, in face of the express and emphatic declaration with which it closes (xxi. 24; cf. xix. 35), to deny the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel, thereby convicting the writer of deliberate falsehood. The conclusion may seem probable to one who takes account exclusively of the critical evidence; but there are other and weightier considerations which should not lightly be set aside and must surely appeal most powerfully to one who has knelt by a death-bed and seen the wasted face light up as though it had caught a glimpse of the glory to be revealed, while he repeated those words which have been the stay of myriads of departing souls: “In My Father's house are many mansions: if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto Myself; that where I am, there ye may be also. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid.” Amazing as are the moral mixtures which the human heart is capable of containing, it passes belief that one who stands convicted of a literary fraud should have conceived that peerless chapter. The fact is that, so far as purely critical investigation goes,

¹ *Grace Abounding*, §§ 37, 38.

much may be said on both sides as regards the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel;¹ and surely it is but reasonable that the weighty evidence of Christian experience should turn the wavering balance.

Nor is it only the experience of believers that thus attests the historicity of the evangelic narratives. It is surely a powerful reinforcement of the argument that the moral supremacy of our Lord is universally acknowledged. "Not even now," says John Stuart Mill² "could it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life"—precisely the sentiment which Dr. George MacDonald has put in the mouth of a simple and unlettered believer: "When anything comes up, I just says to myself, 'Now, Old Rogers, what do you think the Lord would best like you to do?' And as soon as I ax myself that, I know directly what I've got to do."³ The meaning of this is that the Evangelic Jesus has the "value" of an external conscience, and it would be difficult to conceive a more conclusive evidence of our Lord's spiritual presence according to His parting promise: "Lo, I am with you all the days even unto the consummation of the age."

Consider further the testimony of history, which is just the experience of mankind. "If," says Romanes,⁴ "we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived." The history of these

¹ Not only is critical opinion fairly divided on the question, but the steady tendency has been to push the date of the Fourth Gospel further and further back. Baur, in defiance of Patristic testimony, put it at 170 A.D.; now it is put near the close of the first century or early in the second.

² *Three Essays on Theism*, p. 255.

³ *Annals of a Quiet Neighbourhood*, iii.

⁴ *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 159.

eighteen centuries is in very truth a record of *gesta Christi*. It would require a volume to show the difference which Jesus has made, but it will suffice here to recall one ancient usage which is eloquent of the misery of the world as He found it and the happy change which He has effected. Alike in Greece and in Rome it rested with the father whether a child should live or die. The infant was laid before him, and, if it pleased him, he took it up (*elevare*) and acknowledged (*agnoscere*) it as his child; but, if he had no mind to rear it, he let it lie, and then the hapless creature was disposed of. Sometimes it was drowned, but usually it was exposed (*ἀπόθεσις*, *expositio*) and left to perish of hunger or to be torn by beasts of prey, unless some passer by should take pity on it and rear it out of charity. It was common to get rid of superfluous girls in this hideous fashion, and it was the invariable practice with deformed or weakly babes. The infant Œdipus was cast out on Mount Cithæron, and his little feet were pierced with an iron pin to ensure his destruction. Some pitiful soul might have rescued a healthy child, but one thus mangled was likely to be left to its fate. Of course the story was but an ancient fable, nevertheless it is a ghastly revelation of the sentiment and usage of the ancient world that, when the drama of Sophocles was acted in the theatre, it excited no horror. Such things were done every day, and that in Athens, the home of philosophy, art, and all the "fair humanities." Even Seneca, that humane and polished gentleman of imperial Rome, could write a passage like this: "We fell mad dogs, we slaughter a fierce and untamable ox, and plunge a knife into diseased cattle lest they infect the herd; monstrous embryos we destroy; children also, if they are born weakly and deformed, we drown. It is not anger but reason to separate the useless from the sound." ¹

Ex uno disce omnia. Such was that ancient world despite

¹ *De Ira*, i. 15.

its philosophy, its literature, its art, its unsurpassed civilization. It is Jesus that has humanized mankind and evoked the sentiments of chivalry and compassion. It is He that has put it into men's hearts to befriend the needy, support the weak, and look on the maimed and broken no longer as worthless refuse but as objects of peculiar reverence and tender solicitude. It is His unseen hands that have built our hospitals, our orphanages, and our houses of refuge. Had He never lived that life of love and died that death of sacrifice whereof the Gospels tell, the world had never known that "enthusiasm of humanity" which unbelievers share with His disciples, inasmuch as they too live in the new world which He has made, and, even while they disown Him, breathe His spirit.

Now, what is the inference to which this points? It may be maintained that the Evangelic Jesus is simply an un-historic ideal, a beautiful dream which has set men's hearts on fire and allured humanity to loftier and ever loftier heights. Something like this has been argued by the late Mr. T. H. Green of Oxford, the prototype of Langham in *Robert Elsmere*. His position is that it matters not at all whether the evangelic conception of Jesus be historical. In point of fact it is not. It is a sublime ideal, the creation partly of St. Paul, but still more of one even greater than St. Paul, "the writer whom the church calls St. John." "More, probably, than two generations after St. Paul had gone to his rest, there arose a disciple, whose very name we know not (for he sought not his own glory and preferred to hide it under the repute of another), who gave that final spiritual interpretation to the person of Christ, which has for ever taken it out of the region of history and of the doubts that surround all past events, to fix it in the purified conscience as the immanent God."¹ Wherefore inquire after the

¹ *Works of T. H. Green*, vol. iii. p. 242.

Historic Jesus? It is sufficient that this perfect ideal of the relation betwixt God and man has dawned upon the world, and it matters not whence or how it arose.

Ye know there needs no second proof with good
Gained for our flesh from any earthly source:
We might go freezing, ages,—give us fire,
Thereafter we judge fire at its full worth,
And guard it safe through every chance, ye know!
That fable of Prometheus and his theft,
How mortals gained Jove's fiery flower, grows old
(I have been used to hear the pagans own)
And out of mind; but fire, howe'er its birth,
Here is it, precious to the sophist now
Who laughs the myth of Æschylus to scorn,
As precious to those satyrs of his play,
Who touched it in gay wonder at the thing.¹

Indeed it is an impure sort of faith that concerns itself about historic evidence. "It is not on any estimate of evidence, correct or incorrect, that our true holiness can depend. Neither, if we believe certain documents to be genuine and authentic, can we be the better, nor if we believe not, the worse. There is thus an inner contradiction in that conception of faith which makes it a state of mind involving peace with God and love towards all men, and at the same time makes its object that historical work of Christ, of which our knowledge depends on evidence of uncertain origin and value."²

Notwithstanding Mr. Green's grateful enthusiasm for St. Paul and St. John, one is hardly disposed to admit without demur his title to claim their authority for his rendering of Christianity. It is more than questionable whether the apostles would have recognized in his philosophy the remotest resemblance to the faith which they preached. Assuredly neither of them made light of the historic facts of our Lord's Life, Death, and Resurrection. It is

¹ Browning, *A Death in the Desert*.

² *Works of T. H. Green*, iii. p. 260.

true indeed that in 2 Corinthians v. 16 St. Paul says that "though he has known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth he knows Him so no more"; but here it is not in all his thoughts to make light of the historic facts. On the contrary, he is asserting the momentous truth that Jesus is not dead but the living and reigning Lord; and so far is he from slighting the historic facts that, as he continually recognized, the postulate and guarantee of the spiritual presence of Jesus is the supreme historic fact of His Resurrection. We have it on his own authority that the historic facts formed the invariable theme of his preaching: "I handed on to you first of all what I also received—that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that He was buried, and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that He was seen" (1 Cor. xv. 3-5). In view of such a statement, it is simply flying in the face of the Apostle's own declaration to assert that "there is no reason to think that he knew anything of the details of the life of Jesus of Nazareth."¹ As for St. John his Gospel is nothing else than a record of the historic facts and an interpretation of their eternal significance. Neither apostle would have acknowledged Mr. Green's philosophy of Christianity as an adequate representation of the faith he preached. Sin, Justification, and Reconciliation are the very fabric of St. Paul's theology; while the basis of the Fourth Gospel is no ideal conception of the immanence of God in man, but an objective revelation enacted on the stage of human history—*ἡ τοῦ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνσαρκος οἰκονομία*.

An ideal may charm the intellect, but it cannot satisfy the heart; and it is the condemnation of Mr. Green's view that it makes Christianity not a religion but a philosophy, and a very subtle philosophy hopelessly incomprehensible

¹ *Works of T. H. Green*, iii. p. 232.

to the great mass of mankind. What the metaphysician here misses the poet has perceived :

Truth in closest words shall fail,
* When truth embodied in a tale
Shall enter in at lowly doors.

And so the Word had breath, and wrought
With human hands the creed of creeds
In loveliness of perfect deeds,
More strong than all poetic thought.

Had Christianity been no more than a lofty ideal, "the worship, through love and knowledge, of God as a spiritual being, immanent in the moral life of man,"¹ it would never have entered, as it has, into human history and shaped the course thereof. What has touched the hearts of men, won their allegiance, and inspired them with utter devotion, is no metaphysical ideal, but the spectacle of the Son of God, in His wondrous love and pity, descending from His glory, assuming our nature, bearing our griefs and carrying our sorrows, enduring the contradiction of sinners, bleeding on the cruel and shameful Cross, and bursting the bands of death. If this be all a dream, if the Evangelic Jesus be no more than a symbolization of thought, a sensuous presentation of a sublime ideal, then we are shut up to the astonishing and truly incredible conclusion that an illusion, born of the multitude's incapacity for abstract thinking, has proved itself the most potent and beneficent force in the history of the world during eighteen centuries. "To read the history of the Christian Church without the belief that Christ has been in vital and organic relation with it, seems to me to read it under the impression that a profound illusion can, for centuries, exercise more power for good than the truth. . . . I cannot understand the history of the Christian Church at all, if all the fervent trust which has been stirred

by faith in the actual inspirations of a nature at once eternal and human, has been lavished on a dream.”¹

Sixty generations of believers have been adoring the Evangelic Jesus as their Lord, labouring for Him, and studying the record of His earthly life; and each generation has discovered fresh glory in His person and deeper significance in His teaching. It was all there from the first, but it has been gradually perceived and gradually appropriated. Just as Science has in each successive generation discovered new marvels which had resided in Nature all unsuspected from the beginning, so Faith has been ever bringing to light more and more of “the treasures of wisdom and knowledge which are hidden away in Christ” (Col. ii. 3). The Evangelic Jesus is the perfect revelation, and increasing knowledge, so far from exhausting His unsearchable riches, does but disclose fresh and undreamed of wonders such as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man. Surely the inference is inevitable, that this Jesus of the evangelic story and the Church’s faith is in very truth the Jesus of history, and that, moreover, as the Gospels declare and the Church believes, He is “no dead fact stranded on the shore of the oblivious years,” but the Living Lord who, according to His promise, maketh His abode with believing souls and manifesteth Himself unto them in another way than He doth unto the world. The spiritual presence of Jesus is an indubitable experience with every believer, and the complete accord of this experience with the evangelic narratives is a singular and incontrovertible attestation of their historicity.

Such is the argument from Christian Experience. It is no novel method, but one which our Lord Himself has recommended. “If any man,” He said to cavillers in Jerusalem, “willeth to do His Will, he shall come to know (*γνώσεται*) as regards the Teaching whether it be of God

¹ Hutton, *Theol. Ess.* viii.

or whether I speak from Myself" (John vii. 17). The man who applies himself to that most practical and straightforward task which Jesus here defines as "doing the Will of God" and which answers to such modern phrases as *obeying the dictates of conscience, acting up to the highest one knows*, presently finds himself in possession of a certain experience; and, if he takes the experience thus acquired and lays it alongside of the teaching of Jesus, he will find that it fits in with the latter in a most accurate fashion.

St. Augustine does much less than justice to this pregnant counsel of Jesus when he renders it: "Seek not to understand in order that you may believe, but believe in order that you may understand";¹ as though it were possible to stifle one's doubts and profess an incredible creed in the hope of coming to believe it. This were indeed what Romanes styles a "fool's experiment," and it is in no wise what our Lord enjoins. His counsel is, on the contrary, a challenge to honest and rational inquiry and agrees exactly with the method of scientific investigation. The first step toward discovery is a theory; then follows the testing of the theory by the phenomena; and if so be that they bear it out, it is thereby verified. It is mere waste of breath and endless disputation to reason about the theory. "Do not think; try," John Hunter was wont to say; meaning, "Do not waste time on *a priori* discussion of the theory: put it to the test and ascertain the verdict of the facts."² It is thus that one must proceed in order to acquire proficiency in any art. "Try," said Rembrandt to his pupil Hoogstraten, "to put well in practice what you already know; in so doing you will, in good time, discover the hidden things which you now inquire about."³ The principle is valid also amid the moral tangle of conflicting duties.

¹ Apud *Cat. Aur.*: "Noli querere intelligere ut credas, sed crede ut intelligas."

² Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 167.

³ Hamerton, *Intellectual Life*, p. 303.

“Most true is it,” says Carlyle, “as a wise man teaches, that ‘Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by Action.’ On which ground, too, let him who gropes painfully in darkness or uncertain light, and prays vehemently that the dawn may ripen into day, lay this other precept well to heart, which to me was of invaluable service: ‘*Do the Duty which lies nearest thee,*’ which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second Duty will already have become clearer.”

This is precisely the counsel of our Lord. His teaching is the theory, and the experience of morally earnest men the facts; and He bids us not debate about the theory but subject it to the only just and infallible test by laying it alongside of the facts and ascertaining whether it falls into line with them. The question of the trustworthiness of the Gospels is not to be settled exclusively or even principally by the processes of documentary criticism or the testimonies of ancient authors. Their best credentials lie in our own hearts and consciences.¹ “The Word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart; that is, the Word of Faith which we preach.” The appeal to Experience attests the truth of the evangelic narratives and the historicity of the Evangelic Jesus. And it is no *asylum ignorantiae*. It has the sanction of our Lord, and it is the method of inductive science.

DAVID SMITH.

¹ Cf. the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* of the Reformers. Calv. *Inst.* I. vii. 4: “Sicuti Deus solus de se idoneus est testis in suo sermone, ita etiam non ante fidem reperiet sermo in hominum cordibus quam interiore Spiritus testimonio obsignetur.”

*THE AUTONOMY OF JESUS: A STUDY IN THE
FOURTH GOSPEL.*

CHARGES of indifference and callousness had for long been a commonplace with critics of the Stoics' theory and practice, by the time this book was written. Their main grievance against the Stoic ideal was that freedom from perturbation and solicitation came only at the expense of human sympathy. Impassivity and alienation, as they held, awaited any such attempt to exaggerate an attitude of claustral, philosophic isolation from the world. Not very dissimilar is the charge often levelled against the treatment of Jesus in the Fourth gospel, where (it is argued) under the stress of theological and speculative requirements the person of Christ has been somewhat removed from the breathing life of men, the divine in him overpowering the human, the mysterious overshadowing the natural. If autonomy is thus intensified to the detriment of natural pity in the Fourth gospel, it is a defect of its quality. There is indeed onesidedness in the treatment all through. Perhaps it is more apparent than real. But none the less one must admit some grounds exist for the critique that while in the earlier gospels, for example, compassion is primary, in the Fourth it is usually secondary as a motive. This is patent in the case of the so-called "miracles," which lose here almost entirely the gracious and tender motives commonly prefixed to them in the synoptic tradition, and minimize—though they do not utterly exclude—the natural compassion of which they had been correctly described as the glad outcome. "The synoptical miracles are, in the main, miracles of *humanity*; the Johannine miracles are, so to speak, miracles of *state*. They are wrought for the purpose of glorifying the worker. . . . (They) are, in fact, acts of humanity, but, from the point of view of the narrator, if not of the actor, that seems an

accident.”¹ The selected *σημεῖα* are transformed into proofs of mysterious power and immanent glory resident in the personality of Jesus; they witness to the importance and the authority, not to the affection, of the worker. No doubt this represents a genuine and certain element in the miraculous activity of Christ. It is an element also which is already beginning to show itself in the later portions of the synoptic narratives, where even already the cures and deeds of Jesus are not untinged with a theological or official aim.² But in the Fourth gospel this aim is allowed practically to dominate the conception of Jesus as a whole, to the almost total exclusion of the other features; as if the writer felt the autonomy of the Lord so strongly that any representation of him as relying upon human love or responding to human need would be equivalent to making him a pendant

¹ Bruce, *The Miraculous Elements in the Gospels*² (1886), p. 151. Or, as Mr. Hutton puts it (*Theological Essays*, p. 178), the miraculous power in the Fourth gospel is “intended more as a solemn parting in the clouds of Providence, to enable men to gaze up into the light of Divine mystery, than as a grateful temporary shower of blessing to a parched and blighted earth.” As the stress falls upon the appeal of revelation to the intelligence, or to the evidence for God accessible in the moral intuitions, it is natural, if not necessary, that Christ should be somewhat emancipated from the common and close relationships congenial to a Redeemer.

² A comparison of the miracles in Mark and Matthew shows in the latter (a) an increase of emphasis upon their extraordinary and impressive character, and (b) a tendency to view them not so much as incidental acts of mercy or sympathy, but as repeated and general demonstrations of Christ’s Messianic power. As the apostolic and sub-apostolic development of belief proceeded, the miracles ceased to be merely what they had been to the primitive tradition. Originally the expression of personal sorrow and sympathy upon the part of Jesus as he moved among men, they came to possess a deeper significance as embodiments of a principle and acts of an authoritative agent of the Divine kingdom. This advance is patent in Matthew (Wernle, *Synoptische Frage*, pp. 126, 158), and in one sense the Fourth gospel represents merely its culmination (Wendt, *das Joh.-Evangelium*, pp. 24–28). As in some other points this combination of ideas in the latter book reflects a stage at which certain aspects of Christology had become elaborated to a high pitch within Christian circles which felt the gnostical *Zeitgeist*; but there is evidence to show that these ideas rest upon a basis which is not substantially untrue or illegitimate, even when judged by the standard of the primitive tradition, much less when viewed in the light of previous developments such as are worked out in Colossians and Hebrews.

upon human life. Hence, as the Johannine signs in their present setting¹ usually symbolize spiritual truth personified in Jesus, they corroborate that impression of spontaneity and self-determination upon the part of our Lord, which pervades the rest of the gospel as a whole.

All this undoubtedly tends to lessen the moral impact of Jesus upon mankind. Not only do the great promises of pardon and the appeals for repentance fall away, but there is a certain remoteness in the connexion between Jesus and his age as that is described in the Fourth gospel, a lack (if we may say so) of direct and simple and continued intercourse. He is abruptly introduced as addressing men (viii. 12, viii. 21), and as abruptly breaks off. Figures are brought forward (e.g. Nikodemus and the Greeks) apparently for the sole purpose of furnishing a situation for some speech of Jesus. Before long the speech passes quite away from its immediate topic; then the figures are dropped, as if the writer had no more interest in them, nor does he trouble to describe any spiritual results that followed from the interview. At the same time, this freedom of action is scrupulously safeguarded, upon the Divine side, by a careful subordination of Jesus to the Divine will and mind, and the writer is at pains to bring out the balance of these qualities by treating autonomy in constant relation to necessity. Self-determining as Jesus is, he aims at pure and absolute submission to God his Father (iv. 34, vi. 38, x. 16), depending upon God for his knowledge (vii. 16-17, xii. 49 f.), his authority (viii. 42, x. 36), and life itself (vi. 57). Life to Jesus is described as a necessity of obedience (v. 19-30; ix. 4); the author steadily views Christ's death as the

¹ The introduction, now and then, of concrete material traits (e.g. ii. 6, ix. 6, xi. 39) is due to the general blending of historical and ideal elements, which characterizes the whole book (Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theologie*, ii. pp. 375-378). The general tendency, however, is to obliterate from the picture of Jesus not merely the sordid conditions and surroundings but also the homely and plain background. Hence the literal tears and thirst are all the more impressive.

outcome, not of human force and malice, but of God's providential purpose (iii. 14, xii. 34, in line with Acts iv. 23-30), while his resurrection is in complete harmony with the Divine decree of prophecy and Scripture (xx. 9). Similarly, the teaching of Christ is referred to no human invention or natural occasion, but to the authority and truth of God, from whom he receives it as a trust and revelation (vii. 17 f., viii. 26, xii. 49, xiv. 10, etc.). In this way the author does his best to keep any grounds for a suspicion of irregularity and presumption out of his sketch of Christ's character, and indeed in one famous passage he gives with admirable insight spontaneity and submission as two sides of one being (x. 1-18). Here the gain and end of choice, for Jesus, is to choose God's will; death comes to him as a result of faithfulness in his vocation, for his relation to God and men involves responsibilities which impose upon him suffering and martyrdom. These he will not avoid. Later on, with a dramatic touch, the writer again brings out this law of Divine necessity (xi. 50 f.), proceeding further to illustrate, in the case of Jesus (xii. 23 f.), the natural law that without self-sacrifice and loss no gain for others can be won. Under this Divine pressure Jesus lies passive (xii. 32-4). His death is necessary, in God's moral order, as the prelude to an outburst of spiritual life among his followers (xv.-xvi.), and as such it is accepted by him. Throughout, his personal authority and his Father's will are conceived as absolutely one (xvii.). Obedience is the outcome of perfect sonship to the Father — an idea (πατήρ-υῖός), by the way, which is rather a common feature in the book of Wisdom. Similarly in a piece of Jewish apocalyptic, two centuries earlier, the career of the Messiah had been expressly referred to a series of Divine commands (*Sibyll.* iii. 652-656):

Καὶ τότε ἀπ' ἡλίου τοῦ θεοῦ πέμψει βασιλῆα,
 "Ὁς πᾶσαν γαῖαν παύσει πολέμοιο κακοῖο,

Τοὺς μὲν ἄρα κτείνας τοῖς δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ τελέσσας.
 Οὐδέ γε ταῖς ἰδίαις βουλαῖς τάδε πάντα ποιήσει,
 Ἄλλὰ θεοῦ μεγάλοιο πιθήσας δόγμασιν ἐσθλοῖς.

In dwelling upon this aspect, the author is of course working out a moral principle which lay upon the surface of the synoptic tradition; but in view of what has been already said upon the sources for his autonomy idea, it is interesting to remember that along this complementary line he is true to what also formed a cardinal principle of contemporary Stoic ethics: the more freedom, the more power to obey the Divine will (e.g. Seneca, *de Benef.* vii.; *Epp.* 59, 76, 96; Epiktetus, *Diss.* iv. 1). Acquiescence in the designs and dealings of Providence formed a large part of what passed for virtue in the Stoic creed. As a man conforms to the supreme Will with constancy and cheerfulness, the Stoics taught, so he approximates to the ideal of the perfect man; in proportion to his belief that nothing can happen essentially noxious to his own person or contrary to the Divine will for him, he thinks truly of himself and God. Not wholly unlike Marcus Aurelius and Epiktetus,¹ the author of the Fourth gospel expressly disclaims the misinterpretation that the autonomous man is hard, insensible, unsocial; like them also he finds the supreme manifestation of *αὐταρκεία* to lie in submission or resignation. In fact,

¹ "Stoic theology as represented by Epictetus is fast wiping away its reproach" of arrogance and blasphemy; "but in so doing it has almost ceased to be Stoic" (Lightfoot, *Philippians*, p. 316). "Roman Stoicism in fact presents to us not a picture with clear and definite outlines, but a dissolving view. It becomes more and more eclectic. The materialism of its earlier theology gradually recedes; and the mystical element appears in the foreground" (*ibid.* p. 319). Not merely in Tertullian, but in Justin Martyr's theory of Christ (not half a century later than the Fourth gospel) and general moralism, Stoicism indirectly operated. Generally, as Holtzmann remarks (*Hand-Commentar zum N. T.* iv. 1, sec. edit. p. 45), for the development of what was to be a world-religion no watchword could be more apt than the term λόγος, which Philo had secured through a combination of the term for Jewish revelation with the Stoic world-reason. There is a monograph by Winckler (*der Stoicismus eine Wurzel des Christenthums*) which I have not been able to see.

the example of Jesus upon this side forms one of the fine contributions to Christian morality made by this author; it shows how he could rise above the growing "legalism" of the age. Emphasizing Christ's conduct as a pattern (xii. 24-26, etc.) and type, he implies that it is not unique but a rôle and rule for human life. By means of Christ's career he exemplifies the truth conveyed in the contemporary conception of Christianity as the new Law; but he makes it breathe and move and persuade, as it could not do within the chilly precepts of the Stoic creed, or the thin dreams of philosophic thought. For as the proof of friendship lies in obedience (xv. 4, etc.), and as the Christian's relation to Christ is that of Christ to God, i.e. dependence and obligation (xvii. 18-23, etc.), it follows that for them as for him strength and peace lie in obedience, and that the essence of freedom consists, not in the absence of control, not in caprice or wilful self-direction, but in loyalty at any cost to the revealed will of God and his requirements. The moment a man is put in full possession of his powers, and equipped with lordship over the world, his life dawns upon him as a mission. Such is the Christian ideal of the Fourth gospel upon one side. "The free man is he who is *loyal* to the Laws of this Universe; who in his heart sees and knows, across all contradictions, that injustice *cannot* befall him here. . . . The first symptom of such a man is not that he resists and rebels, but that he obeys. . . . He that will go gladly to his labour and his suffering, it is to him alone that the Upper Powers are favourable, and the Field of Time will yield fruit. Who is he that, in this Life-pilgrimage, will consecrate himself at all hazards to obey God and God's servants? With pious valour this free man walks through the roaring tumults, invincibly the way whither he is bound" (Carlyle, *Latterday Pamphlets*, vi.).

Further, this fine conception of autonomy as a means to

the service of God rests upon another ethical principle, viz. that the higher a character rises, the more independent it becomes of the rules which are required for ordinary life. Advance in moral excellence means less and less reliance upon specific directions and counsels; virtue ceases to be so much of a conscious effort; the right cause is seen more intuitively, and chosen with less deliberate decision. Man is not always meant to be "a shop of rules." The more purified he becomes in motive the less capable is he of choosing anything except the good, or turning to anything except the truth; for, by dint of repetition, the right choice comes to be largely a delight and habit. Henceforward he is free to follow his bent, since his bent is unalterably in the right direction—

Indulging every instinct of the soul
There, where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing.

Thus the Christ of the Fourth gospel is from the first so absolutely in line with God's purpose, eternally set in the mission of the Father, that his spontaneity, while apparently a neglect of common rules and ordinary motives, is really an overflow from the very intensity of his devotion. He is independent of the average and natural suggestions or standards in life (so, we may conjecture, the narrative implies), simply because he lives in a higher world of being where these are no longer necessary. In this light autonomy with Jesus, as with ordinary people in their own degree, forms a privilege granted, as it only can be granted, to the high reaches of devotion, where a will can be implicitly trusted to act in the spirit of the supreme Will in heaven. It is in fact the same idea as that which Dante elucidates at the close of canto 27 in the *Purgatorio*. There he describes how Vergil left the pilgrim at the verge of the celestial forest to wander on unguided for the rest of his journey. His independence, as Vergil explains, is a privi-

lege not a penalty: it is the right granted to maturity of experience.

By intellect and art I here have brought thee;
Take thine own pleasure for thy guide henceforth
Beyond the steep ways and the narrow art thou.
Expect no more or word or sign from me;
Free and upright and sound is thy freewill;
And error were it not to do its bidding;
Thee o'er thyself I therefore crown and mitre.

(tr. by W. M. ROSSETTI.)

Only, this freedom which is gained by ordinary men after long experience and discipline, is the possession of Jesus in the Fourth gospel from the very outset, in full measure (iii. 34, etc.) throughout every province of existence.

Such a brief analysis of some ethical elements in this conception of autonomy helps to vindicate generally the soundness of its use by the author of this gospel, even although its application to Jesus may have led to methods of historical statement which were in danger of occasionally producing an impression of remoteness and unreality. It certainly furthered his aim of exhibiting the Divine greatness of Jesus, as one superior to human conditions and earthly circumstances, who was in the world but not of it, maintaining his inherent sovereignty amid the exigencies of our common lot. In life and death alike this Christ was represented to faith as one who moved on a Divine plan, executing Another's purpose; his life no accident, but an outcome of God's love and a revelation to the world; his death, so far from being a misfortune or a failure, that it proved a fruitful episode in the advancement of God's redeeming providence for mankind, as it had been a supreme act of submission to the Father's will. Consequently, for the author to vindicate, as he has laboured skilfully and earnestly to do, the independent authority of Jesus among men, was to corroborate, not to contradict, the great Christian belief that his life formed the final and

providential expression of God's will and heart for the world. Signs and speculation alike contributed a proof for Judaism and Hellenism that this Jesus of the Church's faith was the genuine Messiah and the real Logos.

For an explanation of the precise form into which this sustained vindication of Christ's authority is thrown, one has to look, as has been already hinted, to the eclectic speculative atmosphere¹ which pervaded the situation of faith at this epoch in the Asiatic communities (Renan,

¹ The direct use of the Book of Wisdom in the Fourth gospel cannot, I think, be demonstrated; nor is such a demonstration necessary for the purpose of the above argument. But some of the resemblances are remarkable, whether they are taken as coincidences or as results of a literary filiation. Cf., for example, the function of the Spirit in John xvi. 8 (ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ ἁμαρτίας καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ κρίσεως) with the description in Wisd. i. 3-8 (δοκιμαζομένη τε ἡ δύναμις ἐλέγχει τοὺς ἄφρονas . . . ἅγιον γὰρ πνεῦμα ἐλεγχθήσεται ἐπελθούσης ἀδικίας) and the reiteration of "conviction" (ἐλεγχος) as the doom of the wicked (e.g. i. 8-9, iv. 20, xviii. 5=John iii. 20); also the passages upon an uneasy conscience reproved by goodness (Wisd. ii. 14, ἐγένετο ἡμῖν εἰς ἔλεγχον ἐννοιῶν ἡμῶν. βαρὺς ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ βλεπόμενος . . . καὶ ἀλαζονεῖται πατέρα θεόν=John iii. 20 and vii. 7, also v. 18, ἐξήτουν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτόν, ὅτι . . . πατέρα ἰδίον ἔλεγεν τὸν θεόν), the collocation of death and the devil (Wisd. ii. 24=John viii. 44), the inscrutability of heavenly things (Wisd. ix. 16, τὰ δὲ ἐν οὐρανοῖς τίς ἐξιχνίασεν;=John iii. 12 f.), the claim of the righteous to know God (Wisd. ii. 13, ἐπαγγέλλεται γνῶσιν ἔχειν θεοῦ=John viii. 55, vii. 29), the safety of the righteous in God's hand (Wisd. iii. 1=John x. 28-30), the knowledge of the truth (Wisd. iii. 9=John viii. 31), the authority of evil magistrates (vi. 3 f., John xix. 10-11), love and obedience (Wisd. vi. 18; of Wisdom, ἀγάπη δὲ τήρησις νόμων αὐτῆς=John xv. 10, 14, xiv. 15, with 1 John v. 3, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν), Wisd. viii. 19-21 with John i. 13, creation by the λόγος (Wisd. ix. 1=John i. 1-2), knowledge of Divine things due to the Holy Spirit sent from heaven (Wisd. ix. 13-17=John xvi. 12-14), the knowledge of God equivalent to eternal life (Wisd. xv. 3=John xvii. 3). Ewald, an excellent judge in matters of style, thought that he detected in the nervous vigour of this author's proverbial style, as well as in the depth of his conceptions, a certain premonition of the Fourth gospel, "like a warm rustle of the spring, ere its time is fully come." In view of some of these passages, and of others which might be quoted, I am unable to see how Harnack can deny the existence of any Hellenic influence whatever in the farewell discourses of the Fourth gospel (*Dogmengeschichte*, E. Tr. i. p. 329 n.). The whole spirit and subject of these addresses naturally precludes any direct references such as are noticeable throughout the rest of the book; but, although lowered and restricted, the influence is there. It is just as impossible to absolutely insulate these discourses from the gospel as a Hellenic product, as to draw distinctions sharply between the prologue and the subsequent narratives.

l'Eglise Chrétienne, chaps. v. ix.). At Ephesus it is more than possible that a native phase of Logos speculation flourished, which was largely independent of Alexandria;¹ to describe any element in the Fourth gospel as "Philonic" does not necessarily imply that it was drawn wholly or directly from a study of the Alexandrian philosopher. But the analogy between this particular conception of autonomy and the allied ideas of Stoicism is so remarkable that upon this point there is good reason to believe the author of the Fourth gospel was susceptible to some influences disseminated by this current and dominant system of philosophy, which approached Christianity in a far-off fashion upon the side of ethics, just as Platonism did upon the side of pure theology.² The prominence assigned in this gospel to features of autonomy and self-determination may be partially accounted for along lines of purely internal Christian development. Materials and motives for this conception of spontaneity undoubtedly lay to the author's hand, as he lived in the area of the earlier Christian tradition and felt the pressure of surrounding reflection upon the personality of Jesus. But some allowance must be also made for the influence of Stoicism, which had many seats and chiefs, as Zeller has shown, studded over Asia Minor,³ and which, at this very epoch, was permeating the general

¹ See Sabatier's remarks on this point in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* (1897), pp. 173 f. The general culture and atmosphere of Ephesus and Ionia are brilliantly sketched by Renan in *Saint Paul*, pp. 330-370. Cp. too Dr. E. Pfeiderer's *die Philosophie des Heraklit*. pp. 294 f.

² Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* (E. Tr.), i. pp. 116-133; Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (7th ed.), pp. 139 f., 238.

³ Tarsus e.g. was a famous Stoic centre, and Hierapolis was the native place of Epiktetus; on the Eastern affinities and Oriental origins of Stoicism, see Lightfoot's essay in his *Philippians* (1891), pp. 273 f.; and on the moral reformation of the age, outside Christianity, Hatch as above. "Nearly all the most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago" (Zeller). On the Stoics as the Puritans of Nero's age and court, cf. Mr. W. W. Capes' *Stoicism*, pp. 97 f.; also his chapters (xii.-xiii.) on Stoicism in the cottage and on the throne.

atmosphere of thought and activity throughout the Roman Empire. As the Julio-Claudian dynasty drew to a close, "the Stoical philosophy, passing beyond the limits of the schools to become at once a religious creed and a practical code of morals for everyday use, penetrated deeply into the life of Rome. At first associated with the aristocratic opposition to the imperial government, it passed through a period of persecution which only strengthened and consolidated its growth. The final struggle took place under Domitian, whose edict of the year 94, expelling all philosophers from Rome, was followed, two years afterwards, by his assassination and the establishment, for upwards of eighty years, of a government deeply imbued with the principles of Stoicism."¹ It was this practical philosophy which was in possession, when early Christianity began to emerge upon a large scale among the Greek currents of the Roman Empire. Surely then it is not an utterly unreasonable hypothesis to conjecture that behind the chief Christian writing of that age, intended to coalesce with philosophical idealism inside the Church, composed in a country² where

¹ J. W. Mackail, *Latin Literature* (1895), p. 171.

² The history of Apollonius of Tyana is itself enough to show the importance of Ephesus as a religious, no less than an administrative, centre in the province of Asia; it represented a ferment of credulity and civilization, of popular superstitions and religious culture in its higher forms. But the connexion of Stoicism specially with Ephesus is indicated in the letters of pseudo-Herakleitus earlier in the first century, and in the fact that Justin Martyr, who was at first attracted to Stoicism as a system of austere morals, probably came under the influence of Christianity at Ephesus. During the Pauline mission in the sixth decade of the century Christianity had spread inland, and in spite of the break in Paul's work it seems that the new faith continued to flourish in these districts, although seriously exposed to internal corruption (Acts xx. 29 f.; Apoc. ii.-iii.; Ignat. *ad Ephes.* vii., ix., xvi.). Ephesus also formed one influential centre for the tendency to exalt John the Baptizer (Acts xix.), against which (among other things) the Fourth gospel (i. 8, 15, iii. 22 f., v. 33-36, also 1 John v. 6) anxiously sets the subordinate and transitory nature of his mission, besides the inadequacy of mere water-baptism. The narrative of Acts throws a wavering light upon these semi-Jewish tendencies within the Church and the welter of contemporary local superstitions among which early Christianity was thrown at Ephesus; it also reveals the interesting fact that Paul's appearance there resembled that of a wandering sophist, advocating a new system (Acts xix.).

such ideas had for long flourished and were still flourishing, composed, too, with an avowedly apologetic aim and in a spirit not unsympathetic with the leading movements of the time—that behind such a work one may feel the vibration here and there of an element which sprang originally from the potent morals of the Stoa.

But if the expansion of this conception of autonomy betrays a ripple of Stoic influence upon early Christian thought, it is impossible not to hear in it as well the reply of a Christian apologist to outside cavils and internal doubts. The death of Jesus had for long (1 Cor. i. 22, 23, *Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον, Ἰουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλον, ἔθνεσιν δὲ μωρίαν*) been adversely criticized in Jewish and Hellenistic circles, and evidently its inferences and issues formed a perennial topic of discussion in the period when the Fourth gospel was composed. The claims advanced by the church for the divine origin and messianic status of Christ, his relation to the authority of Scripture and the like, these occupied men's minds, and probably suggested not unnatural doubts. Did he die simply because he was not strong enough to escape? Were his enemies too clever and powerful for him? Was he the hapless victim of envy and ignorant passion? And was his death an ineffective, involuntary accident? Answers to such criticism, whether levelled from Jewish or from Hellenistic circles, are to be heard in the representation (given in this gospel) of Christ's death and of the life which led to it. He could have escaped, had he wished, is the reply. But he would not. His death was chosen and free; he went to it open-eyed, and suffered it, not as something forced upon him, but as a free moral act. Viewed in the light of his calling and mission, his death is thus seen to subserve the purpose of God for mankind, as already the Old Testament had prophesied (iii. 19 = Luke xxiv. 25 f.). His acceptance of it sprang from his noble and conscious desire to further that purpose,

and from his knowledge that it would effect universal and eternal good for men (xii. 31).

Similarly the apologetic value of this manifesto consists not only in its repudiation of the view that Christ was a victim, weak and helpless, but in the assurance that his choice of death was for the best, that the spiritual and moral gains won thereby would more than compensate for the loss of his earthly presence (xiv.), and that Jesus had by his eternal existence (xii. 34) really fulfilled the Jewish rôle of Messiah.¹ This is of course the outcome of prolonged reflection and experience (xvi. 8-11), under stress of Jewish criticism and Christian doubts. As in so many passages of the Fourth gospel, it shows the history of the church reflected in the history of Jesus; his answers and counsels often are the reply of the Christianity which he created, made by her in his Spirit to outside unbelief and opposition or even to her own wavering self, towards the opening of the second century. By his repeated insistence upon Christ's spontaneity in life and death, this writer hopes to reinforce his readers' faith that Jesus was the Christ, the Son of God—by his death fulfilling the prophetic rôle of the Messiah and providing, strangely but sufficiently, for the best interests of his church within the world. He was no victim of chance or fate, suffering what is to be regretted; he was the true Logos, enduring nothing unworthy of himself or incompatible with the best interests of his kingdom, cramped by no limitations, and swayed by no compulsion. Plainly the writer's object is to comfort and justify faith by expressing, as clearly and imperiously as

¹ xii. 34 f. is the Christian answer to a contemporary objection of the Jewish school, which had for long cherished in some circles the belief that eternity was a predicate of the Messiah: pre-Christian evidence in Enoch lxii. 14, and Sibyll. iii. 50 (both from first century B.C.); a later allusion in Apoc. Baruch lxxiii. 1 (before 70 A.D.), though Schürer explains the "in aeternum" of this passage by the phrase (xl. 3) "in saeculum, donec finiatur mundus corruptionis." Cf. however Stave, *über d. Einfluss des Parsismus auf den Judenthum* (1898), pp. 202 f.

possible, the dignity, serenity, and solemn majesty of its object. The natural inference is that One possessed of such autonomy and omniscience¹ must have deliberately chosen a career which he knew to be fraught with blessing and profit for his own people. Hence it is that the reasonableness of his death is vindicated by an account of the innate glory possessed by him who died; while belief in the providential aspect of the Christian tragedy is justified by considerations of the sublimity and deliberation with which the Sufferer made it part of his life-plan and eternal mission.

These considerations run up into the conception of Christ's sovereignty and authority in the general course of Providence, which is another contribution of value made by this Johannine idea of autonomy. "It was not as an example but as a Master that Christ spellbound the apostles" (Hort, *Hulsean Lectures*, p. 205). Seen in this light, Jesus requires no suggestions and suffers no force from without. The true embodiment of the Divine Spirit, he controls all by his word, and remains unshaken amid the clash and whirl of things,² bearing his purpose and task to

¹ Harnack acutely points out that the Jewish idea of pre-existence really springs from a devout aspiration of faith, namely, from the confidence that all is known to God and controlled by Him, "to whom the events of history do not come as a surprise, but who guides their course" (*Dogmengeschichte*, E. Tr. vol. i. p. 318). Thus the phenomena described above as belonging to the autonomy of Jesus simply represent, from this standpoint, the natural outcome of this conception as applied to the existent Christ on earth.

² This Johannine tendency to emancipate the human Jesus more and more from the changes and claims incident to an earthly career, is probably a development of one feeling which, among others, helped to suggest the idea of pre-existence to the apostolic consciousness. Especially in apocalyptic circles, haunted by the transitoriness and dissolution of their age, it was natural to attribute an eternal pre-existence to the loved objects of their faith, and thus to render them independent of time and its ruinous hazards (cf. Baldensperger, *Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, pp. 3 f. 86 f.). This disposition had been for long prevalent in Jewish circles, and obviously fitted in with the high Christology of the Fourth gospel. As, however, Christ had to be brought down to earth and exhibited as a being of flesh and blood, the author needed other means for preserving this inviolate status of the Logos. Consequently he adopts the

its great end. As I have tried to show, the attempt to represent this in the concrete form of history, along synoptic lines, has occasionally led to several incongruities, as was perhaps unavoidable; despite its impressiveness and beauty, the idea is expressed in a form which has not altogether escaped the hazard of artificiality. What is true and timely in the Christian conception of the exalted Christ is apt to be dislocated as it passes down into the atmosphere of incident and utterance, as these exist upon the level of ordinary experience. To convey the judgment of faith in the guise of history is no easy task. But, after allowance has been made for such inevitable accompaniments of a fusion between the ideal and the concrete, the religious value of the conception remains unimpaired. Especially at emergencies or times of transition, like that at which the Fourth gospel was composed, when an old system is yielding to new forms of thought and statement, when traditional methods fail to satisfy so extensively or adequately as before, or when some of the great practical advances of the church are being undertaken—at such moments there is a natural inclination to suspect that the change which means so much to men, affects God also. Humanity, perplexed and over-anxious, distrustful through its very sense of need and of responsibility, seems eager to press or hurry God. A feeling often spreads abroad, even among people of a religious temper, that God is being taken by surprise, as though the swift changes and quick turns of human thought and experience anticipated Him. The result is that there is a half-concealed tendency to thrust these upon His notice, to demand a solution, or to dictate certain antidotes and methods of escape which appear to

idea of autonomy, or rather heightens one or two features in the synoptic tradition until they form this conception of Christ's person. This tendency was naturally accelerated, as I have shown, by the transcendental importance of the Logos in itself and by fusion with the allied ethics of Stoicism.

our judgment to be requisite. Prayer then becomes a species of panic. It is really a cry of impiety, though it is veiled under the name of piety and faith. Changes and crises, such people suspect, are more obvious to themselves than to the Divine wisdom; and in their anxiety to have Divine truth adjusted to these altered circumstances, the devout are prone to fall into impatience and presumption. Like Martha, in the story of Lazarus (John xi. 21-39), they despair of God's help—a despair which is a form of implied reproach and exaggerated self-reliance; or, like Mary in the same situation, they obtrude their opinions as if all rested upon themselves, making prayer a form of advice to God.

Now the conception of autonomy, as applied to Jesus in devout idealization by the Fourth gospel, furnishes a telling and gentle rebuke to this temper of unworthy panic in a crisis. (i.) The true Jesus of faith, in whom God is shown to us, is master of the situation. He is never taken by surprise. The tide turns with him, not he with it (x. 4, 16). In short, this idea, as worked out with wonderful effectiveness in the pages of the Fourth gospel, forms a very graphic and personal expression of belief in Providence. God possesses the power of initiative in the world's course. Free beginnings are still possible to Him. Unaided and absolute He moves. How foolish then to suspect that Christ, the head of the Church, the supreme manifestation of God, the eternal Son of God, acts ever carelessly or indolently in history! With such a Being, the author implies, it is irreverent and absurd to dictate or to forecast what is to happen. Human wishes and anticipations are quite out of place; fear is as idle as advice is superfluous; the principles and motives of God's providence for His church are and will ever be His own concern. Or—to take this message in its particular and historical setting—the contemporary expansion of Christianity into the Hellenic world (xii. 20 f., xvii. 20), together with the gradual and bitter estrangement of

Judaism from the new faith, must be all part of a predestined plan, not wholly unexpected but foreseen and executed by God's power and wisdom as mediated through Jesus. The general career of the church, subsequent to the crucifixion, is viewed in the Fourth gospel as foretold by Christ (xvi. 1 f., etc.) and really as the prolonged effect of his personality; for the writer has grasped the great idea and expressed it in a singularly apt method,¹ that Jesus was only to be adequately revealed or understood in the history and experience of his church. He and it are indissolubly one, bound together eternally. His life on earth is thus the prelude to all the after-development. But at the same time it becomes a microcosm of the church's history, so that in reading the story and sayings of Jesus in this gospel (even more than in Matthew and Luke) we see some acts and hear some utterances of the apostolic age as it lived out his principles and executed his mission.² By identifying Jesus and his church

¹ Like the modern notion of a certain irreconcilability between the spheres of matter and spirit, the idea that a man's historical existence was limited by the cradle and the grave did not readily present itself to the mind of antiquity. History, to the ancients, embraced all that occurred on, under, and above the earth, in the lives of men and the gods; so that in referring to Christ actions and energies previous or subsequent to his earthly career, the author of this gospel is not wholly without precedent for his general historical method. See on this point Deissmann's *die neutestamentliche Formel in Christo Jesu* (1892), p. 81.

² To this author, the subsequent history of the Christian church is in one aspect a biography of Christ writ large, just as the biography of Christ is the subsequent history of the church writ small. The former supplies the material, the latter the formal, reason for the particular method in which the subject has been treated. Hence the use of the first person plural, in passages like iii. 11 f., ix. 4, implies that what the church uttered in the Spirit of Christ was the very utterance of Christ himself. To some extent this conviction can be traced even in the synoptic gospels, where the speeches occasionally include apostolic material which in all good faith the editors regarded as direct products of Christ's spirit, and which had no hesitation evidently in blending with the primitive memories of tradition. Such a practice was mediated by the attribution of direct speech to the semi-personal Wisdom (e.g., Luke xi. 49 f.), and not merely the Epistle of Barnabas but the oracles of Apoc. ii.-iii., show how the exalted Christ was conceived as speaking through as well as to his church on

in this mystic fashion, the author is enabled to offer his readers an impressive assurance of guidance and control. The living Jesus rules his church: nothing can befall it that has not been anticipated by him, nor can any crisis outwit his power. (ii.) From this it follows that he does not require human advice or information. True faith, as this gospel implies, will leave Christ to do all in his own way and trust him to carry out his plans, despite appearances to the reverse. It is the place of man—however close he may be to Christ—to wait, to hope, to pray. The correlate to Christ's autonomy is human trust. That Christ knows best what is the proper moment for action or the proper method of help, is a truth which ought to be plain and welcome to any one who is acquainted with the resources, the foresight, the eternal significance of his Being. It was Kuenen, I think, who once remarked that every crisis in the history of ancient Israel found a man waiting with a timely word of God for the conscience of the nation. The unknown Christian thinker, to whose genius we owe the Fourth gospel, read Providence in a similar

earth. (Mr. Bartlet has some good remarks upon this point in his *Apostolic Age*, pp. 355-363.) But while this Johannine feature is not absolutely novel, it is intensely characteristic of the Fourth gospel: certainly it does not represent the final stage of a long, previous usage, as Zahn ingeniously endeavours to make out (*Einleitung*, ii. pp. 165 f.), for it is exegetically inadmissible to regard the genitive in phrases like τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, κήρυγμα, μαρτύριον, τοῦ χριστοῦ, as purely subjective. Further, as a correlative to this consciousness in the church, there is the privilege of prayer in the name of Christ; i.e. the Christian community, in its certainty of being mystically united to and identified with the glorified Christ, prays in such a sense that its words are equivalent to his.

It is interesting to observe that this tendency to connect the history of the church with the person and activity of Christ occurs in a slightly different phase within the preceding literature. The Third gospel was followed by a sequel, containing an account of apostolic experiences viewed under the light of a continued energy upon Christ's part (Acts i. 1 f. and *passim*). The significant fact that such a history naturally came as the sequel to a biography of Jesus, shows that by the last quarter of the century the Christian consciousness was moving rapidly towards the standpoint from which the Fourth gospel was eventually written.

light for the church of Jesus; only with him the recurring word is spoken by one Figure, who possesses the secret of each movement and the determining force in any phase of history. Thus the special contribution made by the Fourth evangelist to his age, and to Christian thought in general, is not merely the opportune and brilliant stroke of apologetic by which the Christian Lord was served heir to all that was best in the Hellenistic Logos—a stroke which won a vantage ground for Christian theology in the Greek world during two centuries and more. He achieved a task of greater lustre. He read history in such a way that when viewed as the background to a biography of Jesus it emphasized the conviction that the economy of the world (and of the church in the world) was the direct outcome of Divine care and control, the living Head of the church retaining and exercising unfettered powers of action as each successive crisis rose. This quality of self-determination, lying at the disposal of unerring insight, is picturesquely reflected in those narratives and sayings of the Fourth gospel which portray what we have termed the “autonomy of Jesus.” Such a supremacy had been already indicated by Paul, by the author of Hebrews, and by the synoptic writers, each in his own fashion. But in the Fourth gospel it reaches a climax, owing to the special situation of Christianity at the close of the first century. For, if we interpret the *métier* of the book correctly, it appears intended to show that the recent progress and extension of Christianity beyond the local limits of its founder, so far from being an eclipse of his career or an improvement upon his plans, was really their outcome, due to the spiritual power over the universe exercised by him in his exalted state (vii. 39, xiv. 12); while, upon the other side, the more novel forms of Christian thought and expression were as actually the product of his Spirit working from the first within the course and consciousness of the church (xiv. 26, xv. 26 f.,

xvi. 7-15). It was a thought which naturally lent verve and confidence to Christianity. Contemporary philosophy might be contented, perforce, with acquiescence at this changeful period. Its rôle might be to accept, rather than to inaugurate. "In the age of the Antonines . . . the wedge which philosophy had inserted in the world seemed to have made no impression on the deeply-rooted customs of mankind. The ever-flowing stream of ideas was too feeble to overthrow the intrenchments of antiquity. The cause of individuals might be turned by philosophy; it was not intended to reconstruct the world. It looked on and watched, seeming, in the absence of any real progress, to lose its original force."¹ With what force and resolution, then, we can conceive this Christian thinker would describe the moral insignia of his Christ! Here was a Logos indeed in whom there was no exhaustion or sad toleration, a Lord able and determined to take his own bearings and choose his own course, active with the vigour and the wisdom of God himself! Over the fortunes of the church and world alike, it was to be inferred, this self-determining Spirit presided; all progress, henceforth as hitherto, was nothing else than the result of his unaided power, controlling the efforts and the aims of men, especially of his followers and friends. Such in effect was one apologetic and edifying profit accruing from this gospel, as it pictured and reiterated the idea that Christ, the Son of God and the guiding authority of man, decides without anxiety and acts without effort, neither pliant nor perplexed in the emergencies of life, but ruling still, as in his days on earth, the turns and tides of history.

JAMES MOFFATT.

¹ Jowett, *Epistles of St. Paul* (1894), ii. p. 223.

THE SEVENTEENTH PSALM.

THE late Prof. Robertson Smith devoted a long article in the *EXPOSITOR* (1876, pp. 341-372) to the consideration of the sixteenth Psalm; it may not be inappropriate to offer the readers of the same magazine an attempt to remove the difficulties of the seventeenth. These difficulties have attracted less attention than those of the sixteenth Psalm; yet they are by no means slight, and the current explanations are not perhaps as satisfactory as could be wished. Following Prof. Robertson Smith's example, I will present my own solutions in the form of an exegetical study of the whole Psalm, and if the views of textual criticism which I presuppose are more "advanced" than those implied by Prof. Smith's article, I am saved from discouragement by the reflection that my own present textual criticism is the legitimate development of views which, as put forth in the translation of the Psalms now twenty-three years old, long ago obtained the approval of this loyal friend and admirable scholar.

The seventeenth Psalm, if I am not mistaken, is written in what may for convenience sake be called tetrameters, i.e. each line (or verse) in the Hebrew has four beats. It is a prayer of pious Israel, the Israel within Israel—the congregation of the pious "poor," which, according to some, is meant by that enigmatical phrase in the Second Isaiah—the "Servant of the Lord" (E.V.), or rather "Servant of Yahwè." The speaker bases his sure confidence that his prayer will be answered on his proved fidelity to Yahwè. An elaborate self-justification precedes his appeal for pro-

tection as the client of Yahwè, domiciled in His sanctuary. He is nevertheless not so much absorbed in the sense of mystic union with his God as not to perceive the imminent danger in which, humanly speaking, he stands, and being of sensitive nature (for Israel must be represented in colours borrowed from the Israelites), he breaks out into a vehement demand for a terrible retribution to his enemies. That his prayer will be granted he cannot doubt, for the Messianic age is at hand, when Israel will be admitted to a nearer and an altogether satisfying vision (see end of article) of the Divine countenance in the sanctuary, and this cannot be unless the land of Israel is relieved from the blighting presence of Israel's deadly foes. Who these foes are the traditional text does not tell us. But there is some probability that in the true text of verse 11 they are called the Geshurites. At any rate the parallelism between this Psalm and Psalms v., vii., x., xi., xvi., xviii., xxii., especially the four latter, leaves no doubt than the North Arabian tribes, who by their implacable hostility at and after the fall of Jerusalem earned such bitter hatred from Israel, are intended. We must not omit to add that Psalm xvi. and Psalm xvii. are also closely connected by their parallel ending, and that both are akin to the large group of Psalms expressing love of the temple, and especially to Psalms xxvii. and lxi., Psalms on which not a little fresh light may perhaps in the future be hoped for.

The Psalmist has often been accused of abruptness in his transitions. But this supposed abruptness is due to textual corruption. Criticism can, with high probability, remove this corruption; at the same time it reveals a want of literary originality in the Psalm. Some of the ideas and forms of expression which are most characteristically post-exilic are to be found here. The points of contact with the nine Psalms mentioned above are specially remarkable. In this connexion it may be noticed that the reading

חֲבִלֵי כָוֶת, “the snares of Deathland,” in line 19, points to a date long enough after that of Psalm xviii, for the text of that Psalm (*v.* 5*a*) to have become corrupt. The interval between the two Psalms must not however be exaggerated; textual corruption evidently began very early. It is strange that Duhm—certainly the boldest of critics—should represent Psalm xvii. as the work of a Pharisee, as if assertions of legal righteousness began with the party called Pharisees, and should even emend the difficult word פָּרִיץ (A.V. the destroyer) in *v.* 4 into פָּרוּשׁ or פָּרִישׁ, “Pharisee”; “den Pfad der Strengen hielt fest mein Schritt” is his rendering. None of the Psalms, so far as I can find from the text-critical evidence, can safely be brought down to the age of the Pharisees, nor indeed is it judicious to regard any number of the group of Psalms to which Psalm xvii. belongs as the utterance of an individual.

We now proceed to the translation of a revised text; each stanza, it will be seen, consists of two lines or verses.

- | | | |
|----|--|---|
| 1 | Hear my wail, O Yahwè! attend unto my prayer; | 1 |
| | Hearken unto one that prays with lips that are | |
| | truthful. | |
| | Let my sentence proceed from thy presence [in] | 2 |
| | rightness; | |
| | Let thine eyes view [the pious] with exactness. | |
| | If thou triest my heart, if thou provest my reins, | 3 |
| | No deceit wilt thou find, in my heart is no wrong. | |
| | From the tracks of traitors, from the ways of | 4 |
| | rebels— | |
| | I have kept myself, O Lord! from the paths of | |
| | liars. | |
| | My steps follow close in thy tracks; | 5 |
| 10 | My feet waver not [in thy paths]. | |
| | O Lord! I call upon thee, thou wilt answer, O | 6 |
| | [my] God! | |
| | Bend down to me thine ear, hear my speech. | |
| | Separate thy loyal one in thy sanctuary, | 7 |
| | And keep him close in thy habitation; | |

- Preserve me, O Lord! | in the courts of thy house, 8
 With the shadow of thy wings | cover thou me.
 From the (angry) face of the wicked | deliver thou 9
 me,
 To the greed of mine enemies | [abandon me not].
 The snares of Deathland | encompass me, 10
 20 The floods of ocean | affright me;
 [For] there surround me | a troop of Geshurites (?), 11
 With pointed horns | they mangle me.
 They attack me as a lion | which longs for prey, 12
 [They encompass me] as a young lion | which lurks
 in coverts.
 Arise, O Yahwè! | and make him bow down; 13
 Rescue my soul | from the teeth of the young lions.
 Do thou, O Yahwè! rain | hot coals upon them; 14
 With a horrible blast | do thou fill their belly.
 As for me, by [thy] righteousness | I shall behold 15
 thy face;
 30 I shall be satisfied with thy lovingkindness | in thy
 habitation.

The exegetical notes which follow are limited to the most necessary ones. First of all, in line 2 we may observe the stress laid by the speaker on truthfulness. Truthfulness is a primary note of righteousness in the early Judaism—truthfulness towards men (v. 9, xv. 2, lii. 3; Isa. liii. 9, lix. 4) and also towards God (lxvi. 18). If Psalm xvii. were the prayer of an individual, we might be disposed to accuse the speaker of self-righteousness and pride. But it is the utterance of the pious community, and the Israel within Israel, with all its defects, is conscious of its high ideals, and that, through the indwelling Spirit (li. 11, Isa. xlii. 1, lxiii. 11), it is a polished shaft in God's quiver (Isa. xlix. 2). In line 5 the reader will notice that the revised text is without that troublesome word לילה, "by night," which led Duhm to suppose that Psalm xvii. was meant to be an evening Psalm; also, in lines 7 and 8, that we have got rid of the unseemly phrase "the word of thy lips." פִּרְיֶיךָ, in line 8, is

an interesting and much misunderstood word. It also occurs in Jeremiah vii. 11, Ezekiel xviii. 10, Daniel xi. 14, but not in the true text of Ezekiel vii. 22 (read עֲרִיצִים with Cornill) and Isaiah xxxv. 9 (read הָאֵרֶץ). It means, not "violent," or "a violent one" (=robber), but "lying" or "a liar" = פָּחָשׁ and (partly) בֹּגֵד. The noun פָּרֵץ occurs probably in Nahum iii. 1 (the usual reading פָּרֶק is unsuitable) and in Jeremiah vi. 6 (read עִיר הַפָּרֵץ, cf. LXX.). The root is פָּרַץ, "to lie" = Assyrian *parāṣu* (so Ruben for פָּרֵץ in Nahum *l.c.*). פָּרַץ, "to act violently," is thought to occur in Hosea iv. 2, but the true reading is בָּאֵרֶץ as in LXX.; so Ruben. "In thy habitation," lines 14 and 30, means "in thy temple." God is chiefly present in His temple, and therefore to be His guest or housemate is the pledge of security; cf. xxvii. 5. Line 15, as here given, deprives us of a parallelism with Deuteronomy xxxii. 10 f., Zechariah ii. 8. Certainly the received text (*v.* 8a) is plausible; Tylor has shown that the pupil of the eye is connected elsewhere in folklore with the soul (*Primitive Culture*, i. 389). But parallelism is opposed to the common text. Lines 19-28 (= *vv.* 10-14) are apparently, as subsequent notes will make clear, imitations of striking passages in Psalms xi., xviii., xxii., but the reader should be warned that in this remark I assume the correctness of my own revised text of the passages referred to. By "Geshurites" are meant the North Arabian oppressors of the Jews; there was a southern as well as a northern Geshur; see the article "Geshur" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. ii. The rest of the present essay will be devoted to the explanation of various new readings which (as few will deny) add considerably—if correct—to the interest of the Psalm. I avoid controversy with those who stand where it was perfectly natural to stand at an earlier point of progress. When the scales have fallen from their eyes they will at once judge differently of the possibility and

probability of many of the corrections to which they are now unable, but not, I am sure, unwilling to do justice. The general position which I myself take up has been already set forth in the EXPOSITOR in a study on the text of Psalm xxxix.

In *v.* 1 the Septuagint presupposes 'צדקִי, i.e. "O Yahwè, who art (the source of) my righteousness." However plausible this may be, it is wrong. The whole verse is in disorder and needs rearrangement with due regard to the division into tetrameters. צדק is quite right, but it belongs to *v.* 2 (=line 3), where it is the necessary parallel to מי־שרים; see ix. 9, xcvi. 9. Next, we find בלא שפתי מרמה attached to תפלתי, as if it were "a shortened relative clause" (Duhm). But evidently we have here a confusion of the scribe. תפלתי is doubly significant. (1) It is parallel to רנתי (lxi. 1); (2) it represents an omitted כִּתְּפִלָּה. We should therefore read the two first tetrameters thus:

שמעה י' רנתי והקשיבה תפלתי
האזינה מתפלל בלא שפתי מרמה

In line 3 צָדֵק should be restored from *v.* 1; cf. Jeremiah xi. 20, "that judgest [in] rightness (שִׁפֹּט צָדֵק), that triest the reins and the heart" (see *l.* 6). Both metre and sense suggest the insertion of חסיד, which would easily fall out after רנתי. In line 5, for בחנת and פקדת we should read תבחן and תצרף; confusions like those here supposed are among the easiest; the imperfect is more natural than the perfect. צרפתני is an expansion of צרפת; suffixes appear to have been often inserted by the later editors of the text. צרפת is a variant to פקדת, and is more correct. Cf. Job vii. 18, where we should undoubtedly read תִּצְרֹפֵנִי for תִּפְקֹדֵנִי. We have already referred to the inconvenient word לילה. This is not the only occasion on which לילה has arisen by textual corruption (see xvi. 7, Job. xxxv. 10). A writer in an almost forgotten English periodical (*Journal of Sacred Literature*, new series, iv. 340) proposes כְּלִיֹּת

(לִבּ). But this is not enough ; read בְּלִיּוֹתִי (Grätz). This was originally written 'כליות', with the mark of abbreviation. In line 6 (end of v. 3) the much disputed זִמְתִּי (? זִמְתִּי) is obviously wrong. Probably there have been both transposition and corruption of letters. Read כִּרְכָּה ; ר and ר and ת and כ are regularly confounded. So too בל־יעבר פי is impossible. עבר, "to transgress," is not Biblical (see *Origin of the Psalter*, p. 466). The whole phrase must be corrupt. פי will be accounted for presently. For בל־יעבר read בְּלִבִּי אֵין. After אֵין supply אָן, which very easily dropped out. און and כרכה are naturally parallel ; see xxxvi. 4.

The opening of v. 4 cannot be right. "The word of thy lips" is not adequately defended by cxix. 13 ; indeed the whole clause is corrupt. In correcting it we must be guided by the parallel line. ברבר would easily come out of מורכי ; דבר and דרך are not unfrequently confounded (see e.g. xxxix. 2). For שְׁפִתֶיךָ, "thy lips," we want a plural noun such as פְּשָׁעִים ; after פ and ש had been transposed, it was not difficult to misread the following letters. For the impossible אָדָם לְפִעְלֹתֶיךָ Duhm proposes אָדָם לְפִעְלֹתֶיךָ, "deinem Thun schweige ich." If a verb were wanted, we should rather expect a phrase like כָּלֹאֲתִי רִגְלִי (cxix. 101, Prov. i. 15). But how could the present text have arisen out of such an original ? The corruption is deeply seated. But remembering how often בגדים is miswritten in our text, and that in lxxxii. 7 it has become corrupted into אדם, and that it makes an excellent parallel to פְּשָׁעִים and פְּרִיץ, we shall do best to restore the word here. לֵפ very possibly comes from כִּמְעַנְגְלוֹת ; the second כ became ג ; the first is represented by פי at the end of v. 3. ל is dittographic. Passing on, אני is an imperfectly written ארני. It has produced the omission of ג in נשכרתי (so we should read with Wellhausen). Next read כְּאֶרְחוֹת (Baethgen, Grätz, and Wellhausen after the Syriac). פְּרִיץ may remain in the

sense of "liar(s)"; see above. In lines 9 and 10 the descriptive infinitive is not in place; read **תִּמְכֹּי** (cf. xxxv. 16). Insert **בִּרְכִּיךָ** (metre and parallelism), with Bickell.

In line 11 the changes **אֶדְנִי** and **אֱלִי** are too simple to need defence. But in line 13 we have to use our methods boldly if we would not unduly disparage the capacities of the Psalmist. **חֲסִי בָךְ=הִסְיִד** might conceivably come from **חֲסִי**. So the old translator Street, whose clever work (now a hundred years old) is far too little known. The Septuagint has *τοὺς ἐλπίζοντας ἐπὶ σε* (similarly the Syriac). These are petty expedients. A perfect cure can only be effected by a remedy based on a wide experience of textual error. For **מוֹשִׁיעַ ח'** read **בְּמִקְדָּשֶׁיךָ**. Obviously **חֲסִדֶיךָ** should be **חֲסִידֶיךָ**. In line 14 "from those that rise up by thy right hand" cannot be right; no exegetical ingenuity can justify it. Parallelism requires a verb. The passage must be taken together with xvi. 11 (see below, on l. 30). **נִמְּוִים בִּימ'** is parallel to the false reading **נַעֲמֹות בִּימ'**, and both readings spring from **נִמְּוִי=נִמְּוִנִי=נִמְּוִתִי** (**נ**=**ק**; **פ**=**צ**). Cf. xxvii. 5. In line 15 **כְּאִישׁוֹן בֶּת-עֵין** is too short, and is not favoured by parallelism. **עֵין** comes from **אֶדְנִי**, and belongs to the first half of the line; **כְּאִישׁ בֶּת** is a distortion of **בְּהִצְרֹת בֵּיתֶךָ**. In line 17 we can hardly tolerate **זֹה שְׂדֵינִי**. Aramaisms are not as a rule probable, but here **שִׁיזִיבִנִי** at once suggests itself. The next line should perhaps be **בְּנֶפֶשׁ אִיבִי אֶל-תִּתְּנִנִי**. Cf. xxvii. 12.

In line 19 we have to combine material from the end of v. 9 and the beginning of v. 10. Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*, 2nd edition, p. 379) thought that a particular part of the *viscera* was meant (the Arabic *hilib*, "midriff"). But it is not probable that **חִלָּב** in this sense would have been used side by side with **כֶּבֶד** ("liver") as the seat of the feelings. Duhm (after Dyserinck) would read **חִלָּב לִבֵּנו**, "their heart is become fat," continuing **סָגְרוּ פִימָה**; not satisfactory. **חִלָּבֵנו** should certainly be **חִלָּבֵנוּ מֵוֹת** (**חִלָּבֵנוּ**);

see xviii. 6, on which our passage is dependent. As line 20 we should certainly read, to match line 19, **שְׁבִלֵי יָמִים** **יִבְעֲתוּנִי**; cf. xviii. 5, lxix. 3. The correction is justified by sound method. **דְּבָרוֹ** probably comes from a dittographed fragment of **שְׁבִלֵי יָמִים**. **יָמִים** means "ocean," as in xxiv. 2.

In line 21 occurs one of the greatest textual problems of the Psalm. What can **אֲשֶׁרְנוּ עָתָה סִבְבּוֹנִי** mean? "At each of our steps"? But surely this is superfluous, nor does it suit **סִבְבּוֹנִי**. If however we grant that the enemies referred to in the neighbouring Psalms are the North Arabian peoples, and that a name for one of these peoples was **נִשּׁוֹר**, which is often miswritten as **אִשּׁוֹר**, we shall at once see that **אֲשֶׁרְנוּ** is probably a corruption of **נִשְׁאֲרִים**. The LXX. has *ἐκβάλλοντες* or *ἐκβαλόντες*, i.e. perhaps **נִשְׁאֲרִים** **עָתָה** is also suspicious. Transposing, let us read **נִשְׁאֲרִים** **עָתָה** **סִבְבּוֹנִי** | **נִשְׁאֲרִים**, and compare xxii. 17. The alternative to **נִשְׁאֲרִים** is **רִשְׁעִים**.

In line 22, as represented in the traditional text, there are more corruptions which Duhm has tried to heal, but by a false theory (Pharisees). Grätz, Nestle, and Wildeboer have also made imperfect emendations (see Stade's *Zeitschrift*, 1896, p. 323; 1897, p. 180). Probably there is another to Psalm xxii. (revised text), where the North Arabian oppressors are variously described (*vv.* 13, 17) as "lions," and as "wild oxen with pointed horns." Read **בְּקֶרְנֵי הַשֵּׁן בְּתִירוֹנִי**. For **בָּאֲרִץ** see the next note. Line 23 presents us with the extraordinary word **דְּמִינוּ**, on which see the dictionaries. The LXX. has *ὑπέλαβόν με*, i.e. **דְּמִינוּ**. Clearly we should read **יְקִדְמִינוּ** (cf. xviii. 6, 19); see below. **ק** is represented by the **ץ** in **בָּאֲרִץ** (see on line 22); **בָּאֲרִ** is a fragment of **בָּאֲרִי**, "as a lion," written too soon. In line 24 for **יְכִסּוּךָ** read **יְכִסְךָ**, with Bickell, Grätz and Budde (on Job xiv. 15). **לְטָרָךְ** should be **לְטָרְךָ** (Grätz). Insert **יְקִיפוּנִי**, which easily fell out before **כַּכְפִּיר**. It was however replaced in the margin, and now appears in the text of *v.* 13,

corrupt and mutilated, as פניו ; קדמה, which precedes, represents יקדמוני (a corruption of רמינו). In line 25 read והכריעו ; in line 27 for the impossible מִרְשָׁע חֲרָבָךְ read probably מִשְׁנֵי כְּפִירִים. כְּפִירִים is a word very liable to corruption ; in xxii. 21 כפיר has become חרב.

Now we meet with one of the greatest "Biblical difficulties." ממתים ידך must be corrupt. But only a weak critic would add "hopelessly." ידך, like ידי in lxxvii. 3, most probably comes from יהוה. Then comes the ditto-gram יהוה ממתים and the extraordinary combination of words, מחדל חלקם בחיים. The key to the latter exists in Job (see xx. 23). The true text runs, תמַתַּר עֲלֵיהֶם גְּחָלִים ; in Job *l.c.* בלחומי should certainly be גְּחָלִים. Errors frequently arise both through the transposition of letters and through the substitution of similar or kindred letters. Thus מחדל=עליהם, and גְּחָלִים=חלקם. Still stranger but only a little less certain examples of this follow. בהיים וצפינדך (and צפונך) should most probably be וְרִיחַ פְּלִצוֹת (xi. 6, where גחלים needs correction). Thus we get a parallel for גחלים. תמלא בטנם is right (see Job xx. 23). ישבעו is superfluous both for sense and for metre. Most probably it comes from אשבעה, which was written too soon, through the scribe's eye glancing at what is here reckoned as line 30.

In the closing couplet (=v. 15) read בצדקך, "in thy righteousness"; ך easily fell out after ק. Not so easily corrected is the final phrase בְּהִקִּיץ תְּמִיתֶךָ. Conservatively minded readers will pardon me if, after a long and wide experience of critical methods, I presume to say that the textual reading is due to the unrestrained, uncritical subjectivity of an ancient editor. Various attempts have been made to explain it, and the present writer has taken his fair share of the trouble. Passing over earlier theories (for which reference may be made to the commentaries), I will only here refer to Beer (*Individual- und Gemeindepsalmen*, p. 18) and Wellhausen, who regard 'ת as the subject of

הקיץ. The "awaking of God's form" is thus taken to mean the revelation of the Divine glory at the judgment. Unfortunately no parallel can be adduced for such a phrase, and if this view of the construction were correct, it would be necessary to emend 'תמ' into אמונתך, or rather (see the writer's *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, p. 241) קנאתך. This however is not favoured by the parallelism. Some (e.g. Smend in Stade's *Zt.*, 1888, p. 95) would render, "... with thy form at (thine) awaking," i.e. at thine intervention in my behalf, while others (cf. *Origin of the Psalter*, p. 430) think that הקיץ is used technically of God's raising the dead. But let us put aside the current exaggerated belief in the Massoretic text, and apply a stricter critical method. Evidently בהקיץ is not a proper parallel to בצדק, neither is תמונתך a proper object to נעמות בימינך. One might be inclined to transfer נעמות בימינך from xvi. 11 (where it is metrically superfluous) to xvii. 15, supposing the scribe to have made an error (*lapsus oculi*). But the expression is too unnatural ("pleasant things in thy right hand") to be correct. It is perfectly true that the theory of *lapsus oculi* will most easily account for the existence of these words (נעמ' בימ') at the end of xvi. 11, but the further problem remains to discover the word, or the words, out of which the improbable phrase referred to may have arisen. A practised eye will at once see that תמונתך, which already exists in the text of xvii. 15, is a parallel false reading to נעמ' בימ', so that we have to find a word, or words, out of which both תמונתך and בימינך can have developed. There is only one possible solution—במשפנתך. בהקיץ still remains. Beyond doubt, this has arisen out of חסדך. Parallel cases abound in the Psalter. The decisive proof however is that חסדך is the only word out of which the troublesome נצה at the end of xvi. 11 can have arisen.

What then is the satisfying vision of God's countenance

to which the speaker of this Psalm looks forward? If we adhere to the traditional text, and take Psalm xvii. in connexion with Psalm xvi., and still more in connexion with Psalms xlix. and lxxiii. (according to the revised text), we are justified in supposing that the Psalmist expressed himself in such a way as to edify those who in the late Persian or early Greek period (?) accepted the new delightful hope of personal immortality. Prof. Charles is willing to abandon Psalms xvi. and xvii., if he may but retain the older view of Psalms xlix. and lxxiii. I do not think that a strict textual criticism will justify this position. It is only the remnant of a conservative prejudice which prevents us from seeing that in all these Psalms the speaker is pious Israel (i.e. the Israel within Israel, the true "servant of Yahwè"), and that the hope which animates him is, not (as the rationalists thought) deliverance from some one of the dangers which from time to time beset the community of Israel, but the crowning deliverance from a combined attack of Israel's foes, which will be immediately followed by the great golden age of "Messianic" felicity. Thus the truth, in this as in so many other problems, lies neither on this side nor on that, but apart from and yet near to both sides in the old controversy. It is pious Israel which, on moral grounds, so confidently hopes for lasting continuance, and out of this hope at a later time will develop the elevating and ennobling hope of personal immortality, the Divine covenant being seen to be not merely with Israel, but with each pious and devoted Israelite. If a few readers may be led by this to suspect that "advanced criticism" is only another name for "thorough criticism," and that sympathy with the religion of the Psalmists is not confined to scholars who from youth to age stand on the same spot and use the same critical instruments, the first of the objects which the writer of the present article has had before him will have been attained.

T. K. CHEYNE.

AN INDIVIDUAL RETROSPECT OF THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

II.

BUT at intervals glimpses of a faith that was making other faces shine and other voices sing for joy were given ; and though the reason was not the least more satisfied, the heart stood up in even more passionate vindication of its birthright. First and best of all were some few beside me in the College passing from mere carelessness into a true religious life. It was a new world to them, and they sprang up like flames. Why dwell on slow arguments and grudging admissions when miracles on mind are happening close at one's side ? And there were other things too. The Brighton Convention of 1875 gave a moment's sight of an aim so high and pure, that all else seemed beside it like an evil dream, a mesmeric delusion ; twice the beautiful selfless work of healing for mind or body which was going on at Männedorf near Zürich was visited and brought in a sense of the possibilities open to communion with God ; the circle of joyous faces of the Salvation Army, then, in 1880, in its first beauty of sacrifice for the hopeless and helpless, was another good thing ; three or four years later came the first visits to Keswick ; and in the summer of 1887 I read a book that formed indeed an epoch in the life within, and that was *The Memoirs of Port Royal*, written in the beginning of the century. All these various planes of religious life touched after all only a side that had often been touched before ; there was no admixture of the new insight with the old faith, and therefore they could not deal with the central grief hidden deep within ; yet they did some good. It remained impossible to shut one's eyes and go back into the old position, to turn in the tunnel and run back into the old sunshine, since for me that position was a false one, that sunshine did not exist ; and yet, with some show of

right and justice, the sight of such people was a help, for one must give some consistent account of the attraction that produced such unremitting efforts and crowned them with such high ethical success. Through all these years the mystics of the world were a gleam of hope, a refuge, a last resort. They offer no argument, they attempt no solution, but, like the dove before the windy storm and tempest, they would flee away together, and it is almost as though they would say, "Let there be no rational basis for faith; it yet produces these results in the soul, therefore it is true." They escape rather than solve the problem, yet they present so lovely and untroubled a vision that the heart flies after them longing to join itself to their company. The realization of the width of divergence from whence they come gives a sense of stability. Would St. Catherine and Tauler and Zinzendorf and George Fox and William Law all be deluded in the same way at once? It was impossible. Thus to me the thought of the Church Universal, so well learned in younger days, became as true an inspiration as the thought of Christ Himself, and one more tangible, more open to be seen, handled and verified in any way that might seem best. Intellect was no test; it was goodness, beautiful goodness, that was the final criterion, and that undeniably was to be found among the disciples of the Lord. Good sceptics and bad Christians were constantly thrust before the unwilling sight, yet for all that reason held to it firmly that the main stream told another tale. The long procession moved before the eye of the soul—martyrs, missionaries, sufferers, the recluses of Port Royal, the persecuted Huguenots and Covenanters, the Moravians working in Labrador or among the Lepers; yes, and the great tent at Keswick, and Moody's crowded meetings, and hot mission rooms in London, and gatherings in lonely cottages, where a few Methodists met kneeling on the brick floor—there, there is the portion of my inheritance. Are

the best of the race, its flower and crown, all under one illusion? Differing in every other possible point, all are unanimous about two things—the value of the work of Christ for the world, and His present power in the hearts of men. Delusion could not stand such tests; it is not only the method of agreement (I was of course well soaked in Mill's *Logic*), it is the method of concomitant variations, and even the method of difference, for in the same life one may sometimes see this element absent and then suddenly present, and lo! every aspiration and every taste is affected by the change. “His name, through faith in His name, has made this man strong, whom ye see and know; yea, the faith which is by Him hath given him this perfect soundness in the presence of you all.” That is the secret history of the Church of Christ. Here, even among the poor and simple, was some kind of home of the heart; here were to be found “love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance,” not the mere names on their lips, but at least indications here and there of the actual virtues themselves wrought out in the human character, often with sharp strain and rebellious struggle as of a material that is almost too hard for the chisel, but still there—there at last inwrought, instinctive, full of glorious suggestion of perfection, the work of a true artist, inimitable. One could recognize these tools, this hand. It was not that which was vaguely and generally Divine; it was the work of God manifest in the flesh, the work of Christ the sacrifice for sin, the Redeemer and Shepherd, the One who, though meek and lowly in heart, can yet subdue all things unto Himself, and the soul bows down before the results produced by the heavenly Designer and says, with Zinzendorf in his youth: “Wenn es auch ein anderer Gott giebt, so bleibe ich bei dem Herrn Jesu.” It was like turning from mathematics to art, from the mere effort of the intellect to a region where every response of the heart

and the will is aroused. Thought seemed cold and barren and uninspiring beside the quick intuition that recognized the Divine handiwork, the even momentary approximations to the character of Christ, and month after month the reason was one part satisfied and three parts hastily silenced as the heart fell down before Jesus of Nazareth, the one Saviour the world has ever known, and said : "Thy people shall be my people, and Thy God my God." And it did not end there ; but as the light of the moon is an unerring testimony to the presence of the sun, so the will turned from the servant to the Master and sought Him and Him only. There was the one true home, the one element for which we were created, and it must be sought and found at all costs.

The fish drowns not in the mighty sea,
The bird sinks not in the air,
The gold in the furnace fire may be
And is yet more radiant there.
For God to each of His creatures gave
The place to its nature known,
And shall it not be that my heart should crave
For that which is mine own ?

In spite of long silence and of apparent rebuff, the words of so long ago were taken up in their most intimate and personal application : "Entreat me not to leave Thee, or to return from following after Thee ; for whither Thou goest I will go, and where Thou lodgest I will lodge ; where Thou diest I will die, and there will I be buried."

"The lesson of life," says Emerson, "is to believe what the years and the centuries say against the hours." And so it was here. The hours seemed to bring nothing but a blank, but the testimony of the years and the centuries could not be overlooked. The whole process was slow, very slow. As the work of disintegration had been slowly and reluctantly accomplished, so naturally more slowly and cautiously was the work of rebuilding carried on. Some

minds are soon thrown down, and then soon again comforted; but others are tenacious in their hold either for good or ill, and cling long to what has once approved itself as true, even when strong arguments commend themselves upon the further side. They must move wholly if they are to move at all. Hesitation is necessarily the paralysis of action, and all the inner life resolves itself into a dumb, doubtful lingering at the crossroads, the insistent voice of reason presenting its claims and delaying the ardent choice of the heart. Human nature is no simple thing easily to be summed up, and sorrows from wholly another region brought in their added complication, yet in the main it is described by these outlines. Nothing is more uninteresting than prolonged doubt and grief treading the same circle a hundred times, longing to fly swift as an arrow down one chosen path, yet a hundred times prevented, and turning back to make the weary round once more, outwardly calm, but within overshadowed by a hope that does indeed make the heart sick; and even this record would not be worth the effort it costs were it not that it is but an indication and a sample of the religious thought of the time. It seemed to me then to be an utter solitude, an anomaly, a peculiar thing set apart by its waste of vain endeavour; but during the last four or five years it has been made plain that the century was with me, and that these efforts and endurances were as a cupful of water borne along in the sweep of its stream. The wishes of early youth were granted indeed, but in a form that left almost no likeness between the anticipating dreams and their fulfilment, so that it appeared as if the hopes were all baffled and the aspirations thwarted. That some other souls were worse off yet was clear, and the sad suggestion would come: "Lists of safe arrivals in port are published, but where is the list of the shipwrecks?" We are told that Ruskin gave up for the time being the whole of orthodox Christianity on the

comparatively small point of keeping the Sunday as if it were the Jewish Sabbath. He felt he had been thoroughly deceived on this matter; and if on this, so surely also on others, and the crystal clearness of his mind could break, but it could not bend. Others have had a far worse reaction, and our coasts are strewn with the wrecks of ships that once appeared to be seaworthy—stranded, bare and forsaken, pathetic in their silence. But it is of happier auspices that we now speak. Girdled by prayer, fortified by some true understanding of history, well placed for seeing the life of the Church of Christ, ever studying the Bible—even when the life seemed to have gone out of it—ever trying to learn from those whose spiritual life had in it any element of victory, and ever endeavouring secretly to help those still further astray or still more despairing, such a soul comes through the darkness and comes out at last. It is like a long tunnel, where the passenger may first see light doubly and trebly reflected from the black walls, and then singly reflected, and then a far, dim vision of the light itself, and at last he comes out, still perhaps between high banks of earth that preclude the view, but with free air round him and a long line of steady daylight above. It is not the unreasoning happiness of early days, but a solemn yet clear light, like that of the grey dawn before the sunrise. The Inferno, with its haunting sense of hopelessness even in the more placid regions, is left behind, and the air of the Purgatorio is gentle and still, and humble reeds and rushes grow in the clear water. It has its own regrets and sorrows and self accusations, but the line of hope runs through them all, and now and then the mount trembles with a shout of victory as some single soul climbs higher yet.

A painter may easily be too near his subject to be able to sketch it. It is not too little but too much that he sees. Not only does the subject overtop the canvas and hopelessly crowd its small area, but the perspective is false, the pro-

portion misleading, and the whole drawing may be worse than useless. With this fear before me very little more can be added, saving only one or two points which, having been previously touched on, seem in conclusion to demand a few words.

Reason takes up a position neither wholly satisfied nor wholly crushed down into silence, but stands aside as though she would say, "There are provinces where I may not enter. I have led you as far as I can, and you have been obedient. It is not irrational that you should now go further"; and the heart and the will run forward like children glad of emancipation from an authoritative companion, while returning to her again and again. The creed is shortened, but it is real. Some of the old certainties are left open questions, but those that remain are more certain, and will bear a strain. It was perhaps the position of the Bible that brought me the acutest personal pain, as, stripped and exposed, turned over and criticized, and even by some mocked and scourged, it lay there like the dead body of a friend. Loved so long and so well, trusted in every word of it, it could not be forsaken; but it was a useless kind of friendship to sit beside it stricken through with grief, while year after year went by, longing that it might regain by any means its old vitality and power. A nameless something had happened to it that rendered it dumb and helpless, but whether it was paralysis or death it was hard to tell. Many of the Psalms still had a voice; those that spoke of being thirsty and weary, desolate and like unto them that go down into the pit, forsaken by God and man, those had so piercing and true a note that it was not David or Asaph who wrote those Psalms—it was I. But all the dogmatic parts were dumb, and all the comforting parts were a heart's longing, a sweet dream that, seek where you would and wait as long as you might, touched you with no corresponding reality. All the while thought was at work,

grasping here and there, gathering and storing all it could from every source to gain some tenable and consistent view of inspiration. An obstinate endurance made me hold to the Bible through its time of dumbness and sorrow, and then life slowly returned to it—a life not manifested in the same bright and fragmentary way as before, but something more steadily diffused, and that could speak once again to the inmost heart. All came back to life again. The second and third of Genesis had been a difficulty for a while, but now they glowed and shone, appearing more definitely inspired than ever they had done in the old literal days. That out of all the overwhelming events of the prehistoric world, the wars and feuds and catastrophes, the founding of kingdoms on mere force, and the confusions of violence, the writer should have selected to relate in full the awakening of the human conscience, and the first sense of responsibility of man to his Maker, this is a wonderful thing. That out of the dimness of the very early dawn this one event, so silent, so hidden, so utterly unnoticed by the course of the world's history, should have been thus singled out, told us in full detail, with complete fidelity to psychological truth in every step, and put forward in the clearest and most attractive light as an all-important thing for us to know, and as the very deepest laid and strongest foundation stone of our redemption, here surely was not the work of man but of God, here was a true inspiration, the very in-breathing of the Most High. So it was also with other parts, and life flushed again through the well-loved pages, and even further possible discoveries of future critics became a matter of intellectual interest merely, having no spiritual weight of distress connected with them.

In practical life mystery remained so closely surrounding the path, that one seemed to walk along walled about with impervious mist, but the circle of light on the stones immediately before one's feet was unmistakable. It was not born

of the enclosing gloom, it was not a lantern in one's own hand, it was something steady and real, and that was enough. Even the hardest point of all, the over balance of sin and evil and pain in the world, even this could be endured with patience when one caught a glimpse of the end God had in view, and the perils He undertook when He created a being with freedom of choice between good and evil.

Though all, after the manner I have endeavoured to relate, became chastened, careful, and moderate in expression, there are comforts and even joys to be found on this the further side of the tunnel that only those can know who have tasted them. The young untried heart can perhaps hardly believe that so quiet a place can be truly happy. Accustomed to a sky of perfect blue, the sight of a cloud of doubt attracts the eyes and keeps them fastened; for it looks real and solid and menacing, and it is new. That is the important thing, that is the intruder, that is the inexplicable presence; and it forms a focus of restless questioning, while all the beauty and steady serenity of the surrounding heaven go for nothing. But if once one has seen the face of the sky all clouds, it is the rift of blue that attracts attention. See there, a hole in my dismal covering, a look through into infinite space, how wonderful, how glorious! The clouds are really quite close to me, a part of the earth and of my present condition, and they are small and transitory, though they necessarily affect me so greatly; but that open gap is a real thing and a great one—it is wholly unconnected with me and with my dwelling-place, a glimpse of Permanence and Eternity, a link with that which is Divine. With my feet held down to this solid and dark earth, who am I that such a heavenly companion as this open window should be given me, this possibility of purity and stainless perfection? The clouds are forgotten now, for something far, far beyond them

attracts my eyes, a region where they can never enter, and which would endure unaltered were the earth and its attendant clouds all swept away.

But there are many details of practice that are passed over in silence, as, though of profound importance to the individual life, they do not bear upon the religious thought of our age and nation. One thread of the vast complex web of our century has been traced through, worthy of attention only because it lies parallel with hundreds and even perhaps thousands more, and it ends not in darkness but in light. When once the scale had turned, help after help came in of the best things in all the world—love, friendship, and the power of giving sympathy and counsel to those who were still in bewilderment. The loneliness was over, and life began again to be thronged with interests and irradiated with beauty. Even guidance from Heaven itself was not unknown. The deep voice of the years and the centuries spoke first, and drowned the insistent wail of the disappointed hours; but even the hours now and then had a voice at last, and the single-worded whisper close at hand is apt to be more convincing to the individual mind than the thunder up in the air.

Yes, God is faithful, and my lot is cast;
Oh, not myself to serve, my own to be;
Light of my life, the darkness now is past,
And I, beneath the Cross, can work for Thee.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

VIII.

"IS GOD A PRESENT GUIDE?"

THE question has often been asked, What is the common element in the religious life of all nations? There is the vastest possible diversity in creed, there is infinite variety in the rites of worship, there are impassable differences in the

intellectual culture of the worshippers ; is there any point in which they are at one ? You cannot pitch upon any doctrine and say, "You will find that everywhere." The Jew had no Incarnation. The Buddhist had no Resurrection. The Brahman had no Fatherhood. The Parsee had no universal Providence. The Greek had no Fall. The Roman had no Divine Sacrifice. The Mohammedan had no place for human freedom. Where can there be found a centre of unity ?

I answer, You will find it if you turn from doctrine to fact. There is one thing which I think every religion seeks, and that is Divine Help. There is complete diversity of opinion as to what is Divine ; but there is none as to the relation in which Man desires the Divine should stand to the human. There is no religion in the world that has not been embraced for the sake of the help it is thought to bring. Jew, Buddhist, Brahman, Parsee, Greek, Roman, Mohammedan, are divided by the poles in sentiment ; but they are all united in one practical wish—the desire that their respective creeds should each conduce to the achievement of their various ideals of heaven.

Here, then, is a basis for unity ; we all want help from the Power we worship. Now, if the doctrine of Evolution be a religious system, it must conform to this attribute of all religions. We have seen that Evolution is not indifferent to Morality. That is much ; but to make Evolution a religion we need more. It is not enough for me to know that the life of holiness is my highest good ; I want strength to attain it. Does Evolution admit of such a connexion between the human and the Divine as can secure this strength for Man ? If not, it is not a religious system. I hear people speak of a "vague theism." I do not care how vague the theism is provided this one point is clear and definite. It is an old saying, "No man can by searching find out God." But the vital question is whether God can

find out Man. Call Him "the Unknowable," if you will; the question is, Is He "the Unknowing?" It is a mere truism to say that I cannot comprehend *Him*; the interesting inquiry is, Does He comprehend *me*—embrace me in His plan? Without an affirmative answer to that question *any* theism is too vague; *with* such an answer, no amount of mist will cause faith far to stray.

You will observe, what we want, what religion wants, is not a *violation* of the laws of Nature. It is a co-operation with the laws of Nature—a Presence *in* these laws. What we want to know is whether the study of the laws of Nature is compatible with devotion. The poet's study of Nature is compatible with devotion; and why? Because he looks upon Nature as a *present* source of inspiration. If the poet were compelled to believe that the forms on which he gazes were simply the painting by a dead artist, he would only be able to admire, not to adore. The adoration of Nature is incompatible with mere retrospect, whether the spectator be poet or theologian. The thing wanted by each is the sense of a living presence; neither will accept compensation in the shape of a mere memory. Shelley will lose his inspiration if, instead of the Spirit of Nature, he is called to adore the mechanical work of a retired architect; Thomas a Kempis will cease to worship if he is required to substitute the six days of creation for the perpetual working of a living God.

The question, then, simply is, Is the belief in a Divine Presence compatible with the Order of Nature? Is it possible without breaking that order to introduce into our universe the helpful action of God? Is the religious sense capable of union with the scientific sense? Can I accept the agency of the factors of evolution and at the same time recognize the working of a Power over and above these factors—a Power which can impart strength to my spirit without suspending the functions of natural law?

Before considering the scientific barrier supposed to lie in the way, I want to make a preliminary remark. It is this, that in my opinion the doctrine of Evolution is more favourable to belief in a Present Divine Action than any other system since the days of the Old Testament. What I mean is, that, if you once accept the existence of God, the doctrine of Evolution will lead you to regard Him as the Jewish prophets regarded Him—as a *living* God. You will not be able, in the light of modern Evolution, to think of Him as a spent energy—as a Power that has just wound the watch and let it run. The conception of such a Power has always been to me the weak point in the theology of James Martineau. Recognizing, with all others, the massiveness of his mind and the loftiness of his range, I have yet been impressed in his writings with something which I can only describe as incongruous with modern requirements. I would say of his God what Wordsworth said of John Milton—He was “like a star, and dwelt apart.” I do not think it was a separation in time so much as a separation in space. The God of Martineau is not relegated to the past; but He is doomed to be inactive in the present. He occupies a contemporary throne, but He occupies it as an anachronism. We feel that He belongs to an earlier day. He is not of the twentieth nor even of the nineteenth century; He is essentially a survival of the eighteenth. He belongs to that age when Nature was looked upon as a passive thing, when matter was believed to be dead, when the doctrine of Evolution was yet unborn—the age when rest was deemed more regal than action, and when it was the prerogative of a king to be isolated from his people. The God of James Martineau is perfect, but He is moveless. He sits in the circle of His universe wreathed in an atmosphere of purity; but He *sits*. His is a quiescent attitude. It is the Sabbath rest after the six days’ creation. The most a spectator can *say* is, “He has done all things well.”

The spectator wants more. He wants to see his God at *work*. To him the act of helping is more than the help given. The aphorism he would prefer to use would be, "He is *doing* all things well."

Now, I say there is one respect in which the doctrine of Evolution is more favourable to that desire than is the old theory of the universe. The old theory of the universe is that of a world whose central principle is at rest. Whatever the centre is supposed to be—whether earth, or sun, or distant star, it is supposed to be a sphere of rest. But in the doctrine of Evolution there is no place for rest, because, as we have already seen, there is no place for a centre. Everything is in movement; it would be more correct to say, Everything is itself movement. There is no room for quiescence; even things which seem to stand still acquire that appearance by the exertion of a force. We have come to realize that we are living in a dynamical world. Rest has ceased to mean the absence of motion; it has come to mean the absence of impediment to motion. The idea of Divine rest must share in the transition. I can no longer think of God as reclining. I can no longer, to my own mind, represent Divine Majesty as equivalent to movelessness. In a world whose essential being is constituted by the play of forces such a conception seems lowering to the Divine. There was a time when the highest ascription of majesty to God was to say, "His rest shall be glorious"; we should now think Him more honoured when we say, "My Father *worketh* hitherto."

And then there is that other consideration, to which I alluded in a previous study—the unfinished character of the building in which we dwell. This too, as we have seen, is a doctrine peculiar to Evolution. Other systems gaze on a completed temple; the Evolutionist uncovers his head in a temple which is still in process of building. And if so, the Evolutionist more than all others requires a Divine Power

in exercise. The believer in an immediate and final act of creation may worship a God of retrospect, may reverence a Power that has finished the fabric and has now retired to rest. But if the fabric is *not* finished, if the process of construction is still only half way to completion, the conception of such a God would be grotesque in the extreme. I think all scientists of the present day would agree that, if the existence of a God be granted at all, it must be the existence of an active God—what the poets of Israel called a "living God." Once concede the necessity for a Supreme Being, and the doctrine of Evolution will make you go further. It will force you to give Him wings. It will oblige you to recognize Him as fulfilling a part in the great drama of time. It will ask you to assign Him a co-operative work, a present helpful work, in the building of that fabric which, in its completed form, is to be the temple of His glory.

But now we come to what is supposed to be the special religious difficulty of the doctrine of Evolution. The earliest cry of Christian scepticism was, "They have taken away the Lord, and we know not where they have laid Him." Some such cry has been awakened in religious circles by the latest developments of science. The fear which they suggest is not so much that of a God dethroned as of a God displaced—removed from that sphere of daily life where the man in the street is wont to seek Him. The plaint is somewhat like this: "If science be true, we do not find in the practical world any *room* for God. Where shall we place Him? where in the immediate circle of things shall we find space for Him? Has not science told us that every available inch in the House of Nature is already filled with furniture! Upstairs, downstairs, in room and ante-room, in passage and corridor, she points us to the presence of material things—things so closely heaped together that there are no interstices, no spaces between. Where, then, in this circle of ours, shall God move? At what point is there left room for

Divine co-operation in a world where every crevice is occupied by secular forces? The Psalmist asked whither he could flee to *avoid* His presence; *we* are constrained to inquire whither we shall flee to reach it. The House of Nature seems to be monopolized by other forces; if henceforth we seek for God, it surely can only be in some garden *behind* the house! Must we not abandon all search in the precincts of the dwelling!"

Let me try to answer this by a little parable of my own. There once was a man who from childhood had been impregnated with the belief that a certain room of a certain house contained a jewel of priceless value, and that if he entered there, he would find it. He reached the door of the room and found it open; but, as he looked in, his spirit sank. Instead of being confronted by the glittering gem, he saw an apartment in which there was no remaining space for such a thing. Every niche was occupied with piles of boxes. They traversed the length and the breadth; they climbed the height from floor to ceiling; they shut out the light entering by the windows; they prevented entrance *anywhere*. And the seeker of the gem said, "In this room at least it cannot be; the spaces are all filled with other things." So he abandoned the search and descended the stairs, disconsolate. On one of the landings he met a little boy ascending, and questioned him about *his* knowledge of the room, pouring forth at the same time his tale of pessimism. The boy lifted up his eyes and said, "Did you never think of looking inside the boxes?"

And that childlike question is the crucial question. We speak of the things of Nature crowding out the Divine. Do we know what any one natural object is in itself—what it is "inside"? It will not do for us to say that science has banished the gem because she has filled Nature with iron boxes. What if the gem is contained in the boxes themselves—in the very space which has been occupied!

You and I have been so privileged as to get inside *one* of these iron boxes—the thing called Vital Force. We have been allowed to awake in the inside of it and to find out, not how it looks to others, but how it appears to itself. And we have made a wonderful discovery. We find that from the inside it is an entirely different thing to what it looks outside. When I see it in my brother-man it is a mere form of motion—a movement of certain converging currents identical with those which seem to exclude God. But *inside*—what a change! It is no longer movement; it is thought, feeling, reflection, soul. So far from excluding the possibility of a Spirit in Nature, it is itself a Spirit in Nature—a protest against the doctrine that the material fullness of the universe leaves no room for a guiding and co-operating Intelligence. To *see* the force called Life is to see only a bit of moving furniture; but to *become* that bit of furniture is to find room for the *Spirit*.

Have you any reason to think it would be different if we got into some other of these iron boxes? Suppose you were permitted to live for five minutes in the experience of a sunbeam—not merely to feel it but to feel with it—do you think it would be the same piece of furniture which to your eye blocks the Divine Way? It is absolutely certain it would not. Do you think that ether and electricity have their nature represented by their physical actions? If you were permitted to observe the brain currents that accompanied the composition of Macbeth or Hamlet, would you thereby have any clue whatever to the personality of William Shakespeare? Assuredly not. Still less can you tell the nature of the ether from the movements of the ether. For all I know, for all you know, these movements may themselves be only brain currents—the physical accompaniments of an underlying Life whose pulsations are the source of all that is, and the promise of all that is to be.

And, whatever may be said of Evolutionists personally,

the doctrine of Evolution demands such a Life. It will never be a complete science until the existence of such a Life is postulated as its foundation. I have no hesitation in saying that, more than any other system, the creed of modern science demands the agency of a Power within Nature. The creed of modern science is the reduction of physical nature to a system of forces. And yet, by the admission of science itself, there has not been found in physical Nature one single instance of a self-acting force. Evolutionists are never weary of telling us that there is no spontaneity in Nature. What does that mean? It is a wonderful admission. It is a confession that they cannot find in Nature the key to their own system. They profess to reduce everything to movement, to force, to energy. But where shall they find a physical form of real energy? No man has ever seen in Nature an object moving of its own accord. Nothing is stationary, and yet nothing is self-acting. Everything is pushed by something behind it. You look at the sea in a storm; it seems a spontaneous thing animated by a life of its own. Presently you find that it is not—that it is stirred by the winds of heaven. You turn to the winds and say, Surely *these* are spontaneous! By and by you discover that they too are not—that they have originated in a previous state of heat. Shall heat, then, be the spontaneous thing? have we found *here* a resting-place in our search for a self-acting object? Nay, not here; for heat is not an object at all; it is itself only the wave of a great sea—the circumambient ether. Shall we fix, then, upon the ether as the primal force, the original mover? In vain. There is nothing original about the ether. It is not a mover at all; it is the movement caused by another thing; it is itself only an effect. What is the cause behind it; what is that which moves it? To that question physical Nature returns a dead silence. Science confesses to the absence of a voice. The field of physical

research has brought her to a barred gate almost on the threshold; on the first day of her journey she is compelled to sit down.

Will science rest there? She is professedly in search of the forces of Nature. The physical field has refused to reveal to her a single force properly so called. She cannot find in that field anything that is self-moving, anything that is not driven by something else. All the movements seen or heard or felt are movements propelled by other forces. Neither eye nor ear nor hand can detect any primal movement. The things of sense are in constant change and yet they have no real activity. What is pushing them, what is changing them? Truly that is a question which presses not more on religion than on science!

Do not imagine you will get rid of the difficulty by saying the world had no beginning. The question of the world's beginning has nothing to do with it. Proclaim to-morrow that Matter has existed from all eternity, and the necessity for a Primal Cause will press upon science as strongly as ever. What we want to account for is not the origin of something in the *past*; it is the origin of something in the present. Suppose I saw a cart beginning to move without any visible agency, the immediate question in my mind would not be, who *made* that cart? nor would my curiosity be in the least modified if I were told that it never was made at all. Made or unmade, it has apparently done an unscientific thing—moved without horse or hand. That, by the admission of science, is exactly the position of the so-called physical forces. Each one of them has a movement received from the other; but we see not the hand that moves the whole. It is not a question of time; it is a question of space. The mystery does not lie in past ages; it is a riddle proposed to the day and hour. It is for *present* Nature that we need a God. None of the recognized factors of physical Nature are sufficient to explain physical

Nature. To explain it, to explain any one of its agencies, you must introduce an *unrecognized* factor—a primal Force, an originative source of movement.

Can we, then, say that scientifically there is no room for Divine co-operation! It is just scientifically that there *is* room. There is a factor wanting to the evolution process—not only to the *beginning* of the process, but to every phase of it, every step of it. Does not this imply that at every step of life I am entitled to believe in the concomitance of Divine action. We are told, indeed, again and again that no one man can rise above his environment—which is thought equivalent to saying that the human cannot co-operate with the Divine. But is it equivalent? That in the scientific sense no man can rise above his environment, I admit; but what in the scientific sense *is* my environment? When I throw a pebble into the water, what is my environment? Is it that little piece of water within reach of my hand? No; the whole extent of the water is, however silently, affected by the pulsation. Nor does it stop there. The atmosphere on the surface ripples at the stroke. There is a movement of the adjacent particles of air; this moves others; these others impinge upon a series beyond—until there is no conceivable limit to the environment I have woven. It is hard to see how any act of mine can touch a part without being taken up by the whole—welded into the Great Mosaic of Nature's universal life. Those who think they have limited Man when they say "the environment is everything" have wonderfully miscalculated. *Of course* the environment is everything; but the environment is God Almighty! What is the environment of the acorn? Is it the little plot of ground where it has been planted? No. It is all the influences of the natural day, all the forces presently at work in the cosmos. Nay, it is more than that. *Present* influences do not exhaust the environment of the acorn. The past con-

tributes also. The climate and soil of to-day are what they are by reason of yesterday, and the environment of the hour is the effect of past millenniums. It takes all Nature to make an oak.

To sum up : Three agents co-operate in every act of my life—my will, my surroundings, and the environment of these surroundings. The last is an unlimited quantity ; it is nothing less than Nature as a whole—the sum of existence—God. When my action leaves my hand, it passes into the hand of the universe. It is modified there. It acquires new momentum. It stimulates other forces ; it is stimulated by other forces. It assumes relations which I never contemplated. Perhaps I meant it to retard the progress of things. If so, I shall be disappointed. The moment it passes from my hand into the hand of the universe it becomes an agent for the universal good. It loses its particular character, its special character ; it becomes a phase of the Spirit of Nature—what theology calls "a worker together with God." And the co-operation is reached by no gap, no miracle, no interference with natural law. It is attained on the path of science, in the order of natural forces, in the work of the world's evolving. For, in that work, by the confession of Mr. Herbert Spencer, there is always something which is *not* evolved—which persists steadfast, invariable, behind the scenes which itself is conjuring. This Primal Force, this unevolved Existence, is the real Environment of all that lives.

G. MATHESON.

*ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF THE SPIRIT AS
PLEDGE.*

It has become a commonplace of New Testament scholarship to recognize the eschatological background of the Apostolic writings. No doubt the prominence of the Last Things in early Christian thought was due partly to that Messianic hope which, from the first, had been influential in leading the disciples to Christ, and partly, if one may separate the two lines of thinking, to their firm conviction, based on their present experience, that the Parousia could not be long delayed. In any case, a strain of eschatological reference runs through the leading conceptions of the New Testament writers. It may be worth while to examine this reference more minutely as it comes to view in St. Paul's doctrine of the Spirit.

The passages in which the conception to be discussed is most clearly set forth are 2 Corinthians i. 22, v. 5; Romans viii. 15-17, 23; Ephesians i. 14, iv. 30.

Let us take first the most general expression of the truth. In 2 Corinthians i. 22 St. Paul, in emphasizing the faithfulness of God, speaks of Him as "having given the pledge (*ἄρραβῶνα*) of the Spirit in our hearts." Obviously the phrase means "the pledge consisting of the Spirit." But the statement is left undefined. All that can be gathered is that the gift of the *πνεῦμα* is not complete in itself, but points forward to some future attainment of which it is the guarantee. In the next passage, however, a wider horizon is revealed. In 2 Corinthians v. 5 the Apostle introduces this identical phrase in another description of God. The context is the famous one in which he utters his yearning desire "to be clothed upon (*ἐπενδύσασθαι*) with our house which is from heaven." This particular "clothing upon" he defines (v. 4) as "mortality being swallowed up by life." Then he proceeds: "Now, He that hath wrought us

for this very thing is God, who gave us the pledge (*ἄρραβώνα*) of the Spirit." Here, plainly, the Spirit is the pledge of that purpose of God which he specifies, the "clothing upon with the house from heaven." This brings us into the very heart of St. Paul's eschatology. For no conception is dearer to his mind than that of the "spiritual organism" (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*) which the *πνεῦμα* ultimately creates for itself. We need not dwell upon this point in the meantime, as we shall have to return to it immediately. It may suffice to note the emphatic connexion here postulated between the pledge of the Spirit and the wholly new constitution of life which awaits those who have received the Divine gift of the *πνεῦμα*.

Fresh light is shed on the whole tenor of St. Paul's thought by the next passage which must be considered, Romans viii. 15-16. Here, indeed, he does not speak in so many words of the Spirit as pledge, but he leaves no doubt that such is the thought which regulates his point of view. In fact the passage is all the more instructive as containing no *direct* reference to the *ἄρραβών* or to the actual conditions of the future life, for it shows indirectly how easily the Apostle's mind moved from the subject of the Spirit and the Spirit's indwelling to that of the glorified existence which is the Christian's goal. "Ye received the Spirit of sonship" (*υἱοθεσίας*), he says: "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are children of God. And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ, if so be that we suffer with Him, that we may be also *glorified with Him*." He defines the Spirit which has been bestowed upon them. It is the Spirit which makes them realize already that they are sons of God. But what does "sons of God" mean for them? Its ultimate meaning is clearly expressed in the final clause of the verse, "glorified along with Christ." A remarkable parallel is found in 1 John iii. 2: "Beloved, now are we children of

God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that if He shall be manifested, *we shall be like Him.*" This last clause corresponds exactly with that which we emphasized in the verse above. The future δόξα of the New Testament is really synonymous with "likeness to Christ." But this likeness to Christ is the content of the σῶμα πνευματικόν for St. Paul. This is its essential value. It is, of course, the σῶμα σαρκικόν which prevents the υἱοὶ θεοῦ from reaching their true end in this present life. For that reason the Apostle, in writing to the Philippians (ii. 21), speaks of himself as "eagerly awaiting (ἀπεκδεχόμεθα) the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall transform the body of our humiliation into the likeness of the body of His glory." As soon as the σῶμα σαρκικόν has been exchanged for the σῶμα πνευματικόν, which is equivalent to the σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, the Christian shall have come into possession of his κληρονομία. The conception whose outlines are delineated in the verse we have just examined finds complete expression in our next passage, Romans viii. 23, which relates it immediately, on the one hand, to the verses in 2 Corinthians already discussed, and, on the other, to Philippians iii. 21 which has been quoted above. "We also who have the firstfruits (ἀπαρχήν) of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, eagerly awaiting (our) sonship (υἰοθεσίαν), (namely) the redemption (ἀπολύτρωσιν) of our body." These words are extraordinarily rich in their content. They may be said to embody all the separate ideas to which reference has been made, while giving them a fuller significance. Christians in their present condition have "the firstfruits consisting in the Spirit." Here we come back to the Spirit as ἀρραβών. Of what is it the ἀπαρχή? Obviously of the υἰοθεσία, and the υἰοθεσία is expressly defined as the ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος. The passage unmistakably confirms the train of thought traced in the verse above. The possession of the Spirit, which is

the pledge or firstfruits of the *νίθεσία*, points beyond the present to the complete realization of that *νίθεσία* which means the *ἀπολύτρωσις* of the body. The *νίθεσία* is therefore an all-embracing condition. It affects not only the spirit but the body. It is valid for the *whole person* in Paul's judgment. The body is to be Christ's as well as the spirit. The body is to share in the Divine nature, not however as a *σῶμα σαρκικόν* but as a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. It has to be redeemed as well as the soul. The possession of the Spirit is already related to both sides of the redemption, but in the one case as proof, in the other as pledge.

In this, as in every other province, Jesus Christ is the *πρόδρομος* of His followers. He has entered upon His full *κληρονομία*. He has vindicated His position of Sonship in the most glorious fashion. St. Paul gives a remarkable description of the process. "Declared (or "determined," R.V. mg.) to be the Son of God, in power, according to the spirit of holiness, in virtue of the resurrection of the dead" (Rom. i. 4). The resurrection of Jesus Christ, here designated by a striking phrase "the resurrection of the dead," as being the first of a great series, the type of what should follow, marks Him out infallibly to the gaze of men as the Son of God. That resurrection was the inevitable consequence of His possession of the Spirit of holiness, which He possessed without measure. As risen, He appeared to His disciples in the *σῶμα τῆς δόξης*, that *σῶμα* which was, if one may say so, the outward expression of the Spirit of holiness. It was in this guise that He must have revealed Himself to Paul. It was natural that the Apostle should make that experience the basis of his thought concerning the future life of believers. If they are to be "joint-heirs with Christ," they must attain along the lines of Christ's exaltation. What was not so marvellous in Christ's case, the glorifying of His body, not so marvellous because that body had never

been stained by sin, appeared to St. Paul unspeakably wonderful in the case of the Christian, whose body of flesh seemed to be the very seed-plot of all sinful desires and passions. To have a sure pledge that that body should one day be redeemed was as valuable a spiritual attainment as the Apostle could conceive in this present existence.

The doctrine we have been discussing is signally corroborated by the two separate passages from Ephesians which have been cited. And these passages bring us back to the very language we already quoted from 2 Corinthians. Take Ephesians i. 14: "In whom (sc. Christ), having also believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is a pledge (*ἄρραβών*) of our inheritance, with a view to (*εἰς*) the redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσιν*) of the (purchased) possession" (*περιποιήσεως*). The Holy Spirit, probably here regarded as having been bestowed upon them in baptism (*ἐσφραγίσθητε*), which symbolizes the cleansing of the whole nature, is designated as the Spirit "of promise," "a pledge of our inheritance." These are precisely the expressions we have found the Apostle using again and again in the passages already considered. The inheritance can be nothing else, in view of what we have previously observed, than the sonship in which believers are to follow the Captain of their salvation. The function of the Spirit is to point forward, to make the Christian sure of what awaits him. The closing phrase is noteworthy, *εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῆς περιποιήσεως*. We are already familiar with *ἀπολύτρωσις*. In Romans viii. 23 it was joined with *τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*. The noun *περιποιήσις* is rare. It occurs two or three times in the LXX., the example most relevant for our passage being in Malachi iii. 17, *καί ἔσονται* (sc. *οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸν κύριον*) *μοι, λέγει Κύριος Παντοκράτωρ . . . εἰς περιποίησιν*. Very similar is its use in 1 Peter ii. 9, *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν* (a free quotation of Isaiah xliii. 20 where the verb occurs). These instances, however, shed little light on the collocation

before us. Calvin interprets περιποιήσις here as *ipsa Ecclesia*. Probably that is due to the influence of Acts xx. 28, τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἣν περιποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου. Is it too fanciful to correlate περιποιήσεως here with σώματος in Romans viii. 23? There is, at least, as much ground for this interpretation as for that which refers it to the Church. The context never goes beyond the personal reference ἡμεῖς or ὑμεῖς. And something of the same train of thought, the redemption of the Christian as immediately concerned with the bodily organism, seems to lie behind St. Paul's words in 1 Corinthians vi. 20, ἡγοράσθητε γὰρ τιμῆς· δοξάσατε δὴ τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν (according to the correct reading). If ἐσφραγίσθητε refers to baptism, as is most probable, the exegesis suggested receives powerful confirmation. For this rite must have inevitably called up before the minds of the primitive Christians that bodily purity demanded by their new faith which stood in such glaring contrast to the foulness of heathen practice, a purity whose ultimate issue must be the complete dominion of the spirit over flesh.

The last passage to be glanced at adds nothing new to the content of the related conceptions which have been discussed. In Ephesians iv. 30 the Apostle reiterates the idea examined in this paper: "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, in whom ye were sealed (ἐσφραγίσθητε) with a view to (εἰς) the day of redemption" (ἀπολύτρωσεως). There is still the forward look in the operations of the Spirit. There is still emphasized the final purpose of these operations, the ἀπολύτρωσις. But, for the first time in the passages cited, the Spirit is designated ἅγιος. Perhaps this epithet, which, of course, is the normal one, is introduced to sharpen the contrast with λόγος σαπρός. Now σαπρός, which means literally "rotten," "putrid," was used in the vernacular, according to Phrynichus, as a synonym for αἰσχρός (σαπρὰν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, *New Phrynichus*, p. 474), pre-

cisely equivalent to our use of "filthy" as applied to language, etc. That connexion of thought usually centres round coarse, sensual forms of evil, those associated with bodily lusts. Further, as we have just noted, ἐσφραγίσθητε, which occurs here also, inevitably suggests the cleansing of baptism, a cleansing which pointed to an ultimate purity of the whole nature. Putting those several facts together, it does not seem to us far-fetched to suppose that the bodily aspect of the final ἀπολύτρωσις is prominent to the Apostle's mind in this passage also.

Enough has been said to bring out the decisively eschatological bearing of St. Paul's teaching on the Spirit. To realize that the ultimate end of the Spirit's operation is the redemption of the whole human nature along the lines of Christ's own exaltation to glory is to possess a clue which will guide us safely along the obscurer paths of the Apostle's religious conceptions.

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

V.

THE SUPREME EVIDENCE OF THE HISTORICITY OF THE EVANGELIC JESUS.

IT is written in the opening chapter of the Fourth Gospel how Philip, in the wonder and gladness of his discovery of the Messiah, sought out Nathanael and told him of it. "Him of whom Moses in the Law wrote and the Prophets, we have found—Jesus the son of Joseph, the Man of Nazareth!" Nathanael would not believe it. A Galilæan himself, he knew the ignorance of that northern province (John vii. 52) and the evil reputation of that particular town. "From Nazareth," he retorted incredulously, quoting a common proverb, "can there be anything

good?" Philip did not attempt to argue the question. He answered simply: "Come and see." Nathanael went and saw, and presently his doubts were dispelled. "Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God! Thou art the King of Israel!"

Jesus was "His own best evidence." It was difficult for a Jew to allow His claims, so inconsistent did they seem with the Messianic expectations of the day; yet He seldom argued the question. He simply manifested Himself in the wonder of His grace and goodness, and such as had eyes to see and hearts to understand the transcendent revelation needed no other evidence, and adored Him as their Lord.

Now, if the evangelic picture be indeed a faithful delineation of Him who dwelt in Palestine eighteen centuries ago, it ought to exercise, in some measure at least, a like influence over those who approach it with open minds and earnest hearts. It ought to silence their doubts and compel their faith. And such is indeed the experience of not a few in our day. They are confronted by serious difficulties. They cannot believe in Inspiration, Miracles, the Incarnation, or the Resurrection; nevertheless, they cling to Christianity, and are loath to let it go. What is the reason of their hesitation? It is simply this, that they cannot get away from Jesus. They would without a qualm reject Christianity, but they cannot reject Christ.

It may be that, in order to judge with absolute justice of the self-evidencing power of the Evangelic Jesus, it would be necessary that one should be entirely ignorant of Christianity and should approach the Gospels with a perfectly unbiassed mind, after the manner of the old shoemaker in Tolstoi's story,¹ or as one would some ancient manuscript newly brought to light. This is, of course, an impossible attitude for such as have been familiar with the Bible all their days; yet it may be attained to more or less approximately by resolutely dismissing the prepossessions

¹ *Where Love is There God is Also.*

alike of faith and of unbelief and looking with unprejudiced eyes at the picture which the Evangelists have painted.

It must be acknowledged that the first impression is by no means favourable. The story opens with a stupendous marvel, the miraculous Birth, and every succeeding page tells of some wonderful work. It is an axiom of modern philosophy that miracles are impossible; and we are disposed to dismiss the story as a legend of a superstitious age, no more historical than the Life of Apollonius. But something arrests us. This story has a singular beauty. It tells of One strangely unlike all the men we know or have ever heard of. *The Evangelic Jesus is a Sinless Man.* He is perfectly human. He suffers weariness, hunger, thirst, and pain; He is in all points tempted like as we are; yet He is never worsted by temptation and passes through life stainless and irreproachable. He is among sinners yet not of them.

The marvel of the picture is twofold. On the one hand, *Jesus claimed to be sinless.* He stood before the world searched by a thousand curious and critical eyes, and issued His fearless challenge: "Which of you convicteth Me of sin?" (John viii. 46). He often felt the pang of hunger, but never the pang of remorse; He was often weary, but never burdened with guilt; He often prayed, but He never uttered a syllable of contrition or a cry for pardon. On the eve of His Betrayal, when the shadows of death were gathering about Him, He could lift up His eyes to Heaven and say: "Father, the hour is come. I have glorified Thee upon the earth, having perfected the work which Thou hast given Me to do" (John xvii. 1, 4).

Now this is a singular picture. A keen and lively sense of sin has ever been a characteristic of saintly men. It is related of St. Francis of Assisi that an angry brother once loaded him with abuse, calling him a thief, a blasphemer, a murderer, a debauchee, a drunkard. The saint meekly con-

fessed that it was all true; and when the other asked in wonderment what he meant, he answered: "All these crimes and worse than these I had committed, had not the favour of Heaven preserved me." ¹ Such has ever been the judgment of the saints upon themselves, but as for Jesus no word of self-condemnation ever crossed His lips, no lamentation over indwelling corruption, no sigh for a closer walk with God. It was not that He closed His eyes to the presence of sin or made light of its guilt, like Renan who, being asked once what he made of sin, answered airily, "I suppress it!" Such was not the manner of Jesus. His proclamation of the equal guilt of the sinful thought and the sinful deed has extended immeasurably the sweep of the moral law and infinitely elevated the standard of holiness. He was keenly sensitive to the enormity of sin, and the world's guilt lay on Him like a heavy burden all His days. His presence was a rebuke, and even now the very thought of Him has the value of an external conscience. His spotless life is a revelation alike of the beauty of holiness and of the guilt of sin.

Nor is this the sole marvel of the evangelic picture of Jesus. Not only did He claim to be sinless, but *His claim was universally allowed*. His enemies would gladly have found some handle against Him; yet, though they scrutinized Him jealously, they discovered only one offence which they could lay to His charge, and they never imagined that their accusation was in truth a striking testimony to His perfect and unique holiness. They saw Him mingling freely with social outcasts, conversing with them, and going to their houses; and they exclaimed: "This man receiveth sinners and eateth with them!" It would have been no marvel had He associated with sinners, being a sinner Himself. What astonished them was that

¹ Erasm. Colloq., Exseq. Seraph.

He did so being Himself so pure ; and their exclamation was a covert insinuation that for all His seeming holiness He must be a sinner at heart. The fault, however, lay not with Jesus but with themselves. They did not understand that true holiness is nothing else than a great compassion. *Dijudicantes Dominum quod peccatores susciperet, amenti corde ipsum fontem misericordiæ reprehendebant.* The holiness of Jesus was a new thing on the earth, an ideal which could never have been conceived by any human heart. Had the Evangelists been setting forth their own conception of holiness, they would have depicted Jesus after the likeness of the Pharisees.

It is a great marvel that Jesus' claim to sinlessness should have been thus allowed and all unintentionally attested by those who were bent on disproving it. One said to Carlyle once that he could honestly use the words of Jesus, "I and the Father are one." "Yes," was the crushing retort, "but Jesus got the world to believe Him."

Another point to be noted in the evangelic account of Jesus is the assertion which He constantly made and persisted in to the last, *that He stood in a unique relation alike toward God and toward men.* He identified Himself with God. "Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill Him, because He said God was His peculiar (*ἰδιον*) Father, making Himself equal to God" (John v. 18). "He that receiveth you," He says in His charge to the Twelve, "receiveth Me, and he that receiveth Me receiveth Him that sent Me" (Matt. x. 40; cf. Luke x. 16). He sets Himself forth as greater than the prophets. They were servants; He is the Son, the Heir (Matt. xxi. 33-46 = Mark xii. 1-12 = Luke xx. 9-19). They had spoken of Him, had seen His day afar off, and had longed to see Himself; and He announces Himself as the fulfilment of their prophecies. "Beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, He in-

terpreted unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself (Luke xxiv. 27).

Moreover, He claimed to be at once the Saviour and the Judge of men. He had come "to give His life a ransom for many" (Matt. xx. 28); He bade the weary and heavy laden come unto Him that they might find rest unto their souls (Matt. xi. 28-29); and He spoke of a solemn day "when the Son of Man shall come in His glory and all the angels with Him, and shall sit upon His throne of glory, and before Him shall be gathered all the nations" (Matt. xxv. 31-46). How tremendous His claims upon His followers! He pointed to the dearest, tenderest, and most sacred relationships of human life, and demanded for Himself a prior devotion. "He that loveth father or mother above Me is not worthy of Me, and he that loveth son or daughter above Me is not worthy of Me" (Matt. x. 37). "If any one cometh unto Me and hateth not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, moreover, his own life, he cannot be My disciple. And whoso doth not bear his own cross and come after Me, cannot be My disciple" (Luke xiv. 26-27). It was not merely for God, nor yet merely for the Kingdom of Heaven, that He made those stupendous claims: it was for Himself. Conceive such language on the lips of a Galilean peasant! It would have seemed the language of insanity on the lips of Socrates or Julius Cæsar, and would have been greeted with ridicule and contempt. What was there about the gentle Jesus that made such language seem natural and fitting on His lips? It was not those who knew Him best and could judge most truly of the justice of His claims, but the blinded Jews, that said He was mad (John x. 20), and sought to kill Him, because He made Himself equal to God (v. 18).

Again, *how unique are the words of Jesus!* One cannot read them without echoing involuntarily the ancient con-

fession, "Never man so spake!" (John viii. 46). There are no words like them either in the Bible or in any other book. How they sparkle and glow on the pages of the Gospels! It is neither exaggeration nor irreverence to say that they lie embedded in the evangelic narrative like jewels in a setting of base metal. One knows instinctively where Jesus ceases and the Evangelist begins. It is like passing into another atmosphere. The writer remembers the late Professor A. B. Bruce describing how once during his ministerial days he was studying the miracle of the healing of the lunatic boy at the foot of the Mount of Transfiguration, and stumbled at the verse: "Howbeit this kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting" (Matt. xvii. 21). The mention of *fasting* seemed so alien to the Spirit of Jesus. He turned up his Tischendorf and found that the verse has no place in the authentic text of the First Gospel, having been imported into it by some copyist to bring it into agreement with the parallel tradition of the Second Gospel (ix. 29), and, moreover, that the words *καὶ νηστεία* should be omitted from the latter. A kindred example is Matthew xii. 40. This verse is absent from the parallel tradition of the Third Gospel (xi. 29-36), and on its own merits one would gladly dispense with it. Not only does it lack the savour of a genuine *λόγιον* of Jesus, but it spoils the argument. Jonah's adventure with the whale was no "sign" to the Ninevites, who knew nothing about it. It was his preaching that was a sign to them, and this is what St. Luke says. There is no documentary evidence against the verse, but it needs only a glance to recognize it as no word of Jesus. It is an interpretative gloss inserted by the Evangelist, who gives his own crude and prosaic explanation of the preceding *λόγιον*, attesting all unconsciously the divinity of the Lord's teaching and the utter inconceivability of its having been invented by His reporters.

The words of Jesus have a fragrance and a beauty all their own.

οὐδέ νιν
θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρων
ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ μάν ποτε λάθῃ κατακοιμάσκει·
μέγας ἐν τούτοις θεός, οὐδὲ γηράσκει.

While recognizing the grandeur and inspiration of St. Paul's teaching, one feels that his words are in no wise comparable with those of Jesus. He spoke as a Jew, and his teaching is cast in a Jewish mould and coloured by Jewish sentiment. One sympathizes with the judgment of John Colet, perhaps the most distinguished of our English humanists and the friend and hero of Erasmus. He taught awhile at Oxford ere his appointment by Henry VII. to the Deanery of St. Paul's, and his brilliant lectures on the Pauline Epistles inaugurated a new era in the study of the New Testament in England. "He set," says Erasmus, writing in 1519 just after Colet's death to Jodocus Jonas, the friend of Luther and Melanchthon, "the greatest store by the apostolic Epistles, but such reverence had he for that wondrous majesty of Christ that in comparison therewith the writings of the Apostles became in a manner vile (quodammodo sordescerent)." ¹ This is a just judgment. The words of Jesus are peerless. They are no lingering voices of a long-vanished past. They are as fresh and living to-day as when they were first spoken by the Sea of Galilee or in the city of Jerusalem. They palpitate with life and make our hearts to burn within us, reminding us how He said: "The words which I have spoken unto you, they are spirit and they are life" (John vi. 63).

One cannot fail to observe *the complete absence from the Evangelic Jesus of distinctively national characteristics*. And this is the more remarkable inasmuch as He was born of a race notorious for its intense, exclusive, almost

¹ Erasm. Epp. xv. 14 (mihi).

ferocious patriotism.¹ The nationality of St. Paul was always prominent. He could never have been mistaken for a Greek or a Roman. He assures the Corinthians indeed that he had become "all things to all men, that he might by all means save some"; but, whatever sympathetic disguises he might assume, he remained always an Hebrew of the Hebrews, proud of his nationality (Phil. iii. 4-7) and overflowing with tender and passionate love for his people even while he pronounced their condemnation (Rom. ix 1-5). It is far otherwise with Jesus. He was absolutely exempt from national limitations; so much so that Renan, arguing from the name of the province, *Gelil haggoyim*, "circle of the Gentiles," that the Galileans were a mixed race, declares it impossible "to ascertain what blood flowed in the veins of him who has contributed most to efface the distinctions of blood in humanity."² This is a very precarious argument and flatly contradicts St. Paul's statement, ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. Jesus was a Jew according to the flesh, and, save for His Egyptian exile in infancy (Matt. ii. 13-15), and one brief excursion across the northern border (Matt. xv. 21-28=Mark vii. 24-30), He was never, so far as we know, outside of Palestine. He was purely human, recognizing all mankind as children of God, owning kinship with all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who did the will of His Father (Matt. xii. 50=Mark iii. 35=Luke viii. 21), and pronouncing Jerusalem not a whit more sacred than the mountain where the Samaritans worshipped (John iv. 21). He called Himself, not the Son of David, but the Son of Man, which means, according to the Hebrew idiom, the true or universal man.³ He was, to employ an exquisite mistranslation, "the Desire of all nations," the Saviour for whom the hearts of men of

¹ Tac. *Hist.* v. 5; Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* v. 33.

² *Vie de Jésus*, ii.

³ Calv. *Instit.* ii. 13, 2: "palam est hebraico more vocari filium hominis verum hominem."

every clime had all unconsciously been yearning, and in whom all the families of the earth are blessed.

It is impossible, however, to set forth in detail all the manifold wondrousness of the Evangelic Jesus. To approach that peerless picture is to find oneself in the presence of a unique and transcendent Personality. "Jesus himself," says one so unbiassed by traditional reverence as Matthew Arnold,¹ "as he appears in the Gospels, and for the very reason that he is so manifestly above the heads of his reporters there, is, in the jargon of modern philosophy, an *absolute*; we cannot explain him, cannot get behind him and above him, cannot command him." Every other of the great personages of history may be analyzed and the influences which went to the making of him distinguished; but Jesus defies analysis. He was not made nor even influenced by His environment: had He been so, He would have been at every point the precise opposite of what He was. He was a debtor neither to Jew nor to Greek. His is the one perfectly original and absolutely self-determined life in history. He defies analysis and refuses classification. He will not be ranked under the common category of humanity.

Such is the Evangelic Jesus, and the question is: What shall we say of Him? Must we not reverently acknowledge Him the Holy One of God, the Saviour and Lord of men? Immediately, however, objections start up. In the first place, it may be urged, *such a conclusion presupposes the historicity of the evangelic narratives*. If Jesus were indeed what they represent, then the conclusion might be inevitable; but are they reliable? Professor Schmiedel holds that they are utterly unhistorical, containing nothing that is "absolutely credible" beyond nine mutilated sayings. All that may be certainly affirmed of the historic Jesus is

¹ Preface to Popular Edition of *Literature and Dogma*.

that He was a teacher who made a profound impression on His contemporaries but who was neither divine nor sinless. Ere one can bend in adoration before the Evangelic Jesus, one must be assured of the reliability of the evangelic narratives, and this is at the best but problematic.

Now this objection proceeds from an entire misapprehension of the argument. It forgets the initial supposition. We set out with no prepossession in favour of the evangelic narratives and no prejudice against them, treating them all alike and making no distinction between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics. We examined them precisely as we might any ancient documents which should come into our hands recommended by no divine authority; and we have discovered in them a matchless picture—One who lived out in human condition a life which transcends humanity, realizes the ideal of divinity, satisfies the yearnings of our hearts, and commands the adoration of our souls. We do not say with Green that here we have the highest ideal of the relation between God and man, and it matters not how it has arisen. We say rather that it is too wondrous to be an invention of any human mind and must be historical. The Evangelic Jesus is self-attesting. It is He that attests the narratives, not they that attest Him.

It is incredible that that divine life should be a mere dream. The man who conceived it must have been himself divine. It would have needed a Jesus to invent Jesus. Pfleiderer has propounded the theory that St. Paul was the creator of Christianity.¹ He first ascertains from the recognized Epistles the great Apostle's conception, and then endeavours to demonstrate that it is reflected in the evangelic narratives. It is not the Jesus of history that the evangelists portray, but the Christ of the Pauline theology. The answer is simple and direct: If St. Paul were indeed the creator of the Evangelic Jesus, then St. Paul was im-

¹ *Urchristenthum*, S. 520.

measurably greater than we have ever suspected. Ere he could conceive such an ideal he must have been himself divine, and it remains that we should transfer to him the adoration which we have accorded to Jesus.

It is inconceivable that the Evangelic Jesus should be a creation, whether of some master mind or of the myth-forming genius of the primitive Church. Humanity cannot transcend itself. Surely scepticism has its credulity no less than superstition when it is gravely maintained that so radiant an ideal arose "among nearly the most degraded generation of the most narrow-minded race that the world has ever known, and made it the birth-place of a new earth."¹ The mere fact that there dawned on the world, and that in a land barren of wisdom and an age morally bankrupt, an ideal which has been the wonder and inspiration of mankind for more than sixty generations, is an irrefragable evidence that it is no mere ideal but an historic fact. The Divine Life which the evangelists pourtray, must have been actually lived out on the earth, else they could never have conceived it.

And thus the Evangelic Jesus is Himself the supreme evidence of the historicity of the evangelic narratives. "For me," says Ignatius,² "the archives are Jesus Christ, the inviolable archives His Cross and Death and His Resurrection and the Faith that is through Him." No criticism can shake this sure foundation. It may be that the Gospels contain inaccuracies and inconsistencies; though it were well for such as love to dwell on these to remember Rothe's warning against the perversity which, "in examining the sun-spots, misses the sun." It may be that the Evangelists were liable to err and were subject to the influences of contemporary opinion and personal prejudice; though the more one studies their writings the more is one convinced that, untenable as every theory of inspiration

¹ Hutton, *Theological Essays*, p. 290.

² *Ep. ad Philad.* viii 2.

may be, some singular aid must have been vouchsafed to those unlearned men who "carried so much æther in their souls." ¹ It will hardly be disputed by any intelligent believer in the divinity of our Blessed Lord that He was imperfectly comprehended and inadequately represented by His biographers. What human mind could perfectly conceive, what human hand adequately depict, the vision of His glory? It may be impossible to gainsay such contentions, but they may be the more cheerfully allowed inasmuch as they furnish a singular argument for the historicity of the evangelic narratives and the divinity of Him they tell of. The fact that Jesus is "so manifestly above the heads of His reporters" is a conclusive evidence that, when they wrote of Him, they were not composing a work of the imagination but relating in all honesty and simplicity "things which they had seen and heard." And the very imperfection of their narratives is an involuntary testimony to His ineffable glory. When every deduction has been made, the Evangelic Jesus remains a wondrous picture. Blurred as it may be by reason of the unskilfulness of the artists, it is still a picture limned in light of One fairer than the children of men; and if a picture painted by weak human hands be so transcendently beautiful, what must have been the glory of the Divine Original?

It may be objected again that, *even if the historicity of the evangelic narratives be allowed, Jesus may be accounted for on naturalistic principles.* He is simply the Perfect Man, the first we know of and perhaps the only one who has realized the ideal of humanity. He was a man with a unique genius for religion, and stands pre-eminent in his department precisely as Michelangelo and Shakespeare in theirs.

Surely, however, it is fatal to this theory that Jesus appeared when He did in the course of human history. Were He simply the Perfect Man, He would still present an in-

¹ Philostr. *Vit. Apoll.* iii. 42 : τοσοῦτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φέρων αἰθέρα.

soluble problem. According to the law of Evolution the Perfect Man must appear late in history as the consummation of humanity's long development. His appearance midway, and that in a decadent race and a period of universal corruption, were wholly inexplicable. It were strangely premature. His advent should be still far off, the goal toward which upward-aspiring humanity is still tending and ever more nearly approaching. Were He but the Perfect Man, Jesus would be as one born out of due time, as the ripe ear in the season of the green blade.

Neither is He simply the supreme religious genius. Though Michelangelo and Shakespeare stand unrivalled in art and poetry, others also have been great, though in lesser measure, and have not owned them as their masters. But all the saints during these sixty generations have looked up to Jesus, have derived their holiness from Him, and have confessed that it was His grace alone that made them what they were. He is not simply the supreme religious genius, but the Saviour Who, on their own confession, has lifted sinners out of the mire and transformed them into saints. It were indeed rash to affirm that but for Jesus there would have been no saints during these eighteen centuries; nevertheless it is a fact that every saint who has lived upon the earth and made it sweeter by his presence, has owned Jesus as his Lord and found peace and hope in Him alone.

And thus we may turn aside from the strife of criticism and, with strong and quiet assurance, rest our souls on Jesus as on a sure foundation which stands firm amid the removing of the things that are shaken. "For another foundation no man can lay than the one that hath been laid, which is Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. iii. 11). The recognition of Jesus as the manifestation of the Eternal God is the end of all controversy.

I say, the acknowledgment of God in Christ
Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
All questions in the earth and out of it.¹

It settles every dispute. Is it the existence of God that is disputed? Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, *Dei inaspecti aspectabilis imago*. Is it miracles that are objected to? Jesus is Himself the Miracle of miracles; and, in view of the transcendent miraculousness of His sinless life, it were foolish to cavil at the lesser miracles which the Evangelists record. It is no marvel that Jesus should have wrought miracles: the marvel were rather if, being what He was, He had not. Once He is seen in His wonder and glory, faith is absolutely inevitable.

The truth is that the objects of faith do not admit of demonstration. "All first principles even of scientific facts," says Romanes,² "are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can deny this. Now if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles. No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary conclusion that, if there be a God, He is knowable (if knowable at all) by intuition and not by reason." So long as faith rests on demonstration, it can never be more than a probability, and must lie at the mercy of every subtle logomachist. That is a significant confession of one of the interlocutors in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, that, while he was reading Plato's *Phædo*, he felt sure of the immortality of the soul, but, whenever he laid the dialogue aside, his belief slipped away from him. And this is the priceless service that Jesus has rendered to our souls, which were made for God and can never rest until they find rest in Him, that He has lifted faith for ever out of the domain of reason into that of intuition, and has made it sure and abiding for every one who has eyes to behold His glory and an heart to understand His love.

DAVID SMITH.

¹ Browning, *A Death in the Desert*.

² *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 146.

NOTES ON SELECT PASSAGES IN THE OLD
TESTAMENT.

EXODUS i. 16. Render: "And he said, When ye deliver the Hebrew women, then ye shall look upon the seat, . . ." See Jeremiah xiii. 3, marg. If this sense of the word, *sellor parturientis*, δίφρος λοχείος (Suidas) or λοχειαῖος (Artemidorus v. 73, where λοχειαῖος is probably a combination of λοχείος and λοχαῖος), which seems at least as probable as any other, be retained, then the dual form אֲבָנִים may be compared with the Greek Δίφρος and the Latin Bisellium, "a seat for two persons." The construction of רֶאֱזָה with לַע is found in Exodus v. 21.

EXODUS ii. 3. Render: ". . . she took for him an ark of paper-reeds, . . ." Hebrew *Gomé*, the *papyrus* of the Greeks and Romans, and *babeer* of the modern Arabs. Job viii. 8; Isaiah xviii. 1 and xxxv. 7 (not Isa. xix. 7).

EXODUS viii. 12. [Dr. Field leaves the text as in A.V., but proposes a new rendering for the margin, and adds a note as follows.] ". . . concerning the matter (arrangement) of the frogs, which he (Moses) had appointed to Pharaoh." See verses 9, 10. All the commentators (as far as I know) explain אֲשֶׁר-שָׂם לְפָרְעָה to mean *quas immiserat Pharaoni*, which seems an unusual sense of שָׂם. I think the O' and Vulg. have given the correct meaning of the words. O': περὶ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ τῶν βατράχων, ὡς ἐτάξατο Φαραώ. Vulg.: *pro sponsione ranarum quam condixerat Pharaoni*.

EXODUS ix. 17. Render: "As yet dost thou set thyself against my people . . ." Gesenius renders: *Aggeris instar opponis te resistis*; for which sense he quotes Aquila's ἀντιποῖν. But ἀντιποιεῖσθαι (τινος) is not to *resist*, but to *assert one's right to the possession of a thing, sibi vindicare*, a sense which suits this place admirably, if one could trace its connexion with the Hebrew word נִסְתָּוִלֵל.

EXODUS x. 10. In place of "look to it; for evil is before

you," render "see how your intent is evil." The construction may be best compared with 1 Kings xx. 7 A.V. : "see how this *man* seeketh mischief." Hieron. (who in this part of the Vulgate is often found paraphrasing instead of translating, perhaps from following Symmachus) gives the sense of the passage very well : *Cui dubium est quod pessime cogitatis?* And so another paraphrastic translator, J. A. Dathe : *Jam satis apparet vos mala intendere.*

EXODUS xvii. 16. Render : "For he said, ¹ Because *there* is a ² monument by the throne of the LORD : War to the LORD with Amalek from generation to generation." ¹ Or, *Because the LORD hath sworn that the LORD will have war with Amalek*, etc. ² Heb. *hand* (1 Sam. xv. 12; 2 Sam. xviii. 18; Isa. lvi. 5).

EXODUS xxxv. 22. [Dr. Field substitutes "necklaces" for "tablets," and adds] : This is probably the meaning of the A.V. "tablets," which is not in Todd's *Johnson* ; but in Ebers' *English-German Dictionary*, 1794, I find : "Tablet—das Halsband, auch Armband." So the Peschito.

LEVITICUS ii. 1. The primary signification of מִנְחָה being merely a *gift* (O'.: δῶρον, 32 times) or *offering*, that particular use of it, which is peculiar to the Levitical law, seems to have acquired the name of "meat offering" from Coverdale downwards, chiefly from its being commonly found in connexion with "drink offering." From this epithet we infer that it was *something to be eaten*, its composition being left to the accompanying description. There seems no objection to this, except that which arises from the vulgar error that "meat" is synonymous with "flesh" or "butcher's meat." In favour of retaining "meat offering," besides a long prescription, is the difficulty of finding a better word. "Meal offering" has the advantage of similarity of sound to the ejected word; but in attempting more than is necessary, viz. to indicate the principal ingredient of the מִנְחָה, it mars the

effect of its contrast with “drink offering” (e.g. Joel ii. 14); it also conveys an erroneous notion of that very ingredient, which was not “meal” (קִמְחָה), but “fine flour” (סֹלֶת). Thus Solomon’s provision for a day is stated to be thirty measures of fine flour (סֹלֶת) and sixty measures of meal (קִמְחָה). There is the same distinction between “meal” and “flour” in English. “Meal,” according to the dictionaries, is “the substance of edible grain ground to fine particles, and not bolted or sifted.” “Meal bread” is the popular name for what is otherwise called “brown bread.” The ancient versions sometimes (Peschito always) render מִנְחָה by a word expressive of its composition, but the fineness of the flour is rightly indicated by such words as *σμιῦδαλις*, *simila* or *similago*, and سَمْد.

LEVITICUS xvi. 8. Render: “. . . the other lot for Azazel.” Though “the scapegoat” should be rejected as the rendering of עִזָּאֵזַיִל, it might be retained in the heading, and continue to be used, both in its technical and popular sense, as a convenient and appropriate name (though not Scriptural) for the second or live goat.

LEVITICUS xviii. 18. [Dr. Field advocates the retention of the rendering in A.V. text, with the deletion of A.V. margin. He proposes “to be a rival to her” (adopted by Revisers) as an alternative for “to vex her.” He also refers to a letter addressed by him to the Bishop of Ely (Dr. Harold Browne) in 1870, which reads as follows—“I read in a late debate in the House of Lords your criticism on Leviticus xviii. 18, in which (I quote from the *Standard*) you say that the Hebrew phrases ‘a woman to her sister’ and ‘a man to his brother’ should *invariably* be translated ‘one to another.’ Now I think you will find, on further investigation, that there is a peculiarity in the use of these well-known idioms, which is *not* found in the above text: namely, that they are always *extra constructionem*, or might be included in a parenthesis; so that אִשָּׁה or אִשָּׁה in such

cases neither governs the verb nor is governed by it. In the common example **וַיֹּאמְרוּ אִישׁ אֶל-אָחִיו** the construction is: 'And they said (namely) each (said) to his brother.' I do not say that **וַיֹּאמְרָא אִישׁ** would not be a good construction; and indeed I have found one or two instances of this construction with **רָעָהוּ** for **אָחִיו**, but as a rule the verb is in the plural; e.g. Exodus xi. 2. However, I believe no example can be found of **אִישׁ** in such cases being governed by the verb (as you propose in Lev. xviii. 18), nor do I see how it could grammatically be so arranged."]

DEUTERONOMY xxi. 14. Render: ". . . thou shalt not exercise dominion over her, because . . ." So the Greek *κατακυριεύειν* (which seems to come nearest to the meaning of the Hebrew **הִתְעַבֵּר**) is rendered Matthew xx. 25 ("exercise lordship," R.V.). In Genesis i. 28, where the LXX. have *κατακυριεύσατε αὐτῆς*, the Samaritan version has **עֲבִירוּ עֲלֶיהָ** (Gesenius).

DEUTERONOMY xxviii. 57. Render: "and toward her afterbirth that . . ." The rendering "and that on account of her afterbirth" seems to be precluded by the continual repetition of **וְיָבֵ**; and there is no reason why the "evil eye" should not be represented as glancing from the *object* to the *subject* of envy; looking upon the one with malignity and upon the other with gloating.

DEUTERONOMY xxxiii. 25. The marginal versions are rather more probable; but not so much so as to prevail (against nearly all the ancient versions) to eliminate from the English Bible a text which is so deservedly popular.

JOSHUA ix. 4. The marginal version [i.e. in R.V.] should be adopted: it is quite certain. Not "most" but *all* the ancient versions in Walton read **ד** not **ר**. And it is against all probability that two such forms as **הַיִּצְטִיר** and **הַיִּצְטִיר**, both *ἁπαξ λεγόμενα*, should occur in the same narrative within nine verses. Moreover, their assuming the character of ambassadors did not prove that they came from a far country.

FREDERICK FIELD.

*THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE
ROMANS.*

VI.

THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD AND THE NEW LIFE.

THROUGH faith in Christ, set forth by God as a propitiation in His blood, man is justified. His relation to God is determined not by sin, or by any of the powers or ideas which in St. Paul's mind form part of the same whole as sin, such as the law, the curse, or death ; it is determined completely and exclusively by Christ. The sinner who is ignorant of Christ, or who refuses the obedience of faith, is in the wrong with God ; the sinner from whom Christ the propitiation has won the great surrender is in the right with God. He is in that attitude to God which alone answers to the truth of what God is, as God has revealed that truth in giving His Son a propitiation for the sins of the world.

Now to be right with God in this sense is not a part of religion, it is the whole of it. The righteousness of God which Paul preached was not an element in his gospel ; his gospel was exhausted in it. The justification of the sinner was not a preliminary to something higher, it was not a condition without which real salvation could not be attained ; it was itself salvation. In the very nature of the case it could not be supplemented, and it did not need to be ; it has in it the promise and the potency of all that can ever be called Christian. The man who has once apprehended, in Christ or His cross, the true dimensions of the love of God, and in whose heart that unconditioned love, bearing his sins, has called forth the response of unconditional faith, has in principle nothing more to learn about God, and nothing more to receive from Him. His faith in God's love, the faith by which he is made right with God, is his life. The whole of Christianity is in the faith which abandons

itself to the sin-bearing love of God, just as the last truth about God is in the sin-bearing love which offers itself in Christ for the acceptance of faith.

This is the point of view from which St. Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, first enlarges on the life of the justified. In the third chapter he exhibits Christ as a propitiation—God's revelation of a righteousness in which His own character is vindicated, and in which sinners may become right with Him. In the fourth chapter he shows that the way of being right with God which he preaches—the way not of meritorious works which claim as of right God's approbation, but of unconditional reliance upon God in Christ—is no new thing, subversive of all the true religion that has ever been known in the world, but one in principle with the piety of the Old Testament. He points especially to the identity of Abrahamic and of Christian faith in this, that both are trust in a living God who can quicken the dead (v. 17). This is the Scriptural way of saying that both are faith in omnipotence. But in the case of Christian faith, the omnipotence has been demonstrated in a way which gives it a peculiar character. It has been shown in raising from the dead One "who was delivered for our offences and raised for our justification." In other words, it has been shown in the service of the love of God, dealing with the sin of the world for man's redemption. It is not omnipotence *simpliciter* in which the Christian trusts, it is omnipotent *grace*. And when we say this, we see again how trust in such grace is not a part of the Christian life, but the whole of it. Hence we cannot be surprised when St. Paul at this point actually brings the whole Christian life into view as the life of the justified, a life which has its inspiration and all its characteristic qualities and virtues simply in this, that it is the life of men who through faith in the omnipotent grace revealed in Christ are completely and once for all right with God. It is not something added to their

justification, it is something involved in it. It is not something which has another condition than their faith, it is the assertion of their faith through all things. If we introduce a word from another circle of ideas, and speak of a regenerate life, then we may say that justification regenerates, or that faith regenerates; for the regenerate life of Romans v. 1-11 is nothing but the life of justification and of faith. It does not matter for our present purpose whether we read ἔχωμεν or ἔχομεν in v. 1, or take *καυχώμεθα* in vv. 2 and 3 as indicative or subjunctive, though the indicative in all three seems to me the more probable; peace with God, access to God, a secure standing in grace, power to glory even in tribulations and to make them subservient to spiritual good, and a hope of glory which does not make ashamed because it rests on the assurance of God's love, a love poured out in our hearts through His Spirit—all this is included in the life of the justified. It does not occur to the Apostle to ask, What is the connexion between justification and the new life? How is the new life mediated to the man who through faith in Christ set forth as a propitiation has become right with God? These are not real questions for him. The new life, as Romans v. 1-11 exhibits it, is not communicated or evoked in any special way at all. It is the spontaneous manifestation of what justification is and means. It is justification asserting itself as a reality in all the relations, and under all the changing and trying conditions, of our being. "We have received the reconciliation" (v. 11): everything is in that.

It is worth while to notice that this point of view underlies all that Paul has yet to say, and emerges through what might seem at the first glance inconsistent with it. To believe in a love of God which is deeper than sin, and makes propitiation for it, is everything; whoever has this faith has justification and the life of the justified in one. Hence the love of God appears both at the beginning and at the end of

all that St. Paul has to say about the new life (v. 5 ff., viii. 32 ff.), and in both places it appears in that immensity which belongs to it as a love which has made propitiation for sin. The *whole* of the Christian life is *one* indivisible response to *this* love. It is a love with every promise in it, and in both the passages referred to it is made the basis of all Christian inferences. When we are sure of this love, the love which enables the ungodly to become right with God, much more, argues the Apostle in chap. v, may we be sure that all our other necessities will be looked to by God. The same argument is repeated in chap. viii. "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not also with Him freely give us all things?" But to argue in this way from the love which makes atonement to all other demonstrations of God's love which may be necessary for the sinner—in other words, to argue that the whole love of God is given in the love which justifies the ungodly—is precisely the same as to argue that the justification in which this atoning love is received, and in which the sinner becomes right with God, includes in itself the whole of salvation, and that the justified man has only to assert and manifest himself as what he is, in order to be equal to all the demands of life. The new life is in no sense added to justification; justification itself, in St. Paul's words, is *justification of life* (v. 18). It is a mistake to draw distinctions which the Apostle does not draw, and to say that life here means eternal life in the transcendent, not the ethical, sense: its may fairly be questioned whether St. Paul could have made out what this means. Life may be rich, but it is simple and indivisible; and when justification is qualified by life we must take it in its wealth of meaning certainly, but in its simplicity as well. A self-contained justification, an impotent negative justification, without fruit or outlook, is not the Apostle's idea. To him justification is related to life and to be characterized by it. We may say, if we please,

that it has immortality in view, but we must say also that it regenerates. Everything in Christianity is vitally in it, vitally connected with it and dependent on it, its vital manifestation. It follows, of course, that independent of it there is nothing of vital Christianity at all.

This interpretation of St. Paul's teaching on justification may seem to some to leave no room for anything in the Epistle to the Romans after chap. v. 1-11. When the Apostle has reached this point, it may be argued, he has said all he has to say; he has made his gospel known to his readers in all its breadth and length and depth and height. And there is no doubt that the connexion between the part of the Epistle with which we have been engaged, and the part which follows, is difficult to grasp. By some it is simply denied. Ritschl, for instance, argues that Paul keeps the two points of view which they represent—that of justification by faith, and that of the bestowment of the Holy Spirit on believers—quite apart. He traces their course, so to speak, side by side, and makes the attainment of salvation at last equally dependent on the one and on the other, but he never combines them. Holtzmann agrees with Ritschl in this, but makes a certain allowance for the lines of thought crossing each other; and though he holds that Paul never clearly defined their relations, he thinks there are certain ideas common to both (such as faith, the Spirit, and redemption) which assist us in bringing them into connexion. Weiss makes a connexion by the simple process of addition. First, we are justified by faith—not indeed in the sense of justification explained above, but in some more negative and impotent sense; then we receive the Spirit, as the power of the new life, in baptism; and it is the sum of these which is the Christian salvation. None of these views can be willingly accepted by one who reads the first part of the Epistle as it has been read in these papers, and who has on general grounds a prejudice in favour of St. Paul's coherency.

We might rather be disposed to argue that in chaps. iii. 9-v. 11 he is propounding his gospel in its purely religious significance—remembering, of course, that in a religion which puts a man right with God everything is included; that in chap. v. 12-21 he digresses to bring out its significance in the spiritual history of humanity, and particularly to show that the great figures in that history are Adam and Christ, and its great ideas Sin and Grace, Death and Life, as compared with which Moses and his Law have only a subordinate and transient importance; while in chaps. vi.-viii. the ethical significance of the gospel is asserted against plausible objections which would find in it an excuse for sin. But this is to give an exaggerated importance to chap. v. 12-21, which in spite of the enormous place it has filled in the history of dogma is hardly more than an *obiter dictum* in the Epistle to the Romans. What is really before the Apostle's mind from v. 11 onwards is the ethical vindication of his gospel. That gospel was attacked on the ground of reverence for the law, and the main purpose served in his argument by this much disputed passage is to put the law in its place. The law is not what the Jews who slandered him (iii. 8) supposed. It is a vanishing quantity between Sin and Grace, as Moses is a vanishing personality between Adam and Christ. But after his preliminary discounting of its importance (in which the law can only be taken in the historical sense) he comes to face the real objection which was in the minds of his opponents. The law they were concerned about was not to be disparaged as the law of Moses: to them it was the law of God. It represented the interest both of God and man in righteousness, and their assertion was that Paul's gospel of a justification for the ungodly was inconsistent with its claims. It set righteousness at nought. It not only tempted men to say, Let us do evil that good may come, let us continue in sin that grace may abound; it justified them in so saying, and would end in their so

doing. This is the situation to which Paul addresses himself in chap. vi. 1 ff.

Let it be observed that what is assailed is St. Paul's doctrine of justification. Now that which is assailed is that which has to be defended. Nothing will serve the Apostle's purpose except a demonstration that justification as he understands it is vitally related to the holy will of God, as it is expressed in the law, and to the doing of that will in life. To show that there is *more* in Christianity than the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* which he has consistently identified with his gospel, and to argue that morality is guaranteed in another way of which he has as yet said nothing, but which this objection reminds him to set forth, is both irrelevant and absurd. It is as if he tacitly pleaded guilty to the charge made against his gospel, and then by an after-thought got past it; as if he said, Yes, my gospel of a Divine righteousness would be open to these charges if it stood alone; but it does not stand alone. It is supplemented by a reception of the Holy Spirit in which a divine life is communicated to us and maintained in us; and as we walk after the Spirit the righteousness of the law is fulfilled. Such a connexion, or rather such a want of connexion, such an incoherence, in the Apostle's thoughts is incredible. A gospel of justification, which has no relation to morality, and of new spiritual life which has no vital connexion with justification, is a gospel like Mephibosheth, lame on both its feet. It needs a great deal of courage to ascribe it to a mind like St. Paul's, even in the company of such distinguished scholars as those referred to above.

But indeed it is not necessary to do so. The Apostle states the objection of his opponents, apparently in their own words, Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? Then he repels it with moral indignation: *μὴ γένοιτο*. The very idea is shocking. Then—and this is the essential point—he demonstrates its inconsistency with

his gospel. This is the purport of the second verse in the sixth chapter : men who like us died to sin, how shall we continue to live in it? It seems to be taken for granted, by many if not by most interpreters, that the idea of dying to sin is a perfectly new one, having no relation to anything which precedes and intelligible only in the light of what follows. I venture to dissent altogether from this view. Dying to sin is not a new nor an incomprehensible idea to any one who has understood chap. iii. 25 f., and who knows what that faith is in which the sinful man abandons himself to the mercy of God in Christ crucified. It is our death which Christ dies as He bears our sins on the Cross, and when we commit ourselves in faith to the mercy of God which is revealed there, to that mercy and to no other, we make that death our own. Sin becomes to us in the very act of believing all that it is to Christ ; we are dead to it as He is dead ; it is a thing foreign to the world into which our faith introduces us, as it was foreign to Him who died for it. St. Paul does not here supplement his gospel of justification ; he only brings out its contents on the basis of experience, and shows how adequate they are to answer the objections made to it in the name of morality. Every man, he argues, who knows what it is to be justified by believing in Christ who died for sins knows *ipso facto*, in his own soul, what it is to die to sin. It is Christ *dying* for sin who evokes faith, and the faith which He evokes answers to what He is and to what He does ; it is a faith which has a *death* to sin in it. But this is the same faith which justifies, and St. Paul's argument rests entirely on the fact that it is the same. Unless the faith through which the sinner becomes right with God involves in it this death to sin, and what is not a separate thing, but only the other side of the same, a being alive to God, he has no reply to his opponents at all. It is out

of his faith that this argument is constructed. The very same experience in which he becomes right with God through Christ—that is, the experience of faith—is an experience in which he becomes a dead man, so far as sin is concerned, a living man, so far as God is concerned. Not that this is the ground on which he finds acceptance with God, or in view of which God justifies him; nothing could be so direct a contradiction of Pauline theology as the idea that God justifies us because the germ of sanctification or of new life is present in the soul and can be counted on to develop. It is the one unconditional mercy of God in Christ crucified which evokes the one response of faith—a faith in which, as one indivisible experience, the believing sinner becomes right with God and dead to sin. And it is the abiding assurance of this justifying mercy, a mercy in the acceptance of which sin dies, or the believer dies to sin (for the two are one), on which the new life depends. The joy of justification is not the initial impulse by which the boat is pushed from the shore; if St. Paul can be trusted, it is the very element on which it floats; it is the inspiration of the new life from beginning to end, and that life itself can be exhaustively described as the life of justification.

The whole answer of St. Paul to the charge that his gospel led to immorality is contained in that exclamation—*men like us who died to sin!* As has been remarked already, it is no answer, unless the dying to sin is necessarily involved in that very act of believing in which a man is made right with God. Paul knows from experience that it is so involved, but he can imagine his assertion being doubted; and if it is doubted, where is the proof? In the nature of the case there can be no conclusive proof but the experimental one—the actual holiness of the justified, the fulfilment of the law by sinners who have received the reconciliation freely, and with no moral

guarantees either asked or offered by way of preliminary. But in the nature of the case also such an experimental proof can hardly be given, and all St. Paul can do to satisfy those who are sceptical about the death to sin involved in faith is to point to the rite in which faith is declared, and to show that it also has the death in question written on its face. The rite is that of baptism. It is plain from the Apostle's language that all Christians were baptized, and it ought not to be necessary to say that in the New Testament baptism and faith are correlative ideas; the meaning of baptism is the meaning of faith, and that is why Paul can appeal to it here as a way of bringing out what is involved in faith. What, then, is the light which baptism—which is only an illustration of faith, a picture in which the contents of faith are presented to the eye—throws upon the subject in hand? In what way does it support the assertion that faith involves a death to sin, and is therefore inconsistent with a continued life in it?

Baptism supports this assertion inasmuch as, in the form in which it was familiar to the Church, it is a picture of death, burial, and resurrection. These things are in baptism as in a picture, but they are in faith in their reality. What is in the picture for the eye to see is in faith as the experience of the soul. We were baptized into Christ's death, means that when we were baptized our faith was evoked by and concentrated on that death; in its atoning power, a power which belongs to it because it is really our death borne by Him, it takes hold of us and conforms us to itself; we make it our own in the very act of believing, and in Christ through faith we die to sin. This is the faith which baptism presents to the senses; if it is not this, what, St. Paul asks, is it? What other interpretation can you put on the sacrament than that it enshrines and exhibits this spiritual experi-

ence? Paul does not refer to baptism because there is something in it which is not to be found in faith, but for precisely the opposite reason. He refers to it because it brings out the fact that in faith—the faith which justifies—the only faith he knew or could think of, the faith which is identical with the Christian religion and which is confessed in baptism—there is involved (at least in idea) a death to sin which is the only absolute guarantee for a life fulfilling the law.

The ideal or theoretical vindication of St. Paul's gospel is therefore quite complete. He knew in his experience that justifying faith meant death to sin, and the symbolism of the sacrament exhibited this meaning to all. But the ideal is one thing; the reality, even where it has touched the ideal at the central and vital point, is another. The new life is indeed, we may say, guaranteed by the death to sin involved in faith and represented in baptism; it is guaranteed by it, yet it lies beyond it, and as the end contemplated in it, it has an independence of its own. "We were buried with Him by our baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." Religion is not a substitute for morality, it has it in view; and though it is a guarantee for it, morality must be freely and morally produced. Hence the exhortations to right conduct with which the remainder of the sixth chapter of the Epistle is filled. It is as if the Apostle said to his readers, "It is of no use to argue the case; all that can be done is by well doing to put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. Baptism *is* a picture of death and resurrection, and in faith there *is* a corresponding reality; there is a death to sin, and a being alive to God. This it is impossible for us to doubt, but there can be no theoretical demonstration of it; let us demonstrate it, therefore, in act. *Reckon* yourselves to be

dead to sin, and alive to God in Jesus Christ. Remember what you *are*; be yourselves, and every mouth which reproaches the gospel will be stopped."

It is a highly remarkable fact that all through this chapter, in which the Apostle is dealing with the morality of the new life, there is no mention of the Holy Spirit. Christianity is explained in its entirety out of Christ and faith. It consists, first and last, of experiences generated in the believer by the Cross. The fundamental one is death to sin; in the assurance that he has shared with Christ at this point, the Apostle is confident that he will share with Him all through. "If we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him." It is probably a mistake to speak in this connexion of a mystical union with Christ as a transcendent reality on which all such experiences are dependent. It is the experiences alone with which the Apostle is dealing, and it does not make them in any degree more intelligible to provide them with an unrealizable background. To believe in Christ who died for our sins, and who died our death in doing so, is to die ourselves to sin; it is to receive "justification of life"; it is to have the love of God shed abroad in our hearts; it is to know that we are under grace, and that neither sin nor death can have dominion over us any more; it is to have as the ever present, all determining power in our moral life the sense that for these unspeakable blessings we are debtors to Christ who died. We owe them absolutely, and without any qualification, to Him, and our new life is inspired and sustained by the sense of this obligation. As the Apostle puts it in another epistle, it is a life not to ourselves, but to Him who for our sakes died and rose again, and to the God whose love He revealed in doing so. This is the connexion in which the one reference to the Holy Spirit stands which we have yet found in St. Paul's treatment of justification. "The

love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit given unto us " (chap. v. 5). It is this love of God to us, which, through the response of love evoked by it in our hearts, is the guarantee for a good life. Love begets love—to be more specific, grace begets gratitude; and gratitude is the inspiration of all Christian goodness. This, much more than anything suggested by the idea of a mystical union with Christ, or an indwelling of the Spirit, seems to me the point of view from which the Apostle contemplates the problem raised in the sixth chapter of Romans. We cannot continue in sin, his argument runs; to do so would be inconsistent with our whole relation to Christ. It would be inconsistent with the death to sin which is involved in faith, and represented, as in a picture, in baptism; it would be inconsistent with our sense of debt to Him who died for our sins that we might be in bondage to them no more; it would be inconsistent with our hope of the glory of God. All this, I repeat, is intelligible, and it is on the level at which the Apostle writes throughout this section. Whatever it may be proper to say of the Holy Spirit, or of union to Christ, or incorporation in Him, must be said on the basis of such experiences and within their limits.

JAMES DENNEY.

JUDGMENT BY WORDS AND BY WORKS.

IN St. Matthew xii. 37 our Lord declares that "by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." That the judgment referred to is not that of men in the common intercourse of life, but the judgment of God in the last great day, appears unmistakably from the immediate context. He had just been saying that for "every idle word that men shall speak" they shall be called to account "in the day of judgment."

The solemn warning thus conveyed to us, that we ought to be a great deal more careful than we generally are as to what we say and how we say it, calls forth a ready response from the Christian conscience—comes home, indeed, very keenly to most of us. That is perhaps the reason why we fail, almost entirely, to perceive how extraordinary our Lord's declaration really is. Our spoken words, He said, will form the ground of our justification, or of our condemnation, in the judgment of the last great day. The statement is made without any qualification at all. It is not expressly said that by his words *alone* a man shall then and there be justified or condemned; but it is distinctly implied that his words alone would form a sufficient ground—a reliable ground—for that tremendous judgment. That is surely an amazing statement, and one which runs counter to the almost universal opinion of mankind as to the real value of words. So also is that other foregoing statement, which evidently stands in close connexion with it, that “out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh”; in other words, that whatever a man feels strongly will declare itself in his speech. If we read that saying anywhere else than in the Bible, we should at once exclaim that it was very far from being true. We should even smile to ourselves at the simplicity, the inexperience, which permitted a man to make such a statement without qualification. There are *times* when people speak out of the abundance of their hearts, but these times are the exception rather than the rule. Even children frequently employ the faculty of speech in order to disguise their real feelings. Philosophers of a certain order have maintained that language was given to man for this precise purpose. If it be urged that such a paradox could only have originated in a highly artificial and corrupt phase of civilized life, it must be answered that the most un-

tutored savage will often say what he does not mean at all, and still more often not say what he does mean. The art and habit of reticence, of dissimulation, of falsehood, is common to the whole earth, is found among people in every stage of development, is (in many of its aspects) a necessary accompaniment of any sort of civilization. You cannot live with people if you are to tell them just what you think of them. You will not gain their respect or their confidence by wearing your heart upon your sleeve. A very slight experience of the disagreeable and dangerous side of life teaches the child, or the savage, to order his speech with "economy," or even with cunning. The educated and cultured man is, for other reasons, no less disinclined to let his mouth speak out of the abundance of his heart. His deepest feelings he keeps to himself, and in his converse with other men he either suppresses them altogether, or else gives utterance to them only on rare occasions, and for very special reasons.

It may be said that all this is exceptional and abnormal; that in all men the underlying instinct is to utter in words what they think and feel at the moment; that the general rule, therefore, stands as our Lord declared it. But it is not possible to hold such a position in face of the admitted facts of life. The exceptions, the limitations, are far too serious to be left out of sight. Those men who have learned — according to the well-known saying—to be silent in half a dozen languages are only outstanding examples of a world-wide art. Their words never give any positive clue to what they really think. Others—whose name is legion—practise habitual dissimulation all their lives; the relation between their words and their thoughts is one of contradiction, not of correspondence. Among the Pharisees, e.g., our Lord must have known men of this character. Apart from all that may be objected to as abnormal, it is certain that the

common course of life and education does in general work in us a large amount of discrepancy between what we say and what we are. In some ways our speech is worse than our self, because we do so often speak with a certain recklessness (most of us), not expecting to be taken quite seriously. A large proportion of Englishmen, e.g., do not hesitate to call their opponents—political or otherwise—"fools." Some will even apply that epithet to their wives and children, and this without any regard to our Lord's well-known warning about that very word. What is more remarkable is the fact that no one, however conscientious, thinks much the worse of these people, or counts them guilty of a crime. At the worst, this common habit is a regrettable one—the habit of using exaggerated language, language which, in its dictionary meaning, expresses sentiments indefinitely more hostile and contemptuous than those which the speakers really entertain. Some of the most admirable people (it may be) whom we may ever have known, were in the habit of using language of this violent kind. Knowing their real sentiments as we did, we were quite rightly persuaded that it was but a venial fault. Nothing would induce us to believe that for idle words of this kind, *which they did not really mean*, they were to be condemned in the last day. For assuredly in such cases as this the mouth does not speak out of the abundance of the heart; the heart is sound and good; it is only the habit of speech that is at fault. In other ways, again, and more common ways perhaps, our speech is habitually better than our self. Very few educated people commit their worse thoughts or feelings to speech. Their conscience is enlightened enough to make them shy of doing so, and the tacit agreement of decent society discourages it. Our speech, like our action, is very largely determined by the sense of what is expected of us, by the moral standard

which has the approbation of the society to which we belong. This constraint however has, notoriously, but little effect on the real self; it does not control the inner play of thought and feeling (*i.e.* "the heart") at all effectively. Consequently the majority of people in a Christian country have their words much better under control than their "hearts." In other words, their speech is decidedly better than they are themselves. Nor indeed is this to be regretted; for if we gave free vent to all the thoughts and feelings which we tolerate within ourselves, we should not only corrupt others but harden ourselves. We recognize instinctively, but quite properly, that we can only allow the better-behaved part of us to enjoy the prerogatives of speech. Taking both these things together, we may assert, without hesitation, that, for one reason or another, what we say is only a very partial, and a very unreliable index to what we think, what we feel, what we are. Old and young, rich and poor, cultured and savage, Christian and heathen, one with another, we speak to a great extent *from the teeth outwards*. What we say is indeed in some sort an expression of self; but so unconsciously modified, or so deliberately altered, that it is quite unreliable. So well is this understood, that in the literature of all nations the antithesis between words and deeds, between profession and practice, between what a man says and what a man is, embodies itself in a multitude of epigrams, of truisms, of popular judgments. Indeed it may be found easily enough in the New Testament itself.

Yet our Lord declares, without reservation, quite simply, quite positively, that we shall be judged and sentenced according to our *words*.

This is really important because it proves conclusively that a declaration made by our Lord in the most absolute way may be of such a nature that it cannot possibly

be true in the shape in which it stands before us. God forbid that any one should dream that any word of our Lord Jesus Christ is not true. But this is certainly not true in any ordinary sense. If any divine were to set it down in a theological manual that men will be judged at the great assize according to their *words*—the things they have said, the sentiments they have uttered—it would be neither more nor less than a false statement.

Why is it that the ordinary reader, although he is quite aware of this, does not stumble at this saying of our Lord? Is it not because he instinctively takes it in close connexion with, and dependence upon, the previous saying that the mouth speaks out of the abundance of the heart? That statement is known to everybody to be true only in a very limited sense. Our Lord is therefore understood to be insisting that words are far from being unimportant; that they are (rightly considered) emanations of the inner self; that they may even be looked upon as forming the ground of our own future and final judgment, so far as they really represent the inner self out of which they spring. Instinctively the reader perceives at once that, as far as the judgment is concerned, our Lord's declaration has very little *doctrinal* significance, because obviously a man's words form but a very uncertain index to his character, and are far less reliable in that respect than his deeds. But as far as our present life is concerned the reader perceives at the same moment that the declaration has a great *practical* significance, because it puts in so tremendously solemn a light the duty of keeping a watch over the door of our lips.

It follows, then, that our Lord made this declaration about the judgment in this very positive shape, not with a view of telling us anything about the procedure of that day—for we cannot possibly accept it in that sense—but with a view of enforcing upon us a moral duty of our present life.

To put it so bluntly may seem irreverent; and yet there does not appear to be any possibility of escaping the conclusion. No ingenuity will enable us to accept the assertion that we shall be judged according to our words, except under reservations so large and so profound as to leave the assertion itself theologically useless. The more awfully conscious we are of the all-penetrating glance of Him whose eyes are as a flame of fire, the more absolutely certain we are that what we say will form but a small element in His estimate of what we are and whither we have to go, for good or evil. Our words, in fact, do not correspond with any accuracy to our inner selves. The stream of words, which is ever flowing on, takes its rise on the outer slopes of our human life. It does not draw upon the hidden reservoirs of thought and feeling, which more than anything else determine the true character. Or, if it does, it is only intermittently, when these overflow.

If we are willing to acknowledge so much, must we not go further, and confess that it is the same (though to a less extent) with our *works*? Under many conditions of life, a man's action is nearly as much limited and regulated as his speech. If he is lacking in what we call originality, he hardly asserts himself perhaps in his doings much more than in his sayings. One may find hints, of course, in both of these of what he really is, but only hints. And we, who cannot go behind these, are often grievously mistaken in our estimation of the man. In order that the real character should stand disclosed, a concurrence of favouring circumstances is required, which cannot be reckoned on in any particular case. So clearly is this recognized, that it forms the motive in many popular tales. Here, e.g., is a young officer who is universally credited with a frivolous and even fatuous character, because his speech and his manner of life point to that, and to nothing else. But the chances of war throw him into a situation in which all depends upon

him. Immediately he exhibits a strength of mind and a fertility of resource which make him equal to the occasion, and along with these an unpretending heroism of self-sacrifice which wins for him the grateful affection as well as the admiration of all beholders. The story is nought; but the assumption on which it turns, surprising as it is, is abundantly justified by the known facts of human life. Circumstances, however unusual, do not alter people: they have no creative or re-creative power. But circumstances do not infrequently bring to light that real self—that better or worse self—which had never disclosed itself before either in word or deed. It seems to follow certainly that many a man lives his life out on earth without ever knowing, or letting it be known, what his real value is, simply because the opportunity has never come to him. In other words, a man's actual works form, in many cases, no fair criterion of what he is really worth. His manhood, with its want of stimulus, its absence of opportunity, its failure to bring him face to face with high responsibility, has left him as undeveloped, as unrevealed to himself and to others, as his childhood did. It does not, of course, follow in the very least that this man—or any other man—remains unknown or obscure to God, who searcheth the heart and the reins; but it *does* follow that, precisely for this reason, God will no more judge us according to our works than He will according to our words. What a man says, even habitually, may easily give a false impression of what he actually is. So, it seems, may what he does—even what he habitually does. To judge a man by his words is too rough and ready a method even for us: we habitually set it aside in common life in favour of the much more satisfactory test of conduct. But this also is too rough and ready a standard for the all-seeing and all-righteous God, since it is never quite satisfactory, and sometimes would be altogether unfair.

It will probably seem to many that such an argument as

this is, after all, useless—or worse than useless—because it is so repeatedly and so definitely stated in Scripture that men *will* be judged according to their works, and it is vain for us to try to go behind the statement. The Almighty (they will say) will make all necessary allowances—for want of opportunity, as for everything else—but still He will, and must, judge all men according to their works, for He has said so. It is just here that we may find our Lord's declaration about *words* so valuable, and, indeed, so decisive, for our present purpose. He speaks of judgment by *words* every whit as positively, as much without reservation, as He speaks elsewhere, or as any of the sacred writers speak, about judgment by *works*. Yet there is no theologian in the world who teaches that a man's conversation—or anything that comes out of his lips—will form the actual ground of his final acceptance or rejection before God. His words will not be without importance there, because they are not without importance here: but there, as here, the importance must be of a very secondary character. It cannot, therefore, be presumptuous to hold that both these declarations about judgment to come—so precisely similar as they are in form—stand in reality on the same level.

What is that level? What does it really mean when it says in this place that we shall be judged by our words; in that, that we shall be judged by our works?

It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that in both cases the reference is in form to the day of judgment, but in substance to the time of our sojourning here on earth. The passage in St. Matthew xii., which culminates in v. 37, has, so far as we can judge, an exclusively practical reference to the duties of to-day, to the responsibilities of our present life. It emphasizes, in a startling manner, the importance and responsibility of speech. A word, properly considered, is a living thing: it is a direct product of the inner self wherein that inner self, in all its vigour and

complexity, becomes audible to the world. The self-manifestation of man, in and by his words, resembles, however faintly, the self-manifestation of God, in and by His Word. It reveals the man, as he is, in his good or evil. Practically, indeed, this aspect of human speech must be considered transcendental: in actual life it is so broken up and obscured by the manifold incongruity between a man's speech and himself that it is almost without value for testing purposes. Nevertheless the transcendental truth remains true in its own sphere: and because it does, a really good man will never speak without a more or less strong sense of responsibility. Not what our words will be to us *then*, but what they ought to be to us *now*; not what we have to hope or fear from them at God's judgment-seat, but what we have to remember concerning them in our daily converse: *that* was what our Lord really had in view as He spoke. The reference to the judgment of the last day is not prophetic and theological; it is dramatic and religious.

Is it not just the same with the celebrated passage in St. Matthew xxv. 31 f., and with other like passages? They do not help us in the very least to know anything, or to say anything, about the methods or the results of the last assize. They do not even persuade us that we shall really be judged according to our works in any literal or exclusive sense—for that would be incompatible with God's self-revelation in Scripture. But they do help us, in the most emphatic way, to know what it is that God loves (or hates) to find in us *now*. And they do, with the same emphasis, persuade us so to live by help of His grace *here* that He may have mercy upon us in that day. It hardly seems too much to say that almost every reference to the day of judgment in the New Testament is dramatic (or rhetorical) in its character. Its real (and often transcendent) significance is exhausted when we have drawn out its application to the life of Christians here and now.

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

CORROBORATION.

I. THE CENSUS OF QUIRINIUS.

THE theory that the census during which Jesus was born in Bethlehem was the first periodic census of the fourteen years cycle (fourteen years' after the accession of Augustus to the fully developed Imperial power), has to face the difficulty that the proper year of the census was 8-7 B.C.,¹ while the birth of Jesus can hardly be carried back earlier than the year 6 B.C. Accordingly, in my essay on the subject, it was necessary to account for the delay ; and an explanation was found in the rather troubled and difficult situation of affairs in Palestine at the time, together with the natural difficulty in carrying out punctually and exactly the first introduction of this gigantic (as we may fairly call it with reference to the means then existing) operation throughout Syria and Egypt.²

A fair analogy is presented by a much simpler operation which was carried out two or three years later in Asia Minor. When the last king of Paphlagonia, Deiotarus Philadelphus, died or was deposed, his kingdom was incorporated in the Roman province Galatia, and an era was established in that region according to which the cities of that kingdom reckoned from the year in which the incor-

¹ Including all persons born during the cyclic year 9-8 B.C.

² That it was intended to be universal, and that such was the formal expression of Augustus's decree, as Luke says, seems to me to be a matter of that reasonable probability which is possible in such a case. That it was universally carried out is not said by Luke, and is not probable. That it was carried out over Egypt and Syria seems established with high probability.

poration took place as the year 1. The year of the incorporation and the first of the era was that which ended in autumn 5 B.C.¹

It was necessary that the people of the newly incorporated district should take the oath of allegiance to their new sovereign, Augustus. The change in their national position was equivalent to a change of sovereign: Augustus succeeded Deiotarus, and the people took the oath of allegiance to him, as they did afterwards to each new emperor on his succession. This has been stated with convincing arguments by Prof. F. Cumont, when he published last year the important inscription, which has revealed the whole series of events.²

Now the taking of the oath of allegiance was a very simple ceremony, requiring little preparation and no combination of work by a staff of officials, such as is needed for a census. Yet in this Paphlagonian kingdom, prepared for accepting the full provincial status by a long period of government by dependent kings, it took nearly, or perhaps over, two years before the oath of allegiance was administered. The exact day in the year 1 (i.e. Sept. 6–Sept. 5 B.C.) when Deiotarus ceased to reign is unknown; it may have been early in the year, or it may have been late. The reign of Augustus, i.e. the incorporation of Paphlagonia in Galatia, was of course reckoned to begin immediately thereafter. The rest of the year 1, all the year 2,

¹ The new year began at or near the autumn equinox in Pontus and Paphlagonia.

² See his article in the *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 1901, p. 26. The date of the incorporation of Paphlagonia in Galatia (formerly wrongly stated) was established on fair probability in an article by the present writer (*Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 1894, p. 251 f.), raised to reasonable assurance by Mr. Geo. Macdonald in Svoronos's *Journal Internat. d. Num.*, 1899, p. 17, and now confirmed by M. Cumont. It is fixed with that strong probability beyond which we can rarely attain in ancient history; but, as soon as it begins to be brought into even the remotest connexion with the New Testament, it will probably be disputed. For our present purpose, however, the exact incidence of the era is immaterial.

and about six months of the year 3, elapsed. Then at last the oath was administered on the sixth of March, the anniversary festival of the occasion when Augustus became Pontifex Maximus.

In view of this analogy there is no reason to wonder that a census which ought theoretically to have been taken during the twelve months after the conclusion of the cyclic year 9-8 was not carried out in Palestine (a country still very far from ready for incorporation in the Roman Empire) until about two years had elapsed. Such an interval may be quite reasonably admitted, even by those who are not prepared to accept every detail of the sketch which is given in my book of the probable sequence of events between the end of the cyclic year and the day fixed for the census in Palestine.¹ A new measure, requiring the co-operation of many officials all over the country, necessitating considerable organization and instruction of officials, may very well have needed that lapse of time before it came into actual operation. It is now known that even in the third census, A.D. 20, proceedings did not go on with the same regularity in Egypt as in the second and third century.

It seems, therefore, a fair, moderate and reasonable statement that a numbering of the people in Palestine in B.C. 6 is to be accepted as part of the census connected with the cyclic year 9-8, and properly falling in the year 8-7. That a cyclic census ought to have been in process in that year is now established on purely non-Biblical evidence with such reasonable certainty as ancient history is susceptible of. If a person believes that the battle of Salamis is falsely dated, no one can demonstrate to his satisfaction that he is mistaken. So with the cycle-years under Augustus.

¹ That sketch was given as the most probable and natural combination of the few known facts, and not as established on a basis of reasonable assurance, much less as certain. There is not sufficient evidence about that exceedingly obscure period.

II. THE CENSUS LISTS OF AUGUSTUS.

In the same book it is argued that the records of the census were preserved and could be consulted by persons authorized, and that the purpose of the census was to a considerable degree to obtain statistics on which to base the practice of Roman government.

The first of these two points is confirmed by an interesting document published in the last month in the *Amherst Papyri*, ii. p. 90 f., by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt. This is "an application from a woman called Demetria, about 168 A.D., asking that her son Tereus be admitted to the list of privileged persons who were exempt from polltax." The basis of the claim is that the boy's ancestors on both sides were exempt, and this is proved by a genealogy carried back for five generations. "The evidence is extracted in most cases from the census lists." In certain cases, however, that is not so: an authority dated in Nero's eleventh year is twice quoted, which cannot be a census list.

The true bearing of evidence is sometimes distorted through inadequate knowledge. This document is now found to be a confirmation of my theory; but, had it been known five years ago, the reader would have been afflicted with one book the less, for it would at that time have seemed fatal to the theory. The theory on which the book is founded is that those census lists began with the year 9-8 B.C. When the book was written, no census papers were known earlier than 76 B.C.; and the Amherst document, which quotes census lists from that time onwards and quotes a different authority for the period of Nero, would naturally suggest that the census had not come into operation so early as Nero's time. This would be an excellent example of the negative argument. The reasoning would then have seemed almost certain: this document quotes census lists during the period when their existence

is established by other evidence, and it ignores them during the earlier period; therefore no census were made in that earlier period.

But the course of discovery has proved that this negative argument, which would have seemed at that time so strong, is as weak as negative arguments must always be, and quite erroneous. Quickly the progress of discovery revealed evidence that the periodic census were made as early as A.D. 20, and that the census list of A.D. 62 is quoted as an authority in A.D. 72.¹ Hence if Demetria preferred to use different authorities in the earlier and the later periods, her reason was not that census were made only in the later period.

Further, my argument that the census lists in Italy were consulted as evidence about the lives even of obscure individuals is entirely confirmed by the example of Demetria in the Amherst Papyrus.

In the second place, the argument was used in my book that the collection of statistics was regarded by Augustus as an important part of practical administration, and that this was one main purpose in his project of universal census. The intentions of Augustus are, of course, a matter of opinion and inference, and must always remain so. There is no objective evidence of what was in his mind. We simply see what he did, and infer from the facts what was his deep-lying intention.

But, in this case, it is reasonable to find a confirmation of our inferences in the independent opinion of high authorities as to the meaning and intention of Augustus. Now, the reason why Augustus divided Italy into eleven districts has always been obscure. But two such high authorities as

¹ After the book was in proof, but not yet paged, evidence had been found by Mr. Kenyon that the periodic census were as old as 48 A.D. Still later Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt carried them back to 20 A.D., as was mentioned in a post-script to the preface.

Mommsen and Liebenam¹ have come to the conclusion that that division, which was never used for purposes of administration, cannot be satisfactorily explained except as serving for the collection and classification of the results of the census.

“Augustus’s division of Italy into XI. Regions had merely statistical importance, and was intended to serve no administrative purposes apart from the census,” says the latter scholar, and he quotes in a footnote the sharp emphasizing of this view by Mommsen.

A word or two may be added on the purpose of my book. Several unfounded assumptions have been made about this by writers who have criticised it, both favourably and unfavourably. The book does not demonstrate, or seek to demonstrate, that Christ was born at Bethlehem. It only seeks to prove that there was no strength in the arguments by which many writers believed that the falsity of Luke’s account of the census and the journey of Joseph and Mary to Bethlehem had been demonstrated. The confident and even boastful assumption of many writers was that this part of Luke’s narrative has been conclusively demonstrated to be false to Roman methods, and therefore impossible. On the contrary, I have argued (and, as I hope, successfully proved) that Luke’s account of the census is entirely possible, and in perfect harmony with Roman procedure as applied in client states such as Judea.

It cannot be proved from other authorities that Luke’s account is correct, because no other authorities mention the facts; but nothing that is recorded by other ancient authorities conflicts with Luke. Many facts of ancient history, however, rest on one authority alone.

But those who regard the third Gospel as a second century compilation will not be affected by my results,

¹ Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im röm. Kaiserreiche*, p. 453; Mommsen in *Festschrift. II. Kiepert*, p. 102.

because they consider that it has no historical weight in itself, and is not to be believed except where it is confirmed by other and better evidence. In this case there is no other evidence; for it cannot be said that even Matthew confirms Luke. In fact, the question has been seriously raised whether Matthew and Luke are consistent with one another.

Further, in my book no opinion is anywhere stated or intended about the miraculous nature of the birth of Jesus. The subject is not one which falls within my province. Mr. F. C. Conybeare, in a series of controversial letters in the *Academy*, once argued very ingeniously and plausibly that there was nothing supernatural in that event, and that nothing miraculous is implied in Luke's first chapter. He may be right or not: though his view is certainly not complete, and leaves much to be said in very diverse directions. But there is not a word in my book, so far as I am aware, which might not be accepted logically and unreservedly by him.¹

It seems to be a perfectly logical position, and perfectly consistent with the resolution to walk according to one's reason, to believe that the Divine nature may come into closer relations with some human beings than with others, even though one confesses entire inability to understand in what manner and by what exact steps those closer relations are produced. When very young, I felt quite resolute to believe nothing that I could not fully understand; but it was gradually brought home to me in life that one must every day of one's life act on the belief in things and processes which one cannot understand. The standard of education and knowledge has probably risen so much in our modern universities, that hardly even the youngest student would be

¹ Except that once, in setting aside that subject as outside the scope of the book, a phrase was used, which I should have put differently, if I had had his view in my consciousness at the moment.

ignorant enough to feel the confidence which I once did in the ability of human intellect to understand everything. That some persons are far more sensitive to, and far more able to commune with, the Divine nature than others are, seems as obvious and as reasonable as that some are far more sensitive to climate and atmospheric conditions than others; and it is certain that those who are less sensitive will never be able in any possible way to understand how and by what steps the sensitiveness of the others comes to be affected. What precisely is meant in Luke's first chapter I am unable to specify in detail; and I neither accept nor reject the very able and bold theory stated by Mr. Conybeare. I do not think that something miraculous or supernatural must necessarily be implied: on the contrary, the phrase "superhuman but not supernatural" seems to be a very reasonable distinction to make.

But such high speculations are wholly outside of my humble subject, which has always been simply historical.

III. THE FAMILY AND RANK OF ST. PAUL.

It has always lain at the foundation of the present writer's published views about St. Paul that he was a man of good birth and family: "the *civitas* may be taken as a proof that his family was one of distinction and at least moderate wealth."¹

This has been flatly denied recently, and is opposed to the general opinion of the theological and popular writers on St. Paul. The fact that he worked at a handicraft to which he had been trained has been commonly reckoned as sufficient proof that he was of a humble and poor family.

Prof. Gilbert, of Chicago, in his *Student's Life of Paul* (1899), p. 9, partly agrees and partly disagrees with my view. He states clearly and rightly that "the fact that Paul learned a trade is not evidence that his family was

¹ *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 31.

poor"; but, on the other hand, he declares, "we cannot infer from the fact of citizenship that he [Paul's father] had at least moderate wealth,"¹ for "manumitted slaves were frequently presented with citizenship."

Amid these pointedly contradictory statements which is the ordinary reader to follow? No direct proof can here be given. Each statement is an inference from the general conception of Roman society and economic conditions which the respective writers have formed. In such circumstances the independently expressed opinion of acknowledged authorities on Roman social conditions may fairly be quoted in corroboration.

Prof. Gilbert can quote many corroborations from his predecessors. The same statements that he makes on this subject have appeared by a sort of hereditary right in book after book. Yet they are not in accordance with modern studies on society in the earlier Roman Empire. This would not be the place to formally discuss such a subject and quote proofs; but fortunately the opinion of the highest authority can be cited. At the special request of the editor of the *Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft*, Prof. Mommsen has written an article for the last number of that journal on the legal position and relations of the Apostle Paul.²

Prof. Mommsen begins by remarking that he has not much to say special or novel on the subject. "The jurist will, I hope, find the following discussion for the most part self-evident. But for the theologian an exposition of the kind may not be superfluous."

The present writer has been reproached for expecting that writers theological should be acquainted with the minutiae of Roman antiquities. But this is hardly a just reproach.

¹ The echo here implies probably that Prof. Gilbert is referring to and contradicting the statement quoted above from *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 31.

² *Die Rechtsverhältnisse des Apostels Paulus*, 1901, pp. 81-96.

No one expects scholars to be familiar with the minutiae of subjects outside of their own special department; and the writer is conscious of his own shortcomings in every subject. But what one is bound to criticize and blame is (1) the habit of making strong and dogmatic statements about what is possible or impossible as regards the social and political surroundings of early Christian history without sufficient study of the general life and society of that period; and (2) the too hasty drawing of inferences therefrom either unfavourable or favourable to the accuracy of ancient writers sacred or profane.

It was of course impossible for Prof. Mommsen to leave this special point unmentioned. He says: "That Paul, though a trained handicraftsman, belonged to a civilian family of good position, appears from the fact that he possessed the Roman citizenship from childhood; for only the prominent townsmen of the provinces were distinguished in this way."¹ In truth, "Roman citizens" everywhere formed a sort of local aristocracy in the cities of the East; and in the time of Augustus (when Paul was born) they were still few, and their distinction was all the more conspicuous. No one knew better than Augustus that this aristocratic position could not be maintained without money; and we may be sure that none were admitted to Roman citizenship except those who could support the rank. The fact that Paul's father was a Roman is absolute proof, to those at least who familiarize themselves with the facts of life in the eastern provinces before they make statements about the subject, that he was a man of conspicuous position in the great city in which he was so honoured.

It must be noticed that the Greek term for the Roman citizens who lived among them was never "Roman citizens," but simply "Romans" (*Ῥωμαῖοι*). Luke and Paul, as usual, are correct in this point: *Acts* xvi. 37, xxii. 26, 27. But

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 82.

the Greek abstract term for the Roman citizenship was "citizenship" (πολιτεία: the context indicating that the rights of the Greek city were not meant). Here again *Acts* is correct, xxii. 28. In many inscriptions of Greek cities, the Romans in the city are mentioned as a body distinct from the "citizens": most of them were, it is true, "citizens" of the Greek city where they lived, but the Roman rights were more honourable than the Greek and took precedence of them. One observes with some astonishment that often the citizens of the Greek city, in their own decrees, mention "the Romans" first and "the people" (i.e. the body of Greek citizens) second. Among a race so jealous and tenacious of their own rights, this fact alone speaks volumes for the dignity and rank of the Romans resident in a Greek city.

It is on the whole probable, and it seems to be generally assumed, that it was Paul's father, and not his grandfather, who had attained to the citizenship of Rome. That is, however, far from certain. It would be quite within the limits of reasonable and natural possibility that the citizenship came to the family through Julius Cæsar, who was at Tarsus in 47 B.C., or even through Pompey still earlier; both are known to have been favourably disposed towards the nation of the Jews, and Cæsar especially was very popular with them. If that were so, the distinction would have been bestowed in somewhat exceptional circumstances on a person who was eminent enough to have attracted the notice of those great Romans. Some governor of Cilicia might have given the honour for similar reasons.

The possibility must also be taken into consideration that the honour had been bought from some venal Republican governor. Antony, who resided in Tarsus for a time, was notoriously ready to sell anything to any one. If the citizenship was bought, the purchaser need not have been a very distinguished Tarsian; but he must at least have been

wealthy, able to pay a high price for a coveted honour, which would give him in time better opportunities and facilities for acquiring more money. Such a person must have had a clear conception of the worldly advantages conferred by the Roman citizenship, and been ready to pay the high price for something that he valued highly.

In any such case the person who acquired the citizenship would more probably be the grandfather than the father of Paul; and if that were so, any one who takes into consideration the facts of the situation will recognize how much influence this possession, for so long a period of the Roman franchise with its privileges and its duties, must have exercised on the family, and thus finally on Paul himself.

But it is, perhaps, more probable that the citizenship was bestowed in the ordinary course under the reign of Augustus on Paul's father; and that would be a sufficient proof that the father was a Tarsian citizen, not merely of very considerable wealth and importance, but also one who took an active part in the life of the city, and thus attained to the very highest position open to an energetic Tarsian.

The natural and reasonable inference from these circumstances, if fairly weighed, is that Paul was brought up in a family where the splendid opportunities that lay before a Roman Tarsian citizen were properly valued, and where therefore the children must have grown up familiar with those opportunities, and been educated accordingly.

Of course such general presumptions would have to give way, if clear proof were found in the recorded history that Paul had been brought up in the narrowest Jewish style, devoid of any acquaintance with Greek ways and unsuited for Greek society; and it has been maintained by many theologians that he was brought up in that ignorant, narrow, uncultured style, barely able to speak decent Greek. But, on the contrary, it is clear both from the *Acts* and from Paul's own letters that he could mix with ease in every kind

of Greek society, that metaphors and illustrations from the ordinary surroundings of Greek social life rose naturally to his lips and flowed from his pen, that he handled the language with the ease of a master, moulding it to express a new system of philosophy and morality with remarkable skill.

It is only through ignorance that some writers accuse Paul of inability to use the Greek language properly : he did not and could not write the language of Plato and Aristotle, but it shows deliberate blindness to restrict the circle of good Greek to the language of that older period. Paul used the Greek of the Tarsian schools and the Tarsian philosophers, and he employs it with perfect freedom and power. On the Greek spirit in Paul one need not do more than refer once again to the masterly essays of the two scholars who have made themselves authorities on the spirit of Greek society in the later period, Curtius, in his *Paulus in Athen*, and Canon Hicks, in his *St. Paul and Hellenism*.

The importance of this subject will be apparent when one remembers that Paul in his autobiography (*Gal.* i. 13, ii. 14) lays stress on his prenatal preparation for the work to which he was called : he speaks of God having chosen him out and set him apart even from his mother's womb.

Such is the naïve concrete way in which the ancient philosophy stated what we should express in more abstract terms, such as "that heredity and environment had determined his bent of mind, and that his family and early surroundings had been so arranged by an overruling power that he was made to be the person that should preach to the Gentiles."¹

Again, Prof. Gilbert's remark quoted above about manumitted slaves assumes as self evident that, if Paul's father were a freedman, he would probably and almost necessarily be poor. The learned Chicago professor is evidently thinking

¹ *Contemporary Review*, March, 1901, p. 381.

of the destitute condition of slaves set free in the nineteenth century, and assumes that Roman freedmen were in a similar condition.

On this subject nothing could be more apposite than to read the charming essay "Städtewesen in Italien im Ersten Jahrhundert," which forms a preface to Prof. L. Friedländer's translation of the *Supper of Trimalchio*, together with his whole commentary on the text. The learned author, whose life has been spent in studying specially the social condition of the early Roman Empire, is there writing about a novel written during St. Paul's lifetime, whose subject lies in the contemporary society of Roman country towns. One who reads the essay will learn—what every scholar who is familiar with Roman imperial life knows—that the freedmen formed one of the richest classes in the state. Slaves, as a rule, were manumitted because they were persons of such ability and character that they were more useful to their master as free than as slaves. Commonly they were clever, rising men, good traders, or men of distinction in some line by which they had attracted the attention of their master. Every scholar who lives much amid the literature of the Roman Empire is familiar with that stock subject, the contrast between the rich upstart freedman and the poor freeborn citizen of impoverished but self-respecting family—between the influence and standing of the former and the insignificance and humble position of the latter. Hence, even if Paul's father had been a freedman, that would be far from constituting any proof that he was poor.

But, further, it must be observed that St. Paul's father was not a freedman: he was a Tarsian citizen. Now, although Roman law granted Roman citizenship to a slave manumitted with the full and proper legal formalities by a master who was a Roman citizen, yet Greek law was never so generous and enlightened in that respect. A manumitted

slave in a Greek city did not acquire the citizenship, even though his master were a citizen.¹ He and his children and descendants remained always outside the citizenship, as one of a special class of resident non-citizens.

Probably we shall after a short time find that those who at present attempt to prove Paul's poverty by the supposition that his father was only a freedman will soon turn round and begin to argue that Paul was poor because he belonged to one of those impoverished old Roman families, whom the satirists of that period contrast with the rich freedmen's children!

W. M. RAMSAY.

CYRUS, THE LORD'S ANOINTED.

I.

HIS WIDER MISSION.

FEW things are more impressive, even in sacred literature, than the gradual unfolding in prophecy both of the wrath and of the lovingkindness of Jehovah. At first the doom or the salvation of Israel is described with vague grandeur in imagery borrowed from the phenomena of nature. The day of the Lord is "a day of clouds and thick darkness, as the dawn spread upon the mountains" (Joel ii. 2; comp. Zeph. i. 15, Amos v. 20). The restoration is prefigured by the similitude of the desert rejoicing and blossoming as the rose (Isa. xxxv. 1), or as light shining in darkness (Isa. ix. 2; comp. Zech. xiv. 6). Gradually the picture grows clearer and the prophet's eye discovers the wrath and forgiveness of God taking definite effect in the conquest and captivity

¹ An expression in footnote 4, pp. 82, 83, of Prof. Mommsen's paper above quoted might easily be misunderstood as implying the contrary. But in writing to him I mentioned this point, and am able to state on his authority that it would be a misunderstanding of his intention. It is only by accident that a sentence intended as a disclaimer is capable of being misunderstood in that way.

and the ultimate return of a people. (Comp. Zeph. i. 7 ff. with iii. 14 ff., Amos ii. 6 ff. with ix. 11 ff., Micah iii. 12 with iv. 1.) At length the nation's sins have come to a head, or the days of purification are accomplished. The time is at hand, and the prophet no longer speaks in ambiguous terms. The very instrument of vengeance or of salvation is named, and the advance of a Nebuchadrezzar or of a Cyrus is described in unmistakable language.

Very remarkable too is the distinct teaching of the prophets in regard to the meaning of history and the instrumental use of great conquerors: "I will raise up against you a nation, O house of Israel, saith the Lord the God of hosts; and they shall afflict you from the entering in of Hamath unto the river of the wilderness" (Amos vi. 2). In this light Nebuchadrezzar is "the servant" of the Lord (Jer. xxv. 11). Even though the cruelty and oppression of the Chaldean monarch passed all bounds of humanity, "making men as the fishes of the sea and as the creeping things that have no ruler over them," still the prophet concludes, "O Lord, Thou hast ordained them for judgment; and, O mighty God, Thou hast established them for correction" (Hab. i. 12, 14).

But the time came at length when Israel had "received double for all her sins" (Isa, xl. 2) and retribution reached the proud city which had misused its power, and, "as Babylon hath caused the slain of Israel to fall, so at Babylon shall fall the slain of all the land"¹ (Jer. li. 49).

It was this crisis of national history which called forth the most exultant notes of Hebrew prophecy. The deliverance from a long and cruel oppression was at hand, and no word of psalmist or prophet could adequately express the joy of the ransomed people: "When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion we were like unto them that dream.

¹ For an eloquent exposition of this principle in the case of the Assyrian oppression see Isaiah x. 5-19.

Then was our mouth filled with laughter and our tongue with singing" (Ps. cxxvi. 1, 2).

There was, however, even then one element of bitterness to some of the proud captive race in the thought that the instrument of Jehovah in this deliverance should be the prince of an alien people. It was to these critics of the Divine righteousness that the Prophet of the Exile administers the rebuke, which in its deep and eternal significance far transcends its immediate use: "Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker! a potsherd among the potsherds of the earth! Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands?" (Isa. xlvii. 9). See the application of this great principle in Romans ix. 20 foll. For the rest, the later prophecies in the book of Isaiah (and to these should be added the earlier chapters xiii. and xiv.) glow with the picture of the deliverance under Cyrus. To no hero of Israel even had a more glorious task been assigned; no one was so conspicuously to carry out the work of Jehovah, "though he knew it not," as Cyrus or Koresh, the Aryan king of Anzan. The armies of Cyrus are "the consecrated ones" of Jehovah, who Himself "mustereth the host for the battle from a far country." They are "the weapons of Divine indignation," and that the prophesied horrors of the siege of Babylon did not actually take effect was alone due to the humane character of the conqueror (Isa. xiii. 3-5, 15-18; comp. with citations from Chaldean tablets *infra*).

Again, the sublime message of the herald on the mountains of Sion, which we have almost ceased to associate with any other than the Lord Christ Himself, was in the first instance the gospel or *evangelium* of the deliverance by Cyrus: ἐπ' ὄρος ὑψηλὸν ἀνάβηθι ὁ εὐαγγελιζόμενος Σίων κ.τ.λ. (Isa. xl. 9 f.).

The mission of Cyrus is twofold, and the typical character of each mission is infinitely deepened and enriched by the

titles bestowed upon him and the consecration of his work by Jehovah Himself. The first and immediate mission was the restoration of the Jews from Babylon. "I am the Lord . . . that saith of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and shall perform all my pleasure: even saying of Jerusalem, She shall be built, and to the temple, Thy foundation shall be laid" (Isa. xlv. 28).

But while we recognize the fact that the chief motive which inspires the great prophet of the Return in these sublime chapters is to celebrate the work of "the shepherd of the Lord" in the restoration of the exiled Jews to the land of their fathers, and to point out the momentous character of that outwardly insignificant event in the Divine ordering of history, this ought not to blind us to that other fact, that a wider mission and a loftier title are assigned to Cyrus by the inspired writer. The mission of "the Lord's anointed," the Christ or Messiah of Jehovah, for widespread dominion had a far more extended effect on the civilization and the religion of the future than the return of the Jews from Babylon.

The foundation of the first Aryan Empire by Cyrus was one of the few great determining events in the history of the world, and one which in its remoter effects proved to be a necessary condition for the growth of the kingdom of Christ.

Speaking of this wider mission (Isa. xlv. 1-7), the prophet describes the advance of the great conqueror in words of inspired enthusiasm. Cyrus is the Christ or Messiah, whose right hand Jehovah holds, to subdue nations before him, to go before him and make the rugged places plain, to break in pieces the doors of brass and cut in sunder the bars of iron; to give him the treasures of darkness and hidden riches of secret places. So that where Cyrus is most closely typical of the greater Christ to come he is represented as the irresistible conqueror and the founder of an empire

which should, in some mysterious and unrevealed sense extending far beyond the deliverance of Judah, be for the sake of "Jacob the servant of Jehovah and Israel his chosen." What is most interesting for us to note here is not only the remarkable accuracy of the description in the swiftness of the advance of Cyrus and the ease with which his conquests were achieved, but also the recognition of a Divine guidance and ministry, so to speak, in his career, which are also traceable in the conception of Cyrus formed by the Greek and Chaldean historians. For the character, acts, and conquests of this great man form in a remarkable way the meeting point and common ground of three literatures.

The object of this paper, then, is to illustrate from Greek and Chaldean sources the larger mission of the Gentile king, whom the Hebrew prophet does not hesitate to designate as the Christ of Jehovah, to note the consensus with which, from different points of view, his mission is recognized as divinely inspired, and to point out how profoundly the singular beauty of his character and the gentleness of his policy impressed every nationality with which he came in contact.

The acts and events by which the first mission of Cyrus was accomplished are narrated at length in the later historical books of the Bible. For the details of the fulfilment of the larger mission we must have recourse to external records.

To these sources also we must go for a true conception of the character and disposition of Cyrus. For so entirely is the prophetic view concentrated on his work as the agent and instrument of Jehovah, that we are unable to gather from the Book of Isaiah or elsewhere in the Bible any direct evidence as to his individual character. One expression, indeed, has been thought to ascribe righteousness to Cyrus. In Isaiah xli. 2 the phrase occurs, "whom he calleth in righteousness to his foot." But righteousness must here

be regarded as the righteous purpose of Jehovah, and the expression would signify the appointment of Cyrus to carry out that Divine purpose by his achievements. And even if the reading in the margin of R.V., "whom righteousness calleth to its foot," and Cheyne's rendering, "whom righteousness calleth to follow him," be accepted, it is best both here and in the parallel passages (xlii. 6 and xlv. 13) to regard righteousness as equivalent to the purpose of Jehovah, and not as a quality attributed to Cyrus.

On the other hand, knowing as we do from other sources what the character of Cyrus really was, and how widely it was recognized, we find it difficult to believe that the Hebrew prophet was ignorant of a disposition which made this great conqueror worthy to bear the lofty titles bestowed upon him by Jehovah. If this view be correct, the titles and attributes by which Cyrus is addressed as "the shepherd of the Lord," "the servant of the Lord," "one raised up in righteousness," or "called in righteousness," "the man of Jehovah's counsel," and, above all, "the anointed of the Lord," must connote far more than agency or instrumentality. They are ascribed to one, the nobility and excellency of whose character are known to the inspired writer.

Another question of great interest has been raised in regard to an expression in those chapters. In Isaiah xli. 25 we read, "I have raised up one from the north, and he is come; from the rising of the sun one that calleth on my name."¹ Compare with this 2 Chronicles xxxvi. 25 and the parallel Ezra i. 2. Dr. Cheyne says: "It is evidently a prediction of a spiritual change to be wrought in Cyrus in consequence of his wonderful career—his conversion to the belief that Jehovah was the author of his success, the only true God." Dr. Skinner (*Cambridge Bible for Schools*) also says: "The expression can hardly mean less than that

¹ Cyrus is raised from the north as king of Media, which he had conquered; from the east as king of Anzan, a district of Elam, his original kingdom.

Cyrus shall acknowledge Jehovah as God. . . . It is true that in Ch. xlv. 1f. it is said that Cyrus had not known Jehovah, but it is also said (v. 3) that the effect of his remarkable successes will be 'that thou mayest know that I am Jehovah that calleth thee by thy name, even the God of Israel.' There is, therefore, no difficulty in the idea that Cyrus, who was at first the unconscious instrument of Jehovah's purpose, shall at length recognize that Jehovah was the true author of his success." On the other hand, Prof. G. A. Smith writes (vol. ii. p. 131): "Taken in apposition with the phrase, *he is come, 'calleth on my name'* may mean no more than that, answering to the instigation of Jehovah, and owning his impulse, Cyrus by his career proclaimed or celebrated Jehovah's name." The interpretation favoured by Cheyne and Skinner, which rests on the supposition that Cyrus was a monotheist, has, says Prof. Smith, "received a shock from the discovery of a proclamation of Cyrus after his entry into Babylon in which he invokes the names of Babylonian deities and calls himself 'their servant.'"

We shall refer to this proclamation again. Here it will suffice to say that the proclamations of Cyrus both at Babylon and in regard to Jerusalem are those of a wise and lenient conqueror who made it part of his policy to recognize the gods of a conquered country and to place himself under their protection. To imply a conversion of Cyrus either to Chaldean polytheism or to the Jehovah worship of the Jews would be to press unduly the words of either proclamation. At the same time to Cyrus, as a Persian and a monotheist, the religion of the Jews would have an attraction which the Babylonian cult could not possibly possess. And if the story be accepted, and there is no reason to doubt its truth, that this very prophecy which we are considering was shown to Cyrus,¹ the effect of it would certainly be great,

¹ Joseph. *Ant.* xi. 1, 2.

and sufficient to induce a very genuine acknowledgement of the power of Jehovah, which might seem not altogether irreconcilable with his former religious belief.

But what was that belief? According to Herodotus the religion of the Persians consisted in a worship of the elements, "the sun and moon, the earth, fire, water, and the winds" (i. 131). "There is no trace of dualism, not even any mention of Ormuzd. Conversely, in the inscriptions there is nothing elemental; but the worship of one supreme God under the name of Ormuzd, with perhaps an occasional mention of an evil principle" (*Rawlinson's Herodotus*, vol. i., Essay v.). These two systems of religion are quite distinct. The elemental worship described by Herodotus is not Persian or Aryan at all, but Magian, the religion of the Scythian tribes widely scattered over western Asia. This system was adopted by the Medes and became a source of corruption to the purer Zoroastrian dualism, the religion of Cyrus, and of the Persians from a remote antiquity.

There is, as we have seen, no detailed sketch of the career or of the character of Cyrus to be found in the Bible, though there is good reason for the belief that both were perfectly well known to the Hebrew prophets as they were to the Chaldean priests and to the Greek historians.

There are still several points of obscurity in his history to be cleared up, but the following brief outline of events will help to explain the hopes expressed for the future of Israel through the instrumentality of Cyrus.

In the year 555 B.C. the peace of the world appeared to be secured by the strong triple alliance of Cræsus, Nabonidus (Nabû-nâ-id) and Amasis, ruling over the three powerful empires of Lydia, Chaldea and Egypt. This alliance was strengthened by the ties of relationship between Cræsus and Astyages,¹ king, not of the Medes, as the Greek historians

¹ The historian Ctesias, however, denies the relationship. See Grote's *History of Greece*, iv. 218.

assert, but of the Manda or nomad Scythian tribes, whose capital was Ecbatana.¹

Suddenly danger arose from an unexpected quarter. Cyrus, or Koresh, a young prince of Persian descent belonging to the royal tribe of the Achæmenidæ, ruler of Anzan, a province of Elam—probably the level plain as opposed to the more mountainous district—gathered round him a body of Persian soldiers, whom he trained to a perfect state of discipline, and inspired with the ambition of conquest. The first blow was struck at Ecbatana and the Manda, whose king Astyages (Astuvigu of the monuments) had made himself unpopular by the severity of his rule. A disaffected party within the kingdom invited the assistance of Cyrus, which seems to be the substratum of truth in the romantic legend of Herodotus, and Cyrus laid the foundation of his power by the defeat of Astyages. The next step in the progress of the youthful conqueror was the accession of Media to his rule. The circumstances in which this conquest or acquisition was achieved are unknown. But it is clear that the peace or alliance was concluded on terms honourable to the Medes, as the latter take precedence of the Persians in historical narrative, and the Meder rather than the Persian was the name by which this formidable power became known to the Greek.²

The conquest of Lydia³ (554 B.C.) which followed was achieved by one of those swift strokes of generalship which characterize great military genius. The Lydian and Persian armies fought a bloody and indecisive battle on the plains of Pteria. Cræsus retired to Sardis intending to summon his allies and renew the contest in the spring, when Cyrus unexpectedly pursued, crossed the Halys and

¹ Prof. Sayce, art. "Cyrus" in *Hastings' Dict. of the Bible*. A different view is taken by Profs. C. P. Tiele and W. H. Koster in their art. on Cyrus in the *Encycl. Biblica*.

² In the LXX. of 2 Chron. xxxvi. 20 the "kingdom of the Persians" appears as βασιλείας Μηδίων.

³ *Rauclinson's Herodotus*, i. 77, note 2.

invaded Lydia. Sardis was captured by a strategem, and its immense wealth, "the treasures of darkness and the hidden riches of secret places," fell into the hands of the conqueror.

In 538 B.C. Babylon shared the fate of Sardis. Nabonidus, claiming descent from an ancient Babylonian dynasty, usurped the throne vacant by the death of Nebuchadrezzar (c. 555 B.C.). The defeat of the Manda by Cyrus is mentioned in the monuments as averting an invasion of Babylon.¹ But the youthful Persian monarch who had repelled this danger proved in turn a more formidable foe. His first invasion was unsuccessful in 545 B.C., but seven years afterwards Gobryas, the general of Cyrus, a Median, appeared before Sippara, fifty miles to the north-west of Babylon. Here Belshazzar (*Bêl-usarra-usur*) was stationed with the troops. But after a single battle the people of Accad rose in revolt against Nabonidus. On the fourteenth day Sippara fell without a blow. Babylon itself made no resistance. On the eleventh day Gobryas and the troops of Cyrus occupied the city. On the third day after Cyrus himself entered Babylon: "the walls fell down before him. Peace for the city he established; Cyrus to Babylon peace, to the whole of it spake."

This description illustrates the ease of conquest and good fortune—that *felicitas* which Cicero says always accompanies a great general—and also the clemency with which Cyrus used his conquests, and his characteristic love of peace.

In Babylon, as at Ecbatana and probably in Media, Cyrus found a considerable element of disaffection which smoothed his way to conquest. Nabonidus had provoked the anger of his people partly by the neglect of the great

¹ "Cyrus, his (Merodach's) young servant, with his few troops routed the numerous Umman-Manda folk." (Clay cylinder in the British Museum, No. 122.)

annual festival of the new year, and partly by his policy of concentrating the worship of the gods in Babylon and abolishing the local sanctuaries. Consequently Cyrus appeared as a deliverer and a champion of the outraged gods and their offended priesthood. In his proclamation he places himself under the protection of Merodach and other divinities and ascribes his victories to their power. In the clay cylinder containing the history of this conquest the success of Cyrus is attributed to the favour of Merodach: "He sought out an upright prince after his own heart, whom he took by his hand, Cyrus, king of the city of Anzan; he named his name . . . he joyfully beheld his good deeds and his upright heart"—language which possibly reminds us of Isaiah xlv. 1-4. In all this however we trace the action of a politic conqueror and not any serious recognition of the polytheism of Babylon.

At the same time it is interesting to note that the impression made upon the priests and scribes of Babylon resembles that which *mutatis mutandis* appears in the Hebrew prophetic literature. In each there is a sense of a divine mission and behind the incidents narrated there are traces of a personality marked by a wonderful attractiveness and power of conciliation, characteristics which it is not impossible to discern in the portrait sculpture of Cyrus found at Meshed-Murghab, the ancient Pasargada. The same recognition of a definite mission and of a gracious personality appears also in the literature of Greece, as we shall proceed to show. It is this triple acknowledgement of an inspired career and of a character pre-eminent at once for force of will and gentleness of disposition that gives a peculiar distinction to Cyrus among great conquerors and founders of empire, and is of special interest and importance in view of the position assigned to him in the furtherance of the Messianic hope.

ARTHUR CARR.

*A FURTHER NOTE ON THE USE OF ENOCH
IN 1 PETER.*

IN a recent number of the EXPOSITOR¹ I gave reasons for believing that there were traces of the use of the first chapter of Enoch in the first chapter of Peter, and that the allusion in the latter writing to prophets who had it revealed to them that their utterances were not for themselves but for those who should live long after them, was very nearly an extract from Enoch: in fact it only needed a slight change in a single word (*διευσοῦντο* for *διηκόνουν*) to make (a) the coincidence with Enoch indisputable, (b) the sequence of the argument in Peter perfect (*τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν* in 1 Peter i. 13 being connected with the emended word).

If this is correct, and I think it will be allowed that a very strong case has been made out for it, we may perhaps go a step further in our criticism of the extent to which Enoch was present in the mind and in the text of Peter. Recall for a moment the parallel case of the universally recognized use of Enoch in Jude: it is well known that Jude's actual quotation is not the only one in the Epistle, but that, before he betrays his favourite author by name, he has used him three or four times in allusions to the imprisoned angels and condemned stars. The use which Jude makes of his textbook suggests the inquiry (a) whether Peter does not employ Enoch elsewhere than in his first chapter, (b) whether he may not conceivably have actually mentioned him as Jude indisputably does and with great damage to his canonical reputation.

The first question is at once answered in the affirmative, for whatever may be the ultimate exegesis of the celebrated passage concerning the spirits in prison, it is commonly recognized that these imprisoned spirits are the angels

¹ EXPOSITOR for Sept. 1891.

who sinned with mortal women, for whose offence and its punishment the book of Enoch is our prime authority. The very language used in Enoch for their place of punishment—"This place is the prison of the angels" (Enoch xxi. 10)—is in close correspondence with the Petrine expression. Accordingly Mr. Charles, who is our latest and best exponent of Enoch, in tabulating the passages in the New Testament that show traces of its influence, gives the equation—

1 Peter iii. 19, 20 = Enoch x. 4, 5, 12, 13,

and a comparison of the passages will abundantly verify the use of the Apocalypse in question in the Epistle.

Mr. Charles also thinks that there is a trace of the use of Enoch in the Petrine language, "The time is come for judgment to begin at the house of God" (1 Pet. iv. 17), with which he compares Enoch i. 7, "There will be a judgment upon everything and upon all the righteous"; but this parallel is far less forcible than the allusions to imprisoned spirits and perhaps ought not to be pressed; and the objection also suggests itself that the writer is thinking of Ezekiel ix. 6 ("Begin at my sanctuary").

The second question mooted above relates to the possibility that in 1 Peter, as in Jude, the name of Enoch may have actually stood. Here again we may take our stand in the passage where, of all others, the influence of Enoch is most apparent, viz. the verse 1 Peter iii. 19 to which we have already been referring. The difficulties in the exegesis of the sentence

ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν κτέ

have often been regarded as insurmountable, nor are they, at first sight, lightened by the recognition that the language is based on that of Enoch. For how did Christ preach by the spirit to the fallen angels? and why are these singled out as visited in Hades, rather than the patriarchs and

prophets who appear in the conventional "harrowing of hell"? It is no wonder that with regard to the passage in question Luther declined to express any opinion and that, with regard to the doctrine supposed to be deduced from it, he affirmed that if one were ten times wiser than Solomon, he would fail to understand it and should therefore content himself with the simple words of the apostolic symbol of the faith.

But the suggestion presents itself to our mind that perhaps after all the difficulty really arises from the fact that the subject of the word ἐκήρυξεν has dropped out of the text, and that the real person who made proclamation to the spirits in prison is not Christ, but Enoch himself. Write the opening words of the sentence in the form

ΕΝΩΚΑΙ[ΕΝΩΧ]ΤΟΙCΕΝΦΥΛΑΚΗ . . .

and observe how easily the name of Enoch would drop out in copying. It is the simplest kind of error to drop repeated letters in this way, and hardly needs to be illustrated at all, but just for the sake of illustration it may be worth while to refer to a somewhat similar case where a name appears to have been *inserted* in the New Testament. If we turn to Mr. Lake's account of the uncial MS. Ψ in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (vol. i. p. 290), we shall find in Mark xiv. 47 the curious reading ἀρχιερέως [καίαφα] καὶ ἀφείλεν, where a name has either been coined by dittography, or else has been lost from all copies of Mark except the uncial in question. We suggest then that the name Ἐνώχ has dropped out of 1 Peter iii. 19.

It may be perhaps asked why we do not accept the somewhat simpler correction of altering ἐν ᾧ καὶ into καὶ Ἐνώχ. The answer is that the connecting formula ἐν ᾧ is characteristically Petrine and must not be interfered with: cf. 1 Pet. i. 6, ii. 12, iv. 4. We therefore retain it and simply insert the name of Enoch in the right place. When this correction is made, many of the exegetical

difficulties of the passage will disappear at once; we have no need, for instance, to treat ἐν ᾧ as a relative to a previous πνεύματι. It is simply an awkward introduction of a new sentence, as in 1 Peter iv. 4 (ἐν ᾧ ξενίζονται) and in other places, and we are not to look for an antecedent to the relative.

It remains to be seen whether Enoch did go and make any proclamation of doom to the fallen angels. The solution is in Enoch xii. as follows:

“And before all these things fell out Enoch was hidden, and no one of the children of men knew where he was hidden, and where he abode, and what had become of him. And all his activities had to do with the holy ones and with the watchers in his days. And I Enoch was blessing the great Lord and the King of the world, when lo! the watchers called me—Enoch the scribe—and spoke to me. ‘Enoch, thou scribe of righteousness, go, announce¹ to the watchers of the heaven who have abandoned the high heavens and have defiled themselves with women,’ etc. And Enoch went and said²—‘Azazel, thou shalt find no peace,’ etc.”

Surely we have here a sufficient basis for the statement of Peter, τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν. Moreover the superficial difficulty which suggests itself that Enoch could hardly have preached in the days of Noah disappears when we observe that the legation of Enoch is expressly said to be subsequent to his translation.

There are still some serious difficulties to be faced, and the explanation of the whole passage requires to be taken up again and argued in detail. For the present we limit ourselves to the two following theses:

(a) The name of Enoch has dropped out of the text in 1 Peter iii. 19.

(b) Many of the exegetical difficulties of the passage disappear when it is restored.

J. RENDEL HARRIS.

¹ Gr. πορεύου, εἶπε.

² Gr. Ὁ δὲ Ἐνώχ τῷ Ἀζάηλ πορευθεὶς εἶπεν.

*PROFESSOR HARNACK ON OUR LORD'S
RESURRECTION.*

THE recently translated lectures¹ of Dr. Harnack on the Essence of Christianity have excited profound interest in this country and in America, partly because of the remarkable position the author holds as an authority in the world of theological scholarship, and partly because his discussions touch and offer judgments upon almost every disputed point in the origin and history of the Christian faith. All students and teachers of religion owe an immense debt of gratitude to one who has with justice been called "the Mommsen of contemporary theology." His researches in early Church history, and his application of scientific methods to the rise and development of doctrine, have led to a modification in traditional opinion, and have opened up fresh and promising fields of inquiry. His calling as a specialist of the first rank gives a more than ordinary significance to his words, when he leaves "the recondite learning" and "scholarly folios" of the academy and aims at giving "a short and plain statement of the gospel" to the man in the street. Many who admire Dr. Harnack most, and have been stimulated alike by his spoken and written word, will deeply regret to find him here committing himself to views which seem to them reactionary, and incapable of satisfying their religious and reflective needs. And their regret is all the deeper when they see parties of a purely negative tendency, shelter themselves behind his honoured name, and exploit his reputation in the interests of a merely critical rationalism. One thing is clear: if the essence of Christianity, as Dr. Harnack believes, allows us no longer to speak of Christ as in a unique and unparalleled sense the Son of God, or of his life and death as the ground of our redemp-

¹ The passages cited are from the translation under the title: *What is Christianity?* by T. B. Saunders. The references to the German are in brackets.

tion, or of His resurrection as a genuine fact of history, then the Church from the days of the Apostles has been mistaken, and the gospel which it preaches is not the actual message which Jesus brought into the world, but one substituted for it woven out of the fears and hopes and fancies of men. This is a conclusion which should give us pause. Ere we accept it, a careful examination of the author's premisses, and of the presuppositions that lie behind his handling of the evidence, would seem to be a necessity.

We turn, then, with special interest to Dr. Harnack's treatment of what we are accustomed to consider one of the unshakable bases of Christianity—the resurrection of Christ from the dead. We do not indeed to-day conceive this event in the unspiritual and external way of Paley and his “twelve men of known probity,” but we feel that, as Ritschl remarks, “we would give up the whole Christian conception of things, if we gave up this key to our religious standpoint with the argument that the restoration of a dead man to life would contradict natural law.”¹ Every historian of religion has to face the problem: Can the belief of the first Christian age that Christ rose from the dead be explained naturally without the acceptance of the objective reality of the resurrection? Let us see how Dr. Harnack solves the problem. In accordance with his acknowledged purpose to separate the “kernel” from the “husk” in Christianity, he distinguishes between the “Easter faith,” which is the “kernel,” and the “Easter message,” which is the “husk.” We were accustomed to think that the distinction between the Easter message and the Easter faith lay in this, that it was through the former that the latter was called forth. The belief in the resurrection was evoked by the testimony that on Easter morning the grave was found empty, and that Jesus showed Himself alive by “many infallible proofs” to his disciples. This is not Dr.

¹ Quoted by Ecke in his *Die Theologische Schule Albrecht Ritschls*, p. 198.

Harnack's view. On the contrary, he proposes to show how the Apostles gained the "Easter faith," that is, "the conviction that Jesus Christ passed through death," that "He lives as the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep";¹ while at the same time the record of the historical manifestations of the victory of Christ over death may be set aside as so much poetry and legend. In other words, the apostolic conviction was valid, but the apostolic testimony was invalid.

"The Easter message," he says, "tells us of that wonderful event in Joseph of Arimathæa's garden, which, however, no eye saw; it tells us of the empty grave into which a few women and disciples looked; of the appearance of the Lord in a transfigured form—so glorified that His own could not immediately recognize Him; it soon begins to tell us, too, of what the risen one said and did. The reports became more and more complete, and more and more confident."²

It is clear that Dr. Harnack does not believe that on the third day the grave was really empty. Yet one of the extreme radical school lays it down that "the point of departure in every discussion touching the resurrection of Jesus is the material fact that on the morning of the Sunday which followed the crucifixion, the tomb in which His body had been laid was found empty."³ And in this judgment a brilliant English disciple of Dr. Harnack agrees,⁴ and is forced to add: "In my opinion the empty grave offers us a problem which objective history can never solve." The German historian, however, does not resign himself to this agnostic despair of history, but offers us an explanation. The theory would seem to amount to this: A few women and disciples "glanced into" (*hineingeblickt*) the grave and believed mistakenly that it was empty, though no one had seen

¹ p. 163 (102)

² p. 161 (101).

³ A. Reville, *Jesus de Nazareth*, vol. ii. p. 453.

⁴ Dr. Percy Gardner: *Exploratio Evangelica*, p. 255.

Christ's body leave its resting-place. This mistake would naturally give rise to a belief that He was risen, and this belief would soon embody itself in visions which in turn would react on the belief, making it more intense and certain, and giving to it an apparent foundation. Hence the empty grave gradually lost its significance for the disciples: what was all-important for them as for St. Paul was "not the state in which the grave was found, but Christ's appearances."¹

Now we may pass by the Renan-like touch about "the women" as unsatisfactory witnesses of the empty grave, inasmuch as Dr. Harnack himself admits that some of the disciples themselves shared the responsibility for the report. But our earliest source tells us that the first visitors to the grave "entered in,"² not merely "glanced in"; and St. Luke, whose source for the closing sections of his narrative is an admittedly good one, tells us that the Apostles treated the report of the women as "idle tales," and that certain of the disciples "went to the sepulchre and found it even so as the women had said."³

The disciples did not come to the grave expecting to find it empty: they came to prove the truth or falsity of what had been told them by the women. This certainly makes against the notion of a blunder in observation. Again, Dr. Harnack's repetition of Strauss's objection that the resurrection had no eyewitness is somewhat unfortunate, for it is capable of being turned against the theory that legend had much to do with the apostolic belief. The contrast between the silence of all the Gospels as to the actual condition or mode of the resurrection, and the attempt of the apocryphal Gospel of Peter to describe it, shows that in the former we are dealing with serious history. If the tradition of the empty tomb had a purely legendary origin, then might we not expect that the sober limits of the Gospel narratives

¹ p. 161 (102).² St. Mark xvi. 5.³ Chap. xxiv. 22.

would be overstepped, and a highly coloured and popularly striking account be given of the actual emergence from the tomb of death's Conqueror? Once more: as to the waning importance attached to the empty grave in the Apostolic witness, it is worth noting that the appearances of Jesus which, according to Dr. Harnack, were the all-important thing for St. Paul and the early disciples, necessarily implied that His body had left the tomb. On the contrary supposition, it would follow either that He assumed a new body or continued to exist as a disembodied ghost—and either alternative is inconsistent with our sources. That St. Paul shared the belief of the first disciples in the empty grave is certain—is proved, first, by the statement which he had “received” that “Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and *that He was buried*, and that He rose again *the third day* according to the Scriptures”;¹ and secondly, by his whole argument for a bodily resurrection at the last day as guaranteed by the resurrection of Christ. And in emphasizing Christ's manifestations he at the same time, by implication, emphasized the fact of the vacant tomb. But how does Dr. Harnack deal with St. Paul's account of the appearance to him of the Risen One? “Paul,” we are told, “based his Easter faith upon the certainty that the ‘Second Adam’ was from heaven, and upon his experience, on the way to Damascus, of God revealing His Son to him as still alive. God, he said, revealed Him ‘in me’; but this inner revelation was coupled with a vision overwhelming as vision never was afterwards.”² Now it would be truer to the thought of the Apostle to say that he based his certainty that the second Adam was from heaven on his Easter faith, and not, as Harnack will have it, the reverse. For St. Paul starts with the conception of Christ as risen and glorified, therefore as One exalted to Messianic sovereignty. His death, then, was not the death of a sinner

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4.

² p. 161 (102).

whom the grave could have held as its rightful prey, but the vicarious death of a sinless Mediator which had a quite cosmical significance, and constituted the ground of our redemption and reconciliation. But what must these facts demand save that a person holding such relations to God and to man should have His ultimate origin, so to say, in the fundamental realities of the universe, in the timeless being of God? It was the light shed by the glory of the Risen One, that for the Apostle seemed to make clear the mystery of His person. Nor can we accept Dr. Harnack's view that St. Paul's vision of the risen Christ was of the same order as his later ones, differing only in its greater intensity. For the Apostle makes it one of a series of appearances¹ to which the highest objectivity is attached. "And last of all He was seen of me also as of one untimely born"—words which imply, as has been said, "on the one hand that he conceived the appearance to himself to have been like the rest constituting the series; and on the other hand that the series itself was not an unbroken one distributed evenly over the considerable period between the Passion and his own conversion."² As has already been indicated, St. Paul gained a conviction of the saving efficacy of Christ's death through the knowledge not merely that Jesus lived on after death, but that he was the Risen One who, because He bore a burden not His own, could not remain in the power of the grave. The revelation of the Divine Sonship of the Messiah was mediated by the appearance of the Messiah as risen. Of course Dr. Harnack objects to the validity of the appearances that "a clear account of them cannot be constructed out of the stories told by Paul and the Evangelists."³

Here again the argument is double-edged. For had there been no discrepancies there would be reason for believing

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 5-8.

² J. V. Bartlett: *The Apostolic Age*, p. 5.

³ p. 162 (102).

that we were dealing not with a transcript from experience but with an artificially harmonized and concocted narrative. It may be frankly admitted that there are difficulties which are, perhaps, insoluble as to the order of the appearances and the scene of their occurrence. But all the more certain does the fact stand that the Apostles believed they had seen Him, and through this belief became sure of God and of eternal life, and were prepared to yield their lives in defence of this faith. It is idle to demand a clear account of something which in part belongs to the unseen order that transcends experience. Thus the contradictory phenomena which the documents reveal are a proof rather than a refutation of their historical fidelity.

Having thus disposed of the Easter message, Dr. Harnack would have us still hold to the Easter faith, and claims the New Testament on his side in so doing. "The story of Thomas is told for the exclusive purpose¹ of impressing upon us that we must hold the Easter faith even without the Easter message: 'Blessed are they that have not seen yet have believed.' The disciples on the road to Emmaus were blamed for not believing in the resurrection even though the Easter message had not yet reached them. The Lord is a Spirit, says Paul: this carries with it the certainty of His resurrection."² All this will prove to most readers that a man may be a brilliant historian and yet a very indifferent exegete. We note, first of all, what seems to be a strange confusion of ideas. For the history tells us that St. Thomas had heard the Easter message. "But Thomas, one of the twelve called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came. The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the Lord."³ What our Lord

¹ "Singulière exegèse! Car enfin qui ne croirait que saint Jean avait pour but dans ce récit de fournir le témoignage précis d'un homme d'abord peu disposé à croire à la réalité corporelle de la resurrection?"—M. Lagrange in *Revue Biblique Internationale*, January, 1901, p. 113.

² p. 160 (101).

³ John xx 24.

reproaches him with is not his refusal to believe, even though he had not received the Easter message, for, as a matter of fact, he had received the message, but his refusal to believe the message on the testimony of others. In other words, when our Lord says, "Blessed are they that have not seen yet have believed," He does not demand the Easter faith in the absence of the Easter message, but He does demand belief in the Risen One where physical tests are no longer available, and He implies that a special blessedness accompanies such a belief. If St. Thomas had accepted the Easter tidings as corroboration of a faith born of his intercourse with Jesus during His earthly ministry, then the painful state of spiritual confusion, the inner turmoil of a soul not at peace, would have been impossible. Such an acceptance would have shown his sensitiveness to "the link of the seen and the unseen orders." The same thing is true to-day. We do not believe in Christ's resurrection simply because others have reported it, but because our knowledge of Him in the gospel story, and our experience of Him as a saving and redeeming power, recognize in the resurrection, when the message of it comes to us, the fitting crown and climax of His career. The faith within us that such an One could not be holden of death presses forward to welcome and rejoice in the external witness of history.

Once more : as to the disciples on the road to Emmaus, they were *not* "blamed for not believing in the resurrection, even though the Easter message had not yet reached them," but for failing to believe the Easter message which *had* reached them, interpreted, as it ought to have been, in the light of Old Testament prophecy. They had heard of the empty tomb, but the crucifixion had obscured everything, so darkened their whole inward world that the tidings could evoke no response. Their hope that He was the Messiah was wellnigh quenched by the tragedy of the Cross. Their Messianic programme, in spite of all that

Jesus had told them, had no room for suffering crowned by a shameful and ignominious death. Hence the task of the stranger was to lead them to a revision of that programme in accordance with a spiritual view of the Old Testament Scriptures which would find in the Cross not the defeat of the Divine purpose, but rather its glorious accomplishment. And so hope revived and faith was born anew. The lesson for us would seem to be not that we should have the Easter faith in the absence of the Easter message, but that the message should awaken and confirm a faith produced by the Divine revelation in the history of humanity, and more particularly in that of ancient Israel.

Perhaps the arbitrariness of Dr. Harnack's exegetical methods appears nowhere more marked than in his bold identification of the Lord and the Spirit on the basis of 2 Corinthians iii. 17. "Der Herr ist der Geist, sagt Paulus, und in diese Gewissheit war seine Auferweckung mit eingeschlossen." But the many passages in which Christ and the Spirit are distinguished—and there is a notable one at the end of this very Epistle—suffice to bar out the identification here assumed. The Apostle does not say, "The Lord is a Spirit," but "the Lord is *the* Spirit." That is to say, for the purpose which St. Paul has in hand, that namely of showing how, when the heart turns to Christ, the Spirit enters into it and dwells there, the influence of Christ and the influence of the Spirit may be spoken of as synonymous. In other words, we are not here dealing with any depositions as to the *person* of our Lord. It is the nature of His *influence* in the hearts of believing men that is under discussion. That influence is spiritual, persuasive, and makes its appeal to the springs of our inner life, in contrast with the influence of the older order, which was legal, coercive and externally binding. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."¹ What is this Spirit? It is the Lord Himself,

¹ 2 Cor. iii. 6.

whose Spirit is a Spirit of liberty. Thus with the fall of Dr. Harnack's exegesis there falls also his claim that St. Paul is his ally in the advocacy of a merely spiritual resurrection.

As one reviews Dr. Harnack's discussion of the evidence for the Easter message, he cannot help asking what is the presupposition which lies behind the historian's handling of the sources? The answer is found in the statement that "we must either decide to rest our belief on a foundation unstable and always exposed to fresh doubts, or else we must abandon this foundation altogether, and with it *the miraculous appeal to our senses.*"¹ This means that the evidence is approached with an unjustified metaphysical assumption. And how does this mode of procedure agree with the repeated assurances that the subject is approached in a purely "historical" spirit? The historian as such cannot say *a priori* what can or what cannot happen. The moment he does so he exchanges his role for that of the philosopher—without, however, submitting to the task of justifying his philosophic conviction. The terms "miracle," "order of nature," "supernatural" are really question-begging ones, and do not advance us a step toward a true and satisfying view of the universe. An unreasoned conviction does not help us here at all; while it is certain to bias us in our treatment of historical matters.

So far the Easter message.

If Dr. Harnack's words up to this point have been chilling and depressing, nothing can exceed the enthusiasm and glow of spiritual feeling when He comes to speak of the Easter faith. That faith is the conviction "that the Crucified One gained a victory over death; that God is just and powerful; that He who is the firstborn among many

¹ p. 162 (102); cp. p. 26 (12). "We are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such thing as miracles."

brethren still lives.”¹ And again: “This grave was the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death is vanquished and that there is a life eternal.”² And yet again: “Jesus Christ has passed through death, God has awakened Him, and raised Him to life and glory.”³

What precisely does this mean? Not of course that Christ rose from the dead in the sense accepted by the New Testament writers, for “interruptions of the order of nature do not happen,” but in the sense that Christ achieved an inward victory over death in virtue of some “divine power” which enabled Him to “encounter” that order in “such a way that everything was for the best.” The idea is that Christ submitted to death as part of His vocation, and in virtue of His confidence and hope in God gained an inward triumph over it and thus robbed it of its terrors. This is true, but does not seem quite to the point. For this victory was achieved not on Easter Day, but in the instant and article of dying, when with His last breath He said, “Father, into Thy hands I command My spirit.” But how is this conquest of the last enemy to take its place amid historical realities so as to endue men with the conviction of eternal life if it remained a secret transaction within the soul of the Redeemer, known only to Himself and the Father? How could the disciples be certain that Jesus had passed unscathed through death, if all historical manifestations of that stupendous achievement had been wanting? Dr. Harnack replies, “By the vision of Jesus’ life and death, and by the feeling of His imperishable union with God.” But the answer bears all the marks of modern reflection, and is out of harmony with what we know to be the disciples’ state of mind after their Master’s execution. A philosophic thinker of our own time might indeed assure himself that the spiritual might of Christ could not be broken by a fact in the physical order, but in attributing

¹ p. 161 (101).² p. 162 (101).³ p. 163 (102).

such a conception to the disciples in the first century are we not really reading into their depositions our own ideas? For what was their mental attitude after the crucifixion? A clue is found in the utterance of the two disciples on the journey to Emmaus: "Jesus of Nazereth, which was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people . . . But we trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel: and beside all this to-day is the third day since these things were done."¹ It is clear then that the disciples did not expect His death, or if they did, their thought was that He would enter the heavenly world and come forth immediately as the victorious Messiah. Hence they did not look for His resurrection. What they anticipated was His return in glory to set up His kingdom visibly in the world. For the Christ was a "prophet"; but, as Beyschlag remarks, "They thought the Messiah was concealed under the prophet garb, and that some day He would assume His kingly functions."² And now the Cross had paralysed that hope, and made an end of their theocratic dreams. If then they had no evidence that He rose again, how could they have gained their Easter faith, and in the strength of it have faced a hostile world? The Cross had not for them as it has for us a halo of glory. It was the sign of all that was unspeakably terrible in human experience, of a curse so awful that God Himself seemed impotent to remove it. Too sadly clear was it that Calvary could afford no hope that He who died there had won His way to eternal life. He had been a "prophet" indeed—that faith had survived the universal wreck; but as for His Messiahship it was a noble dream rudely scattered by the ruthless forces of man's crime and passion. What was it that transformed the climate of their souls, endued them with a joyous and unshakable confidence, and nerved them to

¹ Luke xxiv. 19, 21.

² *New Testament Theology*, vol. ii. pp. 303, 304, Eng. trans.

martyrdom? There is no evading that problem, unless we are prepared to give up the origin of the Christian faith as absolutely insoluble.

We can all agree with Dr. Harnack when he says: "This grave was the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death is vanquished, that there is a life eternal." But could that "indestructible belief" have originated in a grave where lay mouldering the body of Jesus? Was it not because the grave was empty on the one hand, and because the Lord manifested Himself on the other hand, that the Easter faith was born? Nay, were the Church to-day convinced that she has made an age-long blunder, that

Now He is dead. Far hence He lies
In the lone Syrian town,
And on His grave with shining eyes
The Syrian stars look down,

where would be her certainty of eternal life? What message would be hers beyond what Plato and the religions of Persia, and later Judaism have delivered to the world? If Christ did not rise again, then, so far as immortality is concerned, we are precisely where we were before His advent. And that means that anxious and sorely questioned hope we may have, but certainty we cannot have. What connexion is there, on Dr. Harnack's showing, between Christ's immortality and ours? None, so far as we can see. For Christ's immortality depended, we are told, on His imperishable union with God, preserved in life and in death. Be it so; but where is the link between sinful humanity and Christ so that His immortality guarantees ours? The race through moral evil is alienated from God, does not stand in union with Him, and is therefore "without hope in the world." Nor can Christ help men here. The most He can do is to achieve immortality for Himself. He stands apart from us on the shining heights of goodness:

His life and death serve only to throw into relief our guilt and shame : His entrance into glory but gives us a glimpse into the Paradise from which we are shut out for ever.

Dr. Harnack calls his critical method the sundering of kernel and husk. Strauss warned the adherents of this method in his day of the danger attending their craft of "emptying out the child with the bath." The warning is still needed.

S. McCOMB.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

IX.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PRAYER.

WHAT has been the most prominent product of organic development? It is a question not of philosophy, not of metaphysics, not of speculation, but of simple fact. And yet it is probable that, if such a question were proposed to a public school, no two of the examination papers would agree in the answer. Of course there would be universal agreement as to the general trend of the development ; all would admit it was the working out of a *mental* process. But when the answers dealt with details, when they came to state what *phase* of mind is that which has most widened its borders, the diversity of view would appear. Let me look at one or two of the hypothetical answers.

Some would say that the manifestations of mind had increased in *wonderfulness*. I do not think they have. So far as mere *wonderfulness* is concerned, I do not think reason has any advantage over instinct. Nay, if we keep to the range of marvel, the latter has the pre-eminence. I once heard the criticism passed on a public orator, "He speaks above his talent." Is not this just the criticism

we pass upon the lower creation as a whole. We have the impression that it speaks "above its talent"—manifests an effect which its own power is not adequate to explain. This is the phenomenon which all animal instinct presents to the human eye, and it must remain a source of permanent wonder. However marvellous be the spectacle of an intelligence using means to compass a definite end, there is a spectacle which I have always felt to be more marvellous still—that of a living being who has attained the achievement of an end *without* the aid of what men call intelligence.

Others, again, would say that the manifestations of mind had increased in *variety*. And here, also, I am doubtful. It is quite true that, if you measure the human mind over against the mind of any single animal, you will get a startling transition from monotony to variety. But if you weigh the human mind, not over against any *single* animal, but over against the whole animal world, your increase of variety will, I think, disappear. Is there not as much variety in the sphere of animal instinct as in the sphere of human intelligence? There is a great difference, no doubt, between the genius of the poet, and the genius of the philosopher. But is there not as much difference between the genius of the bee and the genius of the spider. Each is great in its own occupation; each would be imbecile if transferred to the other's occupation. The bee could never make a web; the spider could never make a cell. I would say, that there is a greater bond of unity between the different manifestations of human intelligence than between the different manifestations of animal instinct. The names "animal world," "lower creation," "order of instinct," are words which cover a multitude of islands in the sea of life— islands separate, incommunicable, divided by a gulf as wide as that which severed the home of Lazarus from the latest abode of Dives. I do not think, therefore, that the second

answer has come any nearer than the first to a solution of the problem. I do not think that the increase of variety, any more than the increase of marvellousness, has been the distinctive note of organic development. The manifold aspects of the vital principle are nowhere more abundantly illustrated than in the life of the animal creation.

But I come now to consider a third answer which might be returned to my question. It might be said, the most prominent product of organic development is an increasing sense of *want*. It would be at first sight a startling answer, it would suggest the paradox that things get weaker as they grow; my earliest impulse would be to *reject* this examination paper. By and by I should ask if I were not under a false alarm. I should begin to question myself thus: "Is an increasing sense of want really an increase of weakness! Is it not rather a symptom of strength! Can conscious mental want come from anything but a taste of the desired object! How can a soul feel its incapacity except by being enlarged! Is not the sense of ignorance the result of knowledge! Is not the consciousness of sin the shadow of purity passing by! If there be an upward development in the evolution of life, how could it better manifest itself than by revealing at each step an increasing pressure of want!

Having cleared away this preliminary prejudice, I should then, ask what do we find? And here there would break on me a remarkable fact. At the top of the evolution line—so far as hitherto it has advanced—there stands an organism which is distinguished from all its ancestors by the amount of its unsatisfiedness. The thought is far from new. It was expressed some twenty-five centuries ago by a poet of the race of Israel, "Behold the sparrow hath a house, and the swallow a nest for herself; but my soul longeth, fainteth!" It may be safely said that, had this poet lived and sung in our day, his sense of Man's comparative unsatisfiedness would have been increased rather than

diminished. The sense of human want has deepened with human culture. It may be true that the ages of animal life are ages of greater struggle ; but the struggle arises from the fact that there is actually waiting for the life that shall win it a supply of all its needs. Man, on the other hand, has come to the conclusion that what he seeks is not to be got by struggle—not to be found outside of him at all. His is an inner want—a want which would not be met by any success in physical struggle or any longevity in physical survival. It lies below sense and the objects of sense. It is capable of coexisting in the midst of outward luxury, in the heart of earth's music and dancing, in the enjoyment of fame and power. The struggles of *Man* are undertaken rather to hide this want than to conquer it.

Now this is a fact of science, of evolutionary science. It has its correlate in the brain ; it could be described in terms of matter and force. If we describe it in terms of consciousness, it is because consciousness is nearer to us than the movements of the brain. What, then, is the scientific value of this consciousness—this feeling of want ? It is that the Instinct of Prayer—that instinct which of all others is supposed to be at variance with the laws of Nature—has been the final issue of that great march of development which has marked the epoch of organic life. The evolution of the earthly system has in its last result been an evolution of the sense of need, an unfolding of the feeling of emptiness. To this goal the ages have been climbing, to this point the powers of Nature have been tending. All the struggles for possession, all the strife for survival, all the efforts to secure the prize of natural selection, have resulted in a product of the tree of life whose distinctive feature is the multiplicity of its unsatisfied desires.

There is then a place for prayer in the order of science—a point in which it conserves the development of the

organism. What is that place? What is that precise door in the Temple of Evolution which answers to the act of prayer in the Temple of God? This is the question and the only question with which I am concerned. Other points may be left to the theologian, to the religious teacher, to the man of Christian experience. But the point with which *we* have to do is the discovery of a place for prayer in Nature, the determination of that particular end which it serves in the economy of human evolution.

If I were asked, then, to define the province of prayer in a scientific order, I should say, It is the premonitory symptom of a larger life. We shall best see this by fixing our attention on the *elementary* stage of prayer. Its first form in the heart is a dumb sense of need. In that day it asks for nothing, cries for nothing. There is abundance of *unsatisfiedness*, but not yet *dissatisfiedness*. These do not mean the same. To be *dissatisfied* is to murmur against something; to be *unsatisfied* is simply to murmur without knowing what is wrong. This latter is the earliest form of prayer. Strictly speaking, it is prayer *without* a form. It is a simple state of unrest. It is a feeling of want which cannot be localized, specialized, described in any way. There is no definite complaint; there is simply an indefinite complaining. There is no appeal to any one; there is just a cry into the air. This is what I would call the germ-cell of the life of supplication. It is not limited to infancy. Elementary as it is, it will be found in thousands of adult lives. It often takes the form of that feeling for which the Briton has no word but which the French call *ennui*—a nameless and unaccountable inability to reproduce the glow of things that once made us glad.

Now whether it appears in infancy or in adult life, I say that this germ-cell of prayer is the premonitory symptom of a higher stage of evolution. It originates in the fact that a few grains of the gold to be inherited in the promised land

have already been wafted into the wilderness. So far from being a rising of the individual against the law of Nature prayer is the law of Nature prompting the individual to rise. Take the cry of physical pain. That is a prayer—whether it be uttered to God or Man; it is the protest of the human body against a particular phase of its environment. But by whom is the protest made? Is it the cry of an unruly member against the government of natural law? No, it is the government of natural law protesting against the conduct of an unruly member. That form of prayer which we call the cry of physical pain is not the invention of the sufferer; it is dictated to the sufferer. It is dictated by the law of Nature itself. When a part of my body is hurt, I am prompted to cry by the part which is whole; the prayer which seems to be uttered by a cut finger is really dictated by the brain. Disease and the pain of disease have not the same origin. Disease is that which interferes with the function of the organism; pain—the act of appeal—is the protest of the organism against the interference. The appeal of prayer is put into the heart of the individual, not by his own rebellious instinct, but by the constitutional government of Nature. It is intended to prevent the disease from running its course to a fatal issue. Its function is remedial. It is the telegram of Nature announcing that there is something wrong in one of its provinces and that things ought to be put right.

I cannot but, in passing, direct attention to the remarkable similarity between this statement of the case from the side of science and the statement made by Paul from the side of Christianity. Speaking of that phase of unrest which I have called the germ-cell of prayer, the Apostle says, “The Spirit helpeth our infirmity; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.” You will observe here that the cry of spiritual

pain is said to be prompted by the *Divine Spirit*. Let me try to paraphrase Paul's words: "You and I have an infirmity—the infirmity of ignorance. We are by nature unconscious of the disease that is preying upon us. By no effort of mere *reason* could we ever come to the knowledge that we are the victims of a serious malady which, if not arrested, must end in death. But, to meet this ignorance, the *Divine Spirit* has created within us a great unrest. Ere yet we have any words in which to clothe a prayer, ere ever we can formulate the nature of our need, there has come to us a sense of want for which we have no name, but which is accepted in room of a petition. The higher law of Nature has wakened within us a sense of dissatisfaction with the lower—a discomfort which, while it has no expression but a wordless groan, is yet a promise from the Father."

Nothing can exceed the scientific character of this statement by Paul. It never occurs to him to regard Christian prayer as an attempt of the worshipper to alter the law of Nature, or, as he called it, the Will of God. This, indeed, is the distinctive feature of Christian prayer—its conformity to the *Divine Will*. It is professedly the *inspiration* of aspiration. It is not in the first instance an appeal from Man to God; it is an appeal from God to Man. It is not originally the creature asking something of the Creator; it is the Creator telling the creature what to ask. It is not primarily a message from earth to heaven; it is a message from heaven to earth. "Teach us to pray" are the words of the disciples to the Master; and they are the keynote of a refrain which has never varied. Every Christian disciple has looked upon his prayer as a prompting from heaven. He has regarded it as a *Divine intimation*, as a prophecy of the purpose of God. "Whatsoever things ye have need of, believe that ye receive them, and ye *have* received them." What do these words mean

if not this, that need is prophetic of its own satisfaction. You will observe, however, it is the *need* that is prophetic—not necessarily the asking. A man's need does not always—I had almost said, does not often—correspond to his asking. Many a soul prays for outward change when the thing it needs is inward rest. Not the wish but the want, not the desire but the deficiency, not the craving but the crudeness, is the ground of my premonition. The wish may be only a symptom, and it may change to-morrow for another symptom; but the want is the disease, and to the want belongs the promise.

And now I come to a crucial question—a question which is supposed to press with special discomfort on the present age. Is it scientifically possible that Nature should respond to the needs of one of its members? The religious mind would put the question in four words, Can God answer prayer? But we have no right to assume that the religious mind is the questioner. It is no longer alone in the temple of God that men inquire. It is no longer merely within the sanctuary that we seek the solution of mysteries. Like the patriarch of old we have stood under the stars of heaven and said, "*This* is none other than the house of God!" We have proposed to bring everything within the test of the visible, to judge all things by their conformity to natural law. Accordingly, I have put the question in the language of the twentieth century. Looking upon Nature as a vitalized organism, and considering men and women as individual members of that organism, I ask, Is it scientifically possible to believe that the conscious need, or prayer, of one of these members should receive an answer from the organic life of Nature?

And the reply I should give is this, It *must* be scientifically possible since, under scientific conditions, it happens every day. As a matter of simple fact, there is conducted by the physical forces a process by which the needs of dilapidated

members are signalled to and answered by the sound part of the organism. Have you ever considered in terms of science the phenomenon called human benevolence? Of course we all know how to describe it in terms of feeling. From that side it seems a most *unscientific* process. I am suffering hunger; I utter a cry of pain; you overhear that cry and send me succour. To a man who witnessed the phenomenon for the first time it would have all the mystery that the shooting of a man by a pistol had to Mr. Rider Haggard's savage; there was, he said, a speaking tube in the distance, and, as it spoke, the man fell. Quite in the same manner, to appearance, we are all in turn shot by the pistol of human prayer; the self-life is killed out of us without any visible contact with the suppliant. But now look at the scientific side. This cry for sympathy, this answer of sympathy, does *not* move through blank space. It is not an interference with natural law. It does not act by pushing aside the forces of Nature; it works *by* the forces of Nature. It does not neglect a single stage of the physical process; it moves upon lines as mechanical as those traversed by the steam engine. If a spectator of the working brain were possible, he would tell us that these answers to prayer called almsgivings have violated no dictum of science. He would tell us that prayer and response alike have been transmitted by the nerves of motion and borne on the waves of ether. He would trace the special wires on which the message travelled, would count the number of the nerve vibrations, would calculate the time required for a reply by estimating the strength of the ethereal current. He would demonstrate, in a word, that the organic life of Nature had responded through its own laws to the cry of one of its weakest members.

Do not say that to quote a human answer to prayer in proof of its Divine possibility is to reason from analogy. It is not; it is to reason from fact. If a savage says, "I

believe in the possibility of death because I have seen the sun go down," that is an argument from analogy. But if he says, "I believe in the possibility of death because I have lost by death three friends this week," that is not an argument from analogy; it is the most perfect of syllogisms. And that is *our* syllogism. We say: There is evidence that part of the organic life we call Nature does actually respond to the needs of another part. We have proof that in this act of helpfulness, so far from interfering with the natural forces, it makes direct use of these forces—utilizes the existing order of things. Shall not that which is proved in the part be possible in the whole! If through these laws, recognized by science, I can receive help from a section of the organism, does it not become a scientific possibility that, through the same laws of Nature, I might receive help from the *entire* organism—from that Primal Force, called by what name you will, which works at the base of all things! Nay, ought there not to be *less* barrier to the whole than to the part. The Primal Force must be—what none of the other forces is—free, spontaneous, untrammelled, the originator of independent movement. I have not the slightest scientific doubt that to the Primal Force each moment is a moment of re-creation—a moment in which the parts are constituted anew. If it be so, then the action of the part is already the act of the Whole, and Man's answer to the needs of Man becomes a phase of the response of God.

And I cannot but observe how this latter view is the view both of the Jewish and of the Christian Scriptures. The Old Testament is a ministry of angels. It is a vicarious government of God in which He elects to act through others. It is the creature that is sent to the *help* of the creature. One would imagine that the Divine fire would itself have been the immediate support of the fainting Elijah. Not so says the narrative: it is an *angel* that

strengthens him, and it is with earthly, not heavenly bread. Then with the New Testament there is a change of government; the ministry is *taken from* the angels. But it is not taken from the angels to be directly resumed by the Father. No, it is transferred to humanity. "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into *His* hand." What does that mean? That Humanitarianism is to take the place of Celestialism, that *Man* is to become his brother's keeper. The angelic ministry is transferred to the human soul. In a more pronounced sense, it is again the creature helping the creature. Whence this early reverence of men for a vicarious answer to prayer—an answer through the lips of emissaries? Was it because they thought of God as overburdened with His universe? On the contrary, the essence of their creed was, "He fainteth not, neither is weary." But I think they had a deep motive for preferring an answer through the creature—a motive in which modern times will fully share. It was because they felt that miraculous help would kill charity. They saw that if God spoke directly, man would not speak at all. They recognized that to a human soul the serving was of more value than the service, and that the greatest gift which the Father can bestow is the gift of a brother's sympathy.

Therefore these men felt, and we feel with them, that the great Primal Force is most glorified when it acts through the human forces. If I had the power of answering prayer, I should prefer the vicarious mode. I would rather heal disease by suggesting a remedy to the mind of a doctor than by sweeping the malady away. I would rather cure the pestilence by the plan of sanitation than stamp it out by imperative command. I would rather relieve the famine through the work of human hands than shower down streams of manna from the heights of heaven. The former course would be greater, diviner. I should choose it on the same principle that the long

road was chosen to the land of Canaan. It would require more time. It would employ more hands. It would exercise more hearts. It would elicit more enthusiasms. It would supplement the gift of benefits by the richer gift of kindness, and identify the answer to prayer with the practice of human altruism.

G. MATHESON.

RECENT NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

VI.

"NUNQUAM SIC LOCUTUS EST HOMO."

JESUS is by universal consent the greatest of religious teachers. "Never did man speak thus" was the testimony of the servants of the Sanhedrin (John vii. 46); and when He preached in the synagogue of Nazareth, "they all bare witness unto Him, and marvelled at the words of grace that proceeded out of His mouth" (Luke iv. 22). Nor is the modern world less lavish of applause, anxious often, one might imagine, to atone for lack of faith by excess of admiration. "'Christianity,'" Rénan writes,¹ "has become almost a synonym of 'religion.' All that is done outside of this great and good Christian tradition is barren. Jesus gave religion to humanity as Socrates gave it philosophy and Aristotle science. There was philosophy before Socrates and science before Aristotle. Since Socrates and since Aristotle philosophy and science have made immense progress; but all has been built upon the foundation which they laid. In the same way, before Jesus religious thought had passed through many revolutions; since Jesus it has made great conquests: but no one has improved, and no one will improve, upon the

¹ *Vie de Jésus*, xxviii.

essential principle Jesus has created; he has fixed for ever the idea of pure worship. . . . Jesus has founded the absolute religion."

Now the question is: *Was Jesus simply the greatest of religious teachers, or was He something more?* and He has Himself answered it. It is written in the Fourth Gospel that once, as He taught in the Temple, the Jews exclaimed in astonishment: "How knoweth this man letters, not having studied?" They believed that the Rabbis were the sole depositaries of sacred lore, and it puzzled them to hear one who had never sat at their feet discoursing so eloquently and powerfully of the things of God. He replied to their wonderment: "My teaching is not Mine, but His that sent Me" (John vii. 14-16). And a still more striking declaration is recorded by St. Matthew (xi. 27): "None fully knoweth the Son except the Father, neither doth any fully know the Father except the Son and he to whom the Son may will to reveal Him." Jesus was no mere teacher but the Son of God, and His unique relation to God was the source of His unique knowledge.

Such is our Lord's claim. It has, however, been deemed possible to trace His teaching to merely natural sources and discover in His intellectual and religious environment at least the germs of His world-transforming doctrines. This is the problem to which we shall now address ourselves; and we shall endeavour to demonstrate the essential difference between Jesus and all other teachers and the absolute impossibility of classifying Him among them even as incomparably the greatest of them all. He was more than a prophet. He was, in the language of St. John (i. 18), the Only-begotten Son who came forth from the bosom of the Father and interpreted Him (ἐξηγήσατο), as only one could who knew His heart and had seen His face.

1. One difference between Jesus and other teachers is *His absolute independence of the past*. It is certain that, unlike St. Paul, who acknowledged himself a debtor not only to the Jews, but to the Greeks and the Barbarians both, Jesus owed nothing to the varied life and rich culture of the great world outside of Palestine. "Neither directly nor indirectly did any element of Greek culture reach Jesus. He knew nothing beyond Judaism."¹ His teaching would have been precisely what it is though no philosopher had ever taught in the schools of Athens, and the likelihood is that He had never heard the names of Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. But to the history and literature of Israel His relation was very different. His mind was steeped in the Old Testament. Throughout His earthly life it was to Him a fountain of refreshment. How aptly He would quote from it in His controversies with His adversaries! The Psalter was His favourite book. In that moment of awful and mysterious desolation as He hung upon the cross, His exceeding bitter cry was a sentence from Psalm xxii. (Matt. xxvii. 46 = Mark xv. 34), and it was the language of another Psalmist (Ps. xxxi. 5) that rose to His lips when he commended His spirit into His Father's hands ere He bowed His head and gave up the ghost (Luke xxiii. 46).

So saturated was our Lord's mind with the ancient Scriptures that much of His teaching has an Old Testament colouring and is cast in Old Testament moulds. St. Matthew v. 3 sq. is a reminiscence of Isaiah lxi. 1 sq.—a passage which He loved and took for His text in the synagogue of Nazareth (Luke iv. 16 sqq.). Matthew v. 5 is Psalm xxxvii. 11, and His phrase, "the pure in heart" (Matt. v. 8), is from Psalm xxiv. 4. His satire on the eagerness of the guests to secure the chief places at a feast is an echo of Proverbs xxv. 6, 7. Nor did He disdain

¹ Rénan, *Vie de Jésus*, iii.

the extra-canonical literature. One of His most beautiful and characteristic sayings is the Gracious Invitation (Matt. xi. 28-30), and it bears a resemblance which can hardly be accidental, to the closing verses of the prayer of another Jesus, the son of Sirach (Ecclus. li. 23, 26, 27) :

Draw nigh unto me, ye uninstructed,
and lodge in the house of instruction.
Your neck put ye under the yoke,
and let your soul receive instruction :
nigh is she to find her.
See with your eyes that little did I labour,
and I found to myself much rest.

Even the golden rule : "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, so do ye also to them" (Matt. vii. 12=Luke vi. 31) is not without its ancient parallel. It is written in the Book of Tobit :¹ "What thou hatest do to no man"; and it is related that a Gentile once went to the gentle Hillel and jestingly promised to become a proselyte if the Rabbi would teach him his whole doctrine while he stood on one leg. "I will teach you the Law in one word," Hillel answered, unruffled by the scoffer's impudence : "*That which is unpleasing to thee, do not to thy neighbour. That is the whole Law, and all the rest is but its exposition.*"²

It should be observed, however, that our Lord's requirement is vastly more exacting than Hillel's. The maxim of the latter is negative : "Do nothing to others which thou wouldst not have done to thyself"; whereas His precept is positive : "Whatsoever thou wouldst have done to thyself, that do to others." It is ever thus when Jesus repeats an ancient saying. He employs the familiar language, but He enlarges its scope and puts into it a fresh and fuller

¹ iv. 15 : ὁ μισεὶς μηδενὶ ποιήσῃς.

² *Shabb. 31a.* Cf. our Lord's answer to the scribe (Matt. xxii. 34-40=Mark xii. 28-34).

significance. He puts *Himself* into it. His last word on the cross was a verse from a Psalm, but it makes a world of difference that He prefixed "Father." And it should be observed, moreover, that, while He revered and loved the Old Testament Scriptures, He yet declared it but a partial and imperfect revelation that had been vouchsafed to Moses and the prophets, and handled their sacred oracles with sovereign authority, now setting His seal to their truth, and anon abrogating some ancient law and setting His own perfect revelation in its place. "*Ye have heard that it was said to them of old: but I say unto you.*" He was not a disciple of Moses and the prophets. On the contrary, He proclaimed Himself their Lord, the Saviour of whom they had written and whose advent they had seen afar off.

A further and still more cogent argument may be adduced in support of the view that Jesus was merely the greatest of the prophets, and merely developed the thoughts of His predecessors. It is this, that the two ideas which chiefly dominated His mind and shaped His career had lain ready to His hand in the Jewish religion. One is "the Kingdom of Heaven," the phrase He used to describe the new order which He had come into the world to establish. It was not an original conception. Its germ is the theocratic ideal so prominent in the Old Testament, and it was greatly developed in the Rabbinical literature. For a generation before the birth of Jesus מְלִכּוּת שָׁמַיִם had been the watch-word of Jewish patriotism chafing under the Roman yoke. Jehovah was Israel's King, and it was disloyalty to Him to pay tribute to Cæsar. Such was the cry of Judas the Galilean;¹ and the burden of the Baptist's preaching was: "The Kingdom of Heaven hath come nigh." Jesus took up the message and proclaimed "the Gospel of the King-

¹ Joseph. *De Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 1: κακίζων εἰ φόρον τε Ῥωμαίοις τελεῖν ὑπομένονσι καὶ μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν αἰσυνσι θνητοὺς δεσπότας.

dom." It was no new conception, but a thought that was in every heart and a word that was in every mouth.

The other idea is that of Messiahship. It had been in the heart of Israel for more than a thousand years, and Jesus took up the ancient expectation and proclaimed Himself the Deliverer whom the prophets had foretold and the nation had been awaiting for all those weary centuries. His claim to the Messiahship may seem a conclusive evidence that He brought no fresh revelation. His ministry was merely the performance of a rôle and the carrying out of a programme. All that He did and taught was but the embodiment of that ancient ideal to which He had served Himself heir. "Beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, He interpreted unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself."

Now, while it is true that Jesus employed those ancient phrases, it must not be overlooked that He invested them with a wholly new significance. He inherited the names, but the ideals were all His own. The Kingdom of Heaven was on every lip when Jesus entered upon His ministry, but what manner of conception did it express? With the Zealots it was a political watchword, a patriotic cry. They thought to establish the Kingdom of Heaven by resisting the exactions of the Roman tyrant and casting off his yoke. On the lips of the Baptist indeed it bore an ethical significance: "*Repent*, for the Kingdom of Heaven hath come nigh"; but it seemed to him, as to the Essenes, an affair of external ablutions and ascetic observances. Jesus employed the phrase so familiar to the men of His generation, but He gave it a new meaning. "Blessed," He declared in tacit contradiction of the Zealots, "are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake; for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven." "Blessed," He said again, with the ascetic Essenes in His eye, "are the poor *in spirit*; for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven." And, in opposition to

the externalism alike of the Pharisees and of the Baptist, He said: "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you" (Luke xvii. 21). It was a familiar phrase that He used when He spoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, but the kingdom He meant was such as none had ever dreamed of before.

And how different was the Messiahship of Jesus from that of the popular expectation! The Jews looked for a victorious hero who should crush the Romans, deliver Israel, and raise in more than its ancient splendour the fallen throne of David. The disciples shared this carnal expectation, and they clung to it all the while their Lord was with them. During the last journey to Jerusalem, when the shadow of the Cross had already fallen dark and grim on their Master, they were dreaming of an approaching triumph and disputing who should be awarded the places of honour about His throne (Mark x. 35-45 = Matt. xx. 20-28). It was because it dissipated their dream that the Crucifixion seemed to them so dire a disaster. "We were hoping that it was He that would ransom Israel" (Luke xxiv. 21). The Resurrection revived their hopes, and on the way to the Mount of Ascension they asked Him: "Lord, is it at this point that Thou restorest the kingdom unto Israel?" (Acts i. 7).

Such was the Messianic expectation of His contemporaries. Jesus retained the word, but He gave it a meaning which was wholly new and which, as appears especially in the Epistle to the Hebrews, made His claim to Messiahship wellnigh incredible to Jewish minds. Had it not been necessary to satisfy Jewish expectations in order to commend Himself to Jewish hearts, it may be questioned whether He would ever have announced Himself as the Messiah. The acknowledgment of Jesus as the Christ was indeed a great confession, and when it was made by Peter as spokesman of the Twelve at Cæsarea Philippi, He hailed it with rapture (Matt. xvi. 13-19; cf. Mark viii.

27-29, Luke ix. 18-20). And no wonder; for consider what the claim to Messiahship involved. It meant that His advent was the consummation of history and His salvation the satisfaction of humanity's long yearning. "*Your eyes*—blessed are they, for they behold, and *your ears*, for they hear. Verily I say unto you that many prophets and righteous men desired to see the things which ye behold, and did not see, and to hear the things which ye hear, and did not hear" (Matt. xiii. 16-17=Luke x. 23-24). Abraham had rejoiced to see His day" (John viii. 58); Isaiah had seen His glory and had spoken concerning Him (xii. 41); Moses and all the prophets had written concerning Him (Luke xxiv. 27). He recognized in the Scriptures a divine revelation; and this was the evidence that their every page delineated His features and their every ordinance was, as it were, a finger-post pointing forward to Him. Israel's history had been a preparation for His advent and its law a foreshadowing of His salvation.

The acknowledgment of His Messiahship meant the recognition of all this, and therefore He welcomed the confession: "*Thou art the Christ.*" Nevertheless, so carnal and false was the Messianic expectation of His day that it may be questioned whether the role of Messiah was not rather an embarrassment to Him and a serious obstacle to His success. It is certain that, though He took as the text of that sermon which He preached in the synagogue of Nazareth, a prophetic picture of the Messiah's gracious work and declared, "*To-day hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears*" (Luke iv. 16-30), He never openly announced Himself as the Messiah, and was manifestly embarrassed when Messianic honours were thrust upon Him (e.g. John vi. 14-15). He rejoiced at Peter's great confession, but He immediately "*charged His disciples that they should tell no man that He was the Christ,*" and, in order to disabuse their minds of carnal expecta-

tions, proceeded to announce His approaching Passion (Matt. xvi. 20-23 = Mark viii. 30-33, Luke ix. 21, 22). He never styled Himself "the Son of David," and from the dialectical use He made of it on one occasion (Matt. xxii. 41-46 = Mark xii. 35-37 = Luke xx. 41-44) in order to bring home to the Pharisees the illogicality of their notions, it would seem that the title was distinctly distasteful to Him. "As long as the people thought of the Messiah as belonging to the line of David, so long would they also represent the Kingdom as being a day of vengeance on the Gentile, an enlargement of their own borders, an enriching of Jerusalem, and the dominion over the circle of the earth. The purple robe and sceptre of David must also be first completely driven out of the thoughts of the disciples before Jesus could avow a name which otherwise could only be an occasion of misunderstanding. Therefore was it that Jesus, in presence of the people and in the hearing of the Rabbis, opposed this expectation of the Son of David, and did so even with the weapons of the schools and on the ground of Scripture."¹

Our Lord's Messianic role was a gracious *οἰκονομία*. Indeed it is hardly too much to say that it was part of His humiliation that the necessity was laid upon Him of expressing His undreamed-of revelation in terms of the prevailing theology and employing language which could not fail to be misunderstood. It was a deep saying of the Rabbis that "the Law spoke in the tongue of the children of men," and Jesus, in His gracious desire to reach the hearts of His Jewish hearers, employed the language wherewith they were familiar. But He transfigured it and invested it with a wholly new significance. He adopted the ancient formulæ, but He gave them new values; He used the old skins, but it was fresh wine that He poured into them. His seeming debt to the past was

¹ Hausrath, *Neutest. Zeitgesch.* ii. 229 (E.T.).

in truth—if an expression so inadequate and misleading be allowed—a supreme triumph of originality.

Our Lord's adoption of ancient ideas was a providential necessity, and the essence of His revelation was His doctrine of God. This it was that chiefly distinguished Him from every religious teacher of the past and proved Him in very truth the Son of God. While it is true that wondrous visions of the divine grace and tenderness had been vouchsafed to prophets and psalmists, the fact remains that the God of Israel had ever been an awful King, jealous of His glory and swift to avenge, exalted far above His creatures, and caring only for one family of mankind. These two ideas of transcendence and particularism dominated the Jewish mind and narrowed its theology. In later days the thought of God had become little better than a burden and a terror. He was pictured as a hard taskmaster demanding a righteousness impossible to weak mortals. And religion was a laborious performance of endless ceremonies which, even when duly performed, brought no peace; for the apprehension always remained that perchance everything had not been done and something was still lacking.

Into a world oppressed by such thoughts of God Jesus came with His revelation of the Heavenly Father, the Lover of men, the Friend of sinners, who grieves over a stricken sparrow (Matt. x. 29 = Luke xii. 6) and pours His mercy, like the sunshine and the rain, with impartial benediction on the whole wide world, making no difference between Jew and Gentile but owning every son of Adam as His child and feeling a peculiar tenderness for the sinful and the weak (Matt. v. 45; Matt. viii. 11; Luke xv. 7, 10). Jesus was the first to proclaim the Fatherhood of God. "This," says Rénan,¹ "was his great act of originality; in this he had nothing in common with his race." Whence

¹ *Vie de Jésus*, v.

was the conception derived? Assuredly it did not steal into His mind from the external beauty which surrounded Him in Galilee, that "very green, shady, smiling district, the true home of the Song of Songs and the songs of the well-beloved";¹ for others had dwelt amid those charming and idyllic scenes, yet no such vision had ever dawned upon their souls. Nor was it the protest of His heart against the ferocious deity of Judaism, "that tyrannical master who kills us, damns us, or saves us, according to his pleasure";² for many a soul had groaned beneath that cruel bondage, yet none had ever learned to cry *Abba, Father!* The source of our Lord's conception of the Divine Fatherhood was His own unique relation to God. It could never have been attained by any child of the sinful human race. It is the sense of guilt that distorts the soul's vision of God and makes it tremble before Him, owning its ill desert and dreading His just wrath. To none save the Holy One of God, His beloved Son in whom He was well pleased (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5), was such a conception possible. Never would we have been delivered from the spirit of bondage and received the spirit of adoption (Rom. viii. 15), had not the only-begotten Son come forth from the bosom of the Father and interpreted Him to us. It is the spirit of His Son which God hath sent forth into our hearts that cries, *Abba, Father* (Gal. iv. 6). *Hoc constanter tenendum est, nunquam vel angelis vel hominibus Deum fuisse patrem nisi unigeniti Filii respectu; præsertim homines, quos propria iniquitas Deo exosos reddit, gratuita adoptione esse filios, quia ille est natura.*³

It was not by His teaching, however, but by His person that our Lord's profoundest revelation of the Divine Fatherhood was made. Greek literature abounds in fables of gods appearing in human form, and it would have been no surprise had the doctrine of the Incarnation been proclaimed

¹ *Vie de Jésus*, iv.² *Ibid.* v.³ *Calv. Inst.* ii. xiv. 5.

on pagan soil. It was in Lycaonia that the scene of that classical story of Baucis and Philemon was laid,¹ and it was doubtless in the thoughts of the people of Lystra when, on seeing the miracle wrought by Paul and Barnabas, they exclaimed, "The gods are come down to us in the likeness of men!" But the dominant idea of Jewish theology was *the transcendence of God*. It seemed to the Hebrew mind that God was infinitely exalted above the world; and so wide did the gulf appear to the Jews of later days that they devised mediators to bridge it over. They deemed it impossible for God to hold direct intercourse with men, and taught that when the Law was given it was through the agency of angels.² It is written in the Book of Exodus (xxv. 8): "And I will dwell (וְשִׁכְנִיתִי) among them," and they conceived His presence as an overshadowing cloud (שֶׁכֶׁנֶת). They personified the Word of God, and this personal מִיכָרַם did extensive service in softening those passages which seem to encroach on the idea of Divine transcendence. Where it is written: "The Lord shut him in" (Gen. vii. 16), Onkelos paraphrases: "The Lord protected Noah by His Word when he entered into the ark"; and for "He spake unto him" (Num. vii. 89) the Jerusalem Targum has: "The Word was talking with him."

It was to minds dominated by this conception that Jesus taught His doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood and presented His claim to be the Son of God. It had been believed that God reigned on high, disdaining to abase His greatness or soil His purity by intercourse with mortals; and now it appeared that He was the Father of men, loving all with a love unutterable, and so little disdaining them that in the person of Jesus of Nazareth He had assumed their nature and come down to tabernacle among them and bear the burden of their sin and sorrow. Such was the revela-

¹ Ovid. *Metam.* viii. 611 sqq.

² Gal. iii. 19; Acts vii. 53, cf. v. 38; Heb. ii. 2; Jos. *Antiq.* xv. 5. 3.

tion which Jesus brought into the world; and it was a new thing, such as eye had not seen, nor ear heard, neither had entered into the heart of man.

2. Another and even more striking evidence of the difference between Jesus and other teachers is *the permanence of His Teaching*. "The heaven and the earth shall pass away," He declared, according to the triple tradition, in His discourse on the Last Things, "but My words shall in no wise pass away" (Matt. xxiv. 35 = Mark xiii. 31 = Luke xxi. 33); and the prediction has come to pass. It is a remarkable and truly unique circumstance that the Teaching of Jesus has survived all the changes of nigh two thousand years. Not a statement of His has been discredited by the progress of human knowledge, and no word of His has lost its freshness and charm. His Teaching is truly a *εὐαγγέλιον αἰώνιον*.

This marvel is absolutely unparalleled. There have been wise teachers who held dominion for a season over the minds of men, but just as each had superseded his predecessors, so he has been superseded in his turn. His teaching, which seemed to his generation so wondrous and complete, has presently been found imperfect, needing to be supplemented and restated, and has at length been relegated to "the history of philosophy—that herbarium of dead and dessicated ideas." Indeed his dethronement is the glory of a great teacher; for it is he that has quickened the minds of men and inaugurated that intellectual movement which leaves him behind in its onward march.

Reference has already been made to our Lord's singular disengagement from contemporary ideas. He never uttered a word which entangled His teaching with any of the crude and erroneous theories, scientific, political, or ethical, which prevailed in His day. Consider the difference in this respect between Him and His great Apostle. St. Paul had been

trained in the Rabbinical schools, and even after he had become "a new creature in Christ," he retained their principles and employed their methods. Very strange to modern minds are the Jewish ideas regarding the constitution of the physical universe. It was supposed that there were several heavens rising above each other in successive tiers.¹ The general belief was that they were seven in number, and each had a name.² From that passage where he tells how he had been "rapt away even unto the third heaven and heard unutterable words," it appears that St. Paul held this fantastic theory of the universe.³ In another well known passage (Gal. iii. 16) the Apostle demonstrates from the use of the word "seed" in the singular that the promise to Abraham (Gen. xvii. 7) had reference to Christ: "To Abraham were the promises spoken 'and to his seed.' He saith not 'and to seeds' as of many, but as of one 'and to thy seed,' which is Christ." This is a genuine piece of Rabbinical dialectic, and it is exactly matched by the following passage from the Talmud: "In the story of Cain, who slew his brother, we find it said, 'Hark! the bloods of thy brother crying.' He does not say 'the blood of thy brother' in the singular, but 'the bloods of thy brother,' his blood and the blood of his seeds (זְרַעֲיָתָיו) in the plural. Man was created single to teach that whoever destroys one life from Israel, it shall be reckoned to him as if he had destroyed the whole world (עוֹלָם), and whoever uplifts one life from Israel, it shall be reckoned to him as if he had uplifted the whole world."⁴

So truly was St. Paul the child of his age, imbued with

¹ Cf. שְׁמַי שְׁמַיִם (1 Kings viii. 27).

² Chag. 9. 2: שְׁבַע רַקִּיעֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם וְכֵן מִבֵּן עֲרֵבּוֹת: יִלּוֹן is Latin *velum*, i.e. the veil which hides the glory of God.

³ 2 Cor. xii. 2-4. It is this passage that Pseudo-Lucian (*Philopatr.* § 12) jests at: ἦν ἰκα δέ μοι Γαλιλαῖος ἐνέτυχεν, ἀναφαλαντίας, ἐπίρρινος, ἐς τρίτον οὐρανὸν ἀεροβατήσας καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκμεμαθηκώς.

⁴ Mishna Sanhedrin, iv. 5.

its spirit and subject to its limitations: With our Lord, however, it was very far otherwise. His Teaching is for all time and for all mankind and exhibits no trace of affinity with the intellectual order which prevailed in Palestine during the first century. It may be urged by way of explanation that this was natural, since Jesus was only a Galilean peasant and had never, like St. Paul, sat at the feet of the Rabbis and learned their methods. But His scathing philippic (Matt. xxiii. 1-39) proves how well He was acquainted with their doctrines, and more than once He made masterly use of the Rabbinical dialectic in order to put His adversaries to confusion, with keen sarcasm turning their own weapons against themselves and answering them according to their folly. One occasion was when the Jews made to stone Him, "because He, being a man, made Himself God." In reply he quoted Psalm lxxxii., where the judges of the people are upbraided for their corruption and almost in the same breath are styled "gods." So it had been customary to entitle the judges in ancient¹ Israel, and Jesus, imitating the casuistical logic of His assailants, argues: "If those judges are called 'gods' in your Law, why should you think it blasphemy that I call Myself the Son of God? They were corrupt men, while the many good works which I have wrought before you prove that the Father hath sanctified Me and sent Me into the world." Another occasion is recorded when He routed His adversaries with their own weapons (Mark xii. 18-27 = Matt. xxii. 23-33 = Luke xx. 27-39). It was in the course of that troubled week before His arrest, when the rulers were pressing Him hard and doing their utmost to "ensnare Him in argument" in order that they might have ground for taking action against Him. In the hope of involving Him in the bitter controversy about the Resurrection certain

¹ Exod. xxi. 6, xxii. 8: לֹא־לֵהֹמֶיִם = "to God" (R.V.), "unto the judges" (A.V., R.V. marg.).

Sadducees had propounded to Him that ridiculous supposition of the woman who had married seven husbands in succession: "At the Resurrection whose wife shall she be?" He quoted the words: "I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob," and added: "He is not a God of dead men but of living." Of course it was no real argument, and it is impossible to imagine our Lord seriously advancing such an evidence of immortality; but it was a typical piece of Rabbinical logic. It effectually silenced His questioners and delighted the multitude.

Had Jesus been the child of His age, He must have shared its delusions, and it is surely a fact which demands explanation that not one word that He ever spoke has been discredited by the onward march of human knowledge. It may be argued that He perceived the insufficiency of contemporary ideas, but this only solves one problem by raising another. How comes it to pass that a Galilean peasant had so far transcended His age and discovered that its wisdom was but foolishness? There is only one reasonable explanation, and it is that He came forth from God and His Teaching was not His own but His that sent Him.

The Teaching of Jesus is not a transient philosophy but a revelation from Heaven, and it has proved itself such by its inexhaustible vitality. It has survived a thousand intellectual revolutions, and every accession of light from science or philosophy has only disclosed an unsuspected significance in the revelation of Christ and opened men's eyes to something more of the fulness that dwelleth in Him—the fulness of the Godhead bodily (Col. ii. 9). Consider how the Gospel has adapted itself to the thought of each generation. Take the central fact of the Atonement. For nigh two thousand years the mercy of God in Jesus Christ has been a glad and glorious reality in the experience of believers, but each generation has viewed it in the light of its own ruling ideas and brought it under its own categories. It hardly

appealed at all to Greek minds. They dwelt rather on the thought of the Incarnation (ἐνανθρώπησις), and men like St. Chrysostom spoke of the Gospel as a φιλοσοφία. But the idea of the Atonement was most congenial to the Jewish Christians, and they interpreted it in terms of their ancient sacrificial system. To St. John Jesus was "the propitiation for the sin of the world," the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." "Ye were redeemed," says St. Peter, "with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot"; "Who bore our sins in His own body on the tree." "Whom God set forth," says St. Paul, "as a propitiation through faith in His blood." "If," says the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "the blood of goats and bulls and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling them that have been defiled sanctified unto the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through an Eternal Spirit offered Himself without blemish unto God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve a living God!" Another ruling idea of early days was *ransom*.¹ The usages of war and slavery had made it very real and significant to the ancients, and it was natural that it should be employed as an illustration of the Great Deliverance from the thralldom of sin. It had the sanction of our Lord Himself (Matt. xx. 28) and His Apostles (1 Pet. i. 18; 1 Cor. i. 30; Eph. i. 7; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Tit. ii. 14; Heb. ix. 12); and it was indeed a most beautiful and impressive figure; but unfortunately it was unduly pressed by theologians. As early as the middle of the fourth century Gregory of Nyssa elaborated the theory that the ransom had been paid to the Devil, the enemy and tyrant of mankind,² and in spite of occasional protests this repulsive

¹ λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον, *redemptio*. Suidas: λύτρα: μισθὸς ἢ τὰ παρεχόμενα ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας ἐπὶ τῷ λυτρώσασθαι βαρβάρων δουλείας.

² Gregory represented the Atonement as a trick practised on the Devil. He accepted Christ as a ransom for mankind, but found that he could not retain Him, and thus lost both the price and the purchase. Peter Lombard puts the

theory held the field until Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) dealt it its deathblow in his *Cur Deus Homo?* the greatest book ever written on the Atonement. The mediæval mind was dominated by the great system of Roman jurisprudence, and Anselm gave the Atonement a forensic interpretation. He defined sin as withholding from God His due¹; and what Christ did was to make "satisfaction" to God and pay Him the honour which had been withheld from Him.

And thus it has gone on from generation to generation. Theology is nothing else than an attempt to interpret God's revelation to the intellect; and, since each generation has a new philosophy, theology is ever changing. Just as Nature abides from age to age, while Science is ever advancing and ever discrediting the doctrine of yesterday by the discovery of to-day, so Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and to-day, even for ever, but each generation sees Him with other eyes and the old interpretation will no longer suffice. This is the difference between Jesus and all other Teachers, that He is the perfect and abiding revelation while they are but His interpreters. Every generation has had its theory of the Atonement, but it has ever been a fact in the experience of believing men that "God was in Christ reconciling a world unto Himself."

It is amazing how every fresh discovery, so far from discrediting the Teaching of Jesus, rather sheds light upon it and discloses an undreamed of significance in it. "It is little less than marvellous, the way in which the words of Jesus fit in with the forms of thought which are to-day current. They are life, generation, survival of the fit, perishing of the unfit, tree and fruit, multiplication by cell growth as yeast, operation by chemical contact as salt,

theory in one revolting sentence: "The cross was a mouse-trap baited with Christ's blood" (*Sent.* ii. 19).

¹ I. xi.: "Non est itaque aliud peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum."

dying of the lonely seed to produce much fruit, imposition of a higher form of life upon a lower by being born from above, grafting a new scion upon a wild stock, the phenomena of plant growth from the seed through the blade, the ear, and the matured grain, and, finally, the attainment of an individual life which has an eternal quality. The claim made for the Son of Man is that He has to do with this vital process in a vital fashion from the beginning of the ages to the end of them."¹ The celebrated works of the late Professor Drummond are doubtless open to grave criticism, and not their least offence perhaps is their evident assumption that the evolutionary theory is final, and that all is well with Christianity if only it be brought into harmony therewith. Nevertheless they have rendered this service at least to Christian apologetic, that they have shown how strikingly the master ideas of the evolutionists chime in with the Teaching of our Lord and how many unnoticed truths therein they bring to light.

In that recent work which has just been quoted, Dr. S. D. McConnell, following up a suggestion thrown out more than twenty years ago by Professors Balfour Stewart and Tait, has made striking apologetic use of a startling discovery of modern science, "that strange substance known as the luminiferous or interstellar *ether*, the medium through which the 'X ray' and wireless telegraphy perform their work." It has been hard for believers to hold fast by the Christian doctrine of Immortality in face of the evidence of science. "All psychical activity is associated with molecular activity in the matter of the brain and nerves," and "so far as we can see there is not only no living personality apart from a material organization, but a 'disembodied spirit' is unthinkable." It was held by some in early days, and the opinion has had its advocates in modern times, that the soul sleeps between death and the Resurrection and

¹ McConnell, *The Evol. of Immort.*, pp. 135-6.

awakes when it is reunited to its body (*ψυχोπαννυχία*). But, when the body is laid in the grave, it does not lie idle awaiting the day when it shall be reanimated by the spirit which once tenanted it. It is dissolved by the chemistry of Nature and fashioned anew into other organisms. St. Paul expressly declares that the resurrection-body is not that which the spirit inhabited during its earthly sojourn (1 Cor. xv. 44).

In that Ethereal Matter, the luminiferous ether, Dr. McConnell sees a possible fabric for the resurrection-body. "The material fabric is every moment disintegrating, and at death falls into ruin. Now, suppose that before that ruin befalls, the soul shall have been able to build up, as it were, a brain within the brain, a body within the body, something like that which the Orientals have for ages spoken of as the 'Astral Body.' Then, when the body of flesh shall crumble away, there would be left a body, material to be sure, but compacted of a kind of matter which behaves quite differently from that which our sense perceptions deal with. It is a material which, so far as science has anything to say, is essentially indestructible. It moves freely amongst and through ordinary matter without let or hindrance. . . . Such Ethereal bodies compacted with living souls would of necessity inhabit a universe of their own, even though that universe should occupy the same space that this one does. Neither earth, nor fire, nor water could in the least impede their movement. In frost and flame they would be equally at home. . . . With bodies of such fine stuff compounded, and so plastic to the uses of the spirit, their knowledge would expand until nature's secrets should be open to their eyes. Their senses would be so acute and delicately balanced as to be capable of thrills of pleasure so transcendent, and of pain so poignant, that the experience of this present life probably gives us no comparison to estimate them by."

This is only an hypothesis, but should it be established, it would be but the repetition of a wonder which has been wrought again and again in the course of these eighteen centuries, putting unbelief to confusion and attesting the Gospel as indeed the revelation of God. Again and again has the human mind after long and painful searching attained to some marvellous discovery, and, behold, it has turned out to be no new truth but a thought of the New Testament! The mystery was already manifested in the Gospel, but had been either hidden away from the ages and the generations (Col. i. 26) by reason of their blindness or derided as a thing incredible. Jesus indeed came into the world to show us the way home to the Father and not to teach us the truths of Science and Philosophy; but He was the Wisdom of God (1 Cor. i. 24) and spoke as one who knew God's heart and saw as God sees. His Teaching was the very truth unencumbered with human speculations, and it is illumined by every access of light and attested by every increase of knowledge. There is perhaps no clearer evidence that the physical world is the work of an intelligent Creator than the fact that it is intelligible and that it is possible for the human mind to comprehend its laws, discovering ever fresh traces of design and, in the fine phrase of Pascal, "thinking God's thoughts after Him." And is it not in like manner a singular attestation of the divinity of the Gospel that every fresh discovery which dawns upon the restless mind of man brings out some unsuspected truth, some hidden beauty, in the Teaching of Him who spake as never man spake, and who declared: "My Teaching is not Mine but His that sent Me"?

DAVID SMITH.

NOTES ON SELECT PASSAGES IN THE OLD
TESTAMENT.

1 SAMUEL xiii. 1. [When this passage was about to come up at the third and final review, a member of the Revision Company wrote to Dr. Field as follows: "In our marginal note to 1 Samuel xiii. 1 we have said, 'The number *thirty* has been inserted conjecturally,' etc. Now it appears to be inserted in 'some copies' of the Septuagint. Would it not therefore be better for the note to stand thus? 'The number *thirty* has been inserted on the authority of some manuscripts of the Septuagint. In others the whole verse is omitted. The Hebrew text has, *Saul was a year old!*'" Dr. Field replied: "In the marginal note on 1 Samuel xiii. 1, I think 'conjecturally' would probably be understood of the present version, and it would therefore be better to say, 'The number *thirty* is only found, probably from conjecture, in a particular revision of the Septuagint, which latter, in its original state, omits the whole verse. The Hebrew is here defective, a numeral having dropped out after *year.*'"]

1 CHRONICLES xii. 29. A.V.: "had kept the ward of the house of Saul." Vulgate: *sequebatur domum*. Coverdale: "for to that time held many of them yet with the house of Saul." Gesenius approves this sense, and "keeping the charge of the Lord" (Gen. xxvi. 5; Lev. viii. 35) seems to come near to it. I should propose "had kept their *allegiance* to," if that word were admissible. Castalio: *multis adhuc eorum Saulini generis curam agentibus*.

2 CHRONICLES v. 11. Render: ". . . (for all the priests that were present had sanctified themselves; they might not keep their courses:)." See chapter xxxv. 15: "they might not depart from their service." Esther iv. 2: "none might enter" (אֵין לְבוֹא). N.B.—I place the terminal

parenthetic mark, as Dathe, who renders tersely: (*nam omnes lustrati erant, nulla classium ratione habita*). Then the apodosis begins with verse 12: "that [*or, then*] the Levites, the singers, all of them," etc. Or the parenthesis might be prolonged to "for ever," so as to include the whole of the addition, as compared with 1 Kings viii. 10: "And it came to pass when the priests were come out of the holy place, that the house was filled," etc. Then "also" in verse 12 should be retained. But after so long a parenthesis we should expect וְיִי to be repeated at the end of it.

2 CHRONICLES xv. 3-6. Render: "But for a long season Israel *shall be* without the true God, . . . But when they in their distress shall turn . . . and seek him, he will be found of them. And in those times there shall be no peace . . . but great troubles shall be . . . And nation shall strive with nation . . . for God shall vex them . . ." The verb ["strive," verse 6], does not occur in A.V., but the noun is found twice for ἀγών. The Heb. נִקְרָא does not appear to be *passive*, but *reflective*. Dathe: *gens cum gente conflictabitur*. Castalio: *gens cum gente confligeret*. LXX. and Vulg. use a more general word: πολεμήσει ἔθνος πρὸς ἔθνος; *pugnabit gens contra gentem*. Compare Matthew xxiv. 7: ἐγερθήσεται . . .

NEHEMIAH v. 2. There seems to be an intended suppression of the invidious clause—"let us sell them and buy corn." So the Vulg.: *accipiamus pro pretio eorum frumentum*; followed by Coverdale, "let us take corn for them"; and perhaps A.V., in which "take up" is explained by Dr. Johnson "to borrow on credit."

NEHEMIAH vii. 2. Render: ". . . a very faithful man." Heb. *like a man of truth*. In English we say "something like" (a tempest, etc.), meaning *a very great one*: thus in the *Times* the other day, a description of the largest steam-hammer yet made was headed "Something like a hammer";

but perhaps this is the figure called *λιτότης*, *quâ res magna modestiæ causa extenuatur verbis*.

JOB ix. 35. Render: “. . . for not so am I with myself.” That is, *in my own conscience*. Dathe: *Nihil enim mihi conscius sum*; which is equivalent to 1 Corinthians iv. 4.

JOB xxxviii. 28: “Drops of dew.” Or, *pools*. Gesenius: *receptacula*, which is confirmed by the renderings of Aquila (*συστάδας*) and Symmachus (*συστροφάς*).¹

PSALM xxx. 5. Another version is: “His favour (endureth) for a life-time”; but I doubt this use of ם״ן without לל. All the Greek translators have ζωή (ם״ן), not βίος (ך״ן).

PSALM xxxi. 21. Symmachus: *ὡς ἐν πόλει περιπεφραγμένη*. May there not be a contrast intended between the ordinary protection of God over His people, compared to that afforded by a pavilion or booth, and His “marvellous kindness” shown to the Psalmist by defending him from his enemies, “as in a fenced city”?

PSALM l. 18. The Hebrew נָצַךְ answers exactly to the Greek *εὐδοκεῖν*, and construed with ׀ to *συνευδοκεῖν*, which is “consented unto” (a thing) frequently in New Testament: here, better, “consented with” (a person).

PSALM li. 4. The Prayer-Book version is “art judged,” and so the A.V. in Romans iii. 4; both taken from the LXX., *ἐν τῇ κρίνεσθαί σε*. But *κρίνεσθαι* is here used, as in the best Greek writers, not for “to be judged,” but for “to contend in judgment” whether as plaintiff or defendant; and so the Syriac translators of the LXX. rightly understood it, using an active verb. In Hebrew, however, this sense would require the Niphal.

¹ The Book of Job in the R.V. owes more, perhaps, to Dr. Field than any other portion of the Old Testament. He practically retranslated it from beginning to end, and his emendations were very extensively adopted by the Revisers. Unfortunately, however, he seems to have written very few critical notes on this book. On the Psalms also there is comparatively little material available.—J. H. BURN.

PSALM lxiii. 1. It seems hard to assert that the verb שָׁהַר has no connexion with the noun שָׁהַר, in the face of such texts as Isaiah xxvi. 9: "With my soul have I desired Thee in the night; yea, with my spirit within me אֶשְׁהַרְךָ."

PSALM lxxvii. 10. Render: "And I said, This *is* my infirmity: *to think* that the right hand of the most High changeth." I take שָׁנוֹת in the sense of τὸ *mutari* (as Mal. iii. 6: "I am the Lord; I change not"—לֹא שָׁנִיתִי), and the "infirmity" to be the thought admitted into the Psalmist's mind expressed in vv. 7-9.

PROVERBS xii. 25. Render: "Carefulness in the heart of man boweth it down:" etc. This good old word "careful" has been unfortunately eliminated from the New Testament by the Revisers, who have substituted for it the non-biblical word "anxious"; and for ἀμέριμνος, "without carefulness," in 1 Corinthians vii. 32—(I would have you) "free from cares"—which is impossible.

PROVERBS xvii. 22. Render: "A merry [*or, glad*] heart doeth good to the body:" etc. The meanings assigned to גִּהָה, *medicina, sanatio*, etc., are very speculative, being derived from a primary sense of *remotio ligaturae*, showing that the wound is healed, as in Hosea v. 13, where, however, the meaning of *ligature* is also doubtful. Another meaning, *facies*, from the Arabic, supported by A. Schultens, Simonis, etc., is also very doubtful. I would therefore fall back upon the Syriac, taking גִּהָה to be equivalent to גִּוָּה, *corpus*, Job xx. 25.

PROVERBS xxv. 11. Render: "A word spoken in its season [*or, according to another reading, אֶפְנִי for אֶכְנִי*, "upon its wheels"] *is like* apples of gold in baskets of silver" [*or, "with chased work."* Chald.: *cum caelaturis argenteis*. Pesch.: *calix*, according to Castell. But it is more probably τόρευμα, *caelatura*, since the same Syriac word is interchanged with the Greek τορευτὸς and τετυρνευμένος].

ECCLESIASTES ii. 21. Render: “. . . with wisdom, and with knowledge, and with diligence” [*or*, earnestness. O.: ἀνδρεία. Vulg.: sollicitudine. Pesch.: strenuitas. Sym.: γοργότης (Liddell and Scott: “fierceness, hastiness”; perhaps “briskness” is the nearest English equivalent for this difficult Greek word)].

ECCLESIASTES iv. 14. Render: “For *the one* from a prison goeth forth to reign; whereas *the other* though born in his kingdom becometh poor” [*or*, although in his kingdom he was poor].

ECCLESIASTES viii. 11. “Fully set” conveys the idea of *fixed resolution*, whereas it is *audacity* [“emboldened”] that is required here and in Esther vii. 5 (where A.V. “who hath presumed.” O.: ἐτόλμησε). In this place Aquila has ἐτόλμησε, and Symmachus ἀφόβῳ καρδίᾳ.

CANTICLES i. 7. Render: “. . . as one that wandereth to and fro among . . .” [*or*, as one that turneth aside, etc. (A.V.). So the Graeco-Ven., ἐκνεύουσα, *declinans, secedens*. Gesenius absurdly renders this common Greek word, *nutibus scorsum vocans*!]. For “wandering to and fro” may be quoted Symmachus, ῥεμβομένη; Peschito, περιερχομένη; Vulgate, *ne vagari incipiam*; and LXX., περιβαλλομένη—not *operta*, as Walton, which would require περιβεβλημένη, but (as rightly paraphrased by Theodoret) μὴ ἄγνοῦσα τῇδε κακέϊσε περινοστήσω.

ISAIAH vii. 11. Render: “. . . ask it in the depth *beneath*, or in the height *above*.” I have inserted “beneath” (in the common reading) for the sake of symmetry; but if הָלַחֲשִׁי be adopted, then the same rendering will serve, only varying the italics thus: “ask it in the depth *beneath*,” etc.

ISAIAH viii. 11. Retain A.V. “with a strong hand.” The other reading (כִּזְקֹתַי) is not supported by Symmachus and the Vulgate (as Bishop Lowth says); for in Symmachus’ version, ὡς ἐν κράτει τῆς χειρὸς, the ὡς merely

softens the metaphor (which is characteristic of Sym.), and Jerome (*sicut in manu forti*) follows Symmachus, which is his wont. See *Prolegom. in Hex. Orig.* pp. xxxiii., xxxiv.

ISAIAH x. 4. Render: "Nay, but they shall bow down . . ." The particle אֵלֶּכֶם negatives implicitly the former suggestions of *fleeing for help*, etc., and introduces the only alternative, It may be compared to the Greek $\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu\gamma\epsilon$.

ISAIAH xviii. 2. Render: ". . . Go, ye swift messengers, to a nation drawn out and polished, to a terrible people that is beyond this; a nation exceeding strong and that treadeth under foot, whose land the rivers have spoiled!" If this be taken of *bodily* stature (*procerus*), it must not be compared with the LXX. $\epsilon\theta\nu\omicron\varsigma \mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\omega}\rho\omicron\nu$, which rather expresses a moral quality, *erectuator, elatuor, superbuor*.

ISAIAH xxvi. 18. Render: ". . . any deliverance for the land; neither are the inhabitants of the world fallen." The examples quoted by Gesenius (p. 897b) of *cadere*, $\pi\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, etc., *de foetu ex utero matris egrediente*, are irrelevant, inasmuch as they all have some addition (*ex utero ad pedes matris, in terram*, etc.) which leaves no room for ambiguity.

ISAIAH xxviii. 16. Render: ". . . he that believeth thereon shall not deal hastily." To "make haste" is always, I think, said *in bonam partem*. Perhaps "shall not hurry" might be admitted, though not a biblical expression.

FREDERICK FIELD.

THE CITIES OF THE PAULINE CHURCHES.

IN gradually building up a proper conception of the transformation which St. Paul wrought in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire, it is necessary to estimate rightly the world in which his work was performed, viz. the cities in which and the society to which he preached. The two most important documents for the historian are the Epistle to the Galatians and the First Epistle to the Corinthians: these have to be studied in their relation to the known facts of history and life in the countries concerned. The first of these documents has already been treated by the present writer with such thoroughness as he can attain. The second has been similarly treated in the EXPOSITOR in its first half; and the succeeding paper of the series, written eight months ago, he desires to think over for another year before printing. But the most salient questions in the rest of *First Corinthians* relate rather to the inner history of Christianity than to its external relations; and it is the latter which we are desirous of studying.

Next to those two documents in importance, as the foundation on which the historian of the Pauline Churches must build, come the letters of John to the Seven Churches of Asia. It is necessary to become very clear about their meaning before attempting the difficult problems connected with the letters to the Colossians and to Timothy.

As a preliminary, we must get some conception of the general characteristics of the great Graeco-Asiatic cities in which the Pauline Churches grew. Disregarding differences, we shall try to describe briefly the chief forces which

had been at work in all those cities, and the most prominent features common to them. If this had been systematically done by writers on the subject, probably some current statements about Paul would never have been made.

Let us look specially at the Seleucid foundations, the many Antiochs, Seleucias, etc., scattered over the western Asiatic lands. The fact that Tarsus itself was once called Antioch, and lost that name chiefly because there were too many cities already bearing it, shows how important those Seleucid cities are for our purpose. Paul's experience of Greek life was gained mainly in Antioch on the Cydnus; and the knowledge of Greek thought and society which he acquired there he applied afterwards to the work which fell to his lot in Antioch on the Orontes, Pisidian Antioch, Ephesus, etc.

The successors of Alexander the Great were Greek kings, ruling oriental lands and peoples. To maintain their hold on their dominions it was necessary to build up a suitable organization in the countries over which they ruled. Their method everywhere was similar: it was to make cities that should be at once garrisons to dominate the country and centres of Graeco-Asiatic¹ manners and education, which the kings were desirous of spreading among their oriental subjects. Sometimes they founded new cities, where previously there seem to have been only villages. Sometimes they introduced an accession of population and change of constitution in already existing cities, a process which may be described as refounding. In both cases alike a new name, connected with the Seleucid dynasty,² was almost

¹ We use the rather pedantic adjective to describe the form which Greek civilization was forced to assume, as it attempted to establish itself in oriental lands: it did not merely change the cities, it was itself strongly modified in the attempt.

² We speak of the Seleucid foundations; but similar remarks apply also to other foundations, Ptolemaic, Pergamenian, etc.

invariably substituted for the previous name of the village or city.

The new population consisted generally of colonists brought from foreign countries, who were considered intruders and naturally not much liked by the older population. The colonists were granted property and privileges in their new cities; and they knew that the continuance of their fortunes and rights depended on the permanence of the Seleucid government. Thus those strangers constituted a loyal garrison in every city where they had been planted. With them were associated in loyalty the whole party that favoured the Seleucid policy, or hoped to profit by it. It would appear that these constituted a powerful combination in the cities. They were in general the active, energetic, and dominating party.

How important in the New Testament writings those new foundations of the Greek kings were, is brought out very clearly by a glance over the list of cities. Tarsus, Syrian Antioch, Pisidian Antioch, Laodicea, and Thyatira, were founded or refounded by Seleucid kings: Ephesus, Smyrna, Troas, Pergamum, and Philadelphia, by other Greek kings in the same period and under similar circumstances.¹

Two classes of settlers were specially required and encouraged in the Seleucid colonies. In the first place, of course, soldiers were needed. These were found chiefly among the mercenaries of many nations—but mostly of northern race, Macedonians, Thracians,² etc.—who made up the strength of the Seleucid armies. The harsh, illiterate, selfish, domineering tone of those soldier-citizens was often satirized by the Greek writers of the third and second centuries

¹ Troas, Pisidian Antioch, and Lystra were refounded at a later date as Roman colonies.

² A Thracian soldier in 2 *Maccabees* xii. 35. Thyatira was a Macedonian colony. Laodicea and Philadelphia perhaps had Thracian and Mysian colonists: see *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, i. pp. 34, 200.

before Christ, who delighted to paint them as braggarts, cowards at heart, boasting of false exploits; and the boastful soldier, the creation of Greek wit and malice, has been perpetuated since that time on the Roman and the Elizabethan stage in traits essentially the same.

But the Greek kings knew well that soldiers alone were not enough to establish their cities on a permanent basis. Other colonists were needed, able to manage, to lead, to train the rude oriental peasantry in the arts on which civilized life must rest, to organize and utilize their labour and create a commercial system. The experience of the present day in the cities of the east Mediterranean lands shows where such colonists could best be found. They were Greeks and Jews. Nowadays Armenians also would be available; but at that time Armenia had hardly come within reach of even the most elementary civilization. Only among the Greeks and the Jews was there that familiarity with ideals, that power and habit of thinking for themselves and of working for a future and remote end, which the kings needed in their colonists. Modern students do not as a rule conceive the Jews as an educated race, and some can hardly find language strong enough to describe their narrowness and deadness of intellect. But when compared with the races that surrounded them, the Greeks excepted, the Jews stood on a far higher intellectual platform: they knew one book (or, rather, one collection of books) well, and it was a liberal education to them.

One might hardly expect to find that the Greeks were loyal subjects of Seleucid kings. They were apt to be democratic and unruly; but it is as true of ancient as it is of modern times that the Greeks are "better and more prosperous under almost any other government than they are under their own."¹ They accommodated themselves with their usual dexterity and pliancy to their position; and

¹ *Impressions of Turkey*, p. 256.

circumstances, as we have seen, made them dependent on the kings. The stagnant and unprogressive oriental party looked askance at and disliked the Greek element; and the latter must regard the kings as their champions, even though the Seleucid kings were far too autocratic and too strongly tinged with the oriental fashions for the Greek colonists to feel in thorough sympathy with them. But settlers and kings alike had the common interest that they must dominate the uneducated mass of the ancient population. Thus the constitution of the new cities was a compromise, a sort of limited monarchy, where democratic freedom and autocratic rule tempered and restrained each other; and the result was distinctly favourable to the development and prosperity of the cities.

It may seem even stranger that the Jews should be found by Seleucid kings their best and most loyal subjects outside of Palestine, for those kings were considered by the Jews of Palestine to be the most deadly enemies of their race and religion. But the Jew outside of Palestine was a different person and differently situated from the Jew in his own land. Abroad he was resigned to accept the government of the land in which he lived, and to make the best of it; and he found that loyalty was by far the best policy.¹ He could be useful to the government; and the government was eager to profit by and ready to reward his loyalty. Thus their interests were identical.

The fullest freedom in religion was granted to those Jewish settlers. The ordinary regulations of the cities were modified to suit their beliefs and customs. When allowances of oil were given to other citizens, the royal law was that an equivalent in money should be granted to the Jews, whose scruples forbade them to use oil that a Gentile had

¹ Moreover, the Jewish colonies planted by the Seleucid kings in Asia Minor and Cilicia were all older than the Maccabæan rising: see the following article.

handled or made. Scruples like this divided the Jews from their neighbours in the cities, and thereby made them all the more sensible of the fact that it was the royal favour which maintained them safe and privileged in the places where they lived as citizens. In Palestine their ritual kept the Jews aloof from and hostile to the Seleucid kings, and fed their national aspirations. But in the Graeco-Asiatic cities their ritual actually bound them more closely to the king's service.

Through similar causes, at a later time, the Jews in Palestine (except the Sadducees) hated the Roman Empire and regarded it as the abomination, and they were subdued only after many rebellions and the most stubborn resistance. And yet, through that troubled period, the Jews outside Palestine were loyal subjects of the Empire, distinguished by their special attachment to the side of the emperors against the old Roman republican party.

Moreover, the Jews, an essentially oriental race, found the markedly oriental policy of the Seleucid kings far more congenial to them than the Greek colonists ever could. Hence the Jewish settlers formed a counterpoise against the Greek colonists in the Seleucid cities, and, wherever the Greek element seemed too strong, the natural policy of the kings was to plant Jews in the same city.

That remarkable shifting and mixing of races was, of course, not produced simply by arbitrary acts of the Greek kings, violently transporting population hither and thither at their caprice. The royal policy was successful, because it was in accordance with the tendencies of the time. Migration and intermixture of peoples, which had been going on even under the Persian domination in many cities of Asia Minor (as might be shown in the case of Tarsus and many other places), was immensely stimulated by the conquests of Alexander the Great, which opened the East and gave free scope to adventure and to trade. During the

fine season of the year, May to September, there was abundant opportunity for travelling. The powerful monarchies and states kept the sea safe; and, as has been said by Canon Hicks, a scholar who has studied that period with special care and ability, in the third century B.C., "there must have been daily communication between Cos (on the west of Asia Minor) and Alexandria."¹

Thus the Graeco-Asiatic cities between 300 and 100 B.C. were in process of natural growth through the settling in them of strangers; and the strangers came for purposes of trade, eager to make money. The kings interfered only to regulate and to direct to their own advantage a process which they had not originated and could not have prevented. What they did for those strangers was to give them the fullest rights in the cities where they settled. The strangers and their descendants would have always remained aliens; but the kings made them citizens, gave them a voice in the government and a position in the city as firm and influential as that of the best, increased their numbers by assisting immigrants, and presented them with lands and allotted them a place in one of the city tribes.² In Cos or Iasos or Ephesus the Jew was an alien, protected sometimes by treaties with kings or Romans;³ but in most Seleucid towns there was a body of Jewish citizens, enrolled in a special tribe or trade guild, and having their own special regulations in each city (their charter of rights)⁴ for protecting their peculiar customs.

The Seleucid cities, therefore, were merely examples of the whole class of Graeco-Asiatic cities. They were, probably, the most favourable examples of the class, having

¹ Paton and Hicks, *Inscriptions of Cos*, p. xxxiii.

² Usually this was done by creating new tribes in which the new settlers were enrolled.

³ e.g. 1 *Maccabees* xv. 18 ff.

⁴ The *νόμος τῶν Ἰουδαίων* at Apameia, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii. p. 533, no. 399 bis.

a better tempered and balanced government than most Greek cities (as we have just seen). Tarsus, in particular, was proverbial as an orderly, well administered city.

Even the Jews, though introduced specially by the Seleucid kings, and always most numerous in the Seleucid colonies, were spread throughout the great cities of the Greek world, and especially in the chief centres of trade and finance (as might be expected). Thus, in a document of the second century B.C., at the Carian town of Iasos;¹ we find Nicetas, son of Jason, of Hierosolyma; and the well known list in 1 *Maccabees* xv. 23 shows how many cities and kingdoms of the coasts of Asia Minor contained Jewish settlers about 139 B.C. Those Jews were resident aliens doubtless, not citizens; as Jews were citizens only in the new foundations of the kings, and in that list such cities were not mentioned (being classed under the kingdoms to which they belonged).

The result of that free mixture of races in the Graeco-Asiatic cities was to stimulate a rapid and precocious development. There was great ease of intercourse and freedom of trade, a settled and sound coinage and monetary system, much commerce on a considerable scale, much eagerness and opportunity to make money by large financial operations. There was also a notable development on the intellectual side. Curiosity was stimulated in the meeting of such diverse races. The Oriental and the European spirit met in the cities, each tried to understand and to outwit the other.

This great experiment in human development was conducted on a small scale and in a thin soil, but was all the more precocious on that account, and also the more short-lived. It was a hot-house growth, produced in circumstances which were evanescent; and it was unnatural and unhealthy.

¹ Le Bas-Waddington, *Voyage Archéol.* iii. no. 294.

The smallness of scale on which all Greek history was conducted is one of its most remarkable features. In Greece proper, as contrasted with the big countries and the large masses of modern nations, the scale was quite minute. In the Graeco-Asiatic states the scale seemed much greater; but development was really confined to a number of spots here and there, showing only as dots on a map, small islets in the great sea of stagnant, unruffled, immovable orientalism. The Greek political and social system demanded a small city as its scene, and broke down when the attempt was made to apply it on a larger scale. But no more stimulating environment to the intellect could be found than was offered in the Graeco-Asiatic cities, and the scanty glimpses which we get into the life of those cities reveal to us a very quick, restless, intelligent society, keenly interested in a rather empty and shallow kind of philosophic speculation, and almost utterly destitute of any vivifying and invigorating ideal.

The interest and importance to us of this moment in society lies in the fact that Pauline Christianity arose in it and worked upon it. In every page of Paul's writings that restless, self-conceited, morbid, unhealthy society stands out in strong relief before the reader. Paul knew it so well, because he was born and brought up in its midst. He conceived that his mission was to regenerate it, and the plan which he saw to be the only possible one was to save the Jew from sinking down to the Pagan level by elevating the Pagan to the true Jewish level.¹

The letters of Paul need to be constantly illustrated from the life of those cities, and to be always read in the light of a careful study of the society in them. It was, above all, the philosophical speculation in which they excelled and delighted that Paul detested. He saw serious danger in it.

¹ This idea is illustrated at greater length in two articles on "The Statesmanship of Paul" in the *Contemporary Review*, 1901, March and April.

Not only was it useless and resultless in itself, mere "empty deceit";¹ and nowhere is his irony so cutting as in the many passages where he alludes to the philosophical acumen of the Corinthians in contrast with his own simplicity of intellect. But, far worse, it led directly to superstition. Vain speculation, unable to support itself in its lofty flight, unable to comprehend the real unity of the world in God, invented for itself silly genealogies² in which nature and creation were explained under the empty fiction of sonship, and a chain of divine beings in successive generations was made and worshipped; and human nature was humbly made subservient to these fictitious beings, who were described as "angels."³

This philosophical speculation cannot be properly conceived in its historical development without bearing in mind the mixed population and the collision of Jewish and Greek thought which belonged to those great Graeco-Asiatic cities. It united Greek and Jewish elements in arbitrary eclectic systems. The mixture of Greek and Jewish thought is far more conspicuous in Asia Minor than in Europe. Hence there is not much trace of it in *Corinthians* (though some writers try to discover it, and lay exaggerated stress on it): the Corinthian philosophers were of a different kind. But in the cities of Asia, Phrygia, South Galatia, and Cilicia—all along the great roads leading east and west across Asia Minor—the minds of men were filled with crude attempts at harmonizing and mingling Oriental (especially Jewish) and Greek ideas. Their attempts took many shapes, from mere vulgar magical formulæ and arts to the serious and lofty morality of Athenodorus the Tarsian in his highest moments of philosophy.

When we think of the intellectual skill, the philosophic interest, and the extreme cleverness of the age, we feel the

¹ *Col.* ii. 8.² *1 Tim.* i. 4.³ *Col.* ii. 18-23.

inadequacy of those arguments—or rather those unargued assertions—according to which the Epistle to the Colossians reveals a stage of philosophic speculation too advanced for the first century, and such as could not have been reached earlier than the second century. How long would it take those clever subtle philosophic inquirers in those cities to achieve that slight feat of intellectual gymnastic presupposed in the Epistle?

The noblest feature of Greek city life was its zeal and provision for education. The minute carefulness with which those Asian-Greek cities legislated and provided for education—watching over the young, keeping them from evil, graduating their physical and mental training to suit their age, moving them on from stage to stage—rouses the deepest admiration in the scholar who laboriously spells out and completes the records on the stone fragments where they are written, and at the same time convinces him how vain is mere law to produce any real and healthy education. It is pathetic to think how poor was the result of all those wise and beautiful provisions.

The literature of the age has almost utterly perished, and the extremely scanty remains, along with the Roman imitations of it, do not suggest that there was anything really great in it, though much cleverness, brilliance, and sentimentality. Perhaps Theocritus, who comes at the beginning of the age, might rank higher; but the great master of bucolic poetry, the least natural form of poetic art, can hardly escape the charge of artificiality and sentimentality. In the realm of creative literature, the spirit of the age is to be compared with that of the Restoration in England, and partakes of the same deep-seated immorality.

The age was devoted to learning: it investigated antiquities, studied the works of older Greek writers, commented on texts; and the character of the time, in its poorness of fibre and shallowness of method, is most clearly revealed in

this department. It is hardly possible to find any trace of insight or true knowledge in the fragments of this branch of literature that have come down to us. Athenodorus of Tarsus was in many respects a man of ability, courage, education, high ideas and practical sense; but take a specimen of his history of his own city: "Anchiale, daughter of Japetos, founded Anchiale (a city near Tarsus): her son was Cydnus, who gave his name to the river at Tarsus: the son of Cydnus was Parthenius, from whom the city was called Parthenia: afterwards the name was changed to Tarsus."¹ This habit of substituting irrational "fables and endless genealogies"² for the attempt really to understand nature and history, was engrained in the spirit of the time, and shows how superficial and unintelligent its learning was. Out of it could come no real advance in knowledge, but only frivolous argumentation and "questionings."

Only in the department of moral philosophy did the age sometimes reach a lofty level. A touch of oriental sympathy with the Divine nature enabled Athenodorus and others to express themselves with singular dignity and beauty on the duty of man and his relation to God. But the "endless genealogies" frequently obtruded themselves in their finest speculations.

Such then was the motley population of the numerous Seleucid colonies which were planted in Lydia, Phrygia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia during the third century, and in Cilicia during the second century B.C. The language of the settlers was Greek, the language of trade and education; and it was through these cities that a veneer of Greek civilization was spread over the Asiatic coasts. The country people for centuries continued to use the native language, and even the native part of the city population long spoke the native language alongside of, or to the exclusion of, Greek. But Greek was the sole language of educa-

¹ Quoted by Steph. Byz., *s.v.* Anchiale.

² 1 Timothy i. 4.

tion, of government, and also of trade on anything except the humblest scale. Those who learned to read and write, learned to read and write in Greek; and the native languages have left hardly any written memorials. One has to go as far east as Syria and Armenia before one finds any evidence of a native oriental language maintaining itself under Christianity and demanding for itself a translation of the Scriptures. Further west, Christianity came in a Greek garb, and imposed its language on its adherents.

The prosperity, both material and intellectual, of the cities was very great under the kings. As the dynasties decayed, the Romans took over their power, and during the disintegration of the Roman Republic and the long Civil Wars, the cities suffered severely from misgovernment and extortion. But prosperity was restored by the triumph of the new Empire, which was welcomed with the utmost enthusiasm by the Graeco-Asiatic cities. The Roman Empire did not, as a rule, need to found cities and introduce new population in order to maintain its hold on Asia Minor. It stood firmly supported by the loyalty of the city population. Only on the South-Galatian frontier was a line of *Coloniae*—Antioch, Lystra, etc.—needed to protect the loyal cities from the unsubdued tribes of Mount Taurus. With that exception the few Roman *Coloniae* in Asia were founded for sentimental or other reasons, as Troas, Parium, Philippi. Names like Claud-Iconium, Claudio-Derbe, have been interpreted as indicating Roman *Coloniae*; ¹ but this is erroneous. Claud-Iconium did not become a *Colonia* before the time of Hadrian. Such titles were a badge of

¹ This error occurs even in the new *Real-Encyclopædie* of Pauli-Wissowa, art. *Colonia*, iv. p. 551: where the only authorities are (1) *C. I. G.* 3993, which is late, and refers to the Ælian colonia: (2) *C. I. G.* 3991, which by its terms (δῆμος) shows that Claudiconium was not a *colonia*: (3) Eckhel's errors. It seems vain to protest against this and other similar blunders, until some German scholar has found them out, after which the world will believe. Meanwhile, every writer takes them on his predecessor's authority.

loyalty and devotion to the imperial policy in those cities, which boasted of their importance in the "Galatic Province."¹

But the history of those cities, and the letters of Paul, show that a very high degree of order, peace and prosperity may result in a thoroughly unhealthy life and a steady moral deterioration, unless the condition of the public mind is kept sound by some salutary idea. The salutary idea which was needed to keep the Empire sound and the cities healthy was what Paul preached; and that idea was the raising of the Gentiles to equality with the Jews in religion and morality.

W. M. RAMSAY.

CYRUS, THE LORD'S ANOINTED.

II.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE GREEK HISTORIANS.

THE first notice of Cyrus in extant Greek literature is to be found in the *Persæ* of Æschylus, "the earliest specimen of Greek history which we possess, though written in verse."² The date of the play is B.C. 473, seven years after the great defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and about sixty years after the death of Cyrus.

In the drama the shade of Darius appears on the stage and narrates the history of the Persian monarchy. After speaking of his Median predecessors he continues: "Third after him Cyrus, a man favoured by fortune (εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ). By his rule he made peace for all his friends, and won for himself the people of the Lydians and of the Phrygians, and harried (ἤλασεν) all Ionia by force, for seeing he was kindly" God envied him not (764-768).

Considering the temper of the Athenian people, the

¹ τῆς Γαλατικῆς ἐπαρχίας, C. I. G. 3886.

² Paley's *Introduction to the Persæ*.

generous way in which Cyrus is spoken of in this passage, and the epithets applied to him, are striking indeed. There was no temptation for an Athenian poet to place the character and achievements of Cyrus in a favourable light. The subjugation of Ionia was in a special degree a dangerous topic, Phrynichus, a contemporary of Æschylus, having been fined 1,000 drachmæ for his tragedy on the "taking of Miletus" a few years previously,¹ this makes the tribute paid to Cyrus the more remarkable. In these few lines the same notes of character are discernible which we have observed in Isaiah and in the Chaldean records. He is *εὐδαίμων*, which we may interpret to mean more than "fortunate," it is the counterpart of "the man of my counsel," or "the Lord's anointed" of Isaiah, it means favoured by heaven as the man "by whose side," according to the Babylonian scribe, "Merodach marched like a comrade and helper" (*Light from the East*, p. 224).

Then he is the peacemaker for all his friends, just as "he is sent to the Gentiles with gracious promises,"² or, to cite again from the monuments, "his great hosts went about harmlessly; the whole land of Shinar and Accad he suffered to have no terrifiers. Within Babylon and all its cities in peace I looked after the sons of Tin-Tir."

The swiftness of conquest so graphically described in Isaiah is signified in two short Iambic lines:

Λυδῶν δὲ λαὸν καὶ Φρυγῶν ἐκτίσας,
Ἰωνίαν τε πᾶσαν ἤλασεν βίᾳ.

Note here the skill with which the poet (with a view to the susceptibilities of his Athenian audience) indicates that the conquest of Ionia was no easy victory, it was not an acquisition (*ἐκτίσας*) like Lydia, but a beating down of resistance (*ἤλασεν βίᾳ*).

Then that kindness of disposition which certainly

¹ Probably in 492 B.C. See Grote, *History of Greece*, iv. 415 foll.

² See heading of Isaiah xlix. v. 5, A.V.

underlies the description of the anointed prince in Isaiah, and is brought out in the monuments in such phrases as: "the nobles rejoiced at his accession . . . their faces brightened . . . they gladly did him homage," is denoted by the Æschylean expression, *ὡς εὐφρων ἔφν*, an attribute which combines the ideas of joyousness and clemency, two qualities which disarmed the envy of the gods and tended to create that attractiveness of disposition, which made even his former foes rejoice at the coming of the Gentile king.

In turning to the account of Cyrus in Herodotus it is impossible to feel that we are reading genuine history. But the aim of this paper is not to investigate the accuracy of the Greek historians, but to show the impression which the character and career of Cyrus made upon the Greek mind. That this impression was at least based upon fact, appears partly from the way in which the character of Cyrus is distinguished from that of his successors, and partly from the consistency of the portrait as depicted by the different Greek writers, and its agreement with the notices in Isaiah and in the Babylonian tablets.

From the first the sense of a mission was present with Cyrus. "For myself," he says to the Persians who were rising against Astyages, "I feel I am destined by providence to undertake your liberation." *αὐτός τε γὰρ δοκέω θεῖν τύχῃ γεγωνὺς τάδε ἐς χεῖρας ἄγεσθαι* (Herod. i. 126). And his conquest of Cræsus was in the Greek conception the accomplishment of a Divine purpose in bringing a long delayed penalty on the house of Gyges, of which Cræsus was the latest representative. The recognition of this by the Greek oracles bears some resemblance to the recognition of his mission by the Hebrew prophets and the Chaldean scribes. The shrewd answers of the Apollo of Delphi or Branchidæ, so far as they were predictive, were undoubtedly based on a very wide and accurate knowledge of events; and the conquests of the youthful Persian monarch and his rapidly

increasing strength were certainly not unknown at these centres of political intelligence. There, at any rate, there was no ambiguity in the meaning of the oracles which foretold the fall of an empire when the Halys was crossed or when a "mule" should reign over ¹ Media.

But besides being the centre of political intelligence and the source of prediction, the Greek oracle was also the conscience of the Hellenic world,² and it was when prediction, coincided with the moral sense of the race, as in the case of Cræsus, that its results were most impressive. It is indeed this religious element which gives the form to history as treated by Herodotus. And on the same lines, but with clearer insight, the Hebrew prophet foretells the doom of Israel or Judah when he sees the approach of the instrument of Divine vengeance coinciding with his sense of the need of punishment.³ The moral cause is at the root; the political condition coincides with it.

Without some recognition of a religious sense or conscience in the nations outside Israel the prophetic appeals to them would have had nothing to start from or to rest upon. The summons to the Gentiles to submit to Jehovah could meet with no response unless the message satisfied the mind and touched an answering chord.

Cyrus then came to fulfil a mission, which approved itself to the religious instinct of the Hellenic race, and at the same time, though he knew it not, to carry out the purpose of Jehovah in bringing many nations under his rule.

The clemency which we have noticed as characteristic of

¹ Herodotus, i. 53, 55. (a) Cræsus having crossed the Halys shall destroy a mighty empire. (b) When a mule is monarch of Media . . . haste away nor blush to behave like a coward. The "mule" is explained to refer to the mixed Median and Persian descent of Cyrus.

² See for instance the answers to Glaucus in regard to money entrusted to his care, and to the people of Cymé respecting the betrayal of Paktyas. Herodotus, vi. 86; i. 158 foll.

³ See G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, i. 152.

Cyrus appears in his magnanimity and consideration in dealing with Crœsus,¹ and in his treatment of the Ionian Greeks. Conqueror though he was, and enslaver of many of their cities, he was remembered by the Greeks as a "father" (ὁ πατήρ) in contrast to the sterner régime of his successor, Cambyses "the master" (ὁ δεσπότης).

Another grand element in the character of Cyrus is implied in the description which Herodotus gives of the race from which he sprang. "The Persians," he says, "think the most disgraceful thing in the world is to tell a lie" ²

Although the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon is a romance and not history, and its subject an ideal prince and ruler, it is inspired by a real personage. The name and reputation of Cyrus suggested to Xenophon the story of a beautiful boyhood marked by unselfishness and a hearty desire to please others, and an after career of wonderful brilliance in peace and war. He is represented as handsome in appearance, quick in learning, educated in a public school (διδασκαλεῖον) in the principles of justice (δικαιοσύνη), self-control and temperance, winning influence and love at every stage of his career, and, when the time came for him to administer affairs and to lead armies, he is represented as the righteous ruler and the humane and generous conqueror.

Ideal though this portrait may be, and unreal many of the scenes and colloquies in the *Cyropædia*, and even the *dramatis personæ*, still the main features of Xenophon's description are entirely consistent with what we know of Cyrus from the Chaldean monuments and the words of the prophet of the exile.³

No doubt legends and imaginary attributes gathered round the name of Cyrus as they gathered round the names of a

¹ Herodotus, i. 90 foll.

² Herodotus, i. 139, where see Rawlinson's interesting note. In the inscriptions of Darius *lying* is taken as the representative of all evil.

³ Whiston, Joseph. *Ant.* xi. 1, notes that Cyrus is called "God's Shepherd" by Xenophon as well as by Isaiah.

Charlemagne or a Barbarossa. "Most of the stories about King Alfred," said Sir F. Pollock in a recent address, "are without foundation. Why, then," he adds, "did the popular imagination attribute a series of acts all praiseworthy to Alfred rather than to any other king?"

The same question *mutatis mutandis* might be asked in regard to Cyrus, and the answer is the same in each case. The details and stories may be false, but the description of the great king who made the epoch is substantially true. It was the astonishing success, the great renown, and the attractive character of Cyrus that stirred the imagination of east and west and gave rise to many legends. His rise and progress seemed to the Greek historian as well as to the Hebrew prophet to be divinely inspired and guided.

The characteristic of Cyrus which especially impressed Xenophon was his pre-eminence in the art of government. "He excelled all other kings," he says, "in his power of ruling diverse nations. Some there were who willingly obeyed Cyrus, though absent from him many days', even many months' journey; some too who had never seen him, and who knew very well that they never should see him, still readily submitted themselves to his government." Although the subject races "spoke neither the same language with himself nor with one another, yet he was able to extend the fear of himself over so great a part of the world that he astonished all, and no one attempted anything against him. He was able to inspire all with so great a desire of pleasing him that they ever desired to be governed by his counsel. He attached to himself (*ἀνηρτήσατο*) so many nations as it would be a labour to enumerate." (Xen. *Cyropædia*, i. 1, Eng. Trans.).

There is no reason to discount this estimate of what may truly be called the imperial gift in Cyrus. It was indeed this astonishing and patent success not only in conquest but in attractive influence and rule that induced Xenophon

to inquire into the antecedents and character of so great a genius. And it is this particular aspect of the work of Cyrus that makes the *Cyropædia* illustrative of Isaiah's picture of the Lord's Anointed. The Hebrew prophet describes the resistless progress of a great conqueror; Xenophon, from an independent point of view, indicates the singular fitness of the unconscious instrument of Jehovah to accomplish His purpose. To the Jew the personal character of the deliverer would be thought a matter of secondary importance. To the Greek historian, if by any possibility he could have known it, the return of the Jews, the scattered remnant of a captive tribe, to their native land would have appeared an incident of no significance for the future of the world. Each furnishes the complement to the other's narrative. In the Biblical account we have the underlying cause of the success which Xenophon records at length. And in the *Cyropædia* there is the sketch of a character which we have a right to assume was known to the sacred writer, and which justifies his enthusiasm.

The mission of Cyrus as liberator of the Jews requires no comment. It is a well understood step in the divine development of history which opened out for the Hebrew race a fresh beginning of national life. His wider mission of conquest and empire is less generally recognized as equally important for the religious future of the world and the spread of Christianity. Before the death of Cyrus his dominions extended from the river Indus to the western coast of Asia Minor, and from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Egypt was ready to fall into his hands, when his career was cut short by a premature death. This vast extent of territory welded into an empire by that marvellous power of governing which, Xenophon notes, was the precursor of the great world powers which successively and in different ways promoted the advance of the kingdom of Christ. Cyrus was the imperial ancestor of Alexander,

Cæsar, and Charlemagne. Each of these great rulers in his own epoch contributed to the work of the larger mission foreshadowed in Isaiah xlv. 1-7. And what is most to be noted is that that larger mission was entrusted not only to Gentiles but to Gentiles of the Aryan or Indo-European race of which the British nation forms a part. The Jews—who belong to the Semitic stock—undoubtedly, and in the first place, were the chosen instruments for the salvation of the world, but the movements, which gave scope for their work, were directed by the great rulers of the Aryan Gentiles.

This fact gives a peculiar interest to the typical aspect of the work and career of Cyrus. Illustration of this kind is perhaps a less usual form of teaching now than formerly; but in the case of this great deliverer of Israel the type is so forcibly presented in the prophetic description that it is in places difficult to separate by a definite line the terms applied to Cyrus, and those primarily applicable to the Messianic King. Like his antitype, the Saviour of the world, Cyrus is the "servant of the Lord," "My chosen in whom My soul delighteth," he is the first "Consolation of Israel," "a preacher of peace," (compare with this the expressions cited from the Chaldean monuments, and the beautiful line in the *Persæ* already referred to: "He made peace for all his friends,") the founder of a kingdom, and above all the "Christ or Messiah of the Lord," the anointed deliverer, the saviour from Babylon, the symbol of iniquity, and the restorer to Sion, the type of righteousness. The typical parallel might be extended to points of character; for we read of a pure, loving, and obedient childhood, and afterwards of a humanity and graciousness quite unparalleled in the conquerors of those days, and of an equitable fairness in judgment, which corresponds with the ἐπιείκεια of the Lord Christ Himself.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE
ROMANS.

VII.

THE NEW LIFE AND THE SPIRIT.

THE conception of the Spirit is by far the most difficult thing to master in the theology of St. Paul. Partly this may be due to the fact that the word is sometimes used in a more popular, at others in a more specific, not to say technical sense; partly to its meaning being determined, here by Old Testament associations, there by the ecstatic accompaniments of primitive Christianity, and yet elsewhere by some Hellenic or semiphilosophic influence; partly to the Spirit's having in one place a physical or hyperphysical mode of manifestation, and in another being purely ethical. But all these difficulties and many others are covered if we say that in St. Paul Spirit is in the last resort coextensive with Christianity. It is one of the ways in which anything and everything Christian can be described—all such things are experiences of a man who is in the Spirit, or who is led by the Spirit, or who walks after the Spirit. To describe them in this way is to describe them by reference to God, or to the Divine power which is their source. Of course God in this case is not conceived abstractly or *in vacuo*; the God whose Spirit is the explanation of all things Christian is the God who has been manifested for our salvation in Christ, and the Spirit to which all that is Christian is due is not an undefined Divine power, it is definitely Christ's Spirit. St. Paul identifies the two, when he says to the Corinthians, The Lord is the Spirit; just as our Lord Himself identifies them, when with reference to the mission of the Comforter, He says, I will not leave you bereaved: I come to you. The difficulty of dealing with St. Paul's mind on this subject is that spirit is not the only term he

uses with this universal scope. Just as everything Christian can be defined in terms of Spirit, when we refer it to God as its source, so everything Christian can be defined in terms of Faith, when it is referred to man's response to God as its condition. It is natural, when we think (as we habitually do) of man's responsibility to God in connexion with the gospel, to put faith in the forefront, and to make the reception of the Spirit depend upon faith, and often St. Paul himself does so. But, on the other hand, it is through the Spirit that the love of God which in Christ crucified makes its appeal to man is shed abroad in our hearts, and to that love faith is only the response. Hence it is hardly real to argue about the relations of faith and the Spirit. They are alternative ways of describing all Christian experiences, according as we regard them as explicable through man's abandonment of himself to God, or through God's gracious and powerful operation on and in man. The only difference, so far as the Epistle to the Romans is concerned, is that Paul gives the primacy to faith in speaking of justification, probably because at the initial stage of Christianity the emphasis has to be laid on the sinner's assuming or refusing to assume, by a free act of his own, the proper relation to God; while a similar primacy is given, when the subsequent life is dealt with, to the Spirit, probably because the dominant consciousness of the believer is that all his experiences now originate in a power which he can only call Divine.

To say that faith and the Spirit are co-extensive terms, each covering the whole area of Christian experience, though looking at it in different relations, is as much as to say that no one could write fully of either without bringing under review all that St. Paul would have acknowledged as Christian. It is not the purpose of this paper to do anything so far reaching, but to examine the subject of the Spirit so far as it is presented in the first eight chapters of Romans,

The one point of supreme importance is, that to St. Paul, as to all early Christians, the Spirit was not a subject of doctrine, but of experience. A doctrine of the Spirit is an anachronism in the New Testament, in a sense in which the doctrine of atonement is not. The apostolic question is not, Do you believe in the Holy Ghost? but, Did you receive the Holy Ghost? To appreciate the experience which the Apostle designates on every occasion on which he uses the word, or indicates that the thought is in his mind, may be difficult, but it is only in so far as we do so that we do anything at all. Of all trivialities which vex the mind of man, few are more distressing than those which are sometimes made to pass muster as a doctrine of the Spirit.

St. Paul first uses the word—in the part of the Epistle which deals with the life of the justified—in chapter v. 5. “The love of God,” he says, “has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to us.” The experience here ascribed to the Spirit is that assured triumphant consciousness of God’s love which enables the Christian to glory in tribulations. It is of God that we have such a conviction about God as this; He has wrought it in us by His own Divine power; we could never have attained it otherwise. The love of God referred to, as the Apostle immediately goes on to explain, is the love manifested in Christ’s death for sinners; it is in making this live, and in enabling us to realize that it is ours—actually bestowed by the Father on us—that the Divine power of God reveals its presence in our hearts. The connexion of ideas here is precisely that which we find in our Lord’s own teaching in John (chaps. xiv.–xvi.). There is no ministry of the Spirit outside of Christ. The Spirit does not speak of Himself. His work is witness bearing, and it is in giving the soul the sense of what Christ’s death means for sinners—in other words, by making the atonement live as the Alpha

and Omega of all we mean when we say God—it is by this, and not by any mystical, blankly or vaguely supernatural process, that He gives us a Divine assurance of God's love.

It is the experimental character of all St. Paul has to say about the spirit which in all probability explains its absence in chapter v. 12–21. In the famous parallel between Adam and Christ we have a theological interpretation of history on the grandest scale; but though there are points of attachment to experience in it—as in the words “all have sinned” in v. 12; or, “they that receive the abundance of the grace” in v. 17—it is on the whole speculative rather than experimental. The Apostle's intellect is stirred by the vast conceptions of the unity of the race in sin and in redemption, in Adam and in Christ, and it is his own experience, and still more his own hope, as a Christian man, which turns the parallel into a contrast, and annuls the reign of sin in the surpassing glory of the reign of grace; but in spite of this experimental prompting, and this Spirit-born assurance, there is something in this passage which is at least as much philosophical as it is divine, and the want of any reference to the Spirit is not surprising.

It is in proportion the more surprising when we find the Spirit absent throughout chapter vi. It may, indeed, be questioned whether it is absent. Does not the use made of Baptism, it may be asked, in the beginning of that chapter, necessarily involve the introduction of the Spirit? Is not the connexion between baptism and the Spirit normal throughout the New Testament, so that whenever the first is mentioned we are not only entitled but obliged to assume the second? Without questioning this in the least, it must be pointed out that it is not on any such relation between baptism and the Spirit that the Apostle's argument proceeds. As has been explained in a previous paper, he refers to baptism, not because it enables him to bring in the

Spirit, but because it enables him to bring out what is involved in faith. The idea underlying all he says is not that baptism brings the gift of the Spirit and so of a divine life which must expel sin, but that baptism exhibits to the very senses the truth that the faith which is declared in it involves a death to sin, with which continued life in sin is irreconcilable. Paul refrains from speaking of the Spirit in this connexion because in the first instance he is not going to speak of the death to sin from the point of view of Christian privilege, but from that of Christian responsibility. This death to sin is involved in faith, the great free act of surrender, on the part of man, to the sin-bearing love of God in Christ crucified; to take this act seriously, to *live* by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved us and gave Himself for us—the whole security of Christian morality lies for St. Paul in that. No doubt he could have put this in another light, and explained the Christian's freedom from sin by reference to the Divine Spirit dwelling in him. But that does not prove that we have a right to introduce the Spirit here, where St. Paul does not. It only proves that he has various ways, which have an independence of their own, of interpreting or rendering the same experience. He can be theological, or religious, in a strict sense, and then he speaks of the Spirit; he can be psychological, or ethical, and then he speaks of faith, or love, or even of gratitude. That in which all his thoughts, and all his modes of expression unite, is Christ. Faith and Spirit alike are words which have no meaning but in relation to Him, and He gives what is to all intents and purposes the same meaning to both. The faith which abandons itself to Christ is at the same time a receiving of the Spirit of Christ, or of what to experience is the same thing, Christ in the Spirit; there are not two things here but one, though it can be represented in the two relations which the words Faith and Spirit suggest. Where human re-

sponsibility is to be emphasized, it is naturally faith which is put to the front ; where the gracious help of God is the main point, prominence is given to the Spirit. But whether we say faith or Spirit, we say something which derives its whole meaning from Christ. It is He who evokes faith, and who in evoking faith becomes a divine spiritual presence in man.

It is the essential relation of the Spirit to God which probably explains the fact that in almost every passage in which it occurs, in the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans, there is a contrast expressed or implied to some condition or experience which is merely human. It has always to be defined by contrast. It is power as opposed to weakness, freedom as opposed to bondage, adoption as opposed to servitude, holiness as opposed to the flesh of sin, life as opposed to death. The very fact that the Spirit is co-extensive with Christian experience makes vain any attempt to be systematic in the treatment of it within narrow limits ; but a survey of the relevant passages in Romans vii. and viii. will serve to bring out those characteristics of Christian experience in which the Apostle was most vividly conscious of the presence and power of God.

The first is chapter vii. 6 : we serve in newness of the spirit, not in oldness of the letter. The *καινότης*, newness or freshness, is that which belongs to or is characteristic of the Spirit, and in the experience of the Christian it is due to the Spirit. It is because he possesses the Spirit that the Christian does not find the service of God stale. In his pre-Christian days it was otherwise. When God was represented for him by "the letter," there was no freshness in His service ; it sank into the heavy routine of custom, or into a punctilious and scrupulous conformity to law, in which spontaneity, and with it life, was lost. But the Spirit is characterized above everything by moral originality and freshness. Under its influence conscience

becomes not the recorder, nor the avenging angel, nor the worm that never dies, but a kind of *genius*; the moral world becomes all of a sudden vast, real, enchanting. In a higher sense than that of the Psalmist the word comes true, "Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, they are created, and Thou renewest the face of the ground."

When we consider the contrast in this passage between spirit and letter, it is a little surprising to find St. Paul say in v. 14: We know that *the law is spiritual*. Law and Spirit, we are apt to think, are mutually exclusive terms. The Christian lives in the Spirit, and therefore he is *not* under the law. But with all his disparagement of the law in certain relations or for certain purposes St. Paul never forgets that the law is of God. That is what he means here by calling it *πνευματικός*. It is spiritual in its essence, though not in its form, and hence there can be none but a spiritual fulfilment of it. A creature like man, who is *σάρκινος*—a creature of flesh sold under sin—can make nothing of it. If his vocation is expressed in the law, then his nature stands in no proper proportion to his vocation; the position is one in which he is doomed to endless defeat. The law which is "spiritual" in essence has its spiritual virtue neutralized by the form in which it addresses itself to man. It may be in itself spiritual, but it does not come to him with the power which properly belongs to spirit. Spirit, according to Paul, is essentially life-giving (*ζωοποιούν*): but, as he says elsewhere, no such thing has been given as a law able to give life (*νόμος δυνάμενος ζωοποιήσαι*, Gal. iii. 21). Had there been such a thing, had there been a law which brought along with it the power to fulfil its own requirements—in other words, had there been a law which was "spiritual" in the full sense of the term—righteousness would no doubt have come by it; man would not have been left to fulfil his vocation alone; as it rose before his mind the power of God would have

risen simultaneously in his heart to realize it. But with all his recognition of the fact that the law came from God and enshrined His will, St. Paul had no experience of this kind to connect with it; life under the law, spiritual as he acknowledged the law to be, and delighting in it as he did "after the inner man," had been for him a life of uninterrupted frustration, ending in despair; all his experience of Spirit as the divine power through which the law is accomplished dates from his acquaintance with Christ.

This is the point to which we are brought at the beginning of chapter viii. The Spirit is here described in *v.* 2 as "the Spirit of life," or perhaps as "the Spirit of the life in Christ Jesus." This latter way of connecting the words, though it is supported only by a minority of scholars (including Pfleiderer and Lipsius), seems to me, grammatically speaking, far more Pauline than the other; but in respect of meaning there is no appreciable difference. When Paul says "the Spirit of life," he has in a manner said everything he has to say on the subject. That the life in question is one with Christ's life is involved in all that has already been said about the relations of Christ and the Spirit. "Spirit," standing by itself, is a blank unintelligible form; whatever meaning and content it has in the New Testament must be derived from Christ. If it is to be characterized as "the Spirit of life," because through it life has come to us in divine power (as it had to St. Paul), then whether the very words of the passage connect that life with Christ or not we can only hold that it is the same life in which the Son of God triumphed over sin and death. And the gift of the Spirit means our participation in His triumph. "The law of the Spirit of the life in Christ Jesus set me free from the law of sin and death."

We have seen already that the Spirit is essentially opposed to anything legal; no contrast in St. Paul's mind is sharper than that of *πνεῦμα* and *γράμμα*, spirit and

letter. Yet the Spirit is not antinomian. There is a *law* of the Spirit. It does indeed transcend everything statutory. To its inexhaustible originality in discovering the will of God all legal enactments are inadequate. But it legislates, nevertheless. It lays down at every moment and at every step the proper course of conduct for man to follow. It can do this because of its relation to Christ. It is His Spirit, and the law of His life is inherent in it. Hence there is nothing mystical in the Spirit any more than there is in the Gospels, nothing in it which opens the door to antinomianism or to moral anarchism any more than there is in the history of Jesus. It is so far from the possibility of any such perversion that justice is done to the law by those and by those only who walk after the Spirit. It is in them that the righteous demand of the law is fulfilled. The law, which is spiritual, never gets justice done to it till man becomes the possessor of the Spirit, and then it gets justice done to it, not by any legal exertions of man, not by "works of law" which he achieves, but by the divine impulse of the Spirit which brings his natural impotence to an end, and carries out the mind of Christ in his life. The just demand of the law, as St. Paul finally puts it, is fulfilled *in* those who walk after the Spirit, *in* them, not *by* them. The sense of debt to God, the consciousness that it is to the life and power He has given that this change is due, is conveyed not only by the reference to the Spirit, but by this self-denying choice of the preposition.

It is not necessary to enter here into an examination of the difficult and complicated sentence in chapter viii. 3. Thus much is certain, apart from details: it is the Spirit which does for man what the law could not do, and the Spirit can only be given through the life and through the atoning death of Jesus. In that life and death the dreadful problem of man's sin was effectually dealt with, and it is on the basis of this effectual dealing, or, to use the old expression, it is on

the ground of Christ's finished work that the divine power is given which brings life and righteousness to men. It brings life and righteousness to men just because the virtue of that finished work is in it; separate "spirit" from this, and it is an empty word; you may say what you please of it, for you are dealing with an unknown quantity in an empty space. All the legitimate meaning of spirit lies in Christ and His atonement, and in the experiences begotten through them in believing souls.

The Spirit, throughout the eighth chapter, is contrasted sharply with the flesh. It is as though the two could not be defined at all except by antagonism to each other. Those who are after the flesh mind the things of the flesh; those who are after the Spirit, the things of the Spirit. The mind of the flesh means death, the mind of the Spirit life and peace. The mind of the flesh means enmity against God; the mind of the Spirit means God's own mind in man. I have explained in a former paper the sense in which "flesh" is to be understood in such passages as these. On the one hand it includes a reference to man's nature, in which there is no special moral emphasis; man as *σὰρξ* is *σάρκινος*, a creature of flesh, a weak and ineffective creature, who has a task before him too great for his powers. On the other hand, it includes a reference to man's nature in which there is a special moral emphasis; man as *σὰρξ* is not only *σάρκινος*, a creature of flesh, but *σαρκικός*, a creature abandoned to the flesh and enslaved by it. "Flesh" not only suggests the inadequacy of his nature to his calling, but at the same time the depravation of his nature through the engrossment and absorption of it all in its lower elements, a depravation by which sin has become virulent and so to speak constitutional in him, so that the disproportion between what he is and what God meant him to be grows continually greater and more desperate. At one point or another, flesh may be used in one or other of these

references mainly, or its meaning may be coloured by the consciousness of both ; but over the whole area in which it can be spoken of it is confronted, defeated, and annulled by Spirit. When God comes to us through the Spirit, all that we were without God comes to an end ; all that we were striving in vain to become for God is assured of consummation. As against the sinfulness of the flesh, the Spirit is a Divine power which ensures righteousness ; as against the death which is all that sinful flesh has to look forward to, the Spirit is the Divine power which brings the earnest of immortality.

To enter into the details by which St. Paul illustrates his faith and experience in this connexion would carry us too far. But it is well worth while to notice the verses (chap. viii. 9-11) in which his whole mind upon the subject is condensed. "*You*," he says to believers, "are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if, as I assume, the Spirit of God dwells in you." "The Spirit of God" is the simplest description which can be given of the Spirit ; it is indeed so simple as to be almost tautological, for the Spirit in experience is nothing but God powerfully and effectively working upon man. But for those who have received the gospel, God is not undefined ; He has been revealed in His Son, and "the Spirit of God," as the Apostle proceeds, becomes almost without his noticing it "the Spirit of Christ." "If any man has not the Spirit of Christ, he is not His." Nothing could show more clearly than this how the Godhead of Christ, as the Lord and giver of the Spirit—that is, of Divine life and power—was assumed by the Apostle. But at the next turn of the sentence, the Spirit disappears, and we come upon "*Christ in you*," which is evidently to be taken as precisely the same thing. Of course Christ *can* only be in us through the Spirit, but it is equally important to remember that that which is in us through the Spirit—the Spirit *of God*—can be nothing but Christ. This Divine

Presence and Power in the soul makes all that is Christ's ours. It does not, indeed, save the body from dying: the doom of sin is not retracted within this area, though it is ultimately reversed. But it is stronger than all the weakness, and than all the badness of human nature. It puts to death the doings of the body. The malignant powers of Sin and Death, which had so long imposed their will on wretched men, are deprived of their sovereignty. The law of God, which is holy and just and good, instead of encountering in human nature nothing but the malignant flesh, which it provoked to greater malignity, or the approving but impotent reason, is borne to its fulfilment on the flood of a new life quickened in the believer by the power of God. If the grave is not shut, it is opened. "If the Spirit of Him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, He who raised from the dead Christ Jesus shall make also your mortal bodies live through His Spirit dwelling in you."

The Spirit is connected with immortality, in the Epistle to the Romans, in yet another way. Not only as a spirit of life, or as the Spirit of Him who raised Christ from the dead and gave Him glory, but as the spirit of sonship, it has this forward look. Sonship, or adoption, of course includes far more than this. It is defined at first by contrast with δουλεία and φόβος, servitude and fear. It is the spirit which breaks out in the loud and joyful cry, unheard from human lips, in the glorious confidence and liberty of the New Testament, till the Spirit of Christ taught it, Abba, Father. But in the filial relation there is an infinite hope, and St. Paul rarely dwells on the one without glancing at the other. "The Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit that we are the children of God; and if children, then heirs." In this sense the Spirit itself is the firstfruits, or the earnest of the inheritance to be revealed. It is not in spite of having it, but because of having it, that Christians sigh in themselves, waiting for the adoption—that is, for

the fulfilment of all it means—even the redemption of the body. The Spirit, in spite of all that is said about its immanence and its essentially ethical character, always represents in St. Paul what we mean by the supernatural. It represents not only what God is as a presence in man, but what God is as a power transcending all that man's experience has yet disclosed. The Spirit is as completely supernatural as the Lord of Glory from whom it comes, and the issue of its indwelling is not only victory over sin, but conformity to the image of the Son. The Spirit is life, and all that is called death is swallowed up in its victory. St. Paul did not and could not make our distinctions between ethical and physical, or ethical and transcendent, or ethical and supernatural, or however otherwise we may phrase them. He did not distribute the working of the Spirit along these as along different lines. For him "spiritual" was a word which had only one synonym—"divine"; and in the Divine will and power, as revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, all such distinctions were transcended. No one can apply them to the manifestation of Christ as that stood present to the mind and faith of St. Paul, and therefore it is equally impossible to use them to any real purpose when we are trying to grasp his conception of the Spirit. Some Christians seem to have the idea that if you ignore heaven you can lay greater stress on holiness; the New Testament does not favour the idea. To St. Paul, at all events, holiness and heaven, the ethical and the transcendent, are one in Christ and in His Spirit; and to an adequate sense of what Christ and His Spirit are—in other words, to an adequate apprehension of the Divine—the mode of being in which Christ now lives and reigns is as real as sanctification; indeed, for St. Paul there is no such thing as sanctification except through a power which is in every sense of the term supernatural. The light of heaven, using the term heaven as a little child uses it, lies on every

particle of genuine Christian morality. And it does so because all such morality is produced by the Spirit of Him who raised up Christ from the dead, and who is making us heirs together with Him.

The last reference to the Spirit in this part of the Epistle is that which connects it with prayer. The new Christian life is a mystery even to him who lives it. There are depths in it which he cannot fathom; he cannot tell whence it comes and whither it goes; sure as he is that it is of God, it brings a vocation and a responsibility with it which exceed his grasp; even when he would commend himself to God for help and guidance he does not know how to begin; his mind will not concentrate itself on anything, and words desert him. This incapacity, which comes with the gift of the Spirit, the Spirit itself relieves. "In like manner the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity; for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." Perhaps there may be a reference in these words to the speaking with tongues, when men prayed in the spirit while the understanding was unfruitful; but I can hardly think so. Such speaking with tongues seems to have been usually of an ecstatic or rapturous character, a thanksgiving to which others might say Amen, or a declaration of the mighty works of God; here, on the contrary, we seem to be in a region where there is not indeed less intensity but surely less liberty in utterance. The only passage in Scripture which occurs to me as a parallel to this is the one in the 53rd chapter of Isaiah: "He shall see of the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied." The prophecy had its supreme fulfilment in Christ, and it is by reference to Christ that we must interpret all that is said of the Spirit. Through the Spirit, as it is spoken of here, we can see something of what Christ's soul travail means. St. Paul knew himself what it was to enter with measureless passionate

sympathy into the difficulties of the new life in inexperienced souls, who were finding the new life itself the most baffling, unmanageable thing in the world. "My little children, of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you." It is this same passionate sympathy with the same baffled inexperience, lost in the very wonder and mystery of that divine life into which it is being initiated, that Paul here, out of his own experience, ascribes to the Holy Spirit of God. Is not such sympathy "the love of the Spirit" (chap. xv. 30), by which most surely "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts" (chap. v. 5), so that, as the Apostle goes on immediately to say, "We know that all things work together for good to them that love Him"? It is through an experience of God's presence and power like this—so intimate, so condescending, so sympathetic, yearning so to take care of us when we cannot take care of ourselves, to inspire us when we cannot think, to intercede for us when we cannot pray, to undertake for us when consciousness and will fail—that we catch something of the breadth and length, and depth and height, and of the love which passes knowledge.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE ROMAN DESTINATION OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.¹

IN supporting elsewhere the Roman Address of the Epistle to the Hebrews, I ventured to suggest that, for reasons inherent in the Epistle itself, we must think not of the great Roman Church as it meets us, for example, in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, but of a smaller Jewish Christian community with an older origin still, and which had continued to maintain an independent existence.² At the time when this was written I had not realized how closely this position corresponded with that advocated by Dr. Theodor Zahn, but now that I have had the advantage of examining his arguments at length in the second volume of the *Einleitung*,³ and the support which more recently has been given to them in the main by Dr. Harnack in the first number of the new *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*,⁴ I desire to restate my argument in the light of their investigations, which, I venture to think, have gone far to settle for good this much-vexed question.

1. In doing so, it is hardly necessary to begin by pointing out that it is upon the internal evidence afforded by the Epistle itself that we have mainly, if not wholly, to rely. The familiar title "To the Hebrews," or, as it was later enlarged, "The Epistle to the Hebrews," formed, as is well known, no part of the original document; and even if it had done so, would in itself tell us very little. All that we can gather from it is that, according to the universal judgment of antiquity—for there is no evidence that the Epistle was ever known by any other name—its first

¹ A paper read before the Society of Historical Theology in Oxford.

² *The Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews* (T. & T. Clark, 1899), pp. 34-50.

³ *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (Leipzig, 1899), ii. pp. 110-158.

⁴ Giessen, J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900.

readers were believed to have been of Jewish descent, a presumption which, as we shall see afterwards, is borne out by the contents of the Epistle itself.

2. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that these readers, wherever situated, formed at least a special Church or community, and that this writing was not addressed, in the first instance at any rate, to Jewish Christians in general (as Reuss), still less to all wavering and dispirited believers (as Biesenthal). For though the want of the customary epistolary introduction (and there is absolutely no evidence that the Epistle once had one which has since been lost) lends a certain amount of support to the latter idea, the writer's own definitely expressed hope in the closing verses that he will see his readers again (chap. xiii. 19-23), and the intimate acquaintance which he shows with their past and present states (chaps. v. 11, 12; vi. 9, 10; x. 32 ff.; xii. 4) go to establish conclusively that he had a definite body of readers in view. No words indeed could better describe the whole character of his book than his own: "*I exhort you, brethren, bear with the word of exhortation (παράκλησεως): for I have written (ἐπέστειλα) unto you in few words*" (chap. xiii. 22).

3. The fact too that this "*word of exhortation*" is evidently regarded as equally suitable for all the readers, and that nowhere throughout the Epistle is there any trace of differences of circumstances or opinions amongst them, points in the direction of the Hebrews having formed, in all probability, a comparatively small body of believers. And the same considerations make it very unlikely that they composed the whole Church in any important sphere of Christian influence. Had they done so, we would surely have had some evidence of such varieties in character and standing amongst them as we find clearly existing amongst the readers of St. Paul's Epistles. Nor is this all, but, as both Zahn (p. 147) and Harnack (p. 16 f.) have well pointed

out, according to all the analogies, both of New Testament and post-apostolic times, our Epistle could hardly have failed to possess a distinctive title and introduction if those to whom it was addressed were the only or main body of Christians in any particular place. Whereas, in writing to a small circle of believers in a town where there were many other such, the writer might quite naturally confine the address to some accompanying private letter, or entrust it verbally to the bearer.

4. On the other hand, there are grave difficulties in the way of thinking of the Hebrews as forming simply a section or party, in the usual sense of these words, inside a larger Church. Had this been the case, the relation in which they stood to the mother Church would surely have been indicated. And we seem, therefore, shut up to the thought of a small independent community or congregation—what Zahn calls a “*Hausgemeinde*,” in a place where there were various other “*Hausgemeinden*” (p. 147), with all of whom it stood in friendly relationship, while retaining at the same time a corporate life of its own, with its own leaders and its own place of meeting. The existence of such communities in the early Church is at least a well-authenticated fact:¹ and not only do the circumstances we have been describing fall in best with the general tone and character of the Epistle, but they throw a new light upon some of its more personal touches. When, for example, in chap. x. 25, the writer calls upon his readers “*Not to forsake the assembling of themselves together*,” the context shows that the reference is not, as is generally thought, to the danger of the abandonment of Christian worship in general, but rather to a growing tendency on the Hebrews’ part to forsake their own particular assembly, with the consequent duties to the brethren who gathered there, in

¹ See e.g. Bartlet, *The Apostolic Age*, p. 467.

order possibly to attend other assemblies of believers.¹ And, again, this same thought of other communities and other leaders undoubtedly lends fresh significance to the emphatically repeated "*all . . . all*" of chap. xiii. 24, "*Salute ALL them that have the rule over you, and ALL the saints.*"

5. Whatever too may have been the case with regard to some of these communities, everything in our opinion goes to confirm the for long almost universally accepted belief that this special community was composed mainly, if not wholly, of men of Jewish descent. In supporting this belief hitherto, too much stress may perhaps sometimes have been laid on such expressions as "*the fathers*," "*the seed of Abraham*," in the opening chapters, or the constant description of the readers as "*the people*," or "*the people of God*," for undoubtedly we find these and similar expressions applied elsewhere to Gentile converts (1 Cor. x. 1; Gal. iii. 7-29, iv. 21-31; Rom. iv. 11-18). At the same time, as bearing out our contention, it is noteworthy that there is no trace in this Epistle of how and when the Hebrews became heirs of the promises made to Abraham, such as we find in the case of the Gentile readers of the Pauline Epistles (Eph. i. 13, ii. 1-iii. 12; Col. i. 21 f., etc.; Zahn, p. 130). Everywhere rather the Hebrews are treated as the direct descendants of those to whom God first spoke in the Old Covenant in a way which, to say the least, naturally suggests oneness of nationality. So exclusively, indeed, does the writer adopt the standpoint of the pre-Christian congregation, that, though he unquestionably regards the work of salvation as extending to all men (chap. ii. 9, 15; cf. v. 9, ix. 26-28), he sometimes speaks as if the death of Jesus only atoned for the sins of Israel (chap. ix. 15, xiii. 12), and as if the New Covenant was

¹ This appears to be the meaning of ἐγκαταλείπειν in distinction to καταλείπειν: see 2 Tim. iv. 10, 16; 2 Cor. iv. 9; Heb. xiii. 5 (Zahn, p. 140 f.).

only intended for members of the Old (chaps. viii. 6-13, x. 16 f.).

Apart, too, from such special indications as these, it seems to us undeniable that only to Jewish readers would an argument based throughout on a comparison between the Old Covenant and the New come home with living force. It may be quite true, as Harnack (p. 18 f.), who here separates from Zahn (p. 129 ff.), has pointed out, that the Gentile, on becoming a Christian, took his stand on the ground of the Old Testament, and that we have no right to set any limit to the extent to which he would work himself into its history. But if so, what special need would he have to be taught that Christianity was better than Judaism? It would be only through his Christianity that he had reached the full meaning underlying Judaism. Whereas the whole argument of our Epistle is plainly directed to show to men, already fully convinced of the Divine purposes of Judaism, how much better is the Christianity which as yet they have only imperfectly apprehended. Probably no one questions the Jewish nationality of the writer (whatever may have been his Hellenistic or Alexandrian training), or the closeness of the relation in which he had formerly stood to his readers, and it seems impossible not to regard his Epistle as the direct personal appeal of one who had himself proved the superiority of Christianity to Judaism, to his believing Jewish fellow-countrymen to rise with him to the full sense of their new privileges.

In these circumstances it is hardly necessary to examine in detail the arguments which within recent years have been put forward on behalf of Gentile readers.¹ They consist for the most part of isolated phrases or expressions in the Epistle, to which we cannot but think a strained interpretation has often been given, and in which even Harnack

¹ They are conveniently summarized by McGiffert, *The Apostolic Age*, p. 467 f.

admits "no absolutely certain proof" of the Gentile nationality of the readers can be found (p. 19). Any proof indeed they do contain as to the readers' nationality seems to us rather to confirm the conclusion at which we have already arrived. For, to mention only one passage on which the upholders of the Gentile address lay great stress, in chap. vi. 1, 2 not only are the "*first principles*" there enumerated equally applicable to Jews as well as to Gentiles, but the plural "*baptisms*" seems expressly used so as to include the various washings which were customary among the Jews along with Christian baptism; and Ménégos has further pointed out that the striking expression "*faith upon God*" (πίστεως ἐπὶ θεόν) implies more readily the idea of continued trust in a God whose existence is beyond dispute, and in whom Jewish Christians had always believed, than the belief in the existence of the true God in opposition to Gentile or heathen idols.¹

On every ground, then, we may take it as practically certain that in this particular the traditional view is correct, and that the first readers of our Epistle were Jews by birth and upbringing.

6. More important, however, than the question of nationality in order to arrive at a correct view of the Epistle's destination is the question of the special circumstances, spiritual and otherwise, of the Hebrews at the time when this Epistle was written. Thus it is not without significance that they owed their conversion not to the Lord Himself, nor apparently directly to His apostles, but to teachers who are described generally as "*those who had heard*" (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουσάντων, chap. ii. 3), that is ear-witnesses of the Lord or His immediate followers, and the truth and accuracy of whose message God had confirmed by signs and wonders. Nor had the Hebrews' conversion been a half-hearted one. On the contrary, their Christian

¹ *La Théologie de l'Épître aux Hébreux*, p. 25.

faith had proved itself from the first in a spirit of sympathy and liberality towards their suffering brethren, a spirit which still continued to distinguish them (chap. vi. 10). And when, apparently not long after their conversion, they had been called upon to face "*a great conflict of sufferings*," they had stood firm amidst reproaches and afflictions, and had taken joyfully even the spoiling of their goods, knowing that they had their own selves for a better possession (chap. x. 32 ff.).

But now in these later days—and the expressions used would seem to imply that some little time had elapsed since their conversion (cf. τὰς πρότερον ἡμέρας, x. 32), though Zahn thinks not so long as to bring us down to a second generation (p. 127)—other and less promising signs had begun to show themselves. Not only had the Hebrews not made the progress that in the time might have been expected of them, but they were actually showing signs of a slackening in their religious zeal, which, if not guarded against, might lead to their falling away from the faith altogether.¹

The Hebrews' danger indeed is often represented in another way, and B. Weiss, for example, still lends his strong support to the view formerly so widely held, that it was apostasy to Judaism with which they were threatened, or, as he expresses it, the finding "their exclusive satisfaction in the Old Testament cultus, which formerly they had regarded as quite reconcilable with their Christianity."² But of this, plausible though at first sight it appears, we can find no definite trace in the Epistle itself.³

¹ "Der Grund christlicher Erkenntniss war richtig bei ihnen gelegt (6, 1 f.); es gilt nur die anfängliche Glaubenszuversicht festzuhalten. . . . Alles was der Vf. an ihnen zu beklagen und für sie zu fürchten hat, ist Zeichen einer Erschlaffung der religiösen Energie, welche ihnen früher und anfänglich eigen war (cf. besonders 12, 12)." Zahn, p. 125.

² *Der Hebräer-Brief*, p. 24 f.

³ "Von einem geschehenen oder drohenden Rückfall der Leser in die Be-

The warnings are all of a more general kind. Not "Misglaube" but "Unglaube" is the threatened peril (Zahn, p. 134); and the writer's whole argument is directed, according to Harnack, "to strengthen Christians who are becoming indolent and languid, and stand in danger through faint-heartedness and lukewarmness of losing all" (p. 17).

Such, then, so far as we can gather them from the Epistle itself, seem to have been the general circumstances of its readers. And combining them, we find that what we are in search of is a small body of Jewish Christians, forming apparently an independent community by themselves in a place where there were various Christian communities. Their conversion, which is referred to as a distinct historical event (*φωτισθέντες*, x. 32), was due to those who had been direct hearers of the Lord or His apostles, and though it was now long past, had not been attended by the progress that might have been looked for. The consequence was that, though at first they had proved themselves steadfast under the afflictions and trials which had been a conspicuous feature of their history, they were losing their former zeal, and were in grave danger of falling away from the faith altogether.

But if this description is correct, it is obvious that many of the destinations often advocated for our Epistle are untenable, or at any rate are wanting in the support that has usually been found for them.

It was the belief, for instance, that the Hebrews must be thought of as, if not actually engaged in the practice of temple worship, at least under its direct influence, that led to the old alternative, Jerusalem or Alexandria, as being the only two places where such temple worship was possible.¹

teiligung am jüdischen Kultus, wovon im ganzen Hb. auch nicht die geringste Andeutung vorliegt . . ." Zahn, p. 136.

¹ So recent a writer as Ayles says, "Here we find the Temple and its ritual

But that, as we have just seen, is to misunderstand the whole situation. Nor must it be lost sight of in this connexion that throughout the writer goes back behind the temple and its services to the "ideal representation of the tabernacle and its worship."

Upon the positive objections to both the Jerusalem and Alexandrian addresses we cannot at present dwell, noticing only that most of the arguments that tell against them tell also against any place in their immediate neighbourhood. And we must pass on rather to point out how satisfactorily the thought of Rome as a destination satisfies the conditions of the problem before us.

Thus not only is there a general consensus of opinion that the Jewish element in the Church of Rome was always particularly strong,¹ but in addition to the Pauline Christianity represented by the recipients of St. Paul's great Epistle, there is good reason for believing, "rather on general grounds than on definite historical evidence, that Jewish types of Christianity, one or more, had likewise their representatives."² Nor is this all, but in Rome we have direct proof of the existence of such "House-Communities" as our Epistle presupposes. In the closing chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, for example, St. Paul mentions three such; and perhaps the most interesting, as it is the most novel, part of Harnack's paper already referred to is the way in which he identifies the Hebrew circle with one of these, and finds in its joint heads Prisca and Aquila the possible authors of our Epistle. This, however, is to go further than the available evidence will permit us; and all that we can safely affirm is that in Rome there

and its services overshadowing everything." *Destination, Date, and Authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Lond., 1899), p. 11.

¹ See a striking quotation from Ambrosiaster in Sanday and Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans*, p. xxv. f.

² Hort, *Prolegomena to St. Paul's Epistles to the Romans and the Ephesians*, p. 18.

were such Jewish-Christian communities as the one we are in search of, and that even the strange title "To the Hebrews" receives a certain amount of confirmation, though this is not a point to be pressed, from the presence in Rome of a συναγωγή Αἰβρέων.¹

The account too of the Hebrews' conversion in chap. ii. 3 corresponds with what is generally believed to have been the method of the introduction of Christianity into Rome, namely, "a process of quiet and as it were fortuitous filtration" ² of believers from different parts, amongst whom we may perhaps reckon the "*sojourners from Rome, both Jews and proselytes*," who owed their own conversion to St. Peter's address on the day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 10). If, indeed, we could think of these as the actual founders of the little community of which we are thinking, the imperfect acquaintance with Christianity, which alone they would be able to gather in their own hurried visit to Jerusalem,³ would go far to explain the corresponding ignorance of the deeper aspects of their new faith, which plainly existed amongst the Hebrews, and which it was the great object of this Epistle to dispel.

We are not, however, left to generalities such as these in seeking to establish the Roman address of our Epistle. There are not a few particulars connected with it to which the thought of that address alone lends a full significance. They have been frequently stated, and it is not necessary to do much more than recapitulate them.⁴

1. We have unmistakable evidence from the Epistle of

¹ Schürer, *Hist. of Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, E. Tr., Div. II., vol. ii. p. 248; and see Note by Nestle in *The Expository Times*, x. p. 422.

² Hort, *ut sup.*, p. 9.

³ Sanday and Headlam, *ut sup.*, p. xxviii.

⁴ The Roman address was first proposed by Wetstein in 1752, and since then has gained the support in various forms of Holtzmann, Kurtz, Mangold, Schenkel, Zahn, and Harnack in Germany, of Renan and Réville in France, and of Alford in England.

Clement that our Epistle was well known in Rome before the end of the first century.¹ And to this may be added the fact that the Roman Church preserved the correct tradition that the Epistle was not written by St. Paul.²

2. The liberality for which the Hebrews were distinguished (chap. vi. 10), and the repeated exhortations on the writer's part that this should continue (chap. xiii. 1, 2, 5), are not only very applicable to the inhabitants of a wealthy town like Rome, but correspond with what we know from other sources to have been the spirit of the early Roman Church.³

3. The "*great conflict of sufferings*" which the Hebrews had already endured (chap. x. 32 ff.), and which apparently were again impending (chap. x. 25, xii. 4 ff., 26 f., xiii. 13), point to persecutions at the hand of heathen persecutors rather than of their unbelieving fellow-countrymen, and find a full explanation in the Claudian or Neronian persecutions in Rome, according to the view taken of the date of writing.⁴

4. Several of the personal allusions and greetings—and in an Epistle where there are so few of these, each one carries weight—are best understood in the light of the Roman address. (a) The unusual title, for example, of οἱ ἡγούμενοι for the heads of the Church (chap. xiii. 7, 17, 24) was customary apparently in the Roman assembly, to judge from the Epistle of Clement, and from the use of προηγούμενοι by Hermas (Harnack, p. 20 f.). (b) The mention of Timothy in chap. xiii. 23 is at once explicable if we think of Rome where he was already well known, while we have

¹ Euseb., *H.E.*, iii. 38.

² This tradition ruled in the Roman Church for 200 or 300 years. Zahn, *Geschichte des Neutest. Kanons*, i. 965 f.

³ Harnack (p. 21) refers, e.g., to Dionysius of Corinth in the letter to Soter.

⁴ The reference to the later persecutions is generally upheld; but for considerations pointing rather to the earlier date, reference may be made to the present writer's *Theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews*, pp. 46 f., 51.

no reason to believe that the Church in Jerusalem had any special interest in him. (c) And most striking perhaps of all, the salutation in the following verse, "*They of Italy salute you*" (ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας), now gains for the first time a full and satisfactory explanation. Grammatically, indeed, the words might mean that the writer, writing from some place in Italy, associated with him certain Italian believers in greetings to his readers. But if so, would he not then have specified the particular place from which he was writing, rather than have used such a general designation as "*They of Italy*"? While it is further noteworthy that elsewhere in the New Testament ἀπό, in similar connexions, always denotes absence at the time from the place spoken of.¹ "*They of Italy*"—would this be Italian Christians outside of Italy, who on the dispatch of a letter to Rome naturally desired to associate themselves with the writer in greetings to their fellow-countrymen there. On any other supposition it is difficult to account for their being mentioned at all.

In view, then, of these facts, and the further consideration that, so far as we are aware, no convincing objection has ever been brought against the Roman destination of our Epistle, we may at least, in the meantime, accept that destination as in itself very probable, while it is certainly illuminative in a high degree of the various problems which the Epistle presents.

G. MILLIGAN.

¹ See, e.g., Matt. xv. 1; John i. 45; Acts vi. 9; x. 23, xxi. 27, xxiv. 18, etc.

THE AMBIGUOUS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

By the "ambiguous" I mean that which is essentially doubtful in meaning, so that it cannot be apprehended with any clearness or certainty as a matter of authoritative teaching. It is my object to point out that there is a very considerable element of ambiguity (in this sense) in the New Testament writings. It is a fact which, for reasons which lie upon the surface of Church history, has been disliked, avoided, and practically denied; but it is a fact which nevertheless exists.

It will be well to begin with an example of the simplest kind, which cannot arouse the suspicion or alarm of any, but yet serves to illustrate distinctly enough the assertion made above.

In 1 Corinthians vii. 20-24 St. Paul addresses himself particularly to the slaves who believed in Christ. His general principle is that earthly and temporal conditions are so comparatively unimportant, and have so little to do with our heavenly standing in Christ, that we may practically cease to trouble ourselves about them. We do well, he says, to dismiss the thought or desire of change, to accept our lot contentedly just as it has fallen for us, to find our solace, our ambition, our satisfaction in the heavenly calling. That is, of course, a thoroughly unpopular teaching nowadays; and, indeed, one may quite lawfully argue that it was never intended for times of unfettered political and social freedom like the present. But anyhow, it *was* the general principle commended to all conditions of Christian people by the Apostle, and particularly to slaves. They were not to vex themselves over the (to our minds) intolerable hardships and limitations of their lot; they were, as slaves, to "abide with God," and to find their freedom there. In verse 21 the Apostle touches

upon the possibility of a slave being offered his freedom, or being in a position to acquire it. Such cases must have frequently occurred—frequently enough to keep the hope of freedom alive in the breast of every slave. How was a Christian slave to act in such a case? The Apostle's answer is given in verse 21; but what that answer is no man will ever be able to say, because it is so strangely expressed that it may equally well be read in exactly opposite ways. In the text of the Revised Version the verse is translated, "Wast thou called being a bondservant? care not for it; but if thou canst become free, use it rather." This "use it rather" is, anyhow, an obscure and elliptical phrase: nevertheless the word "but" leaves it sufficiently clear that in this case the Apostle was making a certain concession to the demands of human nature; as though he said, "Do not trouble thyself because thou art a slave; but, of course, if thou hast a chance of becoming free, make the most of that chance." The good feeling and the good sense of every reader will go heartily along with the Apostle's counsel as thus understood. But we have no right to understand it thus. It is at least as likely that the translation given in the margin is the correct one: "Nay, even if thou canst become free, use it rather," i.e. "even if thy freedom be offered thee, stay rather in thy present condition"—a hard saying indeed, but quite in keeping with the whole tone and purport of the counsels given in this passage. If we look at the Greek, as St. Paul wrote it in the hurry of the moment, we see at once that it is hopeless to try and clear it up; it is (to speak quite frankly) so clumsily expressed that no reader now—and, in all probability, no reader then—could ever be sure what the writer meant. There is nothing petulant or irreverent in saying this, because it merely states the facts of the case. A reference to any painstaking and detailed commentary—such as Bishop Ellicott's, e.g.—will show that in point of

fact the precept always has been taken in diametrically opposite senses. If any commentator, after elaborate balancing of arguments and opinions, comes to one conclusion rather than another, it is only because he cannot afford to do otherwise. Were he quite frank and quite untrammelled, he would say, "What the Apostle really meant we have no means of deciding, and my own opinion on the matter (so far as I have one) is really valueless." For anything at all approaching to an authoritative rendering of this particular sentence, *the essential conditions do not exist, and never can.*

It is, then, as certain as anything in literature can be that, in this passage, St. Paul laid himself out to give advice to Christian slaves as to how they should act in a certain contingency; that this advice was, under the overruling providence of God, incorporated in the inspired Scriptures of the New Testament; that, all the same, the advice was so worded that none can ever know what it means.

From this fact—for fact it is, however unwelcome—certain conclusions have to be drawn, since nothing in Holy Scripture is without consequence or without bearing upon other Scriptures. It appears, then, (1) that the Holy Spirit permitted an inspired writer at times to express himself so badly (using the word, of course, in a purely literary sense) that it is impossible to know what he meant to say. This has an obvious bearing upon the true teaching concerning the inspiration of Scripture; it points to a limitation in one direction which ought never to have been ignored. It appears (2) that, from whatever cause, there are matters of real interest to Christian people as to which the teaching of the New Testament is *ambiguous*. Many a Christian slave must have found himself in the position referred to. Many a one must have earnestly desired to follow the apostolic counsel, however difficult, however unwelcome to the natural man. But there was

no guidance for him in the New Testament. Doubtless the Apostle's meaning was clear enough to himself, and because it was so, he vainly imagined that the sentence in which he sought to express it would be sufficiently clear to others. We often make the same mistake in writing. We have every reason to believe that what St. Paul wrote was always as ambiguous as it is now. It was always open to men equally well to read it in diametrically opposite senses. That is disappointing, perplexing; but it is the fact.

There is therefore an element of ambiguity in New Testament teaching which it would be sinful as well as foolish to refuse or to ignore, because the Divine Author of Scripture has scattered manifest proofs and undeniable instances of it up and down the pages of the New Testament. The only question is how far this element of ambiguity extends. Hitherto the tendency, the desire, has been to confine the ambiguous in the New Testament within the narrowest limits possible. It seemed so natural, so right to take for granted that the Christian revelation *must* have an answer—a direct and unhesitating answer—for every question which it behoved the devout believer to ask. One way or another, whatever seemed doubtful at first reading *must* be capable of decisive and authoritative explanation. We cannot sympathize too deeply with those who clung so fondly to this belief; we cannot treat the belief itself too tenderly. Nevertheless, if we take the New Testament as it is and read it frankly, read it in the light of Christian history and Christian faith, we are bound to find that the ambiguous plays a very large part indeed in its teaching.

Let us take, e.g., the answer (which every one naturally demands) to the question, "Are there few that be saved?" It is a question with which our Lord and His Apostles undoubtedly concern themselves, not directly, indeed, or (so to speak) arithmetically, but indirectly and by implication. When we read many of our Lord's sayings, when

we look to the essential elements of Christian character, of regenerate life as set forth in the New Testament, we inevitably say, "Few, indeed—alas! how few." And so it used to be generally understood throughout Christendom. If it is not so now, if the common answer be precisely the reverse, it is not because so many men have thrown aside the authority of the New Testament, it is because they have fastened their attention upon other passages and other lines of teaching therein. The ambiguity is indeed apparent, although in this case it arises, not from the uncertain meaning of a single passage, but from the fact that different passages tell in opposite directions. The effect, however, is just the same. Christian opinion on this subject is hopelessly baffled, and it is equally easy from the New Testament itself to maintain either of two judgments which are diametrically opposed. God has so willed it, and we must so accept it.

A most excellent specimen of the unexpectedly ambiguous may be found in St. Matthew xxv. 31–46. Nothing can seem at first sight more unambiguous than this portraiture of judgment to come. Commentators have, without exception (so far as I know), treated it as if it were perfectly plain and unmistakable. But they have themselves demonstrated how ambiguous it is, because they never can agree on the most crucial point of all—whether it refers to all men, to Christians only, or to heathens only. Every now and then we read an article by some devout and earnest writer who is quite sure that it concerns itself only with the heathen who have not known Christ and have not had the least notion that in showing kindness to the helpless and distressed they were ministering to the Son of God Himself. The arguments for this opinion need not be rehearsed; they are so obvious. But it will not be many weeks before we read another article on the other side, written with equal conviction and learning; and here,

too, the arguments are so obvious ! How *can* we who are Christians give up that parable ? How *can* we renounce the exhilaration, the inspiration of those words, “ Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these My brethren, ye did it unto *Me* ” ? There is, however, no getting rid of the hopeless conflict of opinion, because the reasons on either side are so strong ; and because, even if one can persuade oneself that there really is a certain small balance of probability on one side or the other, such a persuasion carries with it little weight and small enthusiasm. May I not say that, in view of this one fact alone, the teaching of the parable ought not to be pressed in the way it has been ? If I might, I would fain beseech every preacher and every commentator to consider frankly whether he has any right to treat this parable as a picture of the last judgment *when he cannot even say whether it applies to Christians or not !* For whatever opinion he may hold on this subject is simply his opinion, and is in fact quite valueless. No one will ever *know*, because the wording of the parable is thoroughly ambiguous. If any of my readers will grasp this one fact and what it implies, they may the more easily reconcile themselves to the “ theological ” difficulties of the parable—the difficulty, e.g., that it puts forward judgment by works alone without any place being found for faith, and by works of mercy alone without reference to any of the other Christian virtues. They may even come to a devout and blessed conviction that the parable was never intended to let us into any of the inscrutable secrets of the great day ; that it is neither more nor less than our Lord’s way of saying what St. Paul says in a totally different way in 1 Corinthians xiii. One is dramatic, the other rhetorical. In the one we listen to the Master, who uses that amazing boldness of speech and imagery which belongs to Him ; in the other we listen to the disciple, who rises, indeed, above himself, but still remains far more conventional. But both

teach the same thing—the supremacy of love, if any one will please God—and neither teaches anything else. For whatever in the parable seems to portray the actual procedure of the great assize, and to be capable of theological explication in that direction, is hopelessly and intentionally ambiguous, neither has any man ever succeeded in doing anything with it. What our Lord designed to do therewith was (I doubt not) to *create an impression*, to awake a state of feeling, profound, permanent, effective; and this He has succeeded in doing, as only He (and He by His own chosen method) could succeed. He did not *mean* to tell us anything about the last judgment, save that love will somehow be the greatest thing there also; and He *has* not, in fact, told us anything else.

Herein the parable does indeed only conform to the general law of New Testament teaching about the judgment to come. It is a subject (one would have supposed) which, almost more than any other, concerns the child of man as an individual, as a seeker after God. When he shall appear before the judgment-seat of God, to give an account of himself, what will be the grounds upon which he will be acquitted or condemned? Surely the New Testament must tell us *that* at least, unequivocally, unambiguously! And indeed it seems to do so. It reiterates, many times over, that all men (ourselves included) will have to be judged according to their works—will have to receive, by way of a righteous recompense, the things done in the flesh, whether good or evil. This is affirmed blankly in almost all Christian confessions—nowhere more blankly than in the Athanasian Creed, which seems intended to enforce salvation by orthodox belief. No one will have the hardihood to assert that holy living and merciful dealing are co-extensive with orthodox belief; but “they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire.” Does not the New Testa-

ment say so plainly? Yes; but it is also impossible, according to the New Testament. Shall the penitent thief be judged according to his works? Shall the Magdalene receive the things done in the flesh?

Between the saddle and the ground
He mercy sought, and mercy found.

It was a vain and presumptuous epitaph, because no one could possibly know. But it expresses a commonplace of theology which the New Testament does not allow us to contradict. Where, then, are the works according to which such a man shall be judged? All the works he ever did were bad; and yet he himself shall be saved. He *would* have done good works if he had had time, and God, who searcheth the heart, will take account of that. Be it so; but that is not judgment by *works*, it is judgment by *character*—character, which includes faith and hope and love. There is a great deal to be said in favour of judgment by character. If our own tribunals were able to ascertain a man's character as it really and truly is, they would have to acquit or condemn him in many cases according to his character and not according to his works. If a man were convicted of theft, and yet it were shown that since then he had become an honest and upright man, the world would not tolerate his being punished: it would outrage its sense of justice—for the quondam thief who has become strictly honest is another man, and has cut himself off from his own past. Much more do we feel convinced that it is so with God. The truly converted man, even though he be converted in his last hour, being "in Christ" is a new creation: the evil past is blotted out, because it does not in fact stand in any vital connexion with his living self: he cannot possibly pass into the unseen only to be confronted with the crimes of his unregenerate days. In other words, God will judge him not according to his

old works, but according to the new character which the power of Christ has brought to life in him. We all believe that, because we accept the emphatic teaching of the New Testament about forgiveness and conversion; but then it is absolutely incompatible with judgment by works. The incompatibility is well illustrated by the vision of Revelation xx. 11-15. Here also it is asserted that the dead "were judged according to their works," and no exception or reservation is made. But alongside of the books in which the record of their works was written there appears "*another* book, which is the book of life." This other book is *the Lamb's* book of life, in which He keeps the names of all that are really His. And these will all walk with Him in white, no matter what the record of their works may be, for He came to save sinners, and to receive them to His endless joy, even though their turning to Him in true repentance and faith be the last conscious act of their life on earth. Whereto then serve the books in which their works were written? No one can possibly say. So far as we are able to express our thoughts, judgment by character is what we really believe in and expect—understanding by "character" that inmost self, with its deepest springs of feeling and of will, which is capable of such complete and sometimes sudden transformation under the influence of the Divine Spirit; which does, in fact, determine in the long run the whole outward energy of a man's life and action, in whatever sphere. From whichever side, therefore, we approach the subject of the last judgment, we are driven to acknowledge that we know next to nothing about it. The New Testament seems on the face of it to tell us much. But as soon as ever we begin to examine its formulas—even such a simple and familiar one as judgment according to works—we perceive that they are thoroughly ambiguous, because in their literal and ordinary meaning they are absolutely incompatible with the most distinctive teachings of

the New Testament itself. We know that God *will* judge all men in righteousness, in love; we really know nothing more, and no amount of scrutiny will extract anything more from the inspired writings. It is comparatively easy to follow up a single line of teaching in these writings, and by isolating it to present it as something definite and decisive. But that is not really satisfactory. There are various lines of teaching in the New Testament concerning the judgment, and these various lines are not reconciled there, neither can they be reconciled by us.

From a very different portion of the same great field we may take an equally instructive example. What has the New Testament to teach us concerning the infants, the children, the young people, who die before they reach that age (in itself absolutely incapable of being fixed) at which they must be accounted responsible? Half the souls that pass into the unseen belong to this class. What has the Christian revelation to say to them, or of them? Strange as it may seem—strange as it really is—the Christian revelation does not seem to concern itself about them. It addresses itself to grown people, people who are capable of repentance, faith, discipleship, self-restraint and self-abnegation. It does indeed declare in a very touching way the love of God, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, towards little children. It asserts in so many words their close connexion with the kingdom of heaven. That is unspeakably consoling; it is infinitely valuable; it enables us to trust our children with an unhesitating confidence to the loving care of their heavenly Father. But beyond inspiring us with this happy confidence it tells us nothing at all. What becomes of all the children that die we have not the faintest notion; at least, not on any grounds of Holy Scripture. That they become (so to speak) baby-angels; that they remain for ever as immature immortals; that they are perfected through a discipline of unmingled joy and

love; all these are speculations which may be treated with kindly indulgence, but have no basis whatever in reason or revelation. Even the assumption which is (amongst ourselves) almost universal, that all young children, dying, are "saved," is entirely unsupported by Scripture. It is merely a deduction from what is taught us in the Gospels about the Fatherhood of God; just as the old belief, that half the children who died were eternally lost, was merely a deduction from what is taught us in the Epistles about the corruption of human nature and the inscrutability of God's predestination. It is not even consistent—this optimistic assurance concerning the eternal future of infants—with what we have tacitly agreed to believe (for the most part) concerning our own future. If we are to be judged according to *character*, it is certain that children come into the world with character—undeveloped, of course, but still character. The assumption that children's minds are all like blank tablets upon which experience, training, education, influence of others, are hereafter to trace the characters, is one of the most extraordinary blunders ever made. The imagination that what a child becomes is determined by its surroundings and advantages—or disadvantages—is absolutely false to the facts. One may get to know children who have grown up honest, pure, and gentle amidst thieves, harlots and ruffians. One has known, alas! not a few who, amidst the best surroundings, and under the gentlest management, have developed almost every evil passion at a very early age. The Psalmist only uses a pardonable exaggeration when he says of certain children that "as soon as they are born they go astray and speak lies." Much indeed in the formation of character depends (humanly speaking) upon surroundings and education; but even more upon predispositions to good or evil which the children bring with them into the world. But these predispositions are simply undeveloped character; and God,

who readeth the heart, may as much be expected to take account of undeveloped character in the infant as in the old man who is converted on his deathbed. Unless, indeed, we think of the righteous Judge as dealing arbitrarily with His children, we cannot conceive that these little ones, whose moral natures are really so diverse, should be received indiscriminately to the same blissful regions. Almost everything, therefore, which is popularly believed about the future destiny of such as die in childhood must be looked upon as entirely baseless. We know that God loves them; we know that Christ died for them; beyond that the teaching of Scripture is thoroughly ambiguous, because while it tells us nothing definite, it allows itself to be pressed on this side or on that to the most opposite conclusions.

A curious commentary on this ambiguity of the New Testament in the matter of children is the fact that the Church has never known for certain whether they ought to be baptized or not. In the absence of any directions, or even any allusions to the question, in the apostolic writings, Christian people were from the first thrown back upon inference and argument. Without attempting to enter upon the field of controversy, it may be said broadly that the Gospels have mostly influenced people in favour of infant baptism, the Epistles against it. The practice of the Church wavered during the whole of the primitive ages. It would seem probable that many children were baptized from the first; it is certain that after several centuries a large proportion were not; and in both cases the parents were (as far as we know) equally pious and had equally good reasons to urge. If the practice and the precept were finally settled in the one direction, this was done under the pressure of convictions which we have renounced as inconsistent with the general tenor of the Christian revelation. It is a question as to which people may really do

best to conform themselves to the practice which prevails around them. Otherwise it ought to be left frankly open, as it was in the primitive Church. For, when all is said and done, the New Testament teaching about it is entirely ambiguous, partly because it is so strangely meagre, partly because, so far as it speaks at all, it speaks in two opposite senses. I do not write thus to disparage the New Testament: God forbid. It is, no doubt, a part of its perfect adaptation to the highest purposes of religion that concerning so many matters, wherein we look eagerly for information and guidance, it is either quite silent, or else speaks so ambiguously that we are practically left to our own conclusions and our own devices. What we need to do first is honestly and frankly to recognize the limitations which it has pleased the Almighty to set upon His self-revelation in Scripture. When we have done this, we may go on to find out why these limitations are so wholesome and so necessary for us.

RAYNER WINTERBOTHAM.

SCIENTIFIC LIGHTS ON RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS.

X.

“SHOULD SCIENCE DIM THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY?”

THE question I have put at the head of this study is typical of *all* these studies. I am not considering the absolute determination of *any* problem. My object has been to investigate whether the influx of the modern waters has effaced former evidences. I have now come to a department of natural religion which is supposed to have been specially damaged by the inroad of these waves; I allude to that tract of land which Man sees in *The Future*. The Immortality of the soul has been discussed for ages, and the fiercest stage of the battle has ever been in the heart of

each individual man. I do not here come forward to add to the list of combatants. Mine is a humbler aim. I want to ask whether anything has happened to dim the hopes of yesterday. No man can deny that there *were* hopes yesterday—hopes whose light was strong enough to help men to die, and—what is more wonderful—to help men to live. I want to ask if these hopes have been put out. They were lighted before the days of Evolution; has Evolution extinguished them? Do they belong now to a castle in the air, to a palace of fancy, to a conception of Nature which no longer represents the world in which we dwell? The cry of multitudes is, "Our lamps are gone out." The plaint is not that they are inadequate, but that they are extinguished. Hundreds would be abundantly satisfied if they could only be told that the lamps of the world's virgin youth were still available to light them into the kingdom.

I intend to examine some of these old lamps, or rather, I intend to submit to the reader the result of my examination. I, too, have experienced the weight of the problem, and have subjected these lamps to a careful scrutiny. And for my part I have come to the conclusion that *none* of these lamps have gone out. I do not think there is a single star of hope that once trembled in the world's sky which has been extinguished by the supposed shadows of the atmosphere of science; and I will try to state the grounds which have led me to this conviction.

There is, however, a preliminary point which it may be well to consider in contrasting the old life with the new. Have you ever asked yourself whether there really exists in Nature any deathless object, anything which actually bears the stamp of immortality. I believe that this was one of the earliest questions ever put by Man. I think when Man began to speculate about the prospect of the soul's immortality the first thing he asked himself was, Is *anything* immortal? He felt that his cause would be weakened if its

claim were shown to be exceptional: He looked out for something to reveal a parallel. He gazed into the face of Nature with a view to discover aught that could suggest freedom from death or change. I believe that this was the real origin of fetish-worship. Did it ever strike you as strange that the primitive man did not begin with the worship of the golden stars but with the adoration of a little bit of rag or a piece of wood. I take the reason to have been that to his infant eye the rag and the wood seemed more *permanent* than the star. The star appeared to have been blotted out every morning; but morning, noon, and night he had seen the rag and the wood remain. It was a remaining thing he wanted. He sought for something to tell him that in his search for immortality he was not seeking a possession which was outside of Nature, not desiring a boon which belonged not to the universe: He wanted to be able to say, There is a thing which lives without chance of death; why should not I! It was this desire that made him choose the most changeless things as the objects of his reverence. The wood and the rag were the most changeless things. The lowest objects always are the most changeless; change belongs to vitality. Yet the very stolidness of these lowest forms suggested the immortal; and the primitive man bowed down before them.

I believe the same tendency permeates the ancient world everywhere—the search for the changeless as a suggestion of the immortal. It was this which gave the idea of the Tower of Babel. It was this which inaugurated the Pyramids. It was this which initiated the embalming of the dead. It was this, I think, which made the old world greater in sculpture than in either painting or music. Painting seemed too soft an impress to be durable; music was a series of fugitive notes; but sculpture was fashioned in harder mould—this surely would remain.

Now, we know that in none of these things did the

old world find a permanent object. The mummy and the pyramid are still with us ; but no man would now value them as attesting the existence of an immortal element in Nature. In nothing which meets the *eye* does man now admit such an element. When Christianity came, the face of Nature was changed for him. It ceased to suggest the immortal ; it began to suggest the perishable. He no longer thought of "the everlasting hills," nor spoke of "enduring as long as the sun." His motto rather was "change and decay in all around I see." The idea that the visible world had been fixed upon an immovable foundation fell into the background, and its place was taken by the image of a world which was vanishing away. The reaction against Paganism was the reaction against Nature. Men once had found an Immortal Spirit in wood and grove, a Divine Life in plant and tree ; but it was Pagan men who had found it there. Therefore the Christian robbed the grove of its Immortal Spirit, robbed the tree of its Divine Life. He meant to serve his Master by doing so. It did not occur to him that he was in reality mutilating that Master's teaching and dimming that Master's glory.

Yet this was really the effect of the violent reaction. It deprived Man of a secular symbol of immortality. Henceforth he must search for his future by *shutting* his eyes. No more in the *outward* world must he seek a basis for things eternal. The City of God was not here, its impress was not here. The *external* bore not the stamp of the *eternal* ; it suggested only frail mortality. And there came to Man times when he lamented this impoverishment of Nature which himself, not his Christ, had made. There came times when he longed for something of the old spirit—some return of that natural sense of immortality which saw the fadeless amid the mutable, the constant amid the changeful, the permanent amid the perishable. He began to regret that the rock had been lifted from the sea—that he was allowed

to behold in Nature no abiding thing. There was nothing immortal around him. Was he seeking something abnormal, exceptional? Had he no warrant for his hope beyond the fact of his own ambition? Was eternity an unnatural thing, a supernatural thing? Had he no companionship with the visible universe in aspiring to a possession which would not pass away?

Such is the want of the modern man. Has it been met? Yes. But by whom? By the last man from whom we should ever have expected it: by the evolutionist. In the afternoon of the day, in the midst of the world's prose, there has been realized the dream of the heart's poetry—the desire to find an immortal thing. A hand has pointed us to one imperishable object; and it is the hand of Science. Evolution—the doctrine of change—has itself revealed something which changes *not*. That rock in the sea for which we have been looking so long has at length appeared, and the glass which has discovered it is in the hand of the evolutionist. It is to Mr. Herbert Spencer that mainly belongs the proclamation of an eternal life in Nature. He tells us that there is in this universe a Force whose characteristic feature is abidingness or, as he calls it, persistence. In a universe of perpetual changes—changes which the Force itself has generated—it has from all eternity remained unmoved. It has never been increased; it has never been diminished. Its quantity has never varied; amid endless and fluctuating manifestations the amount of its energy is always the same. The waves rise and fall upon its surface, but, alike in rise and fall, its waters have the same measurement. The winds rage and rest upon its bosom, but, alike in their raging and in their rest, the weight of the atmosphere is equal. The passions of the heart sweep and sleep on *its* heart, but, alike in their sweeping and in their sleeping, the pulsations of this mighty Force are neither less nor more.

And so, after all, there *is* such a thing as immortality in the universe ! That is the exclamation which bursts from us when we hear this statement of modern science. Our impression is one of joy. And truly there is ground for joy. For the first time in the record of Man we have received scientific testimony to the existence of an actual immortal life. It is no longer an impression of the savage ; it is a perception by the savant. We are no longer confronted by a poetic analogy, however beautiful. We are brought face to face with an object whose distinctive attribute is that it lives for ever. We had heard before that there was a Being who possessed eternal life ; but we never heard it from science. It is from science we hear it now, and the message makes us glad. It suggests to us that in our desire to be immortal we are not asking a miracle, not seeking a gift unknown to the universe. It tells us that the world in which we dwell is not, after all, such a perishable thing. It informs us that we are environed by something which is *not* subject to change and decay, which is absolutely impervious to death and incapable of seeing corruption. Such a revelation makes us revise our estimate of the universality of dissolution. We feel that, whatever *we* may be, our environment, at least, is immortal. This Primal Force, this Immortal Force, is our real environment ; it not only persists, but, as Mr. Spencer tells us, it is "everywhere persistent." Is it not *something*, that at all events we are breathing an immortal atmosphere, living in an unbeginning, unending sea. No poetic symbol ever conferred the stimulus which has been created by this scientific fact.

We may now begin to examine the old lamps in a better humour. We have received a preliminary encouragement. We have caught sight of that rock to find which our ancestors scanned the sea. It is a veritable rock of ages—not only a symbol, but an embodiment, of immortality. What if, besides being a symbol and an embodiment, it

should be a source of immortality. If it be so near to us as Mr. Spencer says, it might well infect us with its own eternity. Such a thought, I say, puts us in a good humour with modern science; it encourages us to go back and seek the things we believed to be lost. I repeat, then, the question, Are the old lamps gone out? I take them up one by one to examine them, to see if there be any light left in them. Men often speak of their duties to the present and the future; I think one of their greatest duties is to the past. We act for to-day, we plan for to-morrow; ought we not also to legislate for yesterday—to tell which of its treasures is worthy to remain! It may be that the lights in which our fathers trusted may still be visible from the summit of the hill!

The first of these lamps which is supposed to be extinguished by modern science is the value attached to the individual life. Christianity certainly emphasized the value of the individual; indeed, its immediate address is to the soul of each man. We enter its temple one by one, and, as each goes in, the door is shut. The deepest Christian experience is a solitary experience. The man is made to feel that his own personality is of deathless import. He is forbidden, at first, to look around; he is bidden to look within. He is told to measure himself by no social standard. He is commanded at the outset to think of himself as an isolated unit, alone with God. The motto impressed upon him is, "God is dealing with *you*—with you as distinctly as if in all the realms of space there beat no other heart, throbbed no other pulse, than yours." The weight of responsibility which is laid on him is, in the first instance, the weight of his own soul. That individual possession is actually thrown into the balance against the whole material universe, and, with grand dramatism, made to weigh it down, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul!"

To the Christian, then, the greatest proof of immortality was the value of an individual life. It is this value that science is supposed to have depreciated. When Tennyson wrote *In Memoriam* he was conscious of a collision between the old world and the new. They were struggling in his own mind. The old world said, "Your friend Hallam is alive; God is too righteous to leave a soul in the dust." But the new said, "See how careful He seems of the species, how careless of the individual!" That was a typical conflict of the year 1850. It had been a typical conflict of all that century, of all the previous century. Bolingbroke had left to the age the burden of his song; and its burden had been this, "The species is everything, the individual is nothing; God's Providence can only reach the *general* good." That was the legacy which he bequeathed to a hundred and fifty years, and it was still the possession of our country when Tennyson wrote *In Memoriam*.

But since that time something has happened. A new creed has burst upon the world—a creed which has reshaped our conception of the universe. The doctrine of Evolution has been born. And the question is, do we stand any longer in this matter where Bolingbroke did, where Tennyson did? On the contrary, I say that the doctrine of Evolution has given back the old lamp which an intermediate science extinguished. It has in my opinion reinstated the unit on the throne from which the race had driven him. The aphorism which to my mind would express our modern sense of the attitude of Nature would be just the reverse of that on the lips of Tennyson. I would say that in the light of Evolution she seems "careless of the species and careful of the individual." She is careless of species, for the doctrine of Evolution has tended ever more and more to obliterate the *landmarks* of species. It has tended more and more to hide from human investi-

gation the points of difference between race and race, and to bring into prominence the points in which race and race agree. It may be objected that she is here careless of the species, not in the interest of the individual, but in the interest of the whole. But if Evolution ignores specific difference, it is precisely *for the sake of* individual difference. I have already said that the aim of Nature is to carve out the perfect form. But I would here add that with her the most perfect form is the most individual, the most concrete. Hers has been a progress from masses to units, not from units to masses. She has started with the vast, the extended, the undefined, the all-comprehending nebulous fire-mist. From that she has *descended* in search of perfection. Every stage has been a stage of increasing individualism. Each new form is a form that turns more inward on itself. The star is more individual than the nebulous mass from which it springs; it lives a separate life. The plant is more individual than the star; it is more limited in its range. The animal is more individual than the plant; it is less like mechanical things. The man is more individual than the animal; he has peculiarities which isolate him from all beside.

Can we say, then, that Nature is careless of the individual! Would it not be more correct to say that the individual is the main object of her care! Is not her distinctive work an evolution of individualism! Are not the steps, by Mr. Spencer's own definition, steps in diversity, peculiarity—what he calls "heterogeneity!" And what is that but individuality! What do we mean when we say of a man, he has great individuality? Simply that he is marked out from the mass by points of difference, distinguished from the species by something all his own. It is this distinctiveness for which, by the testimony of Evolution, Nature is working, toiling, planning; this is the aim of her life, this is the object of her striving. In the light

of that aim and its results, how can it be said that she ignores the part in the interest of the whole.

Those who think that Nature is opposed to the permanent existence of an individual should study carefully the views of one of the greatest of living scientists, Weismann, as he has expressed them in *The Contemporary Review* for October 1893.¹ He has advanced a very remarkable, a very startling theory. It is nothing less than this, that since the beginning of organic life up to this hour there has actually continued in existence a single individual form! Amid the successive changes of species, amid the incessant variations of types, one tiny concrete object has persisted—deathless, abiding! The thought almost takes away the breath with its novelty, and one requires some time to get accustomed to it. It is so different from our familiar platitudes about the fleeting nature of life that we seem to be transported into the atmosphere of fairyland. And yet the fact on which Weismann bases his theory appears to lead to no other conclusion. How shall I express that fact! The very statement of it is as subtle as any passage of Browning. Instead of stating it, let me try to describe it. Let me attempt to illustrate it by something which is not quite itself, and which is yet so like it as to be more than an analogy; so, I think, shall we best understand the force of Weismann's argument.

Imagine a bit of stick floating in a pool of water. Imagine that this piece of stick were gifted with the power of growth, in other words, that it embodied an inward life. Imagine that one day, after it had reached a certain size, it all at once broke exactly in the middle and became two pieces. Imagine that each of these halves continued that growth which had existed in the whole, until each of them reached the same size which had been attained before

¹ A similar view is taken by Professor Ray Lankester in the article "Protozoa," *Encycl. Brit.*, 9th Edition, vol. xix. p. 837.

separation. Conceive then that with each of them the original process of separation was repeated, and that the two pieces were divided in the middle just as the original whole had been. Conceive that after this second division each of the new pieces again continued the growth, and each again attained the size of the original stick—only to be subjected in turn to an identical process of separation. Imagine that this alternating process of new growth and new division went on through all the ages without break and without deviation, and that at the present moment we saw the stick repeating the circle described a hundred thousand years ago—what would our conclusion be? Would it not be this, Here is an organism which has never seen death, which has no death in the cup of its nature, which exhibits amid the changeful the power of immortality!

Now, in all that is essential, this is no mere analogy; it is a fact. There has really been, there really is, such an organism. There *is* a creature which, as Weismann says, has never seen death! Before the mountains were brought forth or ever the dry land appeared, while yet the earth was only a wide waste of waters, there was formed within these waters a tiny life encased in a tiny form. That life, that form, has never died. Accident has doubtless eliminated many of its offshoots, but the essence of the life remains. It has passed through the experiences of the stick. It has grown to a certain point and has then split into two pieces. Each of these has attained the original size and each has again divided. The process has been repeated from age to age—through centuries, through millenniums. Each division is followed by a growth; each growth is followed by a new division. And all the time, what is it that grows, what is it that divides? It is the original, tiny organism, the one concrete form. It is this which has lived on, it is this which has preserved its con-

tinuity, it is this which has evaded death. Weismann says that, when the creature breaks in two, each part, if gifted with intelligence, would claim to be the original whole, each would point to the other and say, "I am the mother, that is the daughter." What is this but to say that the thing preserved is the individual life!

This lamp, then—the lamp of individuality—has not been put out by science. Science has rather burnished the lamp anew. It has shown that the aspiration of religious faith is no unscientific dream. It has revealed the spectacle of a creature which has escaped death, which has perpetually renewed its days. Is there not in such a spectacle a scientific hope for Man—the scientific suggestion that he, too, may possess an individual principle which the cleavage called death may leave unaffected. This is not an analogy like the simile of the butterfly, not a poetic symbol like the resurrection wrought by spring. It is a sober truth, a prosaic fact; and as such it grounds religious faith upon the ledge of experience. In the following study I shall continue the examination of these old lamps to see whether their light has ceased to burn; in the meantime it is something to know that the light of this first, this Lamp of Individuality, remains undimmed.

G. MATHESON.

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